

JOURNAL
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LETTERS

University of Calcutta


Journal
of the
Department of Letters

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Vol. XXIX

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CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS

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PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY BHUPENDRALAL BANERJEE,
AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

Reg. No. 992 B.J.—April, 1937—r.

CONTENTS

	Page
1. The Study of New Indo-Aryan by Prof. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, M.A., D.Lit. (Lond.) ...	1-32
2. An Introductory Analysis of Dialectical Materialism by Mr. S. C. Sarkar, M.A. (Cal. & Oxon.) ...	1-63
3. Dayārām's Sārādāmaṅgal by Dr. T. C. Das Gupta, M.A., Ph.D.	31-81
4. A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa by Mr. Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, M.A. ...	1-115
5. Romance and Reality in Keats or the Transition in Keats by Mr. Nripendranath Chatterjee, M.A. ...	1-82
6. The Stūpas of Bengal by Mr. Sarasi Kumar Saraswati, M.A.	1-8
7. Early Indian Terracotta Statuettes, translated by Mr. Charu Chandra Das Gupta, M.A. ...	1-6
8. The Viśwanāth Temple at Māribāg, Rewa State, Central India, by Mr. Charu Chandra Das Gupta, M.A.	1-8
9. On the Meteorological Concepts of the Ancient Hindus by Mr. Sures Chandra Sen, M.Sc., A.F.R.Ae.S. (Lond.)	1-12
10. On the Polarity of Thunder-Clouds by Mr. Sures Chandra Sen, M.Sc., A.F.R.Ae.S. (Lond.) ...	1-13



THE STUDY OF NEW INDO-ARYAN *

BY

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The study of Modern Indian Languages as an important branch of Indology has slowly come to be given its proper recognition. Oriental studies in general, and Indology in particular, meant the study of the earlier history and culture of the peoples of the East and of India. The languages which are the vehicles of the earlier phases of this history and culture naturally enough deserved the first consideration of scholars. The attention which so long was concentrated on the ancient and medieval has now extended its scope to the modern as well, as we have realised that history means a continuity in which the past and the present are irrevocably linked and are mutually explanatory of each other. We now know that just as we must study the past in all its bearings to understand the present, so the present must also be known in detail, for then alone we can have light thrown on many an obscure point in the culture of the past which we have taken upon ourselves to investigate. It is with this growing consciousness that, despite a number of apparently revolutionary changes at certain periods, Indian life, like life in most other lands, presents a whole and a continuity from the most ancient period down to our times; that Indology or Indian "Orientalism" as a branch of science is gaining in extent and in chronology. Philology, in the continental sense of the term, meaning the study of culture through

* Presidential Address delivered before the Section for Indo-Aryan Languages at the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, December 30, 1935.

language and literature, still continues to be the main concern of Indology, no doubt, but other connected subjects and other aspects of culture have received a place: not only Philosophy and Religion, which have been a favoured subject with Indian Philology so long, but also Archaeology and Epigraphy, Political History and Historical Geography, Fine Arts and the Exact Sciences, and the growing science of Anthropology which promises ultimately to become all-inclusive. Indian Philology, again, which concerned itself mainly with Sanskrit (Vedic and Classical), has had to extend its scope both before and after Sanskrit—to the pre-Aryan and pre-Dravidian stages on the one hand, and to the Prakrits and Apabhramsas and the Vernaculars on the other. The emphasis on the Indo-Aryan speech *par excellence*, viz., on Sanskrit, is still there in Indology, but the Philology of Non-Aryan is now coming to be regarded as of fundamental value, connected as it is with the Dravidian and Austric bases of Indian civilisation. Other forms of culture which touched the fringe of that of India, or were related to it, or, again, profoundly modified it, or were themselves modified by it, have already been given a recognition, or will in the long run have to be given recognition in a conference of Indian Orientalists, e.g., Iranian and Islamic Studies have already their rightful places as connected fields or branches of Indology; and we shall have ere long to accord a place to Greater Indian Studies as a further branch of Indology. Thus both the scope and the time-limit of Indology have been extended; and the Modern Indian languages are being given a place beside Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit.

In the field of Indology, however, it is Linguistics which still forms the main interest of the Modern Indian languages. The Modern Indo-Aryan languages are a continuation of the Old Indo-Aryan dialectics (as represented by Vedic and Sanskrit) through the Middle Indo-Aryan (Pali, the Prakrits and Apabhramsa). Their study is necessary to complete the picture. They also afford valuable evidence, not of a mere ancillary

character but fundamentally important evidence, about the bases of Indian culture. For the more we are studying the Modern Indo-Aryan languages from point of view of scientific Linguistics the stronger is becoming the case for the presence of a Non-Aryan substratum or basis for New Indo-Aryan: and this substratum is appearing to have been present in Middle Indo-Aryan and even to some extent in Old Indo-Aryan. The evidence of Indo-Aryan Linguistics, working hand in hand with Archaeology, is revolutionising our notions about the character of Indian civilisation—its bases and its affinities. This in itself is one of the unexpected and far-reaching results of Indian Linguistics. The study of the Non-Aryan languages of India, apart from its bearings on the problems of Aryan speech and culture, has its own intrinsic importance as well. Dravidian and Austric as well as Tibeto-Chinese Linguistics are as much Indological studies as Indo-Aryan Linguistics and Indian Archaeology and Ethnology.

In addition to the merely linguistic aspect of the study of Modern Indian Languages, there is the other, broader and more popular aspect of it—the Literary and Cultural. This means the study of these as vehicles of conscious cultural expression, rather than as the result of an unconscious racial fusion and linguistic accommodation. The interest of the latter is primarily for the Man of Science—the Linguistician, and the Historian; while language as the expression of the mentality and culture of a people has an appeal for all. Very few would be moved by the study of the Old Tamil Sangam literature or of the Old Kannada and Telugu inscriptions as documents for the reconstruction of Primitive Dravidian: but many would be attracted by the rich store-house of romance and culture presented by the originality and variety of Old Tamil literature, or by the feast of faith laid out in the poems of Māṇikkavāṣakar, in the *Dēvāram* and in the *Nāl-āyira-prabandham*. Kol (and Austric) Philology has its votaries who would find pleasure in studying the structure of Santali and would revel in the grammar of

Sora (Savara) by Rāo Bahādur G. V. Rāmamūrti Pantulu; but the rich store of Santali and Munda legend and folklore as in the splendid series of Santali texts with English translation published by the Rev. P. O. Bodding (under the auspices of the Royal Frederik University and of the Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture of Oslo in Norway) and in the *Mundari Encyclopaedia* of Father Hoffmann are for all and sundry. So, too, in the domain of Indo-Aryan Philology. The question of the origin of Hindi (Hindustani) and the inter-relation of the dialects of Northern India is exercising a few specialists, but the average individual is more captivated by Kabīr and Tulasī-dāsa as revealers of the eternal spirit of India in its medieval devotional setting, or is more interested in the immediate problem of unifying India by a common national language.

A survey of the study of Modern Indian Languages as a branch of Indology must take into consideration both the aspects of the question—the purely linguistic and scientific, and the cultural and practical.

It is not necessary to enter into old history in this connexion. Suffice it to mention that grammars of some of the standard Modern Indian Languages, with the very practical aim of helping the acquisition of the speech, inaugurated Modern Indo-Aryan Philology. This began from the 16th century onwards, when Roman Catholic missionaries who came in the train of the Portuguese traders and adventurers into India found it necessary to learn Konkani (Goanese), Malayalam and Tamil, and Bengali, in order to be able to preach and convert. Business relations also necessitated the study of Modern Indian Languages: the German J. J. Ketelaer, in the service of the Dutch East India Company, wrote the first European Grammar of Hindustani by the end of the 17th century, which was published only as late as 1743. Then a new era began with the establishment of the English in Bengal. Halhed's Bengali Grammar came out from Hooghly in Bengal in 1778, being the first book in which Bengali type was used: 35 years previous to that, in

1743, Padre Manoel da Assumpção brought out from Lisbon his Bengali Grammar in the Portuguese language, the Bengali words being given in Roman characters following the Portuguese system of orthography. The founding of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 gave shape to the endeavour to know the culture of India and Asia, and this pioneer institution centered in itself the main stream of oriental studies in India for nearly a century. The establishment of the College of Fort William at Calcutta as a School of Oriental Languages for English civilians and other officials coming to administer the East India Company's possessions, and the foundation of the Baptist Mission translating and publishing board at Serampore, similarly gave a great impetus to the study of the Modern Indian languages and literature from the beginning of the last century. The Fort William College is no longer existent, but the patronage by the English Government in India of the study of Indian Vernaculars manifested itself in various ways, particularly by the institution of the *Linguistic Survey of India* under the guidance of Sir George A. Grierson.

The scientific study of the Modern Indo-Aryan languages began over 60 years ago with the pioneer researches of Beames and Bhandarkar, and it was the direct outcome of Sanskrit and Prakrit studies. From Beames, Bhandarkar, Trumpp, Hoernle and Lyall we have come through Grierson and Tessitori to Bloch and Turner and Grahame Bailey and the present generation of Indian workers : and during this period the scientific study of the New or Modern Indo-Aryan Languages has taken a definite shape, and we are now understanding more clearly its implications, while the real character of its problems is becoming clear to us. We cannot of course divorce New Indo-Aryan studies from those of Middle Indo-Aryan (Pali, the Prakrits and Apabhramsa), and the scholars who have specialised in them and are working in Middle Indo-Aryan (I am particularly reminded of Helmer Smith in Sweden and P. L. Vaidya and Hiralal Jain in India) are also working for New Indo-Aryan.

In the study of New Indo-Aryan, we have now come to a point when we can take stock of the advance actually made, as indicating the amount of sure and positive knowledge we have attained to about the nature and history of it. In other words, we can now venture to survey from a distance the broad outline of the structure of Indo-Aryan laid bare by linguistic research, particularly of New Indo-Aryan. Such a structure for better survey should rest on that of Old and Middle Indo-Aryan as its base : and such a survey has already been made and placed before the learned world by no less a personality in Modern Indo-Aryan Linguistics than Jules Bloch. Professor Bloch's recent work, *L'Indo-Aryen du Veda aux Temps Modernes* (Paris, 1934) is a masterly exposé of the development of Indo-Aryan as a whole, from its most ancient documents the Vedas down to modern times. In this work of capital importance he has given the nature of the linguistic data at our disposal, in the Vedic texts, in the literature of Classical and Buddhistic Sanskrit, in the Prakrit inscriptions, in Pali and Prakrit as well as Apabhramsa literature ; and he has posed certain conclusions and opinions regarding the general trend of this development, which are of great interest, although we might question one or two of his views (*e.g.*, the suggestion that the Vernaculars in Ancient as well as Modern India largely remained unconnected with the trend of the national culture); but we have to thank this brilliant leader of New Indo-Aryan Linguistics for his illuminating survey of the whole question of Indo-Aryan through its three periods of Old, Middle and New Indo-Aryan. The rare insight into the facts of the language which is the gift of present-day science and present-day erudition is manifest in every page of the work, which from its nature, is concerned with a large mass of details not conveniently discussable in a general paper. Professor Bloch is inclined to think that inspite of a number of profound local, *i.e.*, non-Aryan influences, Indo-Aryan has not cut itself off from the Aryan speech of Iran and has not differentiated itself strongly from the other Indo-European languages.

The internal strength of the Aryan speech, the prestige of Sanskrit as representing the oldest phase of Indo-Aryan, historical links with the West in ancient and medieval times, and the influence of Persian, have all contributed to guard the native or original character of Indo-Aryan ; while the action of English at the present day is once again contributing to renovate the bond between the more advanced New Indo-Aryan languages and cognate Indo-European languages of Europe—through English influencing the vocabulary and the syntax. Historically, the repeated “strengthening” of the Aryan or Indo-European basis of Indo-Aryan is of course a fact ; but whether that fact has been able to counterbalance the other fact of non-Aryan influences in the transformation of Indo-Aryan is a matter which will remain worth considering by students of Indo-Aryan Linguistics in the future, when we have made further advance in the subject.

For a proper study of Indo-Aryan, we must have all the data available about the living Indo-Aryan languages and dialects. The main facts of the more important of these are known : Hindustani, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Awadhi, Nepali, Kashmiri—these have to some extent been studied. Other Indo-Aryan speeches are slowly being “acquired for science,” through properly linguistic researches being carried on by competent scholars who are native speakers of these. Grierson, Bloch and Turner have given us examples of the kind of work that is required. Dr. Baburam Saksena’s book on Awadhi, we hope, will not be long in coming. This work presents an admirable combination of the phonetic facts of this important form of Gangetic Indo-Aryan (as they are observable by a trained expert) and a rigidly historical presentment of the phonological and morphological facts in relation to the earlier phases of the dialect. A colleague of Dr. Saksena’s at the University of Allahabad, Dr. Dharendra Varma, has just obtained his doctorate from Paris University on a similar work on Braj-bhakha, in some respects the most important speech of late medieval times in

Northern India. Mr. Udai Narain Tiwari, working under Dr. Saksena, has been collecting facts about his own home dialect, viz., Bhojpuriya, and his very fine grammar of this important language of Eastern India is being published in the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*. The *Calcutta Oriental Journal*, a recent entrant in the field of Sanskrit and Sanskritic studies (which has shown great promise and for which we are indebted to the scholarship and enterprise of our colleague in the University of Calcutta, Mr. Kshitish Chandra Chatterji, who has made the field of Sanskrit Grammar his own), is publishing in instalments Dr. Sumitra Mangesh Katre's *Comparative Glossary of Konkani*, a work which will be indispensable in its own domain within the field of New Indo-Aryan lexicography as controlled by the scientific and comparative method,—the most conspicuous example of which is the great *Nepali Dictionary* of Prof. R. L. Turner (London, 1931). Dr. Katre's *Konkani Phonetics* has appeared from the Calcutta University early in this year as *Calcutta University Phonetic Studies* No. 3. Among last year's noteworthy publications on the subject of New Indo-Aryan Linguistics is Dr. Banarsi Das Jain's *Phonology of Panjabi as spoken about Ludhiana with A Ludhiani Phonetic Reader* (University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1934), which gives in an admirable manner the historical development of the sounds of a form of (Eastern) Panjabi from Middle Indo-Aryan. Some important results in the phonology of Indo-Aryan have been propounded in it, relating to the laws of accent, vowel-length and nasalisation. Dr. Jain's *Ludhiani Phonetic Reader*, published in the same volume with the other work, should have been published in the *University of London Phonetic Readers* series, on the general plan of which it has been prepared. The ticklish question of the treatment of the aspirates in some of the North-Western dialects has been taken up by him with conspicuous success. Dr. Siddheshwar Varma's detailed study of the *Phonetics of Lahndi* is awaiting publication for some years past, and it is hoped its printing will be taken in hand soon by the

Asiatic Society of Bengal. Dr. Varma is carrying on his investigations into the Dardic dialects of Kashmir and into Burushaski, but unfortunately this specialised line of research is meeting with difficulty in the matter of publication—the value of his work is appreciated, but financial difficulties stand in the way. Dr. Banikanta Kakati of Cotton College, Gauhati, Assam, obtained his Ph.D. this year from the University of Calcutta on his valuable history of the development of the Assamese language—a very fine and scholarly work which should be published as soon as possible and which will be sure to interest scholars as the most comprehensive work on the Phonetics and Linguistics of this easternmost member of the Indo-European family. My former Research Assistant in the University of Calcutta, Mr. Gopal Halder, whose unfortunate detention by Government is a loss (a temporary one, we hope) to scholarship, has completed the first draft of a comprehensive Comparative Grammar of the Dialects of Eastern Bengali, on which he has been working under considerable disadvantages in the detention camp. This work will mark a distinct advance in our knowledge of Bengali dialectology and of the mutual relations among the dialects.

All the above works recently published or taken in hand in India by trained Indian scholars embody a certain amount of positive result achieved in the noting and scientific arranging of facts. In all this work, the vital thing is that Phonetics is not ignored. Sounds form the basis of human speech, and, as Patanjali observed over 2,000 years ago, it is the sound which is the word. The complexity of human speech sounds, and the various modifications of it as the result of development or of the influence of substrata (not contemplated by the alphabets and consequently so easy to be ignored),—these are now being realised through the establishment of Scientific Phonetics as the cornerstone of the structure of linguistic investigation. In this matter there is room for much work. The various dialects and languages of India present almost a virgin field. Only a corner has

been touched, through some of the more important languages. There is an immense lot that is crying for attention from properly trained workers. For recruitment of workers who would be able to detect nuances of sounds and sound-attributes with a tolerable amount of success, it would be very helpful if we could have Phonetics made compulsory in all higher language courses in our Indian Universities,—at least in connection with the Philology section of the course in a particular language.

Apart from purely linguistic investigation in the New Indo-Aryan Languages published or completed in English, as in the works mentioned above, a considerable amount of very useful work has recently been done in the vernaculars, through the edition of texts and through linguistic and literary monographs, which furnish indispensable material for linguistic work.

The important dialect group of Rajasthan, now overshadowed by Hindi, is slowly receiving attention, at least from an academical interest, from scholars who are native speakers of it. A certain amount of popular literature in the dialects was always available in the bazaars, in cheap editions; and at least one Rajasthani writer made a serious attempt to set up a form of Rajasthani as a literary language, taking its stand beside Hindi: the late Śivachandra Bharatiyā, author of the drama *Kesar-vilās* (Bombay, Karnatak Press, 1916), and other works. After the *Linguistic Survey of India*, the scientific study of Rajasthani owes most to the late L. P. Tessitori, whose *Notes on a Grammar of Old Western Rajasthani* (Indian Antiquary, 1915), will long remain a landmark in New Indo-Aryan Linguistics, and whose Survey of Bardic Literature in Rajputana and edition of two Rajasthani texts pointed out the importance of Rajasthani studies. The *Nāgarī Prachārīṇī Sabhā* of Benares, taking "Hindi" in its popular sense as covering all the Indo-Aryan languages and dialects other than Panjabi, Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya, Bengali, Assamese and Nepali, has made the study of the literatures in the dialects one of its objectives, and we are thankful to this distinguished body of scholars

in North India for a number of valuable monographs on New Indo-Aryan Philology in its journal the *Nāgarī Prachārīnī Patrikā*. In connexion with Rajasthani, mention may be made of Mr. Gajarāj Ojhā's monograph on the *Ḍiṅgal* Dialect (Samvat 1990) and of other articles ; and among the publications of the *Sabhā* we may specially refer to the fine edition, which has come out this year, of the popular romance of *Ḍhōlā* and *Mārū* (*Ḍhōlā-Mārū-rā Dūhā*) edited by Messrs. Rām Sinh, Sūrya Karaṇ Pārik, and Narottam-dās Swāmī. This gives us a good text with variants, Hindi translation, and full introduction, with a good grammar of the language, for which we are very thankful. The study of early Rajasthani literature and the publication of texts may lead to a revival of the language—or of a form of it—as some Rajasthani speakers seem to hope and mildly to strive for : but the position of Hindi amid the diversity of dialects in Rajputana has become so very secure that it does not look as if it will be seriously assailed, inspite of the influence of local patriotism for the local dialects and a local literature. But we cannot be too sure : for scientific or philological research often leads to unexpected results, in both opinion and conduct.

A desire to revive Maithili, an important form of East Indian (Magadhan) speech, appears now to be very keen among a strong group of scholars and others in North Bihar. This revived interest in their mother-tongue, which is a language quite independent of Hindi (under the umbrage of which it now is), and which can boast of a literature as old as any in New Indo-Aryan, is largely the result of the study of Vidyāpati and other old poets of Mithilā whose influence 400 years ago was most effective on Bengali. A chair for Maithili studies has been endowed by the Mahārājā Bahādur of Darbhāṅgā at the University of Patna ; a number of Maithili enthusiasts have caused a fount of Maithili type to be made,—Maithili has so long been printed largely in Devanagari and only to a limited extent in its own alphabet (which resembles Bengali, its sister-script, very much) by lithography. A *Maithilī Sāhitya Parishad*

has been formed, and attempts are being made to induce the University of Patna to recognise Maithili as a vernacular, side by side with Hindi, Urdu and Bengali, as it has already been done in the University of Calcutta.

Tendencies like the above would at first sight appear to be fissiparous, and would be condemned as dangerous for Indian solidarity. It is not an isolated fact in India alone that a language has to suppress itself in favour of a greater and a more widely spread one. Provençal has quietly submitted to French in France ; Catalan, although restive and eager to break away, still continues to submit to the superiority of Castilian in Spain. In matters like this the views of the local intelligentsia have to be respected. Assamese, as closely related to Bengali as Scots English is to Standard English, seeks to maintain its separate existence, although Assamese speakers number less than 2 millions as against the 53 millions and more of Bengali speakers. Maithili speakers number over 10 millions ; and many of them adopted Hindi when Hindi came, as there was no enterprise among Maithili scholars (Sanskritists of the old school who mainly controlled the intellectual and cultural life of the Maithili-speaking masses) to have a Maithili type-fount made, which would have enabled the local alphabet to come to the rescue of the local language. Now they are finding the spirit of literary Hindi rather different from that of Maithili, in grammar and in turns of expression if not so much in vocabulary. Acquisition of Literary Hindi, with its grammatical gender, its oblique forms and its passive construction for the past tense of the transitive verb requiring concordance between the object and the verb in number and gender, becomes a difficult problem with the peoples of the East ('Purabiyās,' Biharis, Bengalis and others) whose own speeches do not possess these niceties. When these are felt as disadvantages, people can be excused if they look wistfully to their own native speech, particularly when its early literary history is as good as that of

any other sister-speech. If we form a just and proper estimate of the position and function of Hindi in the comity of Modern Indian languages, namely, that with most it must be a subsidiary language, we need not feel alarmed at tendencies which may manifest themselves naturally enough. I think it was Rabindranath Tagore who made this beautiful simile, that Indian Culture was like a lotus flower, each petal representing a provincial language and the literature and culture that is embodied in it. Hindi may then be compared to the pericarp of this lotus, round which these petals range themselves: and it would be only marring the beauty of the flower, if, in our zeal for the Common Language, we were to attempt to arrest or prevent the normal growth of any provincial language. The culture of India will be poorer if a future Vidyāpati or Prithwīraj Rāthaud becomes, as he is bound to become, retarded,—as great poetry cannot be easily achieved in a language which is not the poet's very own. The revival of the Maithili script as against Devanagari would appear similarly to be a retrograde step, when the whole of India would like to have a common script. When, however, the script becomes a symbol of a language or of a special type of culture, the speakers of the language invariably fall under the spell of it, and use it for the support of the language: a sentiment which we see working now in Germany, where the German black-letter is now triumphant once again, restricting to some extent the more international Roman.

To return to the question of work in the Indo-Aryan vernaculars that is going on through the various organisations. Like the *Nāgarī Prachārīnī Sabhā*, the *Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Parishad* through its Journal and its publications has for the last 42 years been serving the cause of the Bengali language and literature. The Universities of Calcutta and Dacca have followed suit in becoming centres of research in Bengali. Among recent work done in Bengali, we may mention the attempt carried on through the *Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Parishad* and the University of Calcutta, to establish the text of Chāṇḍīdāsa, the oldest Vaishnava poet of

Bengal (probably 14th century). Mention is to be made of the first volume of *Chañḍidāsa-Padāvali* edited by Pandit Harekrishna Mukerji and myself from the *Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Parishad* and of the edition of the poems by *Dīna Chañḍidāsa* by Mr. Mañindra Mohan Bose from the University of Calcutta. It is now becoming clear that we have certainly two, and probably three poets of Bengal, all named *Chañḍidāsa*, whose lyrics on the loves of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa have become mixed up and whose personalities have merged into one single *Chañḍidāsa* whom we have established as one of the gods of Early Bengali Literature. The resuscitation of the original personalities behind the name *Chañḍidāsa* and the untangling of the knot of their text is one of the problems of paramount importance in Bengali philology and belles-lettres, and is also of significance for New Indo-Aryan studies in general. It seems we have at last come upon the right line of investigation in this matter. Mr. Sukumār Sen of the Department of Comparative Philology in the University of Calcutta has published this year his very valuable contribution towards the establishment of a sound chronology of Bengali Vaishnava lyric poetry (in his *History of Brajabuli Literature*, Calcutta University) which is the first seriously sober history of this important aspect of Bengali literature.

Hindi literature is receiving the attention of critical study more than ever, and in addition to the various editions we have a new history of Hindi literature from Mr. Rāmchandra Śukla. Prof. Kshitimohan Sen of Rabindranath Tagore's institution at Śāntinikētan has published his long-promised study of *Dādū* in Bengali, and this study of one of the greatest mystic poets of Medieval India will be an honour to Indian scholarship. We ought to have more of such works introducing the classics of one Modern Indian language into another. For Urdu, first rate work has been done by Dr. Mohiuddin Qadri and by other scholars of the Deccan, and of the Panjab (like Prof. H. M. Shīrānī, author of *Panjāb-mēn Urdū*). The Deccan writers of Urdu are coming to their own, and their importance in building

up the Urdu (Hindustani) language and literature is gradually becoming recognised. Dr. Qadri's *Urdū Shahpārē* (1929) is a capital work for the Deccan writers, while his work on the Phonetics of Dakni Hindustani (Paris, 1930) shows him as a careful and scientifically trained observer who has made a distinct contribution to Indo-Aryan descriptive linguistics. We want more carefully-edited texts, and notes on texts, of Dakni Urdu writers, preferably with Roman or Devanagari transcription so that a wider circle of linguisticians may put them to use: and only with this material can the problem of the origin of Hindustani be tackled. The question of the basic dialect and origin of Hindustani is one of the unsolved problems of New Indo-Aryan Linguistics, just as the origin and basic dialect of Pali is an unsolved problem in Middle Indo-Aryan. The latter is on the way to a satisfactory solution, thanks to the brilliant initial suggestions of the late Sylvain Lévi and Heinrich Lueders. It seems that the Panjab scholars like Prof. Hāfiz Mahmūd Shīrānī, and Profs. Grahame Bailey and Jules Bloch are right when they emphasise upon the influence of the Panjab in the evolution of this representative language of Modern India.

Linguisticians appear to be more active in Hindi than in any other vernacular. Within a short period, in addition to the works in General Philology and Hindi Philology by Nalinīmohan Sānyāl, Dr. Mangaldev Shastri and Pandit Syāmsundar Dās already in the field, two noteworthy books have recently appeared: the *Hindī-bhāṣā-kā Itihās* by Dr. Dhīrendra Varmā (the Hindustani Academy, Allahabad, 1933) and *Bhāṣā-rahasya, Part I*, by Syāmsundar Dās and Padmanārāyaṇ Āchārya (the Indian Press, Allahabad, Samvat 1992=1935). These excellent books are sure to popularise the study of linguistics among Hindi-users. A similar work composed in a fine style of scholarship is Dr. Mohiuddin Qadri's *Hindūstānī Lisāniyyāt* or Indian Linguistics, in Urdu (Allahabad, 1932).

A work of unique interest for the history of Hindi has recently been brought out from the Viśvabhāratī Institution of

Rabindranath Tagore—the grammar of Braj-bhakha by Mīrẓā Khān (edited by M. Ziauddin, 1935). This work forms part of a Persian treatise on the Hindi (Braj) Language and Writing, Grammar and Prosody, Rime and Rhetoric, which besides treats of the following topics : *Nāyakas* and *Nāyikās* in Braj poetry, Indian Music, Indian Erotics, and *Sāmudrika-vidyā*. It was composed during the reign of Aurangzeb by an Indian Musalman scholar. The section on orthography and grammar are of great value for our purposes, and they constitute the oldest account of a Modern Indian vernacular speech by an Indian writer that we possess. Of special value is Mīrẓā Khān's minutely careful transliteration of Hindi words in Persian, and this portion will help considerably in the study of the historical phonology of the Braj dialect. The grammar portion has been carefully edited in the original Persian and published with an English translation, and I hope the section on Orthography will also be edited and translated by Mr. Ziauddin in due course.

A 'comprehensive historical survey of the language, literature and social life of Gujarat from the earliest times' by Mr. K. M. Munshi, which has been highly praised by competent authorities, is very welcome news for students of Indo-Aryan. We hope ere long first-rate histories of the different vernacular literatures will be available for both the general public and the scholarly world. In this connexion, the small volumes published in the *Heritage of India* series (so far volumes on Hindi, Urdu, Kannada and Telugu have appeared) can be mentioned as being exceedingly useful. Valuable work is unquestionably being done in the other advanced Aryan languages, the results of which will ultimately be influencing Indian Philology.

In the domain of lexicography, we have the most up-to-date etymological dictionary of an Indo-Aryan language in Prof. R. L. Turner's *Nepali Dictionary* (London, 1931) which forms a landmark in Indo-Aryan studies. This great work has been prepared from point of view of Comparative Linguistics of

New Indo-Aryan, and its admirable cross indexes will make the work indispensable for everybody. Sir George Grierson has completed another of his *magna opera*, the Kashmiri Dictionary. Mr. Gopāla Chandra Praharāj's Oriya Dictionary (*Pūrṇa-chandra-Odriā-Bhāṣā-Koṣa*) is another lexicographical achievement which is progressing, four out of the proposed six volumes (completing up to the letter *pa*) being out. The Hindi lexicon, *Hindī-Śabda-Sāgar*, prepared and published by the scholars of the *Nāgarī Prachārīṇī Sabhā* of Benares, has been completed some years ago (1929), and forms a solid testimony to Indian scholarship. The *Chandrakānta Abhidhān*, the biggest dictionary of Assamese (Assamese-Assamese-English) was published in 1933 from Jorhat in Assam by the *Āsam-Sāhitya Sabhā*, and it will be appreciated by all students of Indo-Aryan. A comprehensive dictionary of Bengali (*Vaṅgīya Śabda-Koṣa*), which is more lexicographical than philological, is now being published in parts by Paṇḍit Haricharan Banerji of Sāntinikētan. This represents the single-handed and devoted labours of the compiler for over a quarter of a century, and will be, when completed, the largest dictionary of Bengali and invaluable for its comprehensive registration of words and its full lexical notes illustrated by copious quotations from literature. I understand that a Dictionary of Panjabi has been taken in hand under the auspices of the University of the Panjab. This is as it should be, and in this matter all Universities might emulate the example of Lahore, and of Madras, in taking up the compilation of the proper lexicons of the various provincial Indian languages. The University of Madras and the interested public can both be congratulated on the near completion of the *Tamil Lexicon* (the letter *va* is in progress now), which will long remain of unique value in Indian Linguistics, of inestimable help even for workers in Indo-Aryan Philology. It is a pity that the Madras University Series of Dravidian Studies could not be continued.

In this connexion mention should be made of the very valuable work that is being done for Indian Linguistics by the

Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture (*Institut for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning*) and the Norwegian Academy of Sciences (*Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi*) of Oslo. The former body has been publishing the Rev. P. O. Boddings's series of Santali Texts with English translation in a very fine edition (one volume has been published by the Royal Frederik University of Oslo, in addition), and the latter the Santali Dictionary by the same authority on the language. The Oslo University, Institute and Academy deserve the thanks of all Indologists for this and other ways in which Indian Philology is being furthered by them. Apart from Kol (Munda) studies, which is a province which Scandinavian scholars have made their own, the Oslo Institute has been publishing Dr. Georg Morgenstierne's researches into the Iranian and Dardic languages of the North-West Frontier, a little-known yet very important group of Aryan speeches which would appear to be in their last struggle for existence (barring Shina and Kashmiri). The latest publication of the Institute has been Lt.-Col. D. L. R. Lorimer's work on Burushaski (2 vols., Vol. I Introduction and Grammar and Vol. II Texts, Oslo, 1935). Linguisticians everywhere will feel gratified by these two handsome volumes in which we have a full and detailed account of the grammatical structure and a comprehensive series of texts of this unique speech whose affinity still remains a puzzle, and in which some scholars wistfully hope to find a relic of one of the pre-Aryan, possibly, primitive Kol, speeches of India. Dr. Morgenstierne discusses (in the Preface to Colonel Lorimer's book) the tantalising question of the affinities of Burushaski with the Caucasian languages as proposed by R. Bleichsteiner, and his conclusions are on the negative side: all that he can say, now, even with the rich mass of material presented by Colonel Lorimer, is this: "the whole problem will certainly deserve a renewed and methodical consideration when the Caucasian languages and the connection between their different groups are better known. And if we ever

succeed in connecting Burushaski with some other group of languages, it will be of the greatest importance for our understanding of the early history of Western Asia." In the meanwhile, the well-arranged mass of facts relating to the Burushaski language as it is, running over to some 900 pages, is before workers in Linguistics, to revel in it and to find out something out of it.

Mr. Guillaume de Hevesy, a Hungarian scholar, proposed to affiliate the Kol (Munda) languages with Finno-Ugrian, and he wanted to disprove the existence of an Austric Family of Speeches (with its two main branches of Austro-Asiatic and Austronesian) as propounded by Pater Schmidt. Not being a specialist in Austric and Kol, I do not propose to give my opinion on it, but it appears to me, speaking in general terms, that Schmidt's thesis has not been disproved. M. de Hevesy further created some sensation by suggesting a connexion between the primitive culture of India and that of Polynesia even in the matter of writing, when he presented some 'agreements' between the pictograms of the Mohen-jo-Daro and Harappa seals on the one hand and the figures in Easter Island wooden tablets on the other. Scholars were inclined to accept these agreements, and even one scholar, Prof. Baron von Heine-Geldern of Vienna, found a possible link connecting Mohen-jo-Daro and Easter Island in certain figures (characters) carved on bone from South China. Speculations were rife, but last July when I was in Paris I had the good fortune to meet M. Métraux of the Trocadero Museum who had then recently returned from an ethnological mission to Easter Island and Polynesia, and he totally disproved the alleged agreements between the pictograms from Sindh and the Panjab and the writing on the incised wooden tablets of Easter Island. Figures regarded as those of men in the Easter Island tablets and compared as such with human figures in the prehistoric Indian writing are really (as explained by M. Métraux, following the Easter Island tradition about these tablets) figures of birds. And the comparison between these

scripts, separated by so many thousands of years as well as miles from each other, therefore, is not tenable.

The inter-connexion between the primitive culture of India and that of Polynesia, however, is acknowledged by linguisticians and by ethnologists, and by some Indologists including the late Prof. Sylvain Lévi. In this connexion I cannot help drawing the attention of scholars to a little note published in the *Calcutta Oriental Journal* (a new philological journal referred to before) by Dr. Panchānan Mitra, Head of the Department of Anthropology in the University of Calcutta. Prof. Mitra in *A Vedic Night of the Moon from Polynesia* (Vol. I, No. 10 of the Journal, July, 1934), shows how the Polynesians have a custom of naming each night after the phases of the moon (a custom familiar to the Hindus as counting the *tithis*), and how the Polynesians have equivalent words for *Rākā* (= *Pūrṇimā* or full-moon night) and *Kuhū* (= *Amāvasyā* or new-moon night), which would suggest that the Sanskrit words *Rākā* and *Kuhū* are really borrowings from Austric. It is indeed tempting, although Dr. Mitra warns us against it, to connect Sanskrit *Mātrkā* with the Polynesian (Maori) *Matariki*, the latter word meaning the *Pleiades*, and the former in Sanskrit meaning *mother*: the similarity of the Austric word with the Sanskrit *mātrkā* = 'mother' probably gave rise to the legend of the Six Stars of the *Pleiades* suckling the infant God of War, Kumāra, as his mothers. The fact of an Austric substratum in Indo-Aryan would appear to go back to the Vedic times, as suggested by Sylvain Lévi and others.

Although Ceylon forms a different political administration, the island is really a part of India, geographically and culturally. Ceylon has two languages, Sinhalese and Tamil, and thus linguistically it is a part of both Aryan and Dravidian India. The study of Sinhalese is a part of Indo-Aryan Philology. So far, we had to be content with Abraham Mendis Gunasekara's Grammar, and Geiger's *Litteratur und Sprache der Sinhalesen* and his *Sinhalese Etymology and Maldivé Studies*. Ceylonese scholars have now seriously taken up the study of their language,

and with Government support, the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society has begun to compile and publish *A Dictionary of the Sinhalese Language*, the first fasciculus of which appeared this year. This is a bit of news which will be hailed with real pleasure. There is a strong body of editors (Sir D. B. Jayatilaka is the editor-in-chief, with Messrs. A. M. Gunasekara, W. F. Gunawardhana and Julius de Lanerolle as his associates, and Prof. W. Geiger is the general director : there are other scholars on the Committee, the Board of Editors, and the Editorial Staff). These scholars are also engaged in editing Eḷu or Old Sinhalese texts, e.g., the *Dhampiyā-aṭuvā-Gāṭapadaya*, the oldest prose work in Sinhalese (10th century). For those Indian scholars who are interested in Sinhalese and yet are not familiar with the Sinhalese script, the use of Roman transliterations in the dictionary is a great blessing. This is now becoming the rule in all scientific works relating to Indo-Aryan languages (in recent works on the Indo-European or general philology even Greek words are being given in Roman transliteration, a method which cannot be too highly praised). It is hoped that Sinhalese scholars in editing important early Sinhalese texts would give Roman transcriptions throughout, if they wish their labours to be thankfully utilised by workers in the sister-languages ; and a text like the oldest prose text of Sinhalese (which I understand a young Sinhalese scholar, D. E. Hettiaratchi, has taken up for philological study) edited in Roman characters with a linguistic commentary would be a desideratum.

This brings me to another question, of great future import, as it appears to me, viz., the increased use of the Roman script in philological work, and the subsequent move towards the Romanisation of the Indian languages, which I believe is bound to come ultimately. I have stated in detail my views about the Romanisation of Indian languages in a paper published in the *Calcutta University Journal of the Department of Letters* this year (*A Roman Alphabet for India*), and I shall not repeat them here. I have suggested a Roman alphabet for all Indian languages,

avoiding the use of letters with diacritical marks,—having adopted a system of detached ‘indicators,’ *i.e.* signs placed after a letter, to distinguish, *e.g.*, a long vowel from a short, and a cerebral from a dental. I insist upon the Indian (Sanskrit) order of letters, and on the Indian (Sanskrit) names for them. I believe it is the duty of the linguist in India to give his honest opinion on the question, and I have done it. With the ordinary Roman alphabet, and a few of the Roman letters used upside down, plus three or four special signs (already in use in printing ordinary Roman) placed after the letters, it will be possible to transliterate consistently any Indian language.

The Roman idea is already in the horizon : I am inclined to think it will loom larger and larger, in the long run. There is apathy, there will be hostility, and very bitter hostility at that; but there will be a steady and ever growing support. Sentiment and a feeling of patriotism are the only serious obstacles; but they are great obstacles. It will not do to try to attempt to force matters upon an unwilling people. Through education, the demand for Roman must come from within. I would cheerfully give two generations for that. It must be said that the question of Romanisation is still an academic one; but it is so easy to bring a thing like this from the academy into the street. Quicker than we might anticipate, the matter may become one of practical politics, leaving its academical aloofness or unreality.

An Indianised Roman script would be the most suitable thing for India of the future; but if I cannot have it immediately (and from sentimental reasons even the most ardent supporter of Roman would feel a secret joy if the Indian alphabet, so precious and so old a friend, continued to be in life for a little longer), I would advocate the general adoption of Devanagari for the whole of India, as such a measure will receive the support of a large number of Indians. The present moment is to some extent propitious for such a movement, as Devanagari is associated with Hindi and with Sanskrit. Hindi was born in the

Devanagari script, so to say ; although the adoption of Devanagari as the pan-Indian script for Sanskrit is only of recent origin, not even a century old. The scientific arrangement of the ancient Indian alphabet which is presented by Devanagari (and other Modern Indian scripts) notwithstanding, there are some complications in the Devanagari alphabet as in use in writing and printing at the present day ; and it is well worth attempting to remove these complications, in order to make the alphabet simpler, easier, and more convenient for the linotype. At the last All-India Hindi Literary Conference held at Indore in April 1935 and presided over by Mahatma Gandhi, a Committee was appointed (including the present writer) to devise a simplified Devanagari. Kākā Kālelkar is the Chairman of this Committee, and after some sittings at Calcutta, Bombay and Wardha, a simplified Devanagari is on the eve of being recommended, which has aimed at reducing the number of letters, particularly the conjunct consonants. It should be easy to change from current Devanagari to this simplified Devanagari ; and after it has gained some currency through Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi and Sanskrit, attempts may be made to introduce it to Bengali and the other languages of India.

I now might mention some of our desiderata in Indian Philology, on the two sides of scientific and popular needs. On the first, we ought to have in the first instance as close and accurate descriptive grammars of as many of our Indian languages and dialects as possible. Such descriptive grammars must be preceded by a rigorous phonetic study of the speech concerned. There is no lack of good models : we can at least be guided by the way in which the phonetics of English and other important European languages is being investigated and have been investigated. And in this matter, I would urge most emphatically upon the general adoption and employ of the Phonetic Alphabet of the International Phonetic Association. It is not necessary to dwell on the value of having a set of internationally understood symbols for these elements of human speech—the sounds produced

by the vocal organs ; and the alphabet of the I. P. A. presents, under the present circumstances, the best set of symbols, and the most widely employed. I would also strongly advocate the use of these symbols (comparable to the international symbols for the elements in Chemistry) even in a book on Phonetics or Linguistics written in a Modern Indian language like Hindi, Urdu, Bengali or Kannada.

Experimental Phonetics is a thing practically unknown in India, and it would be very helpful if we could start it in some of our universities. The findings of Experimental Phonetics are a necessary corrective to whatever blunders that frail instrument the human ear may commit in the way of imperfect reception or imperfect discrimination of sounds.

These detailed grammars and phonetic studies are one great need, and for that there is a great demand for workers. There are other problems, which can be met as we progress with our knowledge of details as well as grasp of the wider issues.

On the side of Etymology, there is that question of a large element in New Indo-Aryan which cannot be derived from Indo-European and which at the same time does not possess sure affinities in the living non-Aryan languages of India (including their sisters and cousins outside India). This is the great question of the non-Aryan substratum. Any one who has handled Prof. Turner's *Nepali Dictionary* will feel quite baffled about a great many of his "Indo-Aryan Reconstructions," which are "words of non-Indo-European, uncertain or unknown origin" (pp. 657-660, Index). The line of procedure taken by Prof. Turner in reconstructing the possible Middle Indo-Aryan and Old Indo-Aryan equivalents of a number of unexplained New Indo-Aryan words is in principle the right one, but his resultant reconstructions, and their affinities and sources as well, deserve the critical consideration of scholars ; and it will be long before we come to any satisfactory conclusion, in the matter of both the reconstructions and their linguistic affinities (which for the present are left undecided or unattempted by Prof.

Turner). The non-Aryan substratum in Old and Middle Indo-Aryan is one of the most baffling of Indo-Aryan problems, and is connected also with Austric (Kol or Munda) and Dravidian. We are awaiting the reconstruction of Primitive Dravidian and Primitive Austro-Asiatic for signal assistance in this field. The comparative and etymological dictionary of Old Indo-Aryan (Vedic, Sanskrit) by Dr. Walther Wüst of Munich, which we expect to have soon from the firm of Carl Winter in Heidelberg [*Vergleichendes Woerterbuch des Alt-Indoarischen (Alt-Indischen)*], printing from 1934] will give us in one volume all that can be said about the etymologies of Vedic and Sanskrit words from point of view of Indo-European ; and the work will be of great assistance in discussing the non-Aryan substratum also.

The question of the inter-relation among the various local dialects in Old and Middle Indo-Aryan is of fundamental importance in unravelling the origin of the Modern Indo-Aryan languages and dialects. The Prakrits representing but partially the actual spoken languages, Prakrit evidence is valuable mainly as indirect evidence for dialectal questions.

In this connexion, I would like to draw the attention of scholars to a view put forward by Mr. Manomohan Ghosh of the University of Calcutta that Mahārāshṭrī Prakrit presents a later form of Śaurasenī and is not contemporaneous with the latter, and that like Dakṣiṇī Hindustani of the 16th-17th centuries it was in all likelihood a North Indian dialect of the Second Middle Indo-Aryan stage which came to be employed in literature first in Mahārāshṭra—a view which appears plausible enough (*Mahārāshṭrī, a Later Form of Śaurasenī*, in the *Journal of the Department of Letters*, Vol. XXIII, 1933, Calcutta University).

Pali, Prakrit and Apabhramsa studies are a basis of New Indo-Aryan investigation which is equally important with the study of the New Indo-Aryan speeches themselves. Hence any work done in these has its bearing on New Indo-Aryan Linguistics also. The great Pali Dictionary of the late V. Trenckner is now under publication, in parts, under the editorship of Dines

Andersen and Helmer Smith, and for this undertaking we are indebted to the Royal Academy of Copenhagen, Denmark. After the work of Hermann Jacobi of Bonn on Apabhramsa, the editing of texts has been taken up in India ; Messrs. Dalal and Gune gave a new edition of the *Bhavisayattakaha* (already edited as *Bhavisattakaha* by Hermann Jacobi) in the Gaekwad's *Oriental Series* ; and Dr. P. L. Vaidya (*Jasahara-chariu*, 1931), and Mr. Hīrālāl Jain of King Edward College, Amraoti, Berar (*Sāvaya-dhamma*, 1932 ; *Nayakumāra-chariu*, 1933 ; *Pāhuḍa-dohā*, 1933 ; and *Karakaṇḍa-chariu*, 1934) have given us some first-rate editions of Apabhramsa texts which will have their bearing on the study of New Indo-Aryan. Mr. Hīrālāl Jain has already made a name in Apabhramsa studies ; and the rich store-house of Apabhramsa and other Jain MSS. at Karanja in Berar, first made known to the outside world by the late Rāi Bahādur Hīrālāl and Mr. Hīrālāl Jain in 1926, has been taken up for edition and publication by Mr. Jain and others. The importance of this form of Middle Indo-Aryan which is the basis and the prototype of the New Indo-Aryan vernaculars, viz., of Sauraseni or Western Apabhramsa, and its wide use from Mahārāṣṭra to Bengal immediately before the development of the Vernaculars, are too well-known to scholars to require discussion ; and it is fortunate that the scholarly exploitation of the treasures discovered at Karanja and elsewhere has been enthusiastically taken up by Mr. Jain and others. Mr. Jain's editions are a scholar's work, the delight of all serious students—they present a veritable *embarras de richesses* in a form of Indo-Aryan in which hardly anything was available for study (barring the MSS. in which the texts were locked) two decades ago.

In connexion with Apabhramsa studies as related to those of the Vernaculars, mention should be made of the edition of the *Ḍakārṇava* by Dr. Nagendra Nārāyaṇ Chaudhurī (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1935). This work is in Western Apabhramsa, and was recovered from Nepal in a fragmentary and debased form by the late Mm. Haraprasāda Sāstrī and published by him about 20

years ago. It gives a specimen of Apabhramsa as written by the Buddhists of Eastern India. Dr. Chaudhuri has compared the text with the Tibetan translation and has sought to establish a correct text, with considerable success. A similar attempt was made by Dr. Muhammad Shahidullah of the University of Dacca some years ago when he published from Paris his study of the Apabhramsa *dohās* of Saraha and Kānha, compared with the Tibetan translation for text exegesis. Dr. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi of the University of Calcutta has a similar work in hand, and we hope this edition of further songs and *dohās* in Apabhramsa by Eastern Indian Buddhists will be published speedily, as their printing was taken up by the University of Calcutta some time ago.

The fine edition of the *Pravachana-sāra* of Kundakundāchārya by Prof. A. N. Upādhye of Rajaram College, Kolhapur, is a work for which the editor can be congratulated: Prof. Upādhye has given a critical edition of this important Jaina Śaurasenī text with a valuable introduction embodying a study of the work and of its author's personality, and including a useful note on the language of the work.

There are the bigger issues to decide by toilsome research and by scientific imagination which must be justified by patient recovery of evidence; and there are hundreds of little points to investigate with infinite patience and caution. Herein only specialists can appreciate or criticise each other's work. The joy of scientific work is there; and the satisfaction of some positive result attained, which is the greatest reward of the plodding Man of Science.

But science, particularly a human science like Linguistics, cannot confine itself in its cloistered hopes and endeavours, its failures and successes, which do not have a direct bearing on the problems of life relating to speech and culture which are crying for solution. The linguist must contribute his suggestions for what they are worth.

One such problem is that of the National Language for the whole of India which is exercising us so much. We all agree

that as the outward expression of a common Indian culture and a common Indian geographical and political entity we ought to have a common National Language. The fact of the diversity of languages and dialects has been exaggerated in India. We do not have 200 and odd languages and dialects which are not reconcilable with each other—we have 10 great literary languages falling into two groups, Aryan and Dravidian, *viz.*, the Hindi form of Hindustani, the Urdu form of Hindustani, Bengali, Oriya, Marathi, and Gujarati ; and Tamil, Malayalam, Kannada, and Telugu. Speakers of the other dialects including literary languages of the second order like Panjabi, Nepali, Assamese and Sindhi, and languages which are attempted to be revived once again as literary languages, like Maithili, use or understand one or the other of the above. The lesser known non-Aryan languages of the North are all under the umbrage of one great Aryan language or other. Of these ten literary languages, Hindi and Urdu, forming Hindu and Mohammadan literary styles of the same Hindustani speech, has the widest employ and the greatest importance. Without any propaganda, Hindustani has gradually spread from its original seat in Western United Provinces and Eastern Panjab throughout the whole of Northern India (Aryan-speaking, India), and has further established itself in the Deccan. Speakers of Bengali and Oriya, and Gujarati and Marathi, understand Hindustani easily enough. A great many people in the Dravidian South, particularly in the big towns and places of pilgrimage, also understand and speak it ; and recent nationalistic endeavours through special organisations have helped to spread it further in the South, particularly among the Andhras (Telugus). Now, naturally enough, when we think of a National Language we can only think of Hindustani.

As a matter of fact, Indians all over the country, when they do not use English (or Sanskrit, among a few Hindu scholars and religious men) in talking to a person of another dialect or language (this statement is made with

reservations for South India), use Hindustani. In this way, Hindustani already exists as a current *Lingua Franca*, an *Umgangssprache*, in India. But this Current Hindustani, based on the Hindustani vernacular speech of Western U. P. and Eastern Panjab, is a very simple language, easy to acquire, vigorous and supple, and quite eclectic in its vocabulary. Compared with it, the literary forms of it, *viz.*, Hindi and Urdu, have far greater complications; and these complications, to my mind, are retarding the greater progress of literary Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu). Literary Hindi and Urdu have grammatical gender: *kāgaz* (paper) is masculine, *kitāb* or *pustak* (book) is feminine; *bhāt* (boiled rice) is masculine, *dāl* (pulses) is feminine. They have different plural inflexions for masculine nouns in *-ā* feminine nouns in *-ī*, and feminine nouns ending in a consonant. Nouns and Pronouns have what are known as "oblique" forms or bases, as opposed to the nominative form. Adjectives take an affix *-ī* if the noun qualified is feminine. All this has been simplified in Current Hindustani. The irrationalities of grammatical gender are ignored; oblique forms are optional; the plural is indicated more commonly by composition. The greatest stumbling block in literary Hindustani (Hindi and Urdu) is in connexion with the verb. The past tense of the transitive verb is really a passive form, the verb being an adjective which takes number and gender inflexions in agreement with the object. The verb in the future tense and the intransitive past are adjectives qualifying the nominative, and becomes feminine adjectives if the nominative is feminine. This is quite an unnecessary complication, and popular or Current Hindustani ignores it all. Barring the dialects of the native Hindustani area, and of the Panjab, Rajputana, Sindh, Gujarat and Mahārāstra, and the Himalayan tracts, the rest of India,—Aryan, Dravidian and Kol (Munda)—ignores grammatical gender and the passive construction and adjectival treatment in the verb. Current Hindustani has therefore fallen in line with the speech-habits of three-quarters of India. Even those who have some agreement

in their speeches with literary Hindustani, *viz.*, speakers of Panjabi, Lahndi, Sindhi, Rajasthani, Gujarati and Marathi,—habitually follow Current Spoken Hindustani in talking that language, ignoring its complications, unless they have taken pains to acquire literary Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu). The Dakni form of Hindustani as current in the Nizam's Dominion and other places in the Deccan (as we learn from Dr. Mohiuddin Qadri's book *Hindustani Phonetics*, referred to previously) has leanings towards Current Hindustani, in that it ignores the passive treatment of the transitive verb past, making it active, as in Current Hindustani.

An English ship's officer writes a practical book on Hindustani as used by Indian sailors, and he takes note of this Current Hindustani, mentioning in his grammar the complexities of literary Hindustani (Hindi and Urdu), but using in his dialogues only the simple forms of this language of the "uneducated" classes. (N. Harrison, *A Manual of Lascari Hindustani*, Third Edition, London, 1911). This Current Hindustani, it must be said, is not confined to the "uneducated classes" alone; all people who do not belong to Western U.P. in particular and to U.P., Panjab and Central India towns in general, as a matter of fact habitually speak Current Hindustani. A Bengali or a Mahārāshṭrī, howsoever educated he may be, will use Current Hindustani as a matter of course, unless he has learnt Literary Hindi or Urdu.

This Current Hindustani—it can be called *Bāzār Hindūstānī*, *Chālū Hindī*, *Lōk-bhāshā Hindī*, *Jan-bhāshā Hindī*, *‘Ām Hindūstānī*, *Bōl-chāl-kā Hindūstānī*, or as a pupil of mine, a Musalman of high social and cultural standing from Delhi, Mr. M. Hamidullah, himself an enthusiast for this Current Hindustani as the proper *Lingua Franca* for India, has named it, *Basic Hindustani*—is the *de facto* National Speech of India, the *Rāshṭra Bhāshā* or *Qaumī Zabān* in its own right. In the matter of Vocabulary, Current Hindustani (*Chālū Hindī* would be a good name for it) retains the Perso-Arabic

element naturalised in the language, but borrows freely from Sanskrit, and whenever there is need, from English. The sort of Hindustani that is used in our Hindustani talkies, prepared in the studios in Bombay, Calcutta and elsewhere, addressing as they must do to both Hindu and Mohammadan audiences, show generally this eclectic character in the words employed.

In a paper to the last All-India Hindi Literary Conference held at Indore, I put in a plea for this Current Hindustani, that it be given some recognition in public life. Those who can do so, by all means they should use Literary Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu), as they are doing at present. But all those who cannot, let them use Current Hindustani, which they know and which they have been using in the streets, in the shops, in the *bāzārs*. In other words, as a student of language and a lover of Hindustani (Hindi), I would urge giving official recognition to the simplified Hindustani that is already there as the great popular language of India. In Calcutta we have been thinking of this ; and wherever I have discussed the case for Current or Popular Hindustani, people have agreed that it should be given its proper place in the national life of India. Let this be therefore recognised as the *Chālū Bhāshā*, the 'Ām-Zabān of India, as a younger sister of the more elaborate *Rāshṭra Bhāshā* or *Qaumī Zabān* which is Hindi and Urdu. The Hindi and Urdu streams have their common confluence in the spoken Hindustani of the people ; and the Hindi and Urdu controversy will be solved only through this.

The grammar of Current Hindustani requires to be regulated, and this should be done on the basis of the absolute *minima* of grammatical forms employed in Current Hindustani. The usage of the whole of India should be considered in this connexion. An attempt to regulate or formulate a grammar for this 'Ām Hindūstānī or *Chālū Hindī*, was made by me in my Hindi paper to the Indore Conference. Herein the co-operation of literary men and linguisticians of

different parts of India is needed. The grammar of this Current Hindustani will be on the basis of Hindi-Urdu ; the characters employed in writing it will be Devanagari (the reformed one, preferably), Perso-Arabic, or Roman, according to the option of the writer. We would not then feel a shame to say in a public meeting, *ham kal āyā, ham-lōg kal āyā, wo roṭī khāyā, wo bhāt khāyā, āp-lōg kab jāegā, apnā biswās-kā mutābik calō aur-lōg-kā biswās par hāth mat lagāo*, as we are not ashamed to say in private conversation (instead of the literary and correct expressions *mañ kal āyā, ham or ham-lōg kal āyē, us-nē rōṭī khāī, us-nē bhāt khāyā, āp-lōg kab jāēngē, apnē biswās-kē mutābik calō aurō-kē biswās par hāth mat lagāo*).

Herein, I believe, those who are occupied in the study of Indo-Aryan linguistically can be of some help to the country at large, in rehabilitating its *de facto* common language—Current Hindustani or *Chālū Hindī*.

Linguistics in relation to Indian languages has a great future ; and when the other Indian Universities fall in line with that of Calcutta (where four vernaculars—Bengali, Assamese, Hindi and Urdu—have already been given the status of languages for instruction and examination, with text-books in these languages, for the Matriculation, with the ideal of gradually making the vernaculars replace English in the college classes too), Indian Linguistics and Indian Philology are bound to become two of the major scientific and cultural studies in our country, going hand in hand with the teaching of the mother-tongue and its literature, as well as with higher research.

AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

BY

S. C. SARKAR, M.A. (CAL. & OXON.)

I

INTRODUCTION

This essay in its scope is a historical study and not an attempt at philosophical criticism. The writer has not the equipment for either expounding the technical character, or examining the validity, of Marx's philosophy. But nobody will deny to-day that even for a student of history the proper understanding of recent and contemporary events involves some knowledge of the nature of Marxian thought. The entire Russian development of the present day, for example, is coloured by the conceptions of Dialectical Materialism. "It is not merely a planned economy that Russia is after. Its economic plan is merely part of a wider plan, and is itself dictated by a philosophical theory which covers every aspect of life."¹ As has been repeatedly pointed out, this characteristic is exactly the difference between the experiment in the U. S. S. R. and the talk about economic planning fashionable in so many countries to-day.

Marxism is a term which may be used to denote two things. It signifies in the first place a series of connected political and economic conclusions which define the aims as well as the strategy of the Communist movement. It includes thus the idea

¹ Prof. Macmurray in the Foreword to the Moscow Dialogues, by Julius F. Hecker, 1938 (p. x).

of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the belief in the withering away of the state after the socialist revolution. There have been two interpretations of what Marx really meant, the so-called 'orthodox' Social Democratic and the revolutionary Leninist versions; of the two, the latter is now generally admitted to be authoritative. But this essay is about the second meaning of Marxism which stands for the basic ideas of the philosophy and the outlook underlying the familiar doctrines and conclusions.² Communist writers claim that the essence of Marxism lies in the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism which applied to history becomes Historical Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History.

Among the classics of Marxian literature, works of a specific philosophical character are not numerous³ and many of these are not available in this country. This is also true of the Russian and German commentaries on the subject. But the Marxian point of view can be studied in every book written by Marx, Engels or Lenin. In reply to the question where Lenin had expounded Dialectical Materialism, Stalin is reported to have remarked, "Where and when did he not expound it?"⁴ Recently moreover valuable studies have appeared in English on the Marxist philosophy—notably those by Professor Hook, Dr. Hecker and Mr. J. D. Bernal.

This essay is an attempt to state the Marxian *weltanschauung* on the basis of the current literature. Consequently criticism has been limited only to those points which help the understanding of the different aspects of the subject-matter. Any systematic

² I have summarised these doctrines and the differences between Social Democracy and Communism in an article on the Organisation of the Soviet Power (Calcutta Review, August, 1932) and in a survey of recent Marxist literature in the Bengali Quarterly পরিচর (Jan., 1935).

³ The Holy Family, German Ideology, Ludwig Feuerbach, parts of the Communist Manifesto (these by Marx and Engels jointly)—Poverty of Philosophy (by Marx)—Anti-Dühring and Dialectics and Nature (by Engels)—On Dialectics, and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (by Lenin).

⁴ Quoted in Aspects of Dialectical Materialism, 1934 (p. 122).

refutation of Marxism presupposes a similar study. Unfortunately too many of the critics of Marx tilt only at windmills.

The chief difficulty in the way of understanding Dialectical Materialism is of course to realise the connection between different aspects of the subject. This specially hampers a writer who is outside the movement inspired by, and at the same time acting on, the development of this philosophy. But even amongst the elect there has been a want of unanimity and possibly even the masters of the school had minor differences. This essay may, therefore, very well fall far short of its object.⁵

II

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

1

Dynamic Philosophy

Marx and Engels started their career as Hegelians. The whole body of Marxist thought bears the impress of the ideas of Hegel. The first point to grasp therefore in a study of Dialectical Materialism is the importance of Hegel in the history of philosophy.

The significance of Hegel is supposed to lie in his emphasis on the world being a changing process; the universe according to him is in constant evolution, its character is dynamic. This is called the dialectical outlook in opposition to the static or 'metaphysical' point of view. The older philosophies were metaphysical in this sense because they neglected change and universal interaction in favour of analysis in a static way or abstract isolated examination. Hegel believed that physical nature, social history and human thought are all characterised by dialectic movement. His new logic, therefore, "in forcing its

⁵ I have deliberately adopted the plan of letting extracts from Marxist literature speak for themselves in this attempt to picture the nature of Marxist thought.

way beyond the narrow horizon of formal logic" "contains the germs of a more comprehensive view of the world."⁶ It is claimed that Hegel's logic bears the same relation to formal logic as higher mathematics to elementary mathematics.

Engels declared that "Nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical" and explained himself in the following way:—⁷

"This method of investigation" (analysis of nature into its individual parts) "has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and natural processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and therefore, not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing but as fixed constants; not in their life, but in their death.***To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other apart from each other, rigid, fixed objects of investigation given once for all.***The metaphysical mode of outlook***sooner or later always reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, limited, abstract.***Dialectics***grasps things and their images, ideas" (Engels is speaking here of materialist dialectics of course), "essentially in their interconnection, in their sequence, their movement, their birth and death."

2

Dialectics and Hegel

Originally dialectic meant an art of conversation or disputation. It appears in this form in Greek thought. It had a vulgar use—"to trip up a speaker by showing that the implications of his statements were self-refuting." But in Plato "dialectic is the process of thinking by which the dramatic conflict of ideas is resolved by definition, differentiation and re-definition until one ultimate, luminously self-evident insight is reached in

⁶ Anti-Dühring (Martin Lawrence edition), p. 153.

⁷ Anti-Dühring, pp. 27-29.

which the original conflict of ideas is harmonised.”⁸ This definition, differentiation, re-definition furnish of course the germs of the triadic pattern of thesis, antithesis, synthesis in Hegel. The Greeks believed that the conflict of opposing ideas would lead to the realisation of truth. “The notion***is that one-sided tendencies correct one another, that you get truth from their conflict, for from their conflict you may get a further result which does justice to both.”⁹ The dialectic in the Middle Ages continued to be a form of argument and discussion.

Hegel transformed dialectics and made it the basis of his whole philosophy. The method of realising truth through conflict of opposing tendencies became with him the key to the unfolding of the entire universe which was a reflection of the changing Ideas. Dialectics was now also a description of actual historical development. One tendency calls forth its opposite but from the conflict of the two arises the new force. Hegel of course believed in evolution but his conception of evolution is all-comprehensive and much wider than ordinary theories of evolution. Thus Lenin claims that Hegelian dialectics is “much more abundant in content than the current theory of evolution.”¹⁰

In the sixth chapter of the “Moscow Dialogues,” Professor Hecker has discussed the relation between Kant and Hegel. Kant proclaimed a distinction between the unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’ and the ‘thing-for-us’ or the representation of the original object on the mind. Fichte and Schelling in different ways attempted to solve this dualism and they both adopted a dynamic, dialectic attitude. Hegel coming after them gave an extended conception to the process of development. Hecker’s description on this point may be quoted here:¹¹

⁸ Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, pp. 74-75.

⁹ Lindsay, Karl Marx’s Capital, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰ Lenin, The Teachings of Karl Marx, p. 14.

¹¹ Hecker, Moscow Dialogues, pp. 72-73.

“The ingenious mind of Kant was unable to overcome its dualism, because he insisted upon his principle that contradictions in the concepts of things are impossible. Quite contrary was the basic principle of Hegel’s dialectic logic. He does not try to reason contradictions out of existence. He recognises it as the dynamic of the cosmic and historical process. Contradiction leads forward.*** ‘Contradiction is what actually moves the world, and it is ridiculous to say that contradictions cannot be thought. In this connection the contention is however true that the matter cannot rest with a contradiction and that it (the contradiction) is removed through itself’ (Hegel).”

The Kantian analysis, in other words, is true in a static metaphysical conception of the world but Hegel wanted to go beyond it to a dynamic dialectical point of view. Hegel moreover gave a pattern for dialectic development everywhere.

“In his language the ‘spirit,’ the ‘idea,’ does not remain static, resting in the thesis. On the contrary, this thesis, this thought, is counterposing itself, dividing itself into its opposite thought. The ‘yeas’ become ‘nays.’ The struggle of these two is reflected in the antithesis, but in the process of the struggle which Hegel called the dialectic, a third element is formed from the interpenetration of the opposites, resulting in a synthesis, which is more than a reversion to the old. A cycle has been completed, but it is not a closed circle, but a spiral, which rises above its starting point. The new synthesis, however, is not final either ; it too contains the germs of its own negation, and thus the process continues without end.”¹²

The triadic pattern however does not mean “a swinging to two extremes and settling down to the middle course.”¹³ The synthesis is not what might be called the golden mean, it is not equivalent to a compromise. This is because synthesis indicates something new, a qualitative difference.

¹² Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

¹³ Aspects of Dialectical Materialism, p. 149.

When historical development is called dialectic, what is meant is that two successive stages are connected dialectically, and that the law of social development is like the triadic pattern. Each stage produces its internal contradictions which drive it forward and out of the conflict emerges a new epoch representing a new quality.

3

Materialist Tradition

Hegel represented the culmination of speculative Idealism. For a period his authority was overwhelming but a reaction came with Feuerbach who is chiefly remembered for his belief that man has created God in his own image. Feuerbach rejected idealism though he fought shy of the word materialism. He has been claimed as a precursor of the humanistic trend in the modern religious world. Through his influence, Marx and Engels broke with philosophical idealism.

Engels complained that Hegel's "mode of thought placed everything on its head and completely reversed the real connections of things in the world."¹⁴ Marx thought that Hegel's explanation of the universe was mystical because in his system the Idea was the only reality. They therefore turned towards materialism as more satisfactory. As political radicals they also disagreed with Hegel's glorification of the Prussian State and wanted to develop a revolutionary philosophy.

The materialist tradition was as ancient as the idealistic. Even before Plato, Democritus expounded a materialist philosophy. But the beginnings of modern materialist thought are attributed by Marxists curiously enough to Spinoza who is more commonly regarded as a spiritualist philosopher. This is because Spinoza, unlike Kant who denied the possibility of knowing the real 'thing-in-itself' recognised an objective world and was

¹⁴ Anti-Dühring, p. 81.

convinced of the possibility of knowing the one universal substance which, however, existed independently of consciousness (Moscow Dialogues, Ch. V). This universal substance having extension (material being) "was presumed by him to be the substratum of all mind and matter. It implied in a sense a static but objective substance****It was a basic unity." ¹⁵ Spinoza of course called his universal substance God but he also identified God with Nature. Spinoza praised Democritus and Lucretius while attacking Socrates and Plato. He adhered to the term God much as a modern humanist continues to speak of God out of a "profound desire for fellowship with the universe." ¹⁶ He also could not explain the emergence of new qualities and thus had to fall back on the idea of God. ¹⁷ But the fact remains that he insisted on the material existence of his universal substance.

Materialism assumed its developed form in the 17th and 18th centuries in England and France and was profoundly impressed by the Newtonian sciences. In the early 19th century, this was the mode of thought in philosophy alternative to speculative idealism. In rejecting Hegel, Marx and Engels however did not identify themselves with Anglo-French materialism of the Age of Enlightenment. They termed it mechanical and non-historical. They thought that "the attempt to understand it (the universe) upwards from pure mathematical physics to sociology is faced with a series of impassable breaks which are merely slurred over with a pious hope that ultimately we shall be able to 'calculate.'" ¹⁸ They aimed at something which will combine the strong points of both the great currents of philosophic thought. The outcome of this effort is Dialectical Materialism.

4

Hegel and Marx

Marxian philosophy thus starts with two main ideas which compounded gives us its actual distinctive name. It claims to be

¹⁵ Aspects, p. 6. ¹⁶ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 61. ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62. ¹⁸ Aspects, pp. 94-95.

materialist but it takes over from Hegelian idealism the conception of dialectic or the general law of development. Engels remarked that Marx and he were the only people "to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history."¹⁹ In the preface to the Capital, Marx wrote that with Hegel dialectic stood on its head and Marx put it right side up.

In the preface to the second German edition of the Capital (Eden and Cedar Paul's translation), Marx explained himself thus :—

"My own dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from the Hegelian dialectical method but is its direct opposite. For Hegel, the thought process (which he actually transforms into an independent subject, giving to it the name of 'idea') is the demiurge (creator) of the real; and for him the real is only the outward manifestation of the idea. In my view, on the other hand, the ideal is nothing other than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head."

Hegel had put forth the movement of 'ideas' as the ultimate reality whereas Marx meant by reality the movement and change in things. Hegel made the world around the external form of the idea; Marx held the idea to be the reflection of the material world. Thus Hegelian spirit becomes Marxian matter but the same law of movement (dialectic) remained common. Marx sought the basis of society in economic organisation rather than in an idea of the Absolute Mind but to him as to Hegel being meant becoming. Marx continued to define dialectics as "the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thinking."²⁰ It must also be remembered that unlike the old classical materialists of the Enlightenment, Marx held that while consciousness is derivative, it cannot be

¹⁹ Anti-Dühring, p. 15.

²⁰ Lenin, Teachings of Karl Marx, p. 20.

reduced simply to matter in a mechanical way. To a very large extent Marx continued to be a Hegelian.

5

Idealism and Materialism

The first problem which arises in this connection is why in spite of the retention of dialectics, Marxian philosophy insists on calling itself materialist and does not even try to take on a new name (analogous to modern realism) which would emphasise its distinctive character.

Engels gave the answer in his booklet 'on Feuerbach. "Which is prior to the other ; spirit or nature ? Philosophers are divided into two great camps, according to the way in which they have answered this question. Those who declare that spirit existed before nature, and who in the last analysis therefore assume in one way or another that the world was created****have formed the idealist camp. The others, who regard nature as primary belong to the various schools of materialism." After quoting the above passage, Lenin added "any other use (in a philosophic sense) of the terms idealism and materialism is only confusing."²¹ And again, "materialism explains consciousness as the outcome of existence and not conversely."²²

This of course is rather naive and popular but these definitions are adhered to throughout the range of Marxist literature. The terminology is not technical but based on commonsense use.

Idealism, therefore, is defined as the belief in the primacy of consciousness over being and materialism as the belief in priority of being over consciousness. Thus Feuerbach in spite of himself is claimed as a materialist because "he recognised the priority of 'nature' over 'spirit' and considered 'nature' or the objective world as real, existing independent of man's

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

consciousness, man himself being a part of nature and controlled by the same laws as those which govern the process of nature.”²³

What Prof. Macmurray has called a “shift in the meaning of the term materialism” should here be clearly recognised. It is interesting to note that Lenin refused to recognise any third synthetic view in relation to the two terms—idealism and materialism.

On this sharp distinction based on an ordinary popular point of view, Marxism had to range itself with the materialist philosophies. “The physical world,” Lenin reminded his critics, “existed at a time when no ‘sociability’ and no ‘organisation’ of human experience was possible.” Professor Hecker remarks in this connection that Lenin held that space and time are not Kantian forms of human understanding but objective realities; in postulating the knowability of the objective world, he was thus not afraid of being called a ‘naive’ realist.²⁴ Lenin defined matter as “a philosophic category for designating objective reality;”²⁵ matter existed independently of man.

The argument advanced for accepting materialism is strictly practical. “Astronomically and geologically speaking, there was a time when being had no consciousness.”²⁶ Consciousness appeared with life—in itself only an episode in the history of the world. “If the further question is raised: what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature which has been developed in and along with its environment.”²⁷ It is also pointed out that everybody as a matter of fact assumes the truth of the materialist attitude. “The priority of a material universe is taken as given, given by the experience of each individual and by the cumulative experience

²³ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁷ Anti-Dühring, pp. 44-45.

of mankind, an experience expressed not so much in meditation or conscious verbal formulation, as in action and practice. The basis is laid on what people do, not in what people think.”²⁸

But it may be said that Idealism *vs.* Materialism is not a real antinomy. Realism should be opposed to Idealism and Spiritualism to Materialism. The Marxists are assuming that the only reality is matter and identifying Materialism with Realism just as they are lumping complex brands of philosophy in one heap which they call Idealism. The question of priority mentioned above may be said to be an antiquated issue and modern Idealism may not be very far from Dialectical Materialism.

Marxists resist this line of approach very firmly. There is a refusal to admit subtle intellectual discussions. Marx “virtually abandoned questions as to the nature of reality as meaningless. The only question about reality to which meaning could be given was in terms of human activity ; what result will such and such activity achieve ? To passive contemplation the ‘thing-in-itself’ must remain for ever unknowable.”²⁹ As regards the tendency in modern philosophy to blur the distinctions, this is considered to be only an example of the law of interpenetration of opposites. As for a change in nomenclature, the following passage³⁰ might be taken as the typical attitude in Marxist circles :—

“Implications of the terms non-mechanical and realism do not and cannot cover the actual positive nature of Marxist thought. There are plenty of other non-mechanical systems that are not dialectical. There are plenty of realistic accounts of the universe which are only formally different from idealist or even religious world-views. Marxism has a specific content.”

Thus Marxists continue to adhere to the name Dialectical Materialism and refuse to accept the name of realists for

²⁸ Aspects, p. 91.

²⁹ Dobb, On Marxism To-day, p. 20.

³⁰ Aspects, p. 154.

example, in philosophy. They also insist on the idea of the sharp division into two opposing camps of all philosophers. Some of the reasons advanced for their attitude are interesting.

The name materialism has got an additional advantage, it is said, because of its traditional associations. "The word reminds us of the continuity in the development of the naturalist instead of the supernaturalist concept of being."³¹ Another explanation is that idealism is associated with "faith in a transcendental world, in the existence of a transcendental being."³² According to Prof. Macmurray—"The essential point in which Dialectical Materialism is materialistic is that it defines the central problem of modern society as a material problem, and consequently insists that any philosophy which is conscious of its social reference must start at this point."³³ Finally, idealism and materialism are characterised as fundamentally opposed by their effect on action and practice. Revolutions proceed from materialist philosophies; all reaction is grounded in idealist philosophy. The Idealist Theory of the State, for example, leads to absolutism of the state without even any reform in its structure.³⁴ "As long as the ways of God are hidden from men,****or if this visible world is merely illusory or incalculable, then there is no call on individuals to leave their private occupations and join the first real conscious attempt at making human history."³⁵ Contemporary experience is also appealed to in the attempt to expose the alliance between Idealism and reaction.³⁶

There is much insistence in Marxist thought on this ideological struggle. "Marx decidedly rejected not only idealism,

³¹ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

³² Berdyaev, *The End of Our Time*.

³³ Aspects, p. 40.

³⁴ Joad, *Modern Political Theory*, pp. 13-17.

³⁵ Aspects, p. 98.

³⁶ Communists refer in this connection to Fascism, Nazism and Gandhism, as illustrations.

always connected in one way or another with religion, but also the views of Hume and Kant, that are especially widespread in our day, as well as agnosticism, criticism, positivism in various forms ; he considered such philosophy as 'reactionary' concession to idealism, at best as a shamefaced manner of admitting materialism through the backdoor while denying it before the world."³⁷ Class-struggle reveals the real character of a philosophy. A system is judged by its effect on social action. "In times of acceleration and intensification of the class-struggles they" (philosophical systems) "fall in line with the social movement, and take sides in the struggle."³⁸

6

The Theory of Perception

Dialectical Materialism is thus classed under Materialism for two chief reasons—the acceptance of matter as the fundamental reality by all materialist systems and the close connection between Idealism and the existing social order. But there is at the same time a gulf between orthodox materialism and Marxian philosophy. This is due to the retention of the dialectical method by the latter in the first place and also to Marx's theory of perception.

"The chief defect of all previous materialism," wrote Marx in "Ludwig Feuerbach," "including that of Feuerbach is that the object (Gegenstand), the reality, sensibility, is only apprehended under the form of the object (Objekt) or of contemplation (Anschauung) but not as human sensible activity or practice, not subjectively."³⁹

As Russell explains in his chapter on Dialectical Materialism in his new book on "Freedom and Organisation," this means that to apprehend one's environment is to act on it and alter it

³⁷ Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³⁸ Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

³⁹ Russell, *Freedom and Organisation*, pp. 220-21.

at the same time. Knowledge is not here conceived as a passive reception of an impression, it is an activity influencing the object. In Marx, adds Russell, "that is why the test of all truth is practical. And since we change the object when we act upon it, truth ceases to be static."⁴⁰ Dobb is even more emphatic on this point—"Precisely in acting upon the world, and hence changing it, is the world knowable, and only in this way; and all the questions of reality which have vexed philosophers acquire meaning only in terms of the efficacy of concrete activities."⁴¹

Of course the conception of the activity of human thought is philosophically idealistic. But Marxism while admitting this activity rules out idealism on the ground that it ignores the actual material conditions of intellectual activity. Orthodox materialism in reducing thought to sensation swings to a position directly opposite to the idealist view and considered to be equally mistaken. Whatever might be its logical validity, a middle position is taken up by Marxist philosophy.⁴²

Professor Hook defined Marx's position in the following words:—⁴³

"He sought to save the idealist's insight that knowledge is active. Otherwise his own historical materialism would result in fatalism.***Things are not revealed in sensation; sensations themselves arise in the course of man's activity on things. The starting point of perception is not an object on the one hand, and a subject opposed to it on the other, but an interacting process.***What it (the subject) sees, its selective reactions***are to be explained, not merely as a physical or biological fact but as a social fact as well.** All psychology** thus becomes social psychology.** Consciousness is social before it is individual."

Marx's theory of perception has been compared by Russell with modern instrumentalism. Hook points out that Lenin did

⁴⁰ Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

⁴¹ Dobb, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴² Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

not quite follow Marx ; for example he said that "sensations are copies, photographs, images and mirror-reflections of things." ⁴⁴ But Lenin elsewhere, for example in his political pamphlets, adopted Marx's position and its logical conclusions without hesitation.

The assumption that mind is the ultimate reality is idealistic but this is not involved in Dialectic Materialism. But to those who adopt a mechanical form of materialistic explanation of the universe, the philosophy of Marx seems to be a form of idealism. Lenin was an ardent Marxist but even he, according to Hook and Russell, slipped into a mechanical position in his theory of perception though in his political writings, as mentioned above, his attitude was in consonance with the Marxian theories. His mistake in "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" was, according to Hook, due to his anxiety to avoid the taint of idealism. As Professor Hook remarks—"He (Lenin) seems to believe that if one holds (1) that mind enters as an active factor in knowing, conditioned by the nervous system and all of past history, then it follows that one must believe:—(2) that mind creates all of existence including its own brain. This is the rankest idealism and idealism means religion and God. But the step from proposition (1) to (2) is the most glaring *non sequitur* possible" (pp. 61-62).

In passing, a brief reference may here be made to the treatment in Marxism of the problem of freedom and necessity. The solution, if it is one, is again Hegelian.

"Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. 'Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood.' Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends.*** Freedom of the will therefore means

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject.***Freedom, therefore, consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity.”⁴⁵

This seems to mean that within the framework of the basic laws of evolutionary process, man may control and direct future events but he cannot succeed against the fundamental tendencies. The analogy is with everyday practical relations of men with nature and society. There must be subjection to general laws but there need not be absolute determinism. It is to be noted that the philosophical problem is handled in a practical matter-of-fact way. After all, revolutions require both the freedom of active will and natural necessity.

7

Laws of Dialectics

Marxism starts with the idea that everything changes and develops so that it is a mistake to view the world in terms of fixed concepts of metaphysics. Marxism also holds that the key to the world-process is dialectics which Engels defined as “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motions and development of nature, human society and thought.”⁴⁶ It is now time to turn to a more complete account of this dialectic so often invoked by Marxists. It has been remarked that like Christianity, Marxism has its mysteries of which the chief is the dialectic.⁴⁷ An attempt to unravel the mystery, however, is made by Marxist literature.

In a famous passage Lenin gave the following description of Marxian dialectic :—⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Anti-Dühring, p. 130.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁴⁷ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁴⁸ Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

"A development that repeats, as it were, the stages already passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher plane ('negation of negation'); a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; a development in leaps and bounds, catastrophies, revolution; 'intervals of gradualness;' transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses for development, imparted by the contradiction, the conflict of different forces and tendencies reacting on a given body or inside a given phenomenon or within a given society; interdependence, and the closest, indissoluble connection between all sides of every phenomenon (history disclosing ever new sides), a connection that provides the one world-process of motion proceeding according to law—such are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of evolution more full of meaning than the current one."

In Communist literature, Lenin's detailed descriptions of dialectical laws are grouped under sixteen points but the terminology is rather vague and these principles are not of very great use in trying to understand the subject.⁴⁹

In this connection it is to be remembered that in any attempt at a dialectical interpretation of social changes, an appropriate time-scale has first to be adopted. "An explosion in the time-scale of an atomic vibrator, is an extremely slow process; but from the relevant time-scale of the total duration of the explosive it is instantaneous."⁵⁰

Thus if a short view is taken of history, if the period selected is a small period, the process of the dialectic cycle may not be revealed adequately in its study. Again, the illustration of dialectical movement in a big span of time is bound to be different from the revelation of the same law in a smaller period. In other words, the examples of dialectical change in history or in nature would differ in accordance with the time-scale selected and in any analysis of nature and history, there is always what might be called a field of relevance. If any small portion of the

⁴⁹ *Aspects*, pp. 14-16.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

field of nature or humanity is considered in isolation it may not thus be possible to demonstrate adequately in it the dialectic process. "Such a portion might be only a part of a larger process and changes in it only become understandable dialectically when the larger process is considered as a whole."⁵¹ A time-scale or a field of relevance is of course an arbitrary selection but then the analysis of isolated portions of nature or history always involves some arbitrariness.

Prof. Levy⁵² accordingly uses a term—Isolate—to illustrate the process of analysis. "An isolate is something that has been dragged from its environment in space, time and matter. By itself, therefore, it is a fiction, for dialectically nothing can be free of environment ; but it is a real fiction in the sense that it really does have an objective existence." These isolates are chipped out and studied and they can then be seen again dialectically in their environments. "Scientific methodology is really a process for endeavouring to find cracks in the dialectic.*** The scientific man***frequently forgets to replace it (the isolate) into its appropriate place in the universe.*** The consequence is a false philosophic interpretation of his findings."

Engels laid down three laws governing the dialectic process—the transition of quantity into quality ; interpenetration of opposites ; and the negation of the negation. They are of course not very definite in their scope but represent general ideas about change in Marxian thought, which have to be noticed here.

The law of interpenetration may be taken first. Examples from mathematics, biology, economics, are cited by Hecker in support of this law.⁵³ Thus it is said that higher mathematical thought develops by means of so-called contradictions. Thus again classes in their evolution coexist while interpenetrating.

⁵¹ Aspects, p. 107.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

⁵³ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

The two opposite elements make a unity but this interpenetration cannot go on indefinitely. "Each interpenetration has also its breaks and upon the revolutionary philosopher lies the responsibility of recognising the moment when the split becomes inevitable." ⁵⁴ This law is an attempt to explain the complexity of things and it draws attention to two points—an internal conflict or contradiction in the original state ; and the formation of what might be called a nucleus for abrupt future change within that state. Of the interpenetrating elements, one may be said to be leading at a given moment. The Marxian picture of class-society and its development is in accord with this law.

Mr. J. D. Bernal explains this in the following passage :—⁵⁵
 "In predicting change, Dialectical Materialism implies two things : an internal conflict in the original state, and an event or close series of events sufficiently disturbing to make an abrupt change of state possible.***The second is***the factor of nucleus formation.***No chain can break unless there is somewhere some flaw to start a minute crack. These indispensable nuclei which initiate all changes are in detail quite unpredictable.***He (the practical man) may not know where the break is coming, but he knows that sooner or later a break will come.***Although no theory can predict precisely when or how the spark will appear it is bound to appear sooner or later." The influence of this theory on communist attitude towards the problem of revolution is obvious.

The law of transition from quantity to quality is illustrated by chemical changes especially. ⁵⁶ The instance which is always quoted in support of this law is the sudden change from water to ice. This law is to be understood to affirm this principle of sudden change—the use of the terms quantity and quality is of course a little confusing. What is essential is this belief

⁵⁴ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁵⁵ Aspects, pp. 115-17.

⁵⁶ Anti-Dühring, pp. 144-46.

in leaps, mutations, breaks in development. The communist faith in revolution is bound up with it.

In accord with this law, Marxism does not ignore continuous change which is slowly going on but insists on the impossibility of any fundamental change arising without discontinuity. A new quality, it is said, always emerges with a jump. "Capitalism does not change into Socialism continuously ; it simply changes to more reactionary capitalism.***The very nature of capitalism—production for profit—is sufficient to ensure that capitalism can never develop continuously into a system where that motive can no longer exist." ⁵⁷

The third law of Engels is a generalisation of the triadic process which is roughly described as a negation of the negation. The process is traced in philosophy, history and mathematics.⁵⁸ The practical conclusion drawn is that every system has its necessary fall, but the development is neither a straight line nor a closed circle, but in spirals. The examples given by Engels are not very happy ; the plant, for instance, is the negation of the seed and when negated in its turn gives rise to more and better seeds. But apart from the form in which it is expressed, this law like the two other laws indicates the general outlook of the Marxists towards the process of change and development in the universe. The laws of Dialectics are not therefore precise scientific laws, but expressions of likely general tendencies.

⁵⁷ Aspects, p. 114.

⁵⁸ Anti-Dühring, pp. 154-57.

III

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

1

Philosophies of History

The philosophy of Marxism is dialectical because it adopts the Hegelian idea of evolution of nature, history and thought according to certain patterns and it is materialist because it assumes that matter is the ultimate reality while consciousness is derivative. The application of this general philosophy to history gives rise to Historical Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History.

The first question which ought to arise here is whether any philosophy of history is at all possible. It may be maintained that no generalisation can be made about history either because no theory can fit all the facts or because too little is known for any confident conclusions. If this is granted, discussion becomes impossible. But as a matter of fact there is always some conception of history present in the mind when history is written or thought of. Otherwise it is not possible to select and appreciate facts even. What is peculiar to Historical Materialism is that a particular conception of history is explicitly and emphatically assumed by it.⁵⁹

One philosophy of history is tacitly rejected by all historians—the theory of wholesale chance. This conception logically leads to the idea that anything might have happened at any time. But it is generally recognised that life is not mere chance for in that case statistical constants would have been impossible. The existence of tendencies in history is universally recognised. The

⁵⁹ Dobb, *On Marxism To-day*, pp. 11-12.

history of an epoch may be said to move within a "narrow range of possibilities conditioned by an antecedent state of affairs." ⁶⁰

The Idealist conception of history also is no longer popular, but it is still a force. Croce's recent history ⁶¹ comes under this class but a more famous name is that of Spengler. Spengler's theory that spirit determines the nature of a culture gives rise to the natural question what determines spirit. Spirit of a people obviously cannot explain the different ideas and outlooks of different groups within the same people. The appearance and the order of appearance of different institutions like slavery, serfdom and capitalism cannot be explained by spirit. ⁶² About idealist theory in general the same objections apply. If the ultimate ideas are divine, control or anticipation of the future becomes impossible while practical life at every step contradicts faith in such superhuman force. If the ideas are human ideas and qualities, the difficulty is that if they are constant they cannot explain change and if they themselves are variable, they cannot explain their own genesis. ⁶³ Idealist history tends thus to become departmental and particular, instead of general or universal. ⁶⁴

Much more fashionable is a loose materialist view about history which is really much more rigid than the Marxist hypothesis. Some material factor is taken as the determining force in historical development. Draper and Huntington represent such a tendency. The material factor selected differs in different cases. It is climate or geography with Buckle, the nature of food with Feuerbach, race with Chamberlain. "The chief defect of all these materialist philosophies is the attempt to reduce the social to merely a complicated effect of the non-social." ⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, pp. 107-11.

⁶¹ Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*.

⁶² Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-13.

⁶⁴ Dobb, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁵ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

The Marxian philosophy of history is distinct from a purely mechanical materialist interpretation of history. "The materialist doctrine," wrote Marx,⁶⁶ "that men are products of their environments and education, different men products of different environment and education forgets that the environment itself has been changed by man." This of course is the recognition of the role of human activity which is stressed by Marx's theory of perception and which distinguishes Marxism from a mechanical materialism. "What requires explanation is those turning-points in history at which (like qualitative changes in a chemical composition) a completely new element appears to emerge. And, it is precisely this act of historical creation that a mechanical determinism can neither forecast nor explain."⁶⁷

This difference between Marxism and other materialist theories of history which colour more or less most modern histories is easily overlooked. Thus Mr. Bernard Shaw⁶⁸ could write without compunction—"His (Marx's) so-called Historical Materialism is easily vulnerable to criticism as a law of nature ;*** Buckle's much less read History of Civilisation, also a work of the mind-changing sort, has the *same thesis* but a different moral" (Italics mine). In fact, Marx's position is distinctive and not purely materialist in the ordinary sense as indeed ought to be inferred from the peculiarity of his philosophic point of view. "In so far as 'ideas' are part of history, they are 'facts' of historical experience as much as mechanical inventions or property-relationships.*** If 'ideas' are conceived, on the other hand, as some supra-historical deus ex machina, invoked from transcendental skies to shape the historical plot, the Marxist would emphatically deny them reality or significance."⁶⁹

The Historical Materialism of Marx is the application of dialectic to history which is thereby revealed to be "no smoothly

⁶⁶ Quoted in Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁶⁷ Dobb, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁶⁸ Intelligent Woman's Guide, p. 467.

⁶⁹ Dobb, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

flowing river of progress." "The dialectic is a sort of social X'ray apparatus, enabling us to see the very bones of human society; and to see how they move."⁷⁰ Change and development in history are represented in terms of successive contradiction, and spiral progress with jumps from stage to stage. It may be said that in that case Marxism is no better than idealistic mysticism. There is force in this criticism which is met by Dobb in this way—"Yet there exists a definable relationship between them" (the past stage and the emergent development), "and the connection is neither arbitrary, nor mystical: a relationship between the old and the new which has the form of a logical antithesis rather than of a syllogism."⁷¹

The essence of Historical Materialism is the hypothesis that history in the last analysis is moulded by class-struggle. Here is easily revealed both the materialist character and the dialectical approach of Marxism—classes are material facts and actual elements of society while their mutual struggles represent the element of human activity. The Marxian theory is called the economic interpretation of history because classes which shape history are the product of the economic structure of society and not because it ignores non-economic elements in development. Marx distinguishes here three elements which are usually confused by his critics—the conditions of production (natural resources, climate, race); the forces of production (tools, technical skill); and the relations of production (organisation of forces and conditions). This distinction is seen in the statement that the cultural superstructure is supposed to be based everywhere on these production-relations of which the legal form is property-relations⁷²—and not on the forces and conditions of production.

⁷⁰ Strachey, *The Coming Struggle for Power*, p. 224.

⁷¹ Dobb, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁷² Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

Materialist Conception of History

Engels formulated the idea of Historical Materialism introduced by Marx in two passages which might be quoted in part.

“The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order.*** According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought,*** not in the philosophy but in the economics of the epoch concerned.*** This also involves that the means through which the abuses that have been revealed can be got rid of*** are not to be invented by the mind, but discovered by means of the mind, in the existing material facts of production.”⁷³

The Marxist, therefore, is required to analyse a given situation which appears as a unit with the aid of past and present observations. It is believed that a correct diagnosis will lead to the discovery of opposite features and thus suggest the future in the light of the general hypothesis of dialectics. The ability to do this, as in the case of Lenin, is hailed as the mark of real leadership.⁷⁴

The second passage⁷⁵ from Engels runs as follows:—“It was seen that all past history was the history of class struggles, that these warring classes of society are always the product of the modes of production and exchange*** that therefore the economic structure of society always forms the real basis from which, in the last analysis, is to be explained the whole superstructure of legal and political institutions, as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other conceptions of each historical period.*** Now a materialist conception of history was propounded, and the way

⁷³ Anti-Dühring, p. 300.

⁷⁴ Hecker, Moscow Dialogues, p. 126.

⁷⁵ Anti-Dühring, pp. 32-33.

found to explain man's consciousness by his being, instead of, as heretofore, his being by his consciousness."

Engels by his popularisations gave rise to certain difficulties in the theory of Historical Materialism as will be seen later on. A similar emphasis on the sweeping character of the theory was laid by Lenin ⁷⁶ also when he described the conception as "discarding subjectivism and free-will in the choice of various 'leading' ideas or in their interpretation, showing how all the ideas and all the various tendencies, without exception, have their roots in the condition of the material forces of production." But Historical Materialism has to be stated with qualifications which however follow naturally from the peculiarities of Marxian philosophy. Propagandists often forget niceties naturally enough. Marxist literature, therefore, must not be scrutinised too literally. Anyhow the main trend of thought is unmistakable and that has to be realised first.

Historical Materialism must be sharply differentiated from what is often confused with it—namely, a technological interpretation of history which would distinguish between periods according to the use of different tools and instruments. The latter are, however, merely production-forces; the other two generic components of the economic process are the conditions and the relations of production. The economic foundation of society is the organisation of all three elements mentioned above. The same type of machinery might now be used both in Russia and in America or Germany but these countries belong to different stages of development. Moreover, technical changes are merely the result of human inventions and a technological theory of history would tend towards Idealism. ⁷⁷ This aspect of Marxism is often overlooked. Thus Russell in his new book, "Freedom and Organisation," while demolishing the technological interpretation of history in

⁷⁶ Lenin, *Teachings of Karl Marx*, p. 16.

⁷⁷ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp 125-29.

the penultimate paragraph of his eighteenth chapter thinks that he has refuted Marxism.

It is also to be remembered that materialism in Marx does not indicate only egoistic motives. The theory is not the embodiment of self-interest or a rejection of the fact that men pursue ideals. Historical Materialism points out the predominance of material factors in history and traces ideas and ideals to the situation which decides their survival and acceptance. Economic organisation, it is asserted, determines which ideals are to flourish ; "the locus of all effective ideals is the class-struggle."⁷⁸ Marx could write without hesitation about non-economic ideas inspiring the proletariat in the class-war—"the proletariat which will not allow itself to be treated as canaille regards its courage, self-confidence, independence and sense of personal dignity, as more necessary than its daily bread."⁷⁹ Here there is no contradiction because Marxism recognises what are called moral ideas as part of the fact of the struggle between classes. It says only that "Man's human nature is revealed only in a socially determined context"⁸⁰ and that "by acting on the external world and changing it, man changes his own nature." (Marx in Capital, Vol. I.) Selfishness is selfishness but its scope and consequently its effect changes according to the economic framework of society.

The Marxian conception of history is not therefore materialistic in the ordinary sense. It may be called the "Realistic Conception of History"⁸¹ but as in the case of the nomenclature of Marxian philosophy, the name materialist is retained for the sake of associations, to mark the sharp differentiation from Idealism of all types and to affirm the basic belief in material conditions as the ultimate ruling factor in history.

⁷⁸ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-32.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁸⁰ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁸¹ Cole, *What Marx Really Meant*.

3

The Conception of Class

The idea of the class and the theory of relations between classes are possibly the central points in Marxism when it is stripped of all intellectual subtleties. The class struggle is the fundamental feature of Marxist thought and practice—the distinctive note in the movement as a whole.

A class is defined ⁸² “not as any sort of social grouping (according to which the definition would be meaningless) but a particular grouping characterised by a peculiar type of relationship to the means of production (*e.g.*, owning and ownerless, owners of realty and owners of personalty). Antagonism, indeed, defined a class rather than was defined by it.” Lenin defined a class as a “large group of people which differs according to the place it occupies in the historically definite system of social production, according to its relation to the means of production (which is usually also established and fixed by law) and finally according to the part they play in the social organisation of labour and the means of obtaining wealth.” ⁸³

The relation between different classes, it is emphasised, is independent of the will of those who participate in production. A man finds himself the member of a class and though a few individuals may change their status, this is not possible for a whole class without effecting a revolution. In modern society, for example, making one's own fortune or rising from the ranks like Ford or others is without any significance for the proletariat as a whole. Classes having different roles in production, “the antagonism between classes flows not from the consciousness (or lack of it) of individual members of the class but from the division of the fruits of production.” ⁸⁴ It follows from this that the class struggle is a concomitant feature of division of society into

⁸² Dobb, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁸³ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁸⁴ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

classes. The possibility of an equitable distribution of the product between classes is denied because an abstract equity or justice does not exist ; each class is bound to have its own conception of justice. Moreover the proletariat is exploited by the capitalists (according to Marxian economics) under the law of surplus value. Ending such a state of things involves a revolution with the emergence of a new quality in social history. About revolutionary changes, the principle is laid down that " a revolution cannot be undertaken at any time, nor if undertaken, succeed, save under certain determinate conditions, all of which are necessary for victory but no one of which is sufficient." ⁸⁵ The situation in modern times has got this peculiarity that the struggle of the proletariat for emancipation cannot be successful without the abolition of class-society itself. Abolition of classes, a class-less social organisation thus becomes the object of the revolutionary class to-day which is thus supposed to serve the cause of the whole of mankind.

A class is a group but it becomes the most important group because economic organisation is more fundamental than any element in the cultural superstructure. Class-consciousness is the idea of loyalty to the class and the realisation of common interests which hold the economic group together. Class is fundamental in society because the Radical picture of the community as a collection of individuals seeking their atomic interests is a distortion and the outlook of most men is in fact coloured by class hopes and fears, class sympathies and prejudices. ⁸⁶

There may be many classes in society to-day but Historical Materialism picks out two fundamental classes—the two camps to-day to which the subsidiary classes attach themselves. " Modern society is divisible into two great groups, the capitalist and the wage-earner. Of the one, the outstanding feature is the fact that he lives by owning ;*** of the other, the dominating fact is that

⁸⁵ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸⁶ Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital*, p. 45.

they live by and are mainly dependent upon wages. Marx is not concerned with minor features of distinction.*** Marx does not deny the possibility of minor sub-divisions.*** They are for him as insignificant as the fact that among capitalists some are successful and others unsuccessful*** however the two great classes are sub-divided, one is united with itself by the fact that it lives by the sale of its labour, and the other by the fact that it owns, in its capital, the means of production.”⁸⁷

Marx's historical analysis described above is remarkable for two things—a detailed analysis of the modern environment and the recognition of the proletariat as the real revolutionary force to-day. These are bound up with the conception of class and the class-struggle.

4

Some Misconceptions

It is very generally assumed that the Marxist conception of history is rigidly deterministic and that the Marxist view about social development is a form of complete fatalism. This is accompanied also by the belief that in Historical Materialism the sole factor which is recognised is the economic factor. A study of the available literature qualifies these preconceptions to a considerable extent.

“Man makes his own history,” wrote Marx,⁸⁸ “but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.” Here clearly enough Marx recognised history as an interaction between human activity and limiting conditions. In the same book, Marx also remarked that the “tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the

⁸⁷ Laski, *Communism*, pp. 67-68.

⁸⁸ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, p. 9.

living." Surely here is a recognition of non-economic forces in their proper place in history.

Engels is even more explicit in his letters, which must be largely quoted in this connection.⁸⁹

"According to the materialist conception of history, the production and reproduction of real life constitutes in the last instance the determining factor of history. Neither Marx nor I ever maintained more. Now when some one comes along and distorts this to mean that the economic factor is the sole determining factor he is converting the former proposition into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis but the various factors of the superstructure*** exercise an influence upon the course of historical struggles*** in which, finally,*** the economic movement asserts itself as necessary. Were this not the case, the application of the theory to any given historical period would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree."—Engels to Bloch, 1890.

"One could hardly, however, assert without pedantry that among the many petty principalities of North Germany, just Brandenburg was determined by economic necessity and not by other factors also*** to become the great power*** It would be very hard to attempt to explain by economic causes without making ourselves ridiculous the existence of every petty German state of the past or present, or the origin of modern German syntax."—Engels to Bloch, 1890.

"What all these fellows lack is dialectic.*** The whole great process develops itself in the form of reciprocal action, to be sure of very unequal forces, in which the economic movement is far and away the strongest, most primary and decisive. They (the critics) do not see that here nothing is absolute and everything relative. For them Hegel has never existed."—Engels to Schmidt, 1890.

⁸⁹ The letters are printed in full in the Appendix to Hook's volume.

“ If Barth imagines that we deny all and every counteraction of the political, etc., reflexes of the economic movement upon that movement itself, he is simply contending against windmills. Let him take a glance at Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire ”**** (or at Capital, Chapter 24)—“ Why are we struggling for the political dictatorship of the proletariat, if political power has no economic effects ? ”—Engels to Schmidt, 1890.

“ Only one point is lacking which Marx and I did not sufficiently stress and in relation to which we are equally to blame. We both placed and had to place the chief weight upon the derivation of political, legal and other ideological notions as well as the actions which they led up to, from fundamental economic facts. In consequence we neglected the formal side, *i.e.*, the way in which these ideas arose, for the sake of the content. That gave our opponents a welcome occasion for misunderstanding.”—Engels to Mehring, 1893.

“ Men make their own history, but in a given, conditioning milieu, upon the basis of actual relations already extant, among which, the economic relations, no matter how much they are influenced by relations of a political and ideological order, are ultimately decisive, constituting a red thread which runs through all the other relations and enabling us to understand them.”—Engels to Starkenburg, 1894.

From the above extracts a few points clearly emerge. The economic structure is claimed to be the basis, the framework, the red thread throughout all relations, in history ; it is the unifying and in the last analysis the controlling factor. But there is a vast superstructure and this very admission logically leads to the recognition of its interaction on economics as well as of its relatively independent formal character. Historical Materialism is not a monistic reduction of everything to a simple element as Plekhanov inclined to think ;⁹ it is not

⁹⁰ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-41,

a denial of variety in history. To say that history is nothing but economic activity, to say that all historical events can be explained in economic terms is contrary to the spirit of Historical Materialism though propagandists have occasionally forgotten this.

It is interesting to remember that even as far back as the beginning of his career, Lenin took the field against what was called Economism in Russia. In this trend of socialist thought was mingled a rigid determinism and the idea that the economic factor is the only element in history. Consequently, an attitude arose which regarded political struggle as the automatic reflection of economic development with the conclusion that a political party should follow, and not try to lead, the mass movement which spontaneously appeared out of economic conditions. Lenin firmly opposed this tendency in his writings, in the true tradition of Marx.

The Orthodox Marxists in Germany again expected the course of economic development to produce socialism automatically. They forgot that "it could only produce by its own immanent movement the presuppositions of socialism.*** When Marx spoke of communism as being a result of a 'social necessity' he was referring to the resultant of a whole social process, one of whose components was the development of objective economic conditions, the other, the assertion of a revolutionary class-will."⁹¹—Marx thus avoided fatalism. Communist analysis often confirms this point of view—for example, when it is said that Italy was objectively ready for social revolution in 1921 and Germany in 1923.

The charge of fatalism is also refuted by Mr. J. D. Bernal.⁹² He maintains that there is not more teleology in Dialectical Materialism than in the law of mechanical motion. When a social system charged with internal contradictions

⁹¹ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁹² Aspects of Dialectical Materialism, pp. 114-15.

changes, it will "change in general to another system which has for the moment fewer internal contradictions. In that sense and in that only its future is determinate."

A quotation from Lenin⁹³ might very well close this section of the subject:—"It is necessary to be critical of it (the movement), to point out its dangers and defects, and aspire to elevate spontaneity to consciousness. To say that ideologists cannot divert the movement created by the interaction of environment and elements from its path is to ignore the elementary truth that consciousness participates in this interaction and creation."

5

The Objections of Russell

There are serious objections to the Marxian conception of philosophy and history but in many cases criticism is undertaken without a full consideration of the actual presentation of the Marxist case. Thus Bertrand Russell in his recent work⁹⁴ puts forward points which have at least partially been already tackled in Marxist literature. The tackling may have been inadequate but the important point is that Russell does not indicate that the attempt is there.

(1) Russell condemns (pp. 225-26) what he calls the dogmatic optimism of the Communist doctrine as a relic of Victorianism. He is at one with Prof. Carr in thinking that there is "no certainty that chaos is impossible or progress necessary."⁹⁵

It has, however, been pointed out already that Historical Materialism is not fatalistic or rigidly determinist. Marx remarked in the Communist Manifesto:—"a warfare (between

⁹³ Lenin, Works, Vol. IV, p. 67.

⁹⁴ Freedom and Organisation, Ch. 18

⁹⁵ Aspects, p. 138.

the oppressor and the oppressed in history) that invariably ended in a revolutionary change in the whole structure of society or else in the common ruin of the contending classes''⁹⁶ thus showing that a return to barbarism is not utterly impossible. It may likewise be added that even a Marxist will not dogmatically assert that the world cannot be destroyed by any catastrophe to-morrow. "For Marx, however, revolution is the political mode by which social evolution takes place. When, where and how cannot be settled in advance. It is always a question of concrete specific analysis." ⁹⁷

Engels again was not dogmatic out and out. He explained his attitude in discussing the law of the negation of the negation :—⁹⁸

"Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes.*** If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but I have made the second part impossible. Each class of things therefore has its appropriate form of being negated in such a way that it gives rise to a development.*** The mere knowledge that the barley plant or the infinitesimal calculus are both governed by the negation of the negation does not enable me to grow barley successfully or to use the calculus."

Engels clearly recognised here that a barren negation leading to no development was not utterly impossible though it is very unlikely in the context of social history, he might have added.

According to Hook,⁹⁹ Marx did not categorically assert anywhere that communism is something fated to be realised in the automatic course of things. He felt that it was the only way out of the impasse created by the internal conflict in capitalism—the way pointed out as extremely probable by past experience and

⁹⁶ Quoted in Lenin, Teaching of Karl Marx, p. 17.

⁹⁷ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁹⁸ Anti-Dühring, pp. 160-61.

⁹⁹ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-104.

knowledge of the laws of evolution. "Marxism is neither a science nor a myth, but a realistic method of social action."

"Dialectical Materialism does not and cannot claim to predict the times and details of events ; it only claims to show that the general trend of political developments cannot run counter to the economic forces."¹⁰⁰

(2) Russell is of opinion that the part played by great individuals in history is unduly minimised in Marxism. If Bismarck had died in infancy, the history of Europe during the past seventy years, it is said, would not have been at all closely similar to what it has been. He also maintains that without Lenin the Russian Revolution could not have achieved what it did.¹⁰¹ This criticism has some force as there are passages in Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Bukharin which tend to explain away the great man's role in history. Even Marx once remarked that "every society needs its great men, and if it does not find them it creates them." One may ask with Hook where was the great leader hiding in Italy in 1921 and in Germany in 1923 ?¹⁰²

But the Marxist philosophy definitely recognises the importance of human activity and the operation in history of non-economic factors ; it is also not rigidly determinist if the philosophical assumptions are followed to their logical end. Thus Marxist literature does not and even need not deny the effect produced by great men, but it emphatically asserts that great individuals also have to work within a conditioning framework and along with the tendencies of the times. A Bismarck or a Lenin in other periods and other lands could not have left the same impress on history ; people equal to them quite possibly have existed without getting any opening in contemporary situation, to attract equal notice. The role of great men is overemphasised mainly because too narrow a span of history is taken as the field

* 100 Aspects, p. 118.

101 Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 228.

102 Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-49.

of relevance. The view on this point which follows logically from Marxist philosophy was given by Marx himself in the already-quoted passage from his Eighteenth Brumaire—"Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth." The distinction between Marxism and other philosophies which recognise conditioning lies in the emphasis on class-struggle in the former.

This attitude is supported by many Marxist writers. Two references are given here.

"Men of the calibre of Lenin do not recur very often in human history; when they do their actions are bound to have a disproportionate effect; but no one, least of all the man of remarkable genius, can set himself across the course of development of his time. Lenin had in the first place to belong to the revolutionary movement, to be influenced and moulded by the addition of Marxism"¹⁰³ which of course was itself the outcome of the class-struggle of the period.

"The strategical genius of Moltke would have triumphed in great campaigns had there not been a nation of some forty millions to supply soldiers, and had not those soldiers been men of strong bodies, sturdy characters, obedient natures, and capable of carrying out orders intelligently.' (Herbert Spencer—Sociology). The achievements of the human spirit which 'reaches out to the future', etc., are facts of history, but men achieve things only because the mental and material accumulations of the past and existing social arrangements permit them to achieve."¹⁰⁴

Marxist theory assigns an important role to human activity and relates it to the class-struggle in national and international history and subordinates it to the general movement of history.

Russell in the next place thinks that trivial chances and accidents often decide history (pp. 228-29). His examples are many, but the argument is unaffected by them.

¹⁰³ Aspects, p. 117.

¹⁰⁴ J. S. Clarke, *Marxism and History*, p. 28.

Marx defined his own position in his famous letter to Kugelmann, 1871, about the Paris Commune.

“ World history would indeed be a very easy thing to make, were the struggle to be carried on only under conditions of unfavourably favourable chances. Its nature would have to be of a very mystical kind if ‘accidents’ played no role. These accidents naturally fall within the general path of development and are compensated by other accidents. But the acceleration and retardation of events are very largely dependent upon such ‘accidents’ among which must be reckoned the character of the people who stand at the head of the movement.” ¹⁰⁵

Marx did not rule out chances, in conformity with his philosophical position. But he also did not give undue importance to them because practically speaking there is such a thing as the most probable line of development which he sought to find out. He had no use for pure scholastic discussions which ordinary critics in this connection suddenly affect.

If chance was entirely ruled out, the result would mean either idealistic or mechanistic mystical fatalism. It might then be maintained that if anything had been different in history everything would have been different. ¹⁰⁶

“ The position of the mechanist is that there is no accident.*** Dialecticians are definitely opposed to this point of view.***Already Hegel had pointed out that the effect is not merely the same as the cause, but also different. This may be observed in nature, in the experience of the individual and in the experience of society.” ¹⁰⁷

(4) Russell says (p. 228) that “ Marx does not allow nearly enough for the time-lag” and instances the case of the survival of old-world Christianity, in modern economic conditions.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁰⁶ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁰⁷ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

Engels recognised the importance of the point when he wrote "we see that religion, once arisen, contains material of tradition, hence in all ideological matters, religion is a great conservative force."¹⁰⁸ He also wrote to Bloch in the letter which has been referred to already.—"Economic situation is the basis but the various factors of the superstructure*** (like) religious conceptions which have been developed into systematic dogmas, all these exercise and influence upon the course of historical struggles."

"Traditional elements may exist within it (the system) but they have been re-adapted to harmonise with the dominant pattern of thought and action."¹⁰⁹ That this is on the whole a true picture of the position of old religions in modern society may perhaps be admitted.

(5) Russell is of opinion (p. 226) that Marx's theory means that after the abolition of classes "mankind must go on and on for ever and ever in a state of Byzantine immobility," for the motive power of development (class-conflicts) would cease to operate. This is expressly denied by Marxian theorists.

"As distinct from all other doctrines of Marx, the principle of dialectic still continues to operate in a communist society. It is not historically conditioned in the same sense as his other theories. It finds expression, however, on a more elevated plane.*** The world still exists in incomplete process, and conflict ever remains at the heart of flux, but now, however, man wrestles not with the primary problems of social existence."¹¹⁰

"Lenin maintained that in socialist society there will be no antagonism" (between classes) "but the immanent contradictions" (of the dialectic process) "will remain. They are the necessary presuppositions of further development, otherwise socialism would be static"¹¹¹ which of course would not be a dialectical world-view at all.

¹⁰⁸ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁰⁹ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹¹¹ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

“ Having reached Communism, the world will have reached a new phase in its development, of an importance comparable with the appearance of life or of human society. The dialectical contradictions that have occupied the previous stages were social and economic contradictions.***Those that will occupy the next stage will be of a different kind. The new field of relevance is unified humanity and the universe, and in that field there is plenty of room for further dialectical development. But to attempt to foresee that development in detail is to fail to understand the process of dialectical development. “ Man,” said Marx, “ does not set himself a problem until he can solve it ; ” but equally he does not solve problems until he has set them.” ¹¹²

Marx himself criticised Hegel for the finality in his scheme of things. To say that Marx held the class struggle to be eternal is absurd seeing that he clearly envisaged a class-less society. Engels expressly exempted primitive tribal society from class-conflict.¹¹³ But dialectical development is claimed to be a much wider thing which applies to nature and thought as well as history. Classes, like the State, are not permanent facts in Marxist theory. Bertrand Russell in his brilliant chapter has not taken the trouble to understand the Marxian point of view in many important particulars. In this he resembles most critics of Marx.

6

Weak Links in Marxism

At this stage the writer may be called upon to define his own points of criticism against Marxist thought. There are weak links in Marxism which theoreticians have neglected in their presentation of Marxist ideas. They will be set forth here

¹¹² Aspects, pp. 121-22.

¹¹³ Lenin, Teaching of Karl Marx, p. 17.

very briefly and baldly because the object of this analysis is not a criticism or refutation of Marx.

At the very outset may be noticed the fact that Marxists insist on a division of all philosophy into the two camps of Idealism and Materialism rigidly distinct from each other. This is of course a matter of nomenclature, perhaps arbitrary. But this becomes important when Marxism is seen to be a combination of elements from both groups—a grafting on of idealist dialectic outlook on materialist assumptions. This conjunction which Berdyaev called an attempt to reconcile what is not reconcilable, may theoretically be claimed as an example of synthesis, but Marxism finds itself in practical difficulties in maintaining its logical balance.

In the second place, the idea that dialectic rules the world is an assumption which is of course a matter of faith only. Hegel is responsible for it but the hypothesis that the development of the world is according to the dialectic pattern remains a hypothesis which attracts some and repels others. The operation of these laws in physical nature especially is rather difficult to trace in spite of Engels' effort in the *Anti-Dühring*. The reader may be referred to the elaboration of the objections to the triadic process by Prof. Carritt in the *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism* (pp. 135-40).

Similarly, the theory that the logical process of dialectics is applicable to history has been challenged, as a relic of idealistic system-making. Russell asks the pertinent question—is the world logical? Hegel believed this to be true but how far is the assumption valid? It may be admitted that a philosophy of social development must be present in every history but the suspicion persists that this may only be an abstraction after all. Engels argued in his *Anti-Dühring* that dialectic development is established by historical observation. "The process" (in the *Capital*) "is a historical one and if it is at the same time a dialectical process, this is not Marx's fault."¹¹⁴ Again, "this

¹¹⁴ *Anti-Dühring*, p. 152.

fact " (in the Capital) " is a proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law." ¹¹⁵ But undoubtedly the dialectic bias permeates the Marxist mind, in its approach to history and its study of facts.

Even if the dialectical hypothesis is accepted there will remain the problem of its actual application and the selection of the field of relevance. Ingenious minds may use the triadic pattern to prove different things and such interpretations may very well differ from each other. Carritt asks the question ¹¹⁶ why " change must always arise from the interaction of contraries " because opposite and dissimilar elements may very well be termed contraries arbitrarily. " The mind tends to feign symmetrical patterns in nature."

Historical Materialism asserts that all past history is a history of class struggles.¹¹⁷ But this assumption has not been definitely proved and not adequately established by a sufficient analysis of the past. The hypothesis may be true in a very general sense but, as Cole pointed out in a recent book,¹¹⁸ all ordinary history or what is usually called history practically remains to a very large extent directly unaffected by this explanation of historic causation. The Marxists envisage history in terms of ages and centuries while the ordinary scale is much less comprehensive. Another point may be made in this connection. The Materialist Conception of History concludes that the transition from stage to stage in history involves a leap or break. The Communists translate this into the dogma of the necessity of a violent revolution. But past experience cannot always be interpreted in this way. The transformation of feudalism was not universally a violent process.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹¹⁶ *Aspects*, p. 137.

¹¹⁷ *Communist Manifesto*, by Marx and Engels.

¹¹⁸ *What Marx Really Meant*.

In the last place may be urged the drawback from which Marxism suffers in relation to the terminology in use. Dialectical Materialism abounds in terms which are not precise enough. Prof. Lévy laid stress on this aspect in one of his articles.¹¹⁹ "To scientific people accustomed to a language of precision that stands to them in striking contrast to the vague phraseology of much that passes for philosophy, the terminology of Dialectical Materialism with its 'unity of opposites,' its 'contradiction of contradictions,' its 'quantity changing into quality,' and so on is a trifle quaint." The same objection may also be put forward by professional technical philosophers, and not merely by scientists. The example of loose use of terms was set by Engels himself when in opposition to dialectics he wrote 'metaphysical' to mean a static conception of the world. "If the Dialectic implies the interrelation and interconnection of all aspects of thought and action, then surely the dialectical method to be effective must provide side by side with it a detailed process of precise analysis that will lay out in clarified form these very connections. Otherwise it is less a method than a hint."¹²⁰ Marx and his disciples produced many specific studies of modern situations but a methodology has not been elaborated or defined. The dialectic is not definite or precise enough for scientific analysis as commonly accepted.

These are according to the present writer some of the important objections which impair the intellectual strength of the Marxist case to a very considerable extent.

¹¹⁹ Aspects, p. 1.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

IV

THE GENERAL LINE OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

1

Philosophy in Soviet Russia

No picture of Dialectical Materialism to-day can be adequate without some account of contemporary developments in the history of that philosophy in Soviet Russia. The most important event in this connection was the formulation, after five years of intense discussion and controversy, of what is called the General Line of Soviet Philosophy. 1931 saw numerous publications in Russia on the subject which are as yet not available in this country. Berdyaev however, one of the most famous of the intellectual emigrés, wrote in 1933 a very searching and severe attack on Soviet philosophy which has since been included in his book "The End of Our Time," to which frequent reference would have to be made.

Recent development in Soviet philosophy is a two-sided movement. It is naturally a rationalisation of recent revolutionary experience because Dialectical Materialism maintains that the connection between a philosophy and the social conditions from which it arises is intimate and necessary. At the same time, it also represents a more serious and more intensive study of the classics of Marxism.

A very striking feature of the philosophical development in the U. S. S. R. is the suppression of individual personality and genius in the field of philosophy. Philosophical work is under the higher direction of a 'collective' and is considered to be a part of the Five Years Plan, an adjunct of the administration. There is and has been no parallel to this in historical experience.

Marx, Engels and Lenin constitute the authoritative source of dialectical tradition. Lenin, unlike his two predecessors, was

not really a student of philosophy but with characteristic energy he produced a big philosophical treatise as part of his polemical fight. His "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" is hailed in Russia as the completest development of Marxist philosophy in the epoch of imperialism and revolution. Stalin has not yet blossomed into a philosopher but the term Stalinism has already been heard of ¹²¹ and he with the Central Committee of the Communist Party defines from time to time the philosophical tasks before the movement. The most urgent tasks before contemporary Soviet philosophy have been defined as the exposure of the heresies of the 'Party-deviations' and the intellectual stimulation of the construction of socialism in the U. S. S. R.

2

Accentuation of Marxism

Marxism is thus being developed even to-day in Russia and possibly certain aspects will be accentuated in the process. But it must be admitted that the General Line of Soviet Philosophy is carrying on the spiritual tradition of Marx. Two things are being specially emphasised now.

In the first place, there is great stress on the necessity for philosophy. Possibly there is even a little glamour in Russia for intellectual distinction to be attained in this realm. But from a practical point of view also, the importance of philosophy is recognised. In particular, 'deviations' in the past and present Party-history are now increasingly connected with philosophical 'errors.' Thus Bernstein is held to have been influenced by Kantian criticism ; Plekhanov was a victim of Menshevik idealism ; and Bukharin is said to have represented mechanical materialism.

Secondly, there is the dogma of the union of Theory and Practice. Pure objectiveness and abstract theoretical speculations

¹²¹ Hecker, Moscow Dialogues.

are denounced as bourgeois. Marx held that knowledge comes from action. Thus the knowledge of nature is only made real by the act of production. Marx defined the task of philosophy to be not to understand but to change the world.¹²²

Lenin declared that the business of philosophy was to direct and organise revolutionary leadership.¹²³

"Revolutionary theory," writes Stalin, "is a synthesis of the working-class movement throughout all lands—the generalised experience. Of course theory out of touch with revolutionary practice is like a mill that runs without any grist, just as practice gropes in the dark, unless revolutionary theory throws a light on the path.*** It (theory) and it alone can give the movement confidence, guidance, an understanding of the inner links between events, it alone can enable those engaged in the practical struggle to understand the whence and the whither of the working-class movement."¹²⁴

The gulf between all this and the current ideas about the functions of intellect and philosophy is unbridgeable. Marx broke away from the intellectualist tradition. "The proletarian commune which he was striving to found could not remain tied to the pure thought which is so essentially a part of the bourgeois state."¹²⁵ Soviet Russia is therefore treading a new path in the history of intellectual development of nations.

The unity of thought and practice does not mean their identity. It is to be understood in a social context. The action inseparable from thought is action connected with that thinking and not necessarily the action taken by the people who actually do the thinking. Thus it seems to mean close connection between pure thought and economic and political action. The

¹²² Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*.

¹²³ "Without a revolutionary theory there cannot be a revolutionary movement" (Lenin). Quoted in Stalin, "Leninism," Vol. I, p. 94.

¹²⁴ Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 94.

¹²⁵ *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, p. 119.

Dialectical Materialist openly avows this connection, to him the unity is explicit.¹²⁶

“Theory not checked by practice becomes a dogma, a scholastic formula, and any claim that a theory does not need such checking is already an idealist heresy. Dialectical Materialism is a unity of theory and practice. Practice is guided by theory, theory is checked by practice ”¹²⁷

3

Mechanistic Materialism

As the heir of Marxian thought, the General Line of Soviet Philosophy fought a struggle on two fronts against two deviations—mechanistic materialism (this was the name applied by the General Line to the philosophy of Stepanov and Prof. Timiriazev and others) and dialectical idealism (represented by Deborin and Karev). The danger from the former was the loss of dialectic ; from the latter, the loss of materialism. The balance of the middle path is maintained by the General Line which thus claims to be the true form of Marx's Dialectical Materialism. The claim of the other two trends to the name of Marxism is denied.

The student of history will recognise at once the parallel between this and party struggles in Russia. As a matter of fact, the ‘left deviation’ of Trotsky is connected in Russia with Deborin's Menshevik idealism and the ‘right deviation’ of Bukharin with Stepanov's mechanistic materialism. The Party ‘deviations’ were not indeed caused by the philosophical ‘errors’¹²⁸—that admission would amount to idealistic explanation but there is close interconnection between the two lines of development.

¹²⁶ Aspects, pp. 151-52.

¹²⁷ Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-87.

¹²⁸ Berdyaev in “The End of Our Time,” p. 218, makes this mistake.

The first struggle in point of time was waged against mechanistic materialism which used the dialectic language but was akin to the old orthodox materialism rejected by Marx and Engels.

Mechanicism¹²⁹ explains movement by external shocks and development by the action of environment. History is subordinated to what Marx called 'productive forces' as in the famous book on Historical Materialism by Bukharin. Mechanical materialism is determinist and in a way therefore fatalistic. Behavior, animal and human, tends to be explained purely by reflexes (Pavlov, Watson). Naturalism is established in sociology and Marxism tends to become for this school a pure science—a Wissenschaft and not a Weltanschauung (as with Struve, Hilferding).

Hilferding in his Finance-Capital wrote thus :¹³⁰

"The theory of Marxism*** is free from judgments of value. It is therefore, false to conceive, as is widely done, intra et extra muros, that Marxism and socialism are as such identical.*** Insight into the validity of Marxism which includes insight into the necessity of socialism is by no means a matter of value judgments." This extreme fatalist attitude is the logical outcome of mechanistic Marxism.

Mechanicism in short reduces complex phenomena in even biology and consciousness to the laws of motion in mechanics. The problem it recognises is thus the problem of reduction, to mechanical laws, of all phenomena. Those who reject this point of view are by it dubbed vitalists in contempt.

But this is not Marxism since it lacks or neglects dialectic.¹³¹ Hence the General Line maintains that matter is not inert but spontaneously moving due to internal conflict or contradiction. This has been given the name of autodynamism. History

¹²⁹ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*

¹³⁰ Quoted in Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

¹³¹ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*

or rather the historical superstructures are based on the productive relations more than on pure productive forces—on class, rather than on technics. The General Line is activist, and not strictly determinist; it does not give undue importance to reflexes and naturalism. Mechanicism, it is said, fails to recognise quality or explain the emergence of a new society. It looks back to the old materialism of the Enlightenment and is in spirit prior to Marx and Hegel.

Mechanistic materialism recognises in the world only sameness, but no difference. The nature of a thing, it may be answered,¹³² depends on the relations of the different elements and not on the parts merely. The idea that motion is of external origin would establish the reality of matter without motion which is denied by the General Line which defines motion as an urge in, an attribute of, matter. Bukharin held that there were states of rest when the conflicts of opposing forces are concealed; any change of forces disturbs the equilibrium and this determines the motion of the system. This is objected to because here “the qualitative aspect in evolution disappears since mechanics knows only quantities;” because the theory of equilibration knows only ‘rest’ and ‘motion’ which is quite different from ‘immanent movement;’ because dialectic contradiction is here reduced to mechanistic collision; and because the inner activity is here replaced by the working of outer forces.¹³³

Again, “the mechanists simply reduce the subjective to the objective. The object is the real, not the subject. In this respect they reason very much like the idealists who reduce everything to the subject, denying a real, objective world.” The Dialectical Materialists believe in what is called the unity of the subject and the object whatever that might mean.¹³⁴

Out of all these intricacies one thing clearly emerges. Mechanistic materialism, or the philosophy which has thus been

¹³² Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66.

characterised by its critics rather, is probably a distortion of and deviation from Marx. It is more akin to orthodox materialism.

4

Dialectical Idealism

The philosopher Deborin was a Menshevik in his early days but after the Revolution he was absorbed into the Bolshevik Party and given a high post by Lenin himself in the teaching organisation. He was the most prominent theoretical leader in the fight against mechanistic materialism from 1925 to 1929 and in his articles in the well known periodical "Under the Banner of Marxism" he did much for the recognition of the dialectical principles on all hands. From 1929 however he with Karev and other followers came to be accused of deviation from the philosophy of Marx in their turn.

In 1929, Stalin made a pronouncement to the effect that Soviet philosophy was lagging behind the socialist development in Russia, that consequently it was now imperative for theory to catch up practice. This was followed in 1930 by a letter from Mitin, Ralsevitch and other members of the Institute of Red Professors pointing out the defects of the existing philosophical leadership, safely entrenched in the Communist Academy. It was an attack on the Deborin School and was taken up by the *Pravda*. Towards the end of 1930, Deborin and his friends were deprived of the philosophical leadership and the General Line took definite form.¹³⁵

The Deborin group was accused of tending to cease to be materialists. They were forgetting the distinction between Hegel and Marx and were tainted with Idealism. Abstract dialecticians rather than revolutionary fighters, Deborin and his friends were thought to have separated philosophy from actual politics. The

mechanicists believed that religion for example would disappear automatically and consequently did not actively participate in the crusade against it; the different outlook of Deborin & Co. produced the same effect—aloofness from the anti-religious struggle. Deborin, it was said, had stopped at Plekhanov and was no better than a Menshevik idealist.¹³⁶

Mitin and his friends charged the Deborin group with formalism which was defined¹³⁷ to consist in "the break which occurs in theoretic work between the form and its contents where the logical is separated from the historical, where philosophic theory is transformed into a sequence of ideas altogether separated from the complete, historical, social class situation." The dialectical idealists were also accused of Trotskyite sympathies. They had seemed to prefer Hegel to Marx, Plekhanov to Lenin, Trotsky to Stalin.

The fall of Deborin marks what is called the New Turn on the Philosophic Front in Russia.¹³⁸ The programme which has been put forward in the name of the new leaders is ambitious and has yet to stand the test. It includes items like—relentless struggle against philosophic idealism; continued fight against mechanical materialism; intensive study of the classics of Marxism; and philosophic defence of the current policy of the Soviet Government.

5

Dangers of the General Line

The General Line of the Soviet Philosophy has achieved a double success. It has triumphed over the opposition of the 'deviations' in Russia and it has demonstrated its right to be regarded as the orthodox version of Marxism. But in order to

¹³⁶ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*

¹³⁷ Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-85.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, Ch. XY.

appreciate its present position, its dangers and weaknesses have to be considered.

(1) Marxism was not conceived by Marx as a closed system of thought but rather as a 'world outlook' as Engels actually called it. The founders therefore did not expound Dialectical Materialism in heavy treatises; they rather wrote on topics of interest from a special angle or vision. The philosophy also developed through discussion and controversies, but it was not erected into a system. Engels poked fun at system-making in Germany and observed that while other nations were satisfied with simple commonplace nonsense, Germans liked sublime nonsense.¹³⁹ Marxism, it was usually maintained, cannot be expounded as a set of propositions or learned as a dogma.¹⁴⁰

But now a tendency may easily arise towards a systematic presentation ending in a rigid Leninist system. The idea of orthodoxy becomes a possible danger when the orthodox can invoke to their aid the ruling power, as is the case in Russia. Soviet philosophy may thus become something like a theology the chief preoccupation of which is heresy-hunting. Berdyaev compares the General Line with Catholic scholasticism always alert against modernist contamination. Two facts make this a real danger.

In the first place, controversies which are allowed in Russia rage round one central point only—what was the real meaning of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Quotations from the founders are regarded as final and decisive arguments. The traditional idea of philosophy from Plato downwards has been the search after truth rather than the defence of orthodoxy by quotations, except in scholasticism perhaps. Philosophy, ideally speaking, is problematical rather than dogmatic in character.

In the second place, the victorious party in the philosophic fight in Russia can now use political power to silence and suppress

¹³⁹ Anti-Dühring, p. 11.

¹⁴⁰ Dobb, On Marxism To-day, pp. 21-22.

critics. The 'deviations' do not get the chance to continue their line of intellectual activity. In politics, Trotsky gave an interpretation of Leninist strategy (backed with quotations from Lenin's writings)¹⁴¹ which was rejected by the Party and the suppression of Trotskyite literature then naturally gave rise to uneasiness. The same thing might take place in the field of philosophy. Marx, Engels and Lenin had the freedom to think as individuals which may not now be possible, for men who consider themselves their followers, within Russia. This is the result of the fact that for the first time there is a Marxist State to enforce its own interpretation of Marxism.

Thus the corrective of criticism within the movement which has played such a healthy role in the history of Marxism may now be lost. Soviet Russia may develop lines of policy with which Marxism must not be tied up at all cost. Plekhanov's fate is instructive. His writings are now held in Russia as tainted and suspect. Yet Lenin once wrote—"no one can become a conscious, real communist without studying—precisely studying—everything written by Plekhanov on philosophy; it is the best of all the international literature of Marxism."¹⁴² Plekhanov is now branded almost as a heretic together with Kautsky and others.

Stalin once outlined the dangers of degeneration¹⁴³ which would face the Party if capitalism got stabilised now. The same dangers would threaten the General Line of Soviet Philosophy, in the absence of healthy criticism.

(2) The technical flaw of Leninist philosophy is considered by Berdyaev to lie in what he calls its double criterion of truth and lack of a theory of value.¹⁴⁴ This is not the place to discuss this problem, but it must be mentioned as the chief criticism of the General Line from an academic standpoint.

¹⁴¹ Trotsky, *Russian Revolution*, Vol. III, Appendix 2.

¹⁴² Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁴³ Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. I, pp. 301-07.

¹⁴⁴ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35.

Pragmatism was first held up but then pulled down by Lenin. "Lenin in his controversy with the empirico-critics insisted that to take relativism as the basis of one's theory of knowledge is to condemn oneself to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry."¹⁴⁵ All those tendencies were of course dismissed as bourgeois. Lenin's criterion of truth was twofold—agreement with the real and with proletarian class-consciousness.¹⁴⁶ This of course postulates a special coincidence between the subjective and objective aspects of truth which is naturally questioned by critics with vehemence. Berdyaev called this objective-subjective criterion a 'messianic faith' in the proletariat and not rational knowledge. Unfortunately for himself, Berdyaev like so many Idealists, after this acute criticism, and after condemning Leninism for its habit of judging all ideas of the past by the one standard of treatment of the working-class, proceeds himself to talk about 'ageless values' (p. 258) and of the 'eternal truth' of religion (p. 256).

(3) Marx-Leninist materialism is considered by many, including some Marxists, to be 'veering towards idealism.' Berdyaev called it a 'psycho-physical parallelism' and 'emphasised idealism' (pp. 225, 244). In it even proletariat consciousness is not empirical but ideal (p. 235). Matter with its property of autodynamism, as has been said, becomes almost a myth with divine properties, in the philosophy of the General Line. This is an important technical danger but one which is inherent in Dialectical Materialism. From the inception of their movement, Marx and Engels conceived their philosophical task to be a combination of dialectics with materialism and the inevitable difficulties of the undertaking did not deter them.

¹⁴⁵ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

¹⁴⁶ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

V

CONCLUSION

1

Inconsistencies in Marxist Literature

To a student of Dialectical Materialism, several conclusions suggest themselves at the end of any survey of the subject, even if detailed criticism be ruled out from the scope of the review. They refer to the character of Marxist thought and literature.

Inconsistencies occur in the presentations of the Marxist case, as has been pointed out by many critics. But two points are usually overlooked in this connection.

Firstly, Marxism is not a fixed closed system but an outlook. Isolated texts from a literature covering decades may conflict with each other but the important thing is not such conflict but the presence of a general attitude which is unmistakable. The spirit is the chief point and passages from different books may have their relative weight. 'It' (Marxian thought) "cannot be neatly cut from its highly charged historical context and examined exclusively in the light of its verbal inconsistencies" ¹⁴⁷

Secondly, the fact must be remembered that Marxian literature is polemic in character and the emphasis differs according to the position attacked. In all controversial literatures this trait is present and this is especially true of all Marx's writings. He was waging battle against numerous tendencies and every passage almost has its peculiar context and immediate polemical objects. Marx had to emphasise different points in different connections. Thus against Hegelians, he advocated materialism; against orthodox materialists,

¹⁴⁷ Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, p. 20.

he stressed human activity. Against fatalists, he proclaimed man as the maker of his history ; against utopians, he emphasised the conditioning factors. Against ethical socialism, Marx pointed out the fact of the class war ; against syndicalist advocates of pure industrial action, he insisted that the struggle is always political.¹⁴⁸

2

The Conception of Philosophy

The term Philosophy may be understood in two senses—the technical discipline of the intellect in search of Truth advancing step by step in rational logical thought ; and a comprehensive view of life and the world. Marxism in reality inclines to this second conception of philosophy.

Marx in his Theses on Feuerbach defined the purpose of philosophy to be not interpreting but changing the world. This will not be accepted as an aim by traditional philosophy and this is exactly the gulf between Marxism and other philosophies. Thus Hecker describes his subject-matter as a “definite philosophy of life which projects its goal and with the aid of science mobilises the means for attaining these goals*** a classless society and conscious self-direction*** in a commonwealth where the ownership of property is socialised.”¹⁴⁹ Again, “ philosophy is a theory of knowledge derived from actual life, and a theory of action based on the knowledge.”¹⁵⁰

The conception of philosophy here is not technical and this underlying idea in Marxist literature has to be grasped firmly. The consequence is that the issue is never fairly joined when Marxist philosophy is subjected to technical criticism from the standpoint of orthodox philosophy. There can be no proper discussion for want of sufficient common ground.

¹⁴⁸ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁴⁹ Hecker, *Moscow Dialogues*, p. 7.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

"Most philosophical disputes fall within fairly solid bases of common agreement. But there is something fundamental in the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism which distinguishes it from all other philosophical systems which I know," writes Prof. Macmurray,¹⁵¹ "and which establishes a gulf between it and them. It involves a revolution in the conception of philosophy itself."

The philosophy of Marxism therefore does not hesitate to accept a set of assumptions which Berdyaev sums up as follows while calling them cheap dogmatic postulates :¹⁵²

"The material world exists; it exists independently of consciousness, without beginning or end in time or space; there is no being other than this world of matter.*** Knowledge is a true reflection of things;*** the earth was prior to man." And elsewhere—"the world is matter in motion in space and time."¹⁵³

3

The Challenge of Marxism

If the Marxist philosophy is more of a Weltanschauung than an intellectual discipline, the question might naturally be asked as to why any sharp distinction is not drawn by the followers of Marx between the nature of Marxism and that of the other philosophies. Why are other schools of philosophical thought criticised and dismissed by Marxists at all, if they are fundamentally different?

That other philosophies are examples of pure thought is a proposition which is disputed hotly by Marxism which contends that all thought in the domain of social studies is partisan. Marxism admits that it itself is an outlook on the world, but

¹⁵¹ Aspects of Dialectical Materialism, pp. 31-32.

¹⁵² Berdyaev, *The End of Our Time*, pp. 236-37.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

declares that other schools of thought are certainly not more independent or impartial. This is the Marxist challenge and this is probably the most novel feature of Marx's thought. The ordinary philosopher believes that philosophy attains the level of pure thought free from any social reference or bias. The Marxist view in relation to this is thus expressed by Hecker—¹⁵⁴ "Philosophy has always been an attempt to give rational justification either to the past or to the hope for future. Its origins may be found in the social experience of classes aspiring to self-consciousness and power. Thus philosophy is not the product of isolated intellectuals living in leisure." Once again there is fundamental difference between the two conceptions and one can only take sides.

Engels explained the Marxist attitude fully in several passages of the *Anti-Dühring*.

"Dühring calls his philosophy natural because it is derived from things which seem to him quite natural. But why they seem to him quite natural is a question which he does not ask." ¹⁵⁵

"Our ideologist may turn and twist as he likes, but the historical reality which he cast out at the door comes in again at the window and while he may think he is framing a doctrine of morals for all times and for all worlds, he is in fact only making an image of the conservative or revolutionary tendencies of his time." ¹⁵⁶

Engels admitted that exact mathematical sciences obtain certain eternal truths so far as their conclusions are not avowedly hypothetical; class values are not involved in their truth or falsehood, though they may be utilised for class purposes. In biological sciences, there are mostly descriptions, not conclusions. In the historical 'sciences,' there must be class-values and eternal truth cannot be claimed except for isolated

¹⁵⁴ Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁵⁵ *Anti-Dühring*, p. 123.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

facts like a particular occurrence.¹⁵⁷ Philosophy is included in this third group and Engels denied that "any individual whatsoever is in a position to hand out to us the final and ultimate truth."¹⁵⁸

"Really scientific works therefore as a rule avoid such dogmatic and moral expressions as error and truth, while these expressions meet us everywhere in works such as the philosophy of reality," (the title used by Dühring) "in which empty phrasemongering attempts to impose on us as the sovereign result of sovereign thought."¹⁵⁹

Lenin was, as Hecker points out, an uncompromising partisan openly and honestly in philosophy as in politics. He declared that it was absurd to speak of the duty not to take sides, for any one who understands the class struggle must participate in it himself even in the realm of thought, meaning social thought in which philosophy is included.¹⁶⁰

This partisanship characterises, according to the Marxists, not merely history and philosophy but also economics which is often claimed as an objective science by orthodox economists.

"Any economic theory," wrote Bukharin,¹⁶¹ "depends on certain presuppositions having a sociological character.*** The following sociological bases of economic science are characteristic of Marxism—the recognition of the priority of society over the individual; recognition of the historical, temporary nature of any social structure; and finally recognition of the dominant part played by production. The Austrian School" (Bohm-Bawerk), "on the other hand is characterised by extreme individualism in methodology, by an unhistorical point of view, and by its taking consumption as its point of departure."

Economics also is therefore held to be not objective in the sense of transcending class-values. "Marx regarded those who

¹⁵⁷ Anti-Dühring, pp. 102-04.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁰ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁶¹ Bukharin, *Economic Theory of the Leisure Class*, pp. 35-36.

restricted themselves to any objective description of social behaviour in which all notions of 'what ought to be' are ruled out, as apologists of the existing order and of the ideals which social institutions embodied. And those who set up their 'ought to be' as a categorical imperative, in independence of the limiting conditions of the given historical situation, he dismissed as Utopians." ¹⁶²

"The objectivist," wrote Lenin, "who tries to show the necessity of a determinate series of facts, continually runs the risk of degenerating into an apologist of these facts; the materialist lays bare the class oppositions upon which he proceeds to take a stand." ¹⁶³ The challenge of Marxism in the domain of history, philosophy, economics is thus put forward with the greatest persistence.

Why then was Marx hailed as the founder of Scientific, as opposed to Utopian, Socialism? If an impartial transcending of class values is not possible, what becomes of the scientific character of Marxism?

There is some play here on the meaning of science. The Marxist method of analysis is objective and scientific but class values direct the process. Marx's conclusions are claimed to be objective yet partial—objective because class-values are not allowed to cook facts; partial because neutrality is not possible. The Marxists speak of class-values but not class-truths. Thus the dialectic process is a truth; another objective truth is the proposition—"class conflicts give rise to conflicting ideologies." ¹⁶⁴

The method of Marxist analysis is claimed to be scientific in the sense that it is "adequate and efficient to secure its goals." But the goals are presupposed in a way. Its scientific validity depends on adequate realisation of class-purposes for

¹⁶² Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁶³ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁶⁴ Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-100.

which it was formulated ; the distinction lies in its analysis as opposed to Utopian schemes. Marx meant by science in such cases "criticism based on the observable tendencies of social development." ¹⁶⁵

The subject-matter of so-called social sciences differs from that of the natural sciences which do not acquire class-values or prompt class activity. All efforts to develop a social science on the other hand involves a programme of social action to which class-values are attached. To deny this is to rob Marxism of its social content and special appeal to the working class.¹⁶⁶ It is claimed to be scientific and objective only in this sense and not in the same way as mathematics or physics.

4

The Role of Faith

If the analysis of Marxism as presented in the pages above on the basis of quotations from authoritative literature is at all near the truth, the element of faith which permeates the Marxist movement must be fully recognised. Indeed it was chiefly the orthodox German Social Democrats who distorted Marxist ideas into a colourless fatalistic 'scientific' attitude open to serious criticism. As a real objective science, Marxism can hardly bear all criticism. As a *weltanschauung*, it becomes in the last analysis a thing of faith which claims to expose other schools of thought as pseudo-scientific and claims its own analysis to be more objective. At the same time a common basis for mere intellectual discussion disappears and classes are left face to face, in the field of thought as in the actual world.

Marx the man fits in perfectly with this picture of Dialectical Materialism. He was not a pure scholar but also and

¹⁶⁵ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 67.


¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19.

primarily an intense agitator "with a passionate sympathy for the victims of the Industrial Revolution"¹⁶⁷ which is hardly objective according to accepted standards to-day. He was a revolutionist who never concealed his class-approach to problems even in philosophy and economics.¹⁶⁸ Marx never denied his faith for the sake of gaining laurels as a detached scientific intellectual, because he did not believe in such a being so far as studies which touched society were concerned. In individual cases, amongst communists also, almost universally, it is the faith which attracts first, not the philosophy.

It seems to follow from the above that the widespread idea that Communism stands or falls with its philosophy is not literally true. In the last resort the popular idea of Marxism as essentially a series of assumptions, conclusions and suggestions for the revolutionary proletarian movement is correct. The philosophy of Dialectical Materialism however remains of vital interest not merely for explaining origins but also for holding the series together and developing it when necessary.

¹⁶⁷ Lindsay, Karl Marx's Capital, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶⁸ Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 66. It may be noticed that this active side in Marx was not grasped by the 'Orthodox' Marxists of the German Social Democratic Movement who pictured Marx merely as a research scholar in the British Museum.



DAYARĀM'S SĀRADĀ-MĀṄGAL

BY

T. C. DAS GUPTA, M.A., PH.D.

On hearing the princess, the prince said, how shall I remain awake at night, alone? However, I may do so, if you, oh beauty, furnish me with a bedstead (পালঙ্ক) to sit upon, a mosquito-curtain made of silk, and a lighted firebrand for the purpose.

On listening to this all the youthful beauties laughed to their heart's content. They said, oh Dhulākutyā, your attitude is like a dwarf who wishes to catch the moon. A bedstead (partly composed of straw) and an old (worn-out) mosquito-curtain were however given to him and a bejewelled light (before the image of Saraswati). The five princesses shut the door and went away and Dhulākutyā remained awake. When it was midnight, an enchanted sleep (lit. *yoganidrā*) over-powered him making him unable to keep his eyes open.

* Continued from the portion published in the Journal of Letters (C.U.), Vol. XXIII.

শুনিয়া কথার কথা কহেন কুণ্ডর ।

কেমনে জাগিব আমি “ধাকি” একেশ্বর ॥ —“নিশি” C. U. MS. 3780.

বসিতে পালঙ্ক দেহ পাটের মশারি ।

মশাল জালিয়া দেহ জাগিব “সুন্দরি” ॥ —“শর্করি” C. U. MS. 3780.

এত শুনি হাসে যত যুবতীর ঘটা ।

বামন হৈয়া চান্দ ধরিতে চাহ ধলাকুটা ॥

বিচিলির খাট দিল পুরাণ মশারি ।

রত্ন-প্রদীপ জালি দিলেন সুন্দরী ॥

Nevertheless he tried his best to keep himself awake. In order to prevent sleep he cut his fingers from which blood flowed freely giving him intense pain, as if salt was sprinkled over his sore or as if he put his hand into a vase full of hot clarified butter. Still Dhulākutyā could not keep himself awake and fell into magic slumber (lit. yoganidrā).

The goddess Saraswati appeared to partake of the offerings given to her by her votaries clad in blue. At midnight she began to eat the hundred offerings meant for her when suddenly there was the sound of conch shells and the sound 'ulu-ulu' which were all auspicious. This disturbed the sleep of Dhulākutyā who being awake saw what was passing in the room. Thus Dayārām composes the story of Sārādā, which song when heard, bestows on the listener increased wealth and merit.

Alternative reading, C. U. MS. 3780 :—

এই কথা ধূলুকুট্যা বলিল কথারে ।
 রতন প্রদীপ জাল্যা দিল তারপরে ॥
 দ্বারেতে কপাট দিয়া পঞ্চকথা গেল ।
 ধূলুকুট্যা পূজার বাসর জাগ্যা রৈল ॥
 রাত্র হৈল হুই প্রহর শুন তার পরে ।
 বোগনিদ্রা কুণ্ডর জাগিতে না পারে ॥
 অতএব অঙ্গুলি কাটি কৈল রক্তপাত ।
 দ্বিগুণ অনল যেন জ্বলে উঠে হাত ॥
 জলা যা জ্বলে যেমন তায় দিল হুন ।
 যত-পাত্র "হাত" যেন "নিবন্ধে" আগুন ॥—"উঠে" C. U. MS. 3780 .

"জলন্ত" do.

এত বুদ্ধে ধূলুকুট্যা বস্তুছে বাসরে ।
 তথাপিহ বোগনিদ্রা জাগিতে না পারে ॥
 সেবকের "পূজা নিতে" দেবী সরস্বতী ।—"দ্রষ্ট দেখি" C. U. MS. 3780.

The prince saw the goddess by virtue of the merits of his previous birth but he could not recognise the divine mother and consequently began to think thus: "Is she a Dākini or a Joginī (an attendant female-deity of mother Kālī) who has come here incognito?" He thought that his ill-luck was going to ruin them. Certainly the princesses would kill him in the execution-ground. "What shall I do now or whither shall I flee" was the thought that crossed the mind of the prince. There was even no way of escape as the door for exit was under lock and key. Like Damayantī my ten kinds of misfortunes are going to complete now. However, let whatever come, I shall beat this vile woman, even if I die for it. A man is sure to die as he is a born creature. He took the cord made of straw to bind the goddess. Dhulakutyā then held the two arms of the goddess and queried in this way:—"What is your name and where do you live? Are you not afraid to eat the offerings meant for the goddess? Oh the wife of a thief! you dare to commit theft even in the temple of a goddess? Just with

নীলবস্ত্র পরিধান নিশাভাগ রাতি ॥

চারিদিগে নানা দ্রব্য নানা আয়োজন ।

(শত উপচারে দ্রব্য নানা আয়োজন ॥)—C. U. MS. 3780.

শঙ্খধ্বনি হুলাহুলি হৈল "অকস্মাতে" ।—"আচম্বিতে" C. U. MS. 3780.

নিজ্রাভঙ্গে ধূলুকুট্য পাইল দেখিতে ॥

সারদা-চরিত্র দয়ারাম বিরচিত ।

ধন-"পুণ্যে" বাঢ়ে লোক যেরা শুনে গীত ॥—"পুত্রে" C. U. MS. 3780.

পূর্ব-"জন্মে" কুণ্ডর পাইল দরশন ।—"দিগে" C. U. MS. 3780.

চিনিতে না পারে থাকে ভাবে মনে মন ॥

ডাকিনী যোগিনী "কিবা" আইলে মায়ারূপে ।—"কোন" C. U. MS. 3780.

মনে করে "নিবন্ধে" ষটিল আজি মোকে ॥—"নিবান্ধী" C. U. MS. 3780.

মশানে কাটিবে "মোরে" রাজার কুমারী ।—"মায়" C. U. MS. 3780.

the dawn you will be awarded the meet punishment for your bad deed.

The prince tied the hands of the goddess tightly, caned her and made her sit down before him. Besides, she was bound to a leg of the bedstead in a way which reminded one of the binding of Krishna to the twin Arjun trees of the legends.

The goddess (Kokilāhini or Saraswati) wept and said to the prince that in all her life she had never been put to so much ignominy. Vishnu's wife (Saraswati) said, "Better you ask of me a boon than bind me down in a way which causes me intense pain as if I am dying. My name is Saraswati and I am honoured all the world over. It is through my grace that man may sit in the assembly of the learned men. Even the gods Indra, Chandra, Brahmā, Varuna, and Pavana worship me with much ceremony. The princesses worshipped

কি করিব কুখ্য বাইব কথা হৈল ভারী ॥

পালাইতে পথ নাহি কপাট কুলুপ ।

দশ দশা পূর্ণ হৈল দময়ন্তী-স্বরূপ ॥

মারিব মাগীকে কিবা আপনি সে মরি ।

জন্ম হৈলে জগতে যমের অধিকারী ॥

বিচলির দড়ি নিল বান্ধিবার তরে ।

ধলাকুট্যা ধরিল দেবীর ছুটি করে ॥

কি নাম তোর মাগী কোন্ দেশে ঘর ।

দেবতার দ্রব্য খাউ বুকে নাহি ডর ॥

দেবতার ঘরে চুরি "চোরের" রমণী ।—“পরের” C. U. MS. 3780.

পাইবে এহার শাস্তি পুহাইলে রজণী ॥

ছুটি কর দড়ি করি বান্ধিল কুণ্ডর ।

মারিয়া বেতের বাড়ি বসাইল গোচর ॥

খাটের খুরায় বান্ধে ক্ষমা নাহি মানে ।

কৃষ্ণকে বান্ধিল বেন বমল-অৰ্জুনে ॥

me with much devotion for which I graciously partook of the offerings. You call me a thief, but I am not so. Thus I relate to you the troubles of a thief, in bygone days:—‘The god Narayana lived in the house of Nanda (the milkman) and got the appellation of cream-thief (ননীচোর). He again stole the saris of the milkmaids near Govardhan hill.

‘The lord being cursed by a chaste lady was once turned into a stone. The recollection of the stories gives pleasure to me. Thus you see even the gods sometimes do acts which are not commendable, but their words are always infallible as the sage Śuka opined in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa. So, my child, untie my bonds and ask a boon from me. Let your fame and fortune increase through ages. I am just going to my husband god Vishnu, as further delay will enrage my lord. I remind you of the case of the sage Jaratkāru of the

কান্দিয়া কুণ্ডে কন কোকিল-বাহিনী ।

জন্মিয়া এমন হুঃখ কত নাঞি জানি ॥

বিষু-প্রিয়া বলে বাছা বর মাগ্যা লেহ ।

বন্ধনে পরাণ “যায়” মোরে ছাড়্যা দেহ ॥—“কাটে” C. U. MS. ৩৭৪০.

সরস্বতী মোর নায় সর্বলোকে পূজে ।

“মোর কৃপা হৈলে” বৈসে পণ্ডিত-সমাজে ॥

—“বলি হেন বীর” C. U. MS. ৩৭৪০.

সত্য ত্রেতা দ্বাপরে পূজিল দেবগণ ॥—C. U. MS. ৩৭৪০.

alt. read.

সভে তারা পূজে মোরে নানা আয়োজনে ॥

ইন্দ্র চন্দ্র ব্রহ্মা আদি বরুণ পবনে ।

পূজিল রাজার কণ্ঠা নানা উপহার ।

অতএব হইল ইচ্ছা বড়ই আমার ॥

চোর বলা বল বাপু চোর আমি নই ।

চোরের “বড়ই দায়” পূর্ব-কথা কই ॥—“বনিতা বটে” C. U. MS. ৩৭৪০.

Mahābhārata story who is wellknown to have abandoned his wife being displeased with her conduct.’”

Dhulākutyā said, “Oh mother, you have spoken too much. Now give up your hope of life. You have troubled me enough these twelve years. Now you should feel the consequences of it. If you promise that I shall henceforth acquire knowledge in all the six Śāstras (branches of learning) and shall acquire proficiency in the Bhāgavata which is like the divine cow Surabhi (*i.e.*, as Surabhi supplies a constant flow of milk so Bhāgavata supplies a perennial flow of devotion). Besides, you will always do my biddings and appear before me when I shall want you to do so.” The goddess agreed to give the desired boon and besides swore to keep her promise by touching the (sacred) Tulasi leaves. This finished, the prince untied the bonds of the goddess by uttering the name of god Hari and being let loose the mother Saraswati returned to her abode at Baikuntha (her heaven).

নন্দালয়ে ননী-চোরা নাম নারায়ণ ।

গোপীদের বস্ত্র-চোরা গিরি-গোবর্দ্ধন ॥

শুনিতে সে সব কথা স্তম্ভ লাগে মনে ।

শিলারূপ হৈল প্রভু সতীর বচনে ॥

দেবতার কথা “সিদ্ধ” কৰ্ম্ম “সিদ্ধ” নহে ।—“সত্য”, “সত্য” C. U. MS. 3780.

শ্রীভাগবত দেখ শুক মুনি কহে ॥

বন্ধন খুলিয়া বাছা মাগ্যা লেহ বর ।

যশোলক্ষ্মী বাচু তোর যুগযুগান্তর ॥

alt. read.

যশকীর্তি জগত ঘূষিবে নিরন্তর ।—C. U. MS. 3780.

বৈকুণ্ঠেতে যাই আমি বিষ্ণু-সন্নিধানে

বিলম্ব দেখিলে প্রভু “দোষ দিবে কেনে ।”

—“ক্রোধ হবে মনে” C. U. MS. 3784.

জরৎকার মুনির কথা কেবা নাহি জানে ।

ভার্যাকে করিল ত্যাগ ভারত পুরাণে ॥

Thus, the night ended and let all utter the name of god Hari at the top of your voice by way of finishing the night's episode. He who hears this story and worships the goddess Sāradā (Saraswati) sits among the society of learned men in joy. Dayārām Dās says, Oh mother Saraswati ! excuse my shortcomings and dispel my miseries due to misdirected wisdom and intelligence.

In the morning the princess Umā came to the Pāthśālā with her almanac and manuscripts. Not knowing what had

ধলাকুট্যা বলে মাতা কথা হৈল গাঢ় ।

এইবার আপনি প্রাণের আশা ছাড় ॥

বড় দুঃখ দিলে তুমি দ্বাদশ বৎসর ।

উচিত করিব শাস্তি “শুন তার পর ॥”—“শুনহ উত্তর” C. U. MS. 3780.

ষট্শাস্ত্রে বিদ্যা “পাবো সত্য কর সাতে ।”

—“দিবে আজ্ঞা কর যোরে” C. U. MS. 3780.

(তবে মাতা ছাড়্যা আমি দিবগো তোমারে ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

স্বরভি স্বরূপ যেন শ্রীভাগবতে ॥

উঠিবে বসিবে মাতা আমার বচনে ।

স্মরণ করিলে দেখা দিবে সেইখানে ॥

যেখন যে হয় মনে মাগ্যা লেহ বর ।

এত বলি সরস্বতী করিল উত্তর ॥

(এত শুনি সরস্বতি দিলেন উত্তর ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

সত্য করি সাখী কৈল “তুলসী সদলে ।”—“তুলসীর দলে” C. U. MS. 3780

শ্রীহরি বলিয়া সে বন্ধন খুল্যা দিলে ॥

বৈকুণ্ঠেতে গেলেন মাতা কোকিল-বাহিনী ।

পূর্ণ করা বল হরি পোহাইল রজনী ॥

এই গীত যেন শুনেন সারদাকে পূজে ।

সেই লোক স্নেহে বৈসে পণ্ডিত-সমাজে ॥

দয়্যারাম দাস বলে ক্ষম দেবী সরস্বতী ।

দুঃখ দূর কর মাতা কুজ্ঞান কুমতি ॥

passed about the offerings at night she took everything to be in proper order and distributed the remnants (of the offerings) to all. In the meantime the girl Bimalā spread out the dust (on the floor) and begged a piece of chalk from the Brahman preceptor. The five princesses sat together and began to read when their faces glowed like the sun. The girls wore on their beautiful persons golden ornaments set with costly gems of various kinds. The Brāhman (guru) at that time elicited a promise (from the fair girl Bimalā to follow his advice implicitly) and bestowed a cloth (? alternative reading—হস্ত hand and not বস্ত্র cloth) on her beautiful person.

রজনী প্রভাতে পাজী “পুথি” হাতে—“খড়ি” C. U. MS. 3780.

পড়িতে আইল উমা।

না জানি প্রমাদ দেবীর প্রসাদ

বাটিয়া “দিলেন রাশা ॥”—“বলে লেহনা” C. U. MS. 3780.

বিছাইয়া ধূল। বসিল বিমলা

ব্রাহ্মণে মাঁগেন খড়ি। *

* Alternative reading after “ব্রাহ্মণে মাঁগেন খড়ি” to the end of “কি বলিবে মাতাপিতা” :—

“শ্রীগুরু চরণে সীমন্তিনীগণে

সভে আছে কর জুড়ি ॥

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বসি পঞ্চজন করিল পঠন

শ্রীমুখা ॥ জিনিয়া ভান্ন ॥

নানা রত্ন মণি পরে সীমন্তিনী

সভে স্বর্ণ অলঙ্কার।

সত্য কর ধনী সেই দ্বিজমণি

শ্রীঅঙ্গে বস্ত্র দিল তার ॥

The Brahmin further said to all the five princesses, "Here your education will not be complete and for this you will have to sojourn in foreign lands." The five girls then left the place by giving their consent to the proposal.

The girls (particularly one girl বিমলা) afterwards repented of their promise over the proposal of their guru. They thought "What a stigma to our family we have brought by such a foolish act and what will our parents think of us when they will hear of this thing. We are after all girls and so are fated to live our lives in the abode of others (as wives). We promised, surely being actuated by the hope of the grace (boon) of the goddess Saraswati. Let the divine

ইথায় না হবে বিদেশ বিত্তা পাবে
বিহারিবে পঞ্চজনে ।
পঞ্চ রমণী চলে সীমন্তিনী
সত্য কর্যা তার সনে ॥

গুরু বাক্য শুনি ভাবে সীমন্তিনী
বিবম হইল কথা ।
কলঙ্কের ডালি কুলে দিলাম কালী
কি বলিবে মাতাপিতা ॥

শরদ শোশি তহু ত্রিমুখ জিনি ভাহু
সুবেশ দির্ব্ব অলঙ্কার ।
সর্ত্য করি ধনি সেই দ্বিজমনি
ত্রীঅঙ্গে হস্ত দিল তার ॥

বাড়িতে না হবে বিদেশে বিত্তা হবে
বিহরহ পঞ্চজনে ।
চাপিয়া তরণি চল ত্রীমন্তিনি
সোভ্যা কর মোর সনে ॥

Now hear something about the girls. The boat and the helm were decorated with gems and this made the girls very happy. Listen now how the illusion or deceit was caused by Sāradā to the elopers. The Brāhman got down from the boat leaving it moored to the bank. "Oh fair girls," he said to them, "you are advised to start at an auspicious moment. God has granted a boat to our liking. Before leaving the house you five fair girls are all to perambulate around your parents (thereby bowing to them indirectly to avoid suspicion) and then carefully (*i.e.*, stealthily) to leave the house. Bring with you some money to defray expenses on the way

“লজ্জিল” কথার মন কে করিবে মানা।—“মজিল” C. U. MS. 3780.

“কাঞ্চনে কাঞ্চন মিশ্যা গেল কাঁচা সোণা ॥”

(কাচে যেন কাঞ্চন মিশায় কাঁচা সোনা।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

কবুল করিল কথার যাব সন্ধ্যাকালে।

পক্ষরাজ তরঙ্গী প্রস্তুত কর জলে ॥

জানিল কথার মন কোকিল-বাহিনী।

বিশ্বকর্মা “ডাকিয়া পান দিলেন আপনি ॥”

—“দিল পান বিষ্ণুর ঘরনি ॥” C. U. MS. 3780.

মাণিক্য-খচিত ডিঙ্গা করিবে নিৰ্ম্মাণ।

পবনেতে উড়ে যেন পক্ষের সমান ॥

বিশ্বকর্মা এত শুনি “অপরাক্ত” বেলা।—“অবসান” C. U. MS. 3780.

উপনীত হৈল কথার ছত্রশালা।

বিশ্বকর্মা গঠেন তবে বিচিত্র তরঙ্গী।

মায়া-নদী করিলেন কোকিল-বাহিনী ॥

“তরঙ্গী বান্ধিয়া কুলে গেলেন ব্রাহ্মণ ॥”

(তরঙ্গী রাখিয়া ঘাটে গেল বিশ্বঘর।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

কথার কথন কিছু শুন সর্বজন ॥

and reach the boat just at night." The five girls promised to do all these and left for their palace.

Dhulākutyā afterwards came to know all these through the grace of the goddess Saraswati. He began to revolve in mind the deed of the Brāhman and his heart sank within him when he considered his helplessness (as regards his maintenance) due to the elopement of the girls. In distress the boy (prince) cried aloud taking the name of Saraswati. The goddess was then serving her lord Krishna (Vishnu in heaven). As soon as the boy's words reached her ears she got up and came before the prince just as god Krishna came before his votary prince Dhruva in bygone days. The prince related the matter in connection with the princesses to mother

“হীরাযুখী” কেয়াল হীরাবান্ধা তরী ।—“হীরাবান্ধা” C. U. MS. 3780.

দেখিয়া “হরষ” বড় রাজার কুমারী ॥—“কৌতুক” C. U. MS. 3780.

সারদার “মায়া যত শুন সর্বজন ।”

(“এত মায়া বুঝে কোন জন”)—C. U. MS. 3780.

তরগী বান্ধিয়া কুলে গেলেন ব্রাহ্মণ ।

তরগী দেখিয়া কুলে কহেন ব্রাহ্মণ ।—C. U. MS. 3780.

শুভক্ষণে যাত্রা “ধনী শুন তার কথা ।”

—“কর বুন মোর কথা” C. U. MS. 3780.

মনোমত মধুকর মিলাইল বিধাতা ॥

মাতাপিতা “বন্দিবেক গো হয়্যা” প্রদক্ষিণ ।

“মন্দিরে করিয়া”—C. U. MS. 3780.

সাবধানে স্নানরী আসিবে পঞ্চজন ॥

ধন কড়ি আনিবে কিছু পথের সম্বল ।

রাত্রি হৈলে নৌকা-ঘাটে “আসিবে” সকল ॥

সত্য করা সীমস্তিনী সভে গেল ধরে ।—“দাণ্ডাবে” C. U. MS. 3780.

ধূলুকুট্যা এ সব শুনিল অতঃপরে ॥

Saraswati with folded palms. “I need not reveal the pang in the inmost corners of my heart. It breaks my heart and still I endure it. The Brāhman Janārdan has gone so far as to obtain their promise by making them touch the sacred tulasi leaves and the holy Ganges water.” The goddess Saraswati said, “My darling, these five girls are your wives. You are my foster-son and I shall have them married to you to-morrow and then return to my lord, god Vishnu. That Brāhman has decoyed the fair princesses. Now see, what revenge I do take upon him.”

The father of the Brāhman Janārdan was named Dāmodar. To him thus said the votary of Saraswati, Dhulākutyā (here the goddess Saraswati incognito):—“Your

বিপ্ৰের “বচনে কত্যা” করেন বিচার ।—“চরিত্র বোদি” C. U. MS. 3780.
কত্যা ছাড়্যা গেলে মোরে কে পুষিবে আর ॥

সরস্বতী বল্যা শিশু ডাকে উচ্চৈঃস্বরে ।
প্রসাদ “ভজেন দেবী কৃষ্ণের মন্দিরে ॥”

(আতঙ্ক জেন অগ্নির ভিতরে ॥)—C. U. MS. 3780.

শ্রুতিমাত্রে সরস্বতী “উঠিল” সাক্ষাতে ।—“উষিতা” C. U. MS. 3780.
“গোবিন্দ-বিজয় যেন ঋবের বিদিত্তে ॥”

(গোবিন্দ চলিলেন যেন ধূর্ধ্ব বর দিতে ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.
কর যুড়ি কুণ্ডর কথার কথা কর ।

“মরমে নাহিক কাষ ভাঙ্গিলেহ নয় ॥”

(কখনি নাহিক ভয় জানিহ নিশ্চয় ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

“সেইরূপে যাবে দিন যুবতী সকল ।”

(জেইরূপে জাবে দিঙ্গ নৃপতি সকল ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

জনর্দন দ্বিজ দিছে তুলসী গঙ্গাজল ॥

son will elope with the king's daughters and thereby will ruin the good name of your family. I have overheard the discussion about the elopement of your son with the princesses which means if his vicious wishes are fulfilled the unsullied name of your family will be tarnished for ever. Oh respected Brāhman, the discussion between Janārdan and the princesses I refer to, was only comparable to the fight between the gods Hari and Hara. Now, you have heard everything from me regarding the conduct of your son and so do the needful."

As soon as the votary of the goddess departed relating the above story regarding Janārdan, his father became highly enraged. It seemed to him as if the very heavens fell upon his head (to smash him). He said within himself

সরস্বতী বলে বাছা শুন তার কথা ।

সেই পঞ্চ বিধুমুখী তোমার বনিতা ॥

কালি বিভা করাইব "বর"-পুত্র তুমি — "বুন" C. U. MS. 3780.

বিভা দিয়া বিষ্ণু-সন্নিধানে যাব আমি ॥

ভুলাইয়াছিল দ্বিজ "ভুবন-সুন্দরী" — "রাজার কুমারি" C. U. MS. 3780.

কালি দেখ বাছা তার কিনা দশা করি ॥

জনার্দন দ্বিজের জনক দামোদর ।

কহিতে লাগিল তারে দেবীর কিঙ্কর ॥

রাজকন্যা লৈয়া যাবে তোমার নন্দন ।

কুলেতে কলঙ্ক দ্বিজ দিল জনার্দন ॥

শুন্যাছি কন্যার সনে করিতে বিচার ;

কুলেতে কলঙ্ক যে রাখিল এইবার ॥

হরিহর যুদ্ধে হৈল এমন সময় ।

জাতা শুভা কাষ কর শুন দ্বিজবর ॥

“Let my son return home, I shall reprimand him severely. He has belittled the good name and fame of my family. Thus the Brāhman sat down and became extremely thoughtful over the matter when Janārdan returned home. He said to his father that he intended to act as a priest (lit. to receive priestly fee —Dakshinā) on the occasion of the funeral ceremony of the father of a certain merchant. “There will be delay,” the son said, “as I shall go to a foreign land. So, I beg leave of you, oh parents.” The parting words of the son elicited no reply from the father and he suddenly remembered what Dhulākutyā had said. (The old Brāhman Dāmodar took recourse to a stratagem.) He said, “You have acquired learning and so myself, your old father, need not give any advice to you. Yet, I should remind you that whenever you go anywhere, you should worship the god Vishnu beforehand.” Thus reminded, the son Janārdan sat to worship the god Vishnu and taking

উপদেশ কর্যা গেল দেবীর কিঙ্কর ।

সেই সব কথা শুনি কোপে দ্বিজবর ॥

আকাশ ভাঙ্গিয়া পড়ে মস্তক উপর ॥

(অনিরুদ্ধ উপাখ্যান জেবা নাহি জানে ।

মহিরাবণের মত কাটিবে মশানে ॥

জাত্মা যুগ্ম কায্য কর যুন দ্বিজবর ।

আকাশ ভাঙ্গিয়া পড়ে মাথার উপর ॥)—C. U. MS. 3780.

বাড়ীতে আসুক বেটা করিব তাড়ন ।

নাম মণঃ ডুবাইল কুলের ভাজন ॥

চিন্তিত হইয়া বড় বসিল ব্রাহ্মণ ।

হেনকালে বাড়ীতে আইল জনার্দন ॥

জনকে কহিল যাবো দক্ষিণা “মাগিতে ।”—“সাধিতে” C. U. MS. 3780.

“পিতৃশ্রদ্ধ হইয়াছে” সাধুর বাড়ীতে ।

—পিতৃশ্রদ্ধ যুনি এক” C. U. MS. 3780.

advantage of this opportunity the old father fastened the door of the room from outside and imprisoned his son. Just taking his stand near the door, the Brāhman began to rebuke his son. "You are a canker in my family," said Dāmodar. Hear you all, these were all done by the "Māyā" or illusion of the goddess Sārādā and for the very same reason the Brāhman Janārdan remained imprisoned in his room.

The princesses told their parents that they would remain away from home that night to worship the goddess Saraswati. The fair girls took with them much wealth and at midnight reached the landing Ghat (where their boat was waiting for them). The goddess Saraswati informed Dhulākutyā as to the girls' waiting place at the Ghat and told him that all this ruse she played only to benefit him (Dhulākutyā). Besides, she said, "I shall carry you

আসিতে বিলম্ব হবে বিদেশের কথা ।

অতএব "বিদায় হইয়া" যাই মাতাপিতা ॥—"প্রণাম করি" C. U. MS. 3780.

পুত্রের বচনে দ্বিজ না দিল বারতা ।

মনেতে পড়িয়া গেল ধূলুকুটার কথা ॥

"বিজ্ঞা হৈল" দ্বিজ বলে বুদ্ধ লোক আমি ।—"বুদ্ধি করি" C. U. MS. 3780.

"বিষ্ণু পূজা সদাই করিয়া যাহ তুমি ॥"

("কৃষ্ণ সেবা সাক্ষ করি যাহ বাছা তুমি ॥")—C. U. MS. 3780.

পিতার বচনে দ্বিজ পূজে নারায়ণে ।

কপাটে কুলুপ দিয়া "রাখে জনার্দনে ॥"

—"রাখিল ব্রাহ্মণে" C. U. MS. 3780.

দ্বারেতে বসিয়া দ্বিজ করেন "ভৎসন !" —"তর্জন" C. U. MS. 3780.

"কুলের ভাজন বেটা বলেন ব্রাহ্মণ ॥"

(কুলের অঙ্গার বেটা বড় অভাজন ।)—C. U. MS. 3780.

সারদার মায়া যত শুন সর্বজন ।

এইরূপে বন্দী হৈল "দ্বিজ জনার্দন ॥"—"দ্বিজের নন্দন" C. U. MS. 3780.

all to a distance of six months in course of only a night. You, a youth of only twenty, have been experiencing misery in banishment, but I shall make you sit on the throne and finally make you marry. I shall make you meet your father, when both of you will recognise each other. Please give no reply to any query made by the girls about yourself. You now understand, the girls do not intend returning to the abode of their parents."

Dhulākutyā said in reply, "Everything happened by your grace, Oh mother." Saraswati, then reminded the lad that there was no use delaying as the night was far advancing. She herself took the work of helmsman at the rudder and Dhulākutyā took charge of all the wealth which he took on board the boat. He understood the girls would board that boat and so beckoning to each of them, he helped them to enter it, one by one. Saraswati advised Dhulākutyā to pass himself as Janārdan and the girls taking him to be

মা বাপে কহিয়া গেল রাজার কুমারী ।

সরস্বতী-পূজা "আমি রহিব" শৰ্ব্বরী ॥—"আজি করিবো" C. U. MS. 3780.

ধন-কড়ি বিস্তর লইল "রূপবতী" ।—"ঔপবতি" C. U. MS. 3780.

নৌকা-ঘাটে উপনীত নিশাভাগ রাতি ॥

সরস্বতী সেবকে কহেন বিবরণ ।

যেইরূপে দাণ্ডায়াছে কত্যা পঞ্চজন ॥

তোমার কারণে আমি করিলাম এত ।

এক রাত্রে লইয়া যাব ছমাসের পথ ॥

বিংশতি বৎসর হুঃখ পাইলে বনবাসে ।

বসাইব রাজপাটে বিভা দিব "শেষে" ॥—"দেশে" C. U. MS. 3780.

পিতা পুত্রে পরিচয় করাইব চল ।

কত্যা জিজ্ঞাসিলে তুমি কিছু নাহি বোল ॥

কথাএ "জানিলে ধনী" যাবে নাহি আর ।

—"চিনিবে কত্যা" C. U. MS. 3780.

ধূলাকুট্যা বলে মাতা মহিমা তোমার ॥

that Brahmin, each one of them came to him and bowed to him, as they were accustomed to do to a superior. Dhulā-kutyā on his part smiled to see the ways of the youthful girls. He pondered as to how the girls would start (for a strange land and with a male who was not their relation) in such a dark night. Among the five princesses the more prominent were Kalindi, Kisori, Uma and Bisakha the daughter of the minister. The five princesses, the prince and the wealth of fifty kings were put on board the swift boat (পঞ্চরাজ-তরঙ্গী). In one night they all will reach the country of King Subāhu. Dayārām solicits apology to

বিলম্বেতে কার্য নাহি “বিসরে” রজনী ।—“বিস্তর” C. U. MS. 3780.

কর্ণধার “হইলেন” কোকিল-বাহিনী ॥—“হৈল নাহ” C. U. MS. 3780.

ধনকড়ি ধূলাকুটা তরঙ্গীতে “তুলি” ।—“তুলে” C. U. MS. 3780.

কথাএ জানিলে ধনী যাবে হেন বলি ॥

একে একে হইলিত নৌকায় আনে তুল্যা ।

সরস্বতী বলে বাছা যাবে এহা বল্যা ॥

কথা জিজ্ঞাসিলে কথা হু হু বল্যা বলে ।

জনর্দন দ্বিজ বল্যা রাজার হুহিতা ।

প্রণাম করিল তারে নৌঞাইয়া মাথা ॥

ধূলাকুটা হাসে তথা হেরিয়া যুবতী ।

কামিনী কেমনে যাবে অন্ধকার রাতি ॥

কালিন্দী কিশোরী উমা রাজার কুমারী ।

পাত্রে বোটের নাম বিশাখা সুনন্দরী ॥

পঞ্চকথা কুণ্ডর পঞ্চাশ রাজার ধন ।

পঞ্চরাজ-তরঙ্গীতে কৈল আরোহণ ॥

সুবাহু-রাজার দেশ যাব এক রাতি ।

দয়ারাম “দাসে ক্ষম” দেবী সরস্বতী ॥—“দাসে দোলা” C. U. MS. 3780.

the goddess Saraswati (in singing this song for any possible error on his part).

The goddess Saraswati gave unto the goddess Ganges the following charge :—“ I intend to take with me on board this boat Prince Lakkhadhar, the son of King Subāhu. This Paksha-raj boat should fly like the wind (*i.e.*, move very swiftly) so that the girls' suspicion may be raised when it is too late.” “ I obey your behest,” said Ganges to Sārādā and carried the boat to a place a six months' journey distant in a moment. Nothing was impossible to a goddess and so a false river (all illusion) was instantly created by the river-goddess Ganges. The helm was handled by the goddess Saraswati herself who began to ply it uttering the name of Hari. The boat passed just then Anga and Vanga with five princesses, one prince and the wealth of fifty kings. The wind helped the extremely swift movement of the boat. The prince Dhulākutyā began to sing the boat-song called “Sari” and the work of the helmsman was being performed by the goddess Saraswati herself. The world-captivating beauty (*e.g.*, the goddess Saraswati) began to smile in a suppressed way by covering her mouth with the

গঙ্গাকে দিলেন “পান” দেবী সরস্বতী ।—“আজ্ঞা” C. U. MS. 3780.

স্বরেধর “দেশে যাব সেবকের প্রতি ॥”

—“দেশে রাজা স্বাহা নৃপতি ॥” C. U. MS. 3780.

স্বাহা-রাজার বেটা নামে লক্ষধর ।

আজি রাত্রে লৈয়া যাব নৌকার উপর ॥

পবনে উড়িয়া যায় পক্ষরাজ তরী ।

কত্বারে সন্দেহ কিছু মনে চিন্তা করি ॥

যে আজ্ঞা বলিয়া গঙ্গা সারদারে কয় ।

ছমাসের পথ আর মুহূর্ত্তেকে লয় ॥

দেবতার্কে অসাধ্য আছএ কোন কথা ।

মায়া-নদী শুধনি করিল গঙ্গা মাতা ॥

corner of her skirt (thus expressing her joy at the success of her plot). In 6 or 7 dandas (one danda = 24 minutes) the boat covered a distance which usually took about 6 months. Now the morning came and let us now utter the name of God Hari (to begin the next episode of the story).

After anchoring the boat by the river bank the prince sat (idly) on the boat when the princesses gave repeated glances to the prince and their mistake made them thoughtful (as they now fully realised the situation). Bimalā (first opened her mouth and said, "Now even the holy Ganges water cannot wash away our sin. It is preordained that a servant of ours will be our husband. That servant in the shape of Dhulākutyā has made our names infamous. His very appearance is our living disgrace and this may scare away our lives from us. Living in the house of a man as wife means living like a bird in a cage" (*i. e.*, living in

হাতে দণ্ড নিল দেবী হরি হরি বল্যা ।

"অঙ্গ বঙ্গ তখনি তরণী" গেল চল্যা ॥

—“আনন্দিতে তরনি গমনে” C. U. MS. 378G,

পঞ্চকন্যা কুণ্ডর পঞ্চাশ রাজার ধন ।

পঞ্চরাজ তরণীতে চলিল পবন ॥

গৌড় গায় ধূলুকুট্যা সারদা কাণ্ডারী ।

মুখে বজ্র দিয়া হাসে ভুবন-সুন্দরী ॥

হয় মাসের পথ গেল দণ্ড ছয় “সাতে” ।—“রাত্রি” C. U. MS. 378D.

পূর্ণ কর্যা বল হরি রজনী-প্রভাতে ॥

কুলেতে বান্ধিয়া তরী বসিল কুণ্ডর ।

“চায়া চায়া পঞ্চকন্যা ভাবে অভঃপর ॥”

—“চায়া চাই কন্যাগণ করে তারপর” C. U. MS. 378D.

“বিমলা” বলেন দিদি বিধির লিখন ।—“বিষ্টপ্রিয়া” C. U. MS. 378D.

গঙ্গাজলে “মেটিলে কি না যায় মেটন” ॥

—“মেটে না বা মেটে কখন” C. U. MS. 378D.

complete submission and dependance as wives, in the house of one who is our servant).

Bimalā opined, “Better I should jump into water and thereby commit suicide than to fall into such a predicament. The Brahmin Janārdan is the common enemy of us all.” The princess Kisori said, “No use mentioning his name. That Brahmin has killed us all by professing love unto us. We are all as unlucky from our birth as Jānaki (of Ramayana story) and are literally done to death in our youth like her (by our lover Janārdan as she was by her husband Ramchandra).”

The plaintive wailing of the princesses drew pity from the goddess Saraswati and she in the guise of an old Brahmin lady tried to console them by wiping out their tears from their eyes with the help of her skirt and delivered the following soothing speech sitting with them : “In the city of Bidarbha reigned king Vishnunkar ; see how (his daughter) Rukmini was given in marriage (to Krishna). Both Savitri and Sankari accorded implicit obedience to their husbands (Satyabān and Siva). Being a king’s daughter Rai (Radhika) fell in love with a cowherd (Krishna). The girls committed

পূর্বের লিখন ছিল নফর হৈল পতি ।
 ধলাকুট্যা হৈয়া ধনী রাখিল খেয়াতি ॥
 প্রতিদিনের খোটা তবে প্রাণে হৈল ডরা ।
 পুরুষের ঘর যেন পক্ষীর পিঞ্জর ॥
 বিষলা বলেন জলে ঝাঁপ দিয়া মরি ।
 জনার্দন দ্বিজ “হৈল মো-সভার বৈরী” ॥

—“মোর হৈল হত্যাকারি” C. U. MS. 3780.

কিশোরী বলেন তার নাম ঘর কেন ।
 পীরিতে বান্ধিয়া দ্বিজ বধিল জীবন ॥
 জনম-দুঃখিনী মোরা জানকীর যত ।
 যুবতীর হত্যা যে করিল এত ॥

no fault in these cases as a male person is like a touchstone (*i.e.*, whatever may be his status yet full of virtues) so in your cases too, you need not feel despondent and feel angry with the young man.¹

Oh girls! fate is always supreme so what is written by the god Bidhata on your foreheads after your birth must happen. If your luck were at all good then, being princesses, why you five are so peculiarly circumstanced and are here. If you think your husband is nothing but your common servant, then I should say, why Radhika's husband (here meaning Srikrishna) took her upon his shoulder (and thereby acted as her servant). Dhulākutyā is my adopted child and you are my daughters-in-law, so I tell you so much by way of advice.

কস্তার করুণা শুনি কোকিল-বাহিনী ।

বুদ্ধা ব্রাহ্মণীর বেশে বিষ্ণুর ঘরগী ॥

মুছিল নয়ন-বারি নেতের বসনে ।

বিধুমুখী বসিয়া বুঝায় কস্তাগণে ॥

বিদর্ভ-নগরে রাজা বিষ্ণুঙ্কর-ভূপে ।

কুন্তীগীর বিভা দেখ হৈল যেইরূপে ॥

“দোপদের সম্বন্ধর দ্রৌপদি কারণে ।

জান ধনি জেরূপে জিনিল পঞ্চজনে ॥

বিবিধ নগরে ঘর ত্রিশক হুহিতা ।

কুন্তীগীর বিভা তুমি জানহ সর্বথা ॥”—C. U. MS. 3780.

সাবিত্রী শঙ্করী স্বামীর আঞ্জাকারী ।

—“সাবিত্রী ও সত্য” C. U. MS. 3780.

রাখালে ভজিল রাই রাজার কুমারী ॥

¹ The significance of the lines are this : Whatever may be the position of a man, he may be accepted as the husband even by a princess as a man should be known by his virtues and not by his social status. He is to carve out his fame by his glorious deeds. As a touchstone, apparently an insignificant stone, has the quality of turning everything into gold so a man of merit has the quality of turning everything around him to his use to rise into fame. The examples of mythological ladies and goddesses signify that they all adored husbands full of defects. They loved their husbands and compromised themselves to their fate to be gainers after all.

A good man's daughter always listens to her mother-in-law's words. This is said by all, otherwise who am I to come to advise you on this occasion.

On hearing these words the good girls showed respect to Saraswati (taking her to be their mother-in-law) by washing her feet, and touching them with their heads by way of obeisance. The goddess, on the other hand, took them by their arms and blessed them with "Be equal to Savitri in getting the love of their husband." The girls again bowed to her and began to show their appreciation and love for Dhulākutyā by discoursing on polity with him and by furnishing him with dishes worthy of a prince. Some one of them began to fan him with a chowrie (a respect shown to deities and royal personages) and some one besmeared him with sweet-scented sandal-paste. Some instantly supplied him with betel-leaves (prepared and made into shapes fit for consumption). The girls thus passed their time on board the boat, but the prince on the other hand, never gave any reply to what they said (and thus maintained a studied silence).

পুরুষ "পরসমগি ইথে নাহি দোষ" ।

— "পরশে কিছু নাই দোষ" C. U. MS. 3780.

কুড়রে কামিনী কেনে করিলে বিরোধ ॥

কপালের লেখা ধনী লেখাছে বিধাতা ।

ভাল হৈলে সীমন্তিনী তুমি কেনে হেথা ॥

"নফর বলিয়া" লজ্জা কর রূপবতী ।— "নর দেখা" C. U. MS. 3780.

রাধিকারে কান্দে কৈল কেন তার পতি ॥

বরপুল ধলাকুট্যা বধু হৈলে তুমি ।

অতএব এ সব কথা কহিলাম আমি ॥

শান্তুড়ীর কথা মানে স্ত্রজনের স্বামী ।

সকলের কথা আমি কুথাকার কি ॥

The princesses with folded palms said, "Why, oh husband, you are not dealing squarely with us (or why are you playing hide and seek with us)?" It is a preordained thing that you should be our husband and so you have become so by the grace of the god Vidhata. (Now deal with us as a husband should do and maintain us by giving shelter, food and clothing as a husband should do.) Please raise a mansion fit for our use. Otherwise how long shall we spend our time on the boat. You should supply clothes to us long enough to fall beneath our knees and give us food sufficient to allay our hunger. This should be done just as Jānaki (Sītā) was maintained by Raghunath (Ramchandra), her husband. We are all daughters of a king, though now fallen into misery. We beseech you to be kind to us. You on your part should not sit idle and increase our misery.

“এই কথা” সীমন্তিনী সারদা সাক্ষাতে ।—“এত বুনি” C. U. MS. 3780.

পাখালিলেন পাদ-পদ্ম করিলেন মাথে ॥

করে ধর্যা আশীর্বাদ করেন “আপনি” ।—“জননী” C. U. MS. 3780.

সাবিত্রী-সমান হবে স্বামী-সোহাগিনী ॥

প্রণাম করিয়া ধনী সারদার পায় ।

রাজনীতি রাজভোগ কুণ্ডরে যোগায় ॥

চামর ছলায় অঙ্গে স্নগন্ধি-চন্দন ।

ভাস্কিয়া পানের থিলি যোগায় “তখন” ॥

—“দেই পঞ্চজন” C. U. MS. 3780.

এই মতে আছে “ধনী” নৌকার উপর ।—“সেই” C. U. MS. 3780.

কুণ্ডর কখন কিছু না কৈল উত্তর ॥

কর যুড়ি কহে কিছু রাজার কুমারী ।

কি দোষে করহ মোরে কপট চাতুরী ॥

পূর্বের লিখন ছিল গুন প্রাণনাথ ।

অতএব হৈলে পতি বিধাতার হাত ॥

আমার মন্দির তুল মহলের মত ।

—“মহল ও মহলের” C. U. MS. 3780.

Rather, you should engage yourself in some trade so that we may increase and multiply our wealth happily."

The prince said, "Listen to me oh princesses, you request me to build a mansion. But it is not quite a feasible task for me. I do not understand the nature of the job you entrust me with. Rather order me to bring dust and straw and I will obey your request forthwith. I shall besprinkle water and cleanse the floor with a broomstick as well as kindle light in the schoolroom at evening. I am the supplier of dust and straw to you during school hours. I know no other work than these. Why, oh fair maidens! do you make fun of me (a poor fellow); you should better have done this with a more deserving fellow. You are daughters of a great man; I know quite well whether I deserve your hands or not. If, however, you at all insist on my raising a mansion and

নৌকার উপরে নিশি গুঞ্জাইব কত ॥—"দিন," C. U. MS. 3780.

আঠুভরা বস্ত্র দিবে পেটভরা ভাত ।

জানকীরে যেমন পুষিল রঘুনাথ ॥

—"জানকী...পূজিলেন," C. U. MS. 3780.

রাজার কুমারী মোরা রূপে কলানিধি ।—"বতি," C. U. MS. 3780.

জুঃখিনীর দিব্য তোরে দয়া ছাড় যদি ॥

—"সারদার আছে," C. U. MS. 3780.

বসিয়া কি যাবে দিন দেখ কারবার ।

যেইরূপে বাড়িবে জগৎ-সংসার ॥

—"যেমন বাড়িবে বশ," C. U. MS. 3780.

কুণ্ডর বলেন শুন রাজার কুমারী ।

মহল তুলিতে বল মোরে বড় ভারি ॥

কি কৰ্ম করিতে বল কিছুই না জানি ।

আজ্ঞা কর ধনি কিছু ধূলা-কুট্যা আনি ॥

ছড়া ঝাটি সন্ধ্যা দিব আর ছত্র-শালা ।

ধূলা-কুট্যা দিব পাঠ পড়িবার বেলা ॥

I am to follow your biddings, then do please pay me up my dues as wages first." On hearing these words the princesses grew pale (for fear of inability to pay him).

At this stage Saraswati rebuked the prince in the following words :—

"Oh prince, why do you use hard words in your reply to the princesses? I shall bestow on you a fair land to-morrow. Why should you feel sorrow because your name is Dhulā-kutyā? (Your service to the princesses, your future wives, has precedence.) Don't you see Krishna took Radha upon his shoulders? You are my votary, so you are no ordinary person. Do enjoy life and give up your pride (অভিমান). Thus Dayārām composes the story of Sārādā. He lives in the village of Kāsijorā-Kisorchawk.

এই কৰ্ম বিনে আমি অস্ত্র নাহি জানি ।

অস্ত্র লোকের উপহাস কেন কর ধনি ॥—"অস্ত্রলোকে," C. U. MS. 3780.

মহতের বেটা বট গুন সীমন্তিনী ।

আমি কি তোমার যোগ্য আপনি সে জানি ॥

তবে যদি মহল তুলিতে বল তুমি ।

আগেত মাহিনা দেহ আজ্ঞাকারী আমি ॥

গুনিঞা স্তথাল্য মুখ বলে সীমন্তিনী ।—"পঞ্চ," C. U. MS. 3780.

কুঙরে তর্জ্জন করে কোকিল-বাহিনী ॥

কেন রে রাজার বেটা বল কুবচন ।

কালি তোরে দিব চল বিচিত্র-ভুবন ॥

ধূলুকুট্টা নাম বোলায় দুঃখ ভাব মনে ।—"দ্বিবে দুঃখ," C. U. MS. 3780.

রাধাকে কানোঞি কান্দে কর্যাছিল কেনে ॥

আমার সেবক আছে যে বড় ।—"এই ধূলুকুট্টা," C. U. MS. 3780.

আনন্দে করহ ঘর অভিমান ছাড় ॥

সারদা-চরিত্র কথা রচে দয়ারাম ।

বস বাস কাশীঘোড়া কিশোরচক গ্রাম ॥

—"পরিপূর্ণ কর জে হরি মনস্কাম," C. U. MS. 3780.

According to the advice of Sārādā the prince gave up his contention, and she after finishing her speech on the other hand, visited the place of a merchant (in the guise of a Brahman). The merchant was the grandson of Bijay Datta and quite devoted to the Brahmans. He received Saraswati with a seat (জল-পিড়ি or foot-stool). With folded palms the merchant enquired of him as to the reason of the visit. On hearing the merchant, the mother Sārādā replied, "Listen to me, oh darling ! It is fate that troubled the king of the land of Baideva, for which he has to remain in a forest for about twenty years. After leaving the place, he now comes to you, considering you as a man full of virtue. (The reason of his visit is this) you please allow me to take possession of

সারদা মায়ের কথা শুনিয়া কুণ্ডর তথা

তেজিল সকল বিবরণে ।—“অভিমান,” C. U. MS. 3780.

সেবকে কহিয়া সরস্বতী মহামায়া

—“করিতে দয়া,” C. U. MS. 3780.

গেলেন সাধুর সন্নিধানে ॥

বিজয় দত্তের নাতি ব্রাহ্মণে করেন ভক্তি

—“জুতি,” C. U. MS. 3780.

বসিতে দিলেন জল-পিড়ি ।

যুড়িয়া যুগল কর জিজ্ঞাসিল তার পর

কি কারণে আইলে মোর বাড়ী ॥

শুনিঞা সাধুর কথা কহেন সারদা মাতা—“সদয়,” C. U. MS. 3780.

শুন বাছা বিধির ঘটন ।

বৈদেব দেশের ভূপে বিধি বিড়ম্বিল তাকে

বিংশতি বৎসর গেল বন ॥

তথা করি বনবাস আইল তোমার পাশ

—“তরুণীতে তিন মাস” “তথা কৈলাম উপবাস,” C. U. MS. 3780.

তুমি সাধু গুণের সাগর ।

উত্তর আওয়াস খান আজি মোরে দেহ দান

দিন দশ থাকিব সদাগর ॥

your quarters on the northern side on behalf of the king for about ten days.”

The merchant showed due deference and consented to the proposal. He asked Saraswati (incognito) to bring her daughters-in-law. He was glad that the king would favour him by his residence in the merchant's house and he worshipped the Brahmans and seniors by way of celebrating the day.

The mother Saraswati blessed the merchant and in an auspicious moment brought her daughters-in-law into the new house. All the wealth of the boat were taken out of it into the new house by Saraswati herself who performed the feat of ten strong men in this matter. The house given by the merchant was all gold and the five fairy-like princesses having moon-like beautiful faces remained there in happiness. They passed their days (about three or four months) with the mother Sārādā. In the good village Kasijore lived the Maharaja full of merits. He has established or formed the

ষে আজ্ঞা বলিয়া সাধু আন গিয়া পুত্র-বধু
এ বলিয়া করিল উত্তর ।

—“আজি মোর সফল্য বাসর,” C. U. MS. 3780.

আজি মোর প্রসন্ন রাজা ব্রাহ্মণে করেন পূজা
প্রধান পুরুষ পরম্পর ॥

“ব্রাহ্মণে করেন পূজা সেহত শূদ্রের রাজা
প্রধান পুরুষ পরম্পর ।

সকল জানহ তুমি কি আর বলিব আমি
নিবেদিলাম তোমার গোচর ॥”—C. U. MS. 3780.

আশীর্ব্বাদ করি তথা পুত্র-বধু আনে মাতা
শুভক্ষণে সারদা জননী ।

তরুণীর ধন যত বল দশ গড়ে কত

—“বলদ শকটে কত,” C. U. MS. 3780.

বহিছেন বিষ্ণুর স্বরশী ॥—“রহিলেন,” C. U. MS. 3780.

village (or temple of Sāradā) and so Dayārām sings the song in honour of Sāradā.

In this way the young princesses lived in the temple of the merchant. Hear now the story of King Subāhu : From the time the prince went to the forest he became reluctant to take any food or drink. His land became devoid of any human being and so turned into a jungle. Without food he himself was reduced to a skeleton and his eyes grew weak. His palace soon became empty of all his treasures and valuable goods. His elephants and horses all died. Like the case of Raja Sribatsa the burnt fish fled away alive from the kitchen. The principal horse of the king was named Pakshirāj. It could win the land of gods in a

সাধুর স্ববর্ণ-পুরী

স্বখে পঞ্চ বিজাধরী

—“ভূজে,” C. U. MS. 3780.

শশীমুখী রাজার কুমারী ।

সারদা মায়ের সঙ্গে হাসিতে খেলিতে রঙ্গে

রহিলেন মাস তিন চারি ॥

কাশীবোড়া মহাস্থান মহারাজা পুণ্যবান্

ধন্য সে ধার্মিক বশোধাম ।—“নরপতি,” C. U. MS. 3780,

ইহ তার প্রতিষ্ঠিত

দয়্যারাম রচে গীত

সারদা-চরিত্র-উপাখ্যান ॥

—“কিশোরচকে জাহাৰ বসতি,” C. U. MS. 3780.

এইরূপে আছে ধনী সাধুর মন্দিরে ।

স্ববাহু রাজার কথা শুন তার পরে ॥

যতদিন গেলেন কুণ্ডর বনবাস ।

সেই হৈতে অন্ন জল সকলি নৈরাশ ॥—“বহু,” C. U. MS. 3780.

মল্লকে মনুষ্য নাই অরণ্য সকল ।

—“মরিল রাজার পুরে মনুষ্য সকল ।” C. U. MS. 3780.

অন্ন বিনে অস্থি সার নয়ন দুর্বল ॥

মাল মাত্তা উড়াইল মৈল হাতী বোড়া ।—“দূরে গেল,” C. U. MS. 3780.

ত্রীবৎস রাজার রূপ পালাল্য মৎস্ত পোড়া ॥

—“ত্রীবৎসের হাত হৈতে,” C. U. MS. 3780.

moment. The horse was laid up with gout for a long period and it was then the king's only property. The king was at last compelled to send even this one to the market for sale and by chance it attracted the notice of Dhulākutyā.

He went to Sārādā and bowed to her feet who blessed him and said to the King, 'Who will buy your old horse? You suggest the proper price and I will buy your horse.' The king replied, "As you please. Do please give me the expenses of my household for to-day and I will sell you the horse in lieu of that" (in so abject a situation the king was). Though it was settled at only ten annas the king was given a full rupee by Sārādā. The king may be said to be lucky enough in making this transaction. The favour of the goddess in the shape of caressing it with her hand cured the gout of the old horse. Then Dhulākutyā rode on it and the Pakshirāj horse began to run like the wind. Saraswati bade the horse

রাজার প্রধান ঘোড়া নামে পক্ষরাজ ।
মুহূর্ত্তেকে জিনিতে পারে দেবের সমাজ ॥

—"জাতে পারে সংসারে মাঝ," C. U. MS. 3780.

বাততে বিস্তর দিন পড়াছিল সেই ।
সবে মাত্র নৃপতির সম্ভবনা এই ॥
বাজারে ফিরায় ঘোড়া বেচিবার তরে ।
ধূলুকুট্যা কুণ্ডর দেখিয়া গেল তারে ॥

—"হেনকালে কুণ্ডর দেখিতে পাল্য তারে ।" C. U. MS. 3780.

সারদা-চরণে গিয়া করিল প্রণতি ।
"সেই ঘোড়া কিছা মোরে দেহ শীঘ্রগতি ॥
এত বলি সারদা কুণ্ডরে লগ্না সাথে ।
উপনিত হৈল গিয়া সুবাহ সাক্ষাতে ॥
উঠিয়া কাঞ্চাল রাজা করিল প্রণতি ।"—C. U. MS. 3780
আশীর্বাদ করিয়া কহেন সরস্বতী ॥
তোমার এ বৃদ্ধ ঘোড়া বেচিবে কি শুনি ।
উচিত করহ মূল্য কিছা লব আমি ॥

to carry the prince to the 84 holy places so that the horse's name may be uttered by all in praise. "Now I shall know," she said, "how much speed you have acquired. You will have to return here only after a short while" (lit. after a second). On hearing this the horse fiercely neighed and flew across the sky towards the holy places. The prince first bowed to the bank of the Jamuna, the banian tree (under which Srikrishna used to play on his divine flute), and the son of the lord of Braja-land (*i.e.*, Srikrishna). He also bowed to the Radha-kunda (tank with the associated with the name of Radha), Syamkunda (tank bearing the name Syāma or Krishna), and the place of Rāsa-play (played by Krishna

যে আজ্ঞা বলিয়া রাজা কৈল অঙ্গীকার

আজির খরচ দেহ উচিত তোমার ॥

মূল্য হৈল দশ আনা দিল এক টাকা ।

ভূপতির ভাগের নাহিক লেখা বোখা ॥

—“ভূপতির মনে বড় বাড়িলেক শঙ্কা ॥” C. U. MS. 3780

বৃদ্ধ ঘোড়া বাতের পীড়া পীঠে দিতে হাত ।

দেবীর কুপায় তার না রৈল বাত ॥—“পালাইল,” C. U. MS. 3780

ধলাকুটা কুঙর চড়িল তার পীঠে ।

—“আনন্দে কুঙর তার চড়িলেন,” C. U. MS. 3780

পক্ষরাজ ঘোড়া যেন পবনেতে ছুটে ॥

সরস্বতী বলে গুন তুরঙ্গ-নন্দন ।

—“তুরঙ্গেরে বলিল বচন,” C. U. MS. 3780

কুঙরে চোরণী তীর্থ করহ দর্শন ॥

—“ব্রহ্মণ,” “সকল,” C. U. MS. 3780

জগতে তোমার নাম যেন পুরস্কার ।—“জগ জত,” C. U. MS. 3780

এবার জানিব গতি মহিমা তোমার ॥—“মাতা,” C. U. MS. 3780

মুহূর্ত্তেকে এখনে আসিব মোর কাছে ।—“পাশে,” C. U. MS. 3780

এতগুলি গাজি অশ্ব উঠিল আকাশে ॥

—“গাজি আসে,” C. U. MS. 3780

with the Gopis). The chief gods Brahmā and Siva also wished to have the dust of the footprints of the places (so covetable places they were). The prince perambulated round the foot-prints of Kānāi (Srikrishna) and bowed to them and rose to the sky (on horseback) to visit the god Govinda (Srikrishna) of Gayā. He showed his respect to Nilmani (Srikrishna) of Nilāchal and Gorā (Chaitanya Deva) of Navadvīpa after which his horse carried him to Prayāga and Haridwāra. He next visited the same Lord of Gayā (Srikrishna) at Dwārakā and in this way he visited the 84 holy places on his horse. After this in an instant the horse stood at the feet of the goddess (Sārādā). All the people of the world witnessed this feat and uttered repeated shouts of praise. Listen, the horse which lately could not move at all (due to gout) now performed this wonderful feat due to the Māyā or divine power of the goddess Sārādā.

প্রথমে প্রণাম করে যমুনা-পুলিনে ।

—“গঙ্গা অবশিষ্টা করে পিঙ্গি ঋষিগণ” C. U. MS. 3780

বংশীবট বৃন্দাবনে ব্রজেন্দ্র নন্দনে ॥—“বাচ্ছাবট,” C. U. MS. 3780

রাধাকুণ্ড শ্রামকুণ্ড শ্রীয়াস মণ্ডলী ।

ব্রহ্মা শিব বাঙ্গা করে যেই পদধূলি ॥—“ব্রহ্মাদি,” C. U. MS 3780

প্রদক্ষিণ প্রণাম কানাই পদদ্বন্দ্ব ।

গগন-মণ্ডলে ভেটে গঙ্গার গোবিন্দ ॥

Not found in the C. U. MS. 3780

নীলাচলে নীলমণি নবদ্বীপে গোরা ।

প্রয়াগ বন্দিয়া ঘোড়া গেল হরিদ্বারা ॥

দ্বারিকায় দণ্ডবৎ গঙ্গার ঠাকুরে ।

করাইব চোরসী তীর্থ রাজার কুণ্ডরে ॥

দণ্ডমাত্র আইল ঘোড়া দেবী পদতলে ।

ধরণীর লোক দেখ্যা ধত্ত ধত্ত বলে ॥

King Subāhu who at first took the goddess Sārādā as a Brahman widow spoke to her thus:—"Oh Brahman lady ! Listen to me. From to-day you carry on the sovereignty of the place with your adopted son. You only provide me with my sustenance (lit. rice) as all are yours from now. I give up from to-day all my rights over my kingdom." The king had then the knowledge that the Brahman widow was not a human being.

The goddess Saraswatī smiled and replied :—

"Why, oh king, you exhibit your weakness (of mind) so much ? You bestow on me a kingdom which is devoid of any prosperity. Better you give me only a village on lease, which you cannot control as part of your kingdom." The goddess thus took possession of such an outlying village and made a gift of it again to a Brahman. The goddess further managed to pay the royal tax from her treasury. The hired labourers began to cut the jungles and the subjects began to settle on the clear land. The king governed his

চলিতে যে ঘোড়া নাহি ছিল সম্ভাবনা ।

সারদার মায়া যত শুন সৰ্ব্বজনা ॥

নীলাচলে প্রবেশিয়া দেখি জগন্নাথ ।

প্রসাদ বেঞ্জন তাও কিনা থায় তথা ॥

দ্বারিকায় দণ্ডবত করায় কুণ্ডর ।

দণ্ডমাত্রে গেল ঘোড়া দেবীর গোচর ॥

প্রণাম করিল গিঞা দেবী পদতলে ।

নগরের জতলোক ধস্ত ধস্ত বলে ॥

চলিতে ঘোড়ার নাহি ছিল সম্ভাবনা ।

সারদার মায়া এত জানে কোন জনা ॥—C. U. MS. 3780.

সুবাহু নৃপতি বলে শুন গো ব্রাহ্মণী ।

বর পুত্র লৈয়া রাজ্য করহ আপনি ॥

সেবকে তগুল দেহ সকল তোমার ।

আজি হৈতে ছাড়িলাম সকল অধিকার ॥

subjects just as Ramchandra did in the past. For a period of three years the people were allowed to carry on agriculture without paying the royal dues. In due course a town sprang up through the energies of the labourers in cutting the forests. These were all possible through the grace of the goddess Saraswati. She made her votary famous throughout the world. Dayārām Das begs to be under the shadow of the feet of the goddess (meaning her protection) so that mother Saraswati may show to him that very grace she showed to the king in the garb of a Brahman lady.

(Here ends the portion published in the Typ. Sel., Part II.)

The following portion is translated from the C. U. MS. No. 3780.

ব্রাহ্মণী মনুষ্য নহে জানিল ভূপতি ।

হাসিয়া উত্তর কৈল দেবী সরস্বতী ॥

এত কেন তবে রাজা হয়েছ দুর্বল ।

আমারে যে রাজ্য দেহ ফুরাল সকল ॥

বাহাতে রাজত্ব নাই অবজ্ঞন জমি ।

সেই গ্রাম আমারেই ইজারা দেহ তুমি ॥

অধিকার নিয়া দিলেন দ্বিজবর ।—“নৃপবর,” C. U. MS. 3780

ভাঙার ভাঙ্গিয়া দেবী দিল রাজকর ॥—“ধন,” C. U. MS. 3780

বেৰুণ্যা কাটেন বন বসাইল প্রজা ।

—“বন কাটে বসিল নবর” C. U. MS. 3780

রাজ্যের পালন যেন করে রাম রাজা ॥

—“রায়ভেঁরে পালন করেন জটাধর” C. U. MS. 3780

তিন বৎসরের কবি নাহি রাজকর ।

—“বৎসর পর্য্যন্ত নাহিক,” C. U. MS. 3780

বন কাট্যা বেৰুণ্যা যে বসাল্য নগর ॥

সকলি করিতে পারে দেবী সরস্বতী ।

সেবকের বশঃ হৈল জগতে থেয়ানি ॥

দয়্যারাম দাস মাগে চরণের ছায়া ।

ব্রাহ্মণীর বেশে মাতা রাজারে সকল দয়া ॥

Subjects in large number settled in that country and the king continued to rule over them (paternally) just like Rama Chandra (king of Ajodhya). The kingdom flourished like Ravana's city in the Ramayana story (Lanka). The goddess wanted the services of the (architect-god) Biswakarmā and remained in the house of the merchant. The goddess addressed the god as follows:—"Oh my son Biswakarmā! do please construct a house of gold very soon. It is through misfortune that my daughters-in-law dwell elsewhere. To-morrow morning I shall bring them to my own house." According to the wishes of the goddess Biswakarmā constructed a house of gold very gladly. The beauty of the apartments of the house was enhanced by the use of gems, pearls and various precious stones. The pillars were made of glass bejewelled with gems and pearls producing multicolour effect. The doors were made of a peculiar wood (lit. Paras wood, i.e., touch-wood) and built very finely having all the episodes of Krishna's life wrought on it. After erecting the beautiful palace the architect-god Viswakarmā reported

The following portion is taken from the C. U. MS. 3780 :—

বসিল বিস্তর প্রজা	পালে জেন রাম রাজা
রাজ্য হৈল রাবণের পুরি ।	
বিশ্বকর্মে দিআ পান	দেবী কৈল স্বরণ
সাধু গৃহে রহিল স্তন্দরী ॥	
সুন বাপু বিশ্বম্বর	সুবত্ত আকার ঘর
শিগ্রগতি গোড়ি দেহ মোরে ।	
কেবল কর্মের দোষে	পুত্রবধু পরবাসে
প্রভাতে আনিব কালি ঘরে ॥	
সুনিশ্চয় দেবির কথা	সুবর্ণের ঘর তথা
আনন্দে গড়িল বিশ্বম্বর ।	
মাণিক্য মুকুতা মতি	মহল গড়িল তথি
সভা করে পরম স্তন্দর ॥	

himself to the goddess Saraswati with folded palms. Biswakarmā returned to his abode being rewarded with eight ornaments and a golden necklace studded with gems. Anantaram, Indrajit, Brindāvan, Parikshit and his son Jagannāth are my ancestors. It is due to their merits that myself (Dayārām) have come to this world and have composed this song of Sārada.

The goddess Saraswati thus erected a golden palace. She being accompanied by her daughters-in-law took leave of the merchant and forthwith wished to bring them to the new residence in the morning. She took with her horses, palanquins, servants and serfs and soon went to the merchant. She said, "Oh merchant, listen ; I am going to take away my

ফটিকের স্তম্ভ কত	হিরামণি বিরাজিত
বিচিত্র নির্মাণ কৈল পুরী ।	
কপাটে পরশ কাটি	কৈল নানা পরিপাটি
কুণ্ডলীলা লেখে সারি সারি ॥	
বিচিত্র মহল গোড়ি	বিশ্বকর্মা কর জুড়ি
কহেন দেবীর বরাবর ।	
পায় অষ্ট অলঙ্কার	মণিময় স্বর্ণহার
বিশ্বকর্মা গেল নিজ ঘর ॥	
অনন্তরাম ইন্দ্রজিত	বিন্দাবন পরীক্ষিত
জগন্নাথ তাহার তনয় ।	
তাহার গুণ্যের ফলে	অবতিষ্ঠা মহিতলে
দয়্যারাম রচে সারদায় ॥	

শোবণের মহল তুলিল স্বরেশ্বতী ।
 পুত্রবধূ প্রভাতে আনিল শিগ্রগতি ॥
 ষোড়া দোলা চাকর নফর লঞা সাথে ।
 সম্মুখে চলিল দেবী সাধুর সাক্ষাতে ॥
 পুত্রবধূ লঞা জাই যুন সদাকর ।
 জশ কীর্তি বাড়ে তোর যুগযুগান্তর ॥

daughters-in-law. Let your fame and good reputation increase through ages. You gave us shelter in your house. So, enjoy long life. Like you there is no other giver in this world." On hearing this the merchant with all his family fell at the feet of the goddess. After consoling all Saraswati left the place and the five girls got into their Dolas (palanquins) in no time. The ladies of the merchant's household began to weep (at this sad separation) as if Jānaki (Ramchandra's wife) was leaving (the hermitage of Vālmiki). Bheri, Turi, Singā, Kādā, Mohari, Mādal, Jagajhampa, Jaydhāk and Mridanga were played upon on the occasion and all the town with its bazar was astir on hearing the sound. There was such a sound that people thought that perhaps an army has invaded the place. In this splendid state the girls reached their own houses and sentries were posted at the gate. The goddess Nārāyani now

বাসেতে রাখিলে বাছা বাড়ু পরমাই ।
 তোমার সমান দাতা ত্রিভুবনে নাই ॥
 এত গুনি পড়ে সাধু সারদার পায় ।
 পরিজন সহিত সকল সমুদায় ॥
 প্রোবদ করিঞা সভে যান সরমতি ।
 পঞ্চ কত্তা দোলায় চাপিল শিগ্রগতি ॥
 সাধুর অঙ্গনাগণ লাগিল কান্দিতে ।
 চোলিল জানকি জেন তপবন হইতে ॥
 ভেরিতুরি সিংঙ্গা কাড়া মোহরি মাদল ।
 জগবান্স জয়টাক মৃদঙ্গ মঙ্গল ॥
 সহর বাজার যুত্ৰা হৈল চমৎকার ।
 কেহ বলে লোহীবক কাহার অধিকার ॥
 এইরূপে পঞ্চকত্তা আইল মন্দিরে ।
 ছয়ারি প্রহরি জত বসাইল দ্বারে ॥
 যুভক্ষণে গমন করিল নারায়নি ।
 কুঙরের বিভা দিতে কোকিলবাহিনি ॥

started to celebrate the marriage ceremony of the prince. She respectfully invited the king on the occasion. She also invited all the inhabitants of the town including the ministers, merchants, guards and the poor men. All people came to the place of celebration on hearing the news. The attendants of the goddess also brought women-folk with the help of a Brahman. A Brahman made the brides perform the ceremony of "Adhibas." Then the bridegroom sat under the canopy (lit. ছায়ামণ্ডপ) and married the princesses with the bridegroom's head-dress (মুকুট) on the head. With the five princesses as

নৃপতিরে নিমন্ত্রণ কোরিল আদর ।
 নগরের মনুষ্য যত মস্তি সদাকর ॥
 রাখি ছুখি রাজ্যে সব কৈল নিমন্ত্রণ ।
 কুন্তরের বিভাস্ত্রনি আন সর্বজন ॥
 স্নান করি আগ্নে শিষ্য দেবির কিস্কর ।
 উদ্ভাস ব্রাহ্মণ করাল্য কঠার ॥
 ছায়া মণ্ডপে বর বৈসে তার পরে ।
 আনন্দে করেন বিভা রাজার কুমারি ॥
 মাথায় মুকুট তথা পঞ্চম্রী মণ্ডিনি ।
 বিভাসঙ্গ হইল সভে কৈল শঙ্খধ্বনি ॥
 পঞ্চকথা বিভাহ করিল ধূলুকুট্যা ।
 ছলাছলি বেদবুলি নানাবাণ্ড ঘট ॥
 বেদবিধিব্রাহ্মণ সকল সমুদায় ।
 পুণ্যকরি বল হরি বিভা হইল্য সার ॥
 কুসুম সজ্যায় যুগ্ম গেল কঠাবর ।
 রজনী প্রভাতে কিছু স্নান তারপর ॥
 বরজাত্রি আন সব ক্ষেত্রি মহাজন ।
 বোসিতে বিছুআ দিল বিচিত্র আসন ॥
 নৃপতির কেন হয়্যাছে দশ দশা ।
 বোসিতে দিলেন দেবি ঘোড়াশালে বাশা ॥
 পুত্রবধু রাজারানি চিনিতে না পারে ।
 অনাদোর দেখি বড় বিশাদ অন্তরে ॥

brides the marriage ceremony was finished and all blew the conches (signifying the end of the auspicious ceremony). Thus Dhulākutyā married the five girls amidst great din and noise, chanting of the Vedic hymns and the sound of the musical instruments. Everything was done according to the Vedic injunctions and the assent of all the Brahmans. Now, listeners to this episode, utter the name of God Hari as the marriage is finished, and acquire merit thereby. Next there was the "Flower-bed" (ফুলশয্যা) ceremony observed by the girls. Now, hear something of what befell in the morning. To accommodate the bridegroom's party including the Kshatriyas and the Vaisyas a fine seat was spread out. The king having suffered from ten Dasās (or adverse fortune) the goddess allotted him and the queen seats in the stable. The daughters-in-law could not recognise them there and this want of good feelings on their part

বুঝিতে রাজার মন বিষ্ণুর ঘরনি ।
 কমলাকে কহিলেন কোকিল বাহিনি ॥
 রাত্রি তিন ঘড়ি হৈলে কোরিবে রন্দন ।
 পঞ্চাশ ব্যঞ্জন অন্ন করাল্যা রন্দন ॥
 নরলোক বিস্তর কোরিবে ভোজন ।
 কমলাকে কোলো কথা কোরিল রন্দন ॥
 বিশ্বক্সে দিল পান বিষ্ঠুর ঘরনি ।
 সোবর্ণের শলা শিগ্রগোড়ি দেহ তুমি ॥
 স্বর্ণের বাটাবাটি স্বর্ণের পিড়ি ।
 মছতেকে বিশ্বক্সা সব দিল গোড়ি ॥
 মাটিয়া পাথর ভাণ্ড নৃপতির তরে ।
 সকল প্রস্তুত কৈল যুঁ তার পরে ॥
 বায়ন বাটী কুড়ি লোক বোশিল বাহিরে ।
 স্বর্ণের ঝাড়ি পিড়ি দিল সভাকারে ॥
 কমলা প্রস্তুত করে কাঞ্চন থালায় ।
 জয় জয় শব্দে কিছু বুনা নাঞি যাজ ॥

made the royal couple extremely sore at heart. The consort of God Vishnu (Saraswati) now wanted to know the mind of the king and addressed the goddess Lakshmi (Kamalā) for the purpose thus: "You will have to begin cooking fifty kinds of dishes at three o'clock at night as many people of the earth will be fed on the occasion." The goddess Kamalā cooked as bidden by Saraswati. Then Viswakarmā was bidden by Vishnu's wife as such:—"You do make dishes of gold for serving the meal as soon as possible. The bātās and bātis (larger and smaller cups) and seats are all to be made of gold." Vishwakarmā made them all in a moment. Then Viswakarmā made earthen utensils for the use of the king. Everything was thus prepared for the occasion. Now listen what happened hereafter. People sat for the dinner in the

পঞ্চাশ ব্যঞ্জন অন্ন অমৃতের মত ।
 ভোজন করিল লোক নিবেদিব কত ॥
 কোপুর তাখুল পুরি সর্প বাটা ।
 সভাকারে কহেন কুঙর ধুলাকুটা ॥
 স্বর্ণধালা স্বর্ণঝারি সভারে ইনাশ ।
 নিহান হইল লোক রচে দয়ারাম ॥
 লেখা বখা নাঞি দব্য লোকে নেই জত ।
 যুদ্ধির রাজহুই কৈল জেন মত ॥
 বোড়াশালে রাজরানি চাহে ঘনে ঘন ।
 কতক্ষণে কুঙর সে করাবে ভোজন ॥
 এইরূপে আমারে দিবেন জে কুঙর ।
 নিহান হইবো মোরা যুগযুগান্তর ॥
 একাসনে রাজারানি এই যুক্তি করে ।
 আপনার পুত্রবধু চিনিতে না পারে ॥
 কুঙর না চিনে তবে যুন তার পর ।
 ভূপতিকে দিল ভাণ্ড মাটিয়া পাথর ॥
 অন্ন আত্মা অনাদরে দিলেন কমলা ।
 পুস্তরে পাণ্ডন রাজা রোদরের জ্বালা ॥

courtyards of no less than fifty-two houses. Every invited guest was given one golden water-bowl (ঝারি) and a seat while the goddess Kamalā made the meal ready on a golden dish. There was the sound of “Jaya Jaya” (lit. victory or success to the host) everywhere by the invited guests and nothing more could be heard by reason of this shout. How shall I describe the fifty kinds of curries whose taste was like nectar and which were eaten by the people with relish. After filling the golden vessels (বাটা) with betels prepared with camphor, Dhulākutyā addressed the assembled people thus : “To everyone one golden dish and one golden jug (or ঝারি) are given as presents.” So all the men left the place and Dayārām composes this song (to describe the above).

There was much profusion of the things that were taken by the people. It was only comparable with the Rājasuya Yajna performed by Raja Yudhisthira. The king and the queen

এইরূপে মহারাজ গেলেন মন্দিরে !
 মস্তি মেলি মন্তনা দিলেন নৃপবরে ॥
 এইরূপে ব্রাহ্মনিকে কোরি বিড়ম্বন ।
 নিবদ করিবো তার নুট্যা নিব ধন ॥
 রাজাকে অসাধ্য কিবা আদ্যা বার্থ নয় ।
 ব্রাহ্মনির বড়াই আজি জানিবো নিশ্চয় ॥
 বিভিষেন বুঝী দিল বিশেষ বারতা ।
 রাজা রাম রনে কাটে রাবনের মাথা ॥
 নৃপতির আজ্ঞা হৈল দিতে নিমন্ত্রন ।
 পঞ্চকথা কুণ্ডরে কোরিতে যাবাহন ॥
 মন্তকের মায়া গেল রাজার মহলে ।
 পঞ্চকথা কুণ্ডর আইল সন্ধ্যাকালে ॥
 নৃপতি কহেন যুন হুয়ারি প্রহারি ।
 জাতে জেন পায়ে নাই সে পাত্রে নারি ॥
 ব্রাহ্মনি বাহির হঞা জদি জায় হেথা ।
 কোটালে কহেন তুপ কাটি নিহ মাথা ॥

looked repeatedly out of the stable to find out when the prince will feed them. "It is a pity that we shall be given dinner in this way. We never imagined that we shall lose our proper places for such a long time (lit. for ages)." Sitting on the same seats the king and the queen were conferring in this way and they could not recognise their daughters-in-law. Even the prince could not recognise his parents. As a result of which he put before them earthen dishes. The goddess Kamalā then served them with food rather discourteously. The king inwardly chafed a good deal but felt at the same time the pangs of hunger. Thus treated the king (with the queen) left for his palace and conferred about the situation with his ministers. His ministers devised ways and means as to how the king will give trouble to the Brahman woman (the

কোটাল বুনিয়া সাবধানে চৌকি ফিরে ।
 ব্রাহ্মন ভোজন হৈল নৃপতির ঘরে ॥
 জত লোক যায় তারা নৃপতি গোচর ।
 ব্রাহ্মনিকে বন্দি কৈল কামিনি কুঙরে ॥
 বিশাল লোচনে সেনা বেড়িয়াছে কত ।
 কুঙর বলেন যাই জনমের মত ॥
 কামিনি সকল কান্দে করিয়া করুণা ।
 এইবার মায়ের মহিমা জাবে জানা ॥
 কুঙর বলেন লুট্যা নিবে কত্যাগণ ।
 হরিনি আতঙ্ক জেন হৈল হতাশন ॥
 এত শুনি স্বরেশ্বতি দিলেন উত্তর ।
 কি কহিব সেণাগণ আর নৃপবর ॥
 নিদ্রাবতি আনিলেন দেবী নারায়নি ।
 কাকপক্ষ্য ঘুমাইল মল্লস্থ্য কি গনি ॥
 পুত্রবধু নোজাঁ মাতা গেলেন মন্দিরে ।
 পুনর্জন্ম হৈল যেন জননী জঠরে ॥
 কোটালের কথা শুনি কাপে নৃপবর ।
 কোন পথে কামিনি কুঙর গেল ঘর

goddess Saraswati in disguise) and as to how he will plunder her riches. They said, "Nothing is impossible for a king to do and his orders must be carried out. We must fathom to-day how much pride the Brahman woman possesses." It was due to Bibhisan's special advice that Rama could cut the ten heads of Ravana in a battle (so the ministers' advice will take good effect). Forming the plan the king ordered his men to invite the five princesses and the prince (to his house). The mother of the world (Saraswati) entered the royal palace first and the five princesses with the prince reached there in the evening. The king said, to all the gate-keepers : "Listen to me, oh gate-keepers and sentinels ! see that the women of the bridegroom's household do not escape. If the Brahman woman tries to escape, (the instruction of the king is that) you are then and there to decapitate her." On this command the Kotowāl (Police-Prefect) guarded the house being extremely careful. The feeding of the Brahmans was finished in the palace of the king. People who visited the king did not understand why the Brahman lady together with the prince and the girls were thus imprisoned. Looking towards the big batch of soldiers that surrounded the prince's abode, the prince stared wildly

মহারাজা বলে বেটা কাটিবো মশানে ।
 কোটালে কাটিতে জায় কত্নার কারণে ॥
 কোটালিআ রুষ্টভজে স্ত্রধতার মত ।
 হৈল মোর হত্যা কারি জে করিল যেত ॥
 কোটালে করিতে রক্ষা কোকিল বাহিনী ।
 উত্তর মশানে মাতা উরিল আপনি ॥
 শুনরে নির্বুদ্ধি রাজা ছাড় অহঙ্কার ।
 কোটালিয়া বংশরক্ষা করিল তোমার ॥
 অবিচারে কোটালে কাটিবে নৃপমনি ।
 কেমনে তোমার পাপ ধরিবে ধরনি ॥
 পূর্ব কথা শুন রাজা পুত্রের বারতা ।
 কোটাল কাটিতে গেল কুণ্ডরের মাথা ॥

and exclaimed that he and his ladies were undone. The ladies began to weep imploring for mercy and wished to test the might of the goddess. The prince said that the girls under his charge would be looted. They were afraid like a doe before a forest-fire. On hearing such solicitations, she (the goddess) replied :—"What mischief the troops and the king may do unto you?" She invited the goddess of sleep and as a result even the crows slept, not to speak of the human beings. The mother (goddess Saraswati) took her daughters-in-law to her own abode which meant to the rescued girls as if they were born again from the womb of their mother.

On learning from the Kotowāl (about the escape) of the princesses the king trembled in rage. "Tell me, by what route the prince and the princesses escaped. Oh vile person! I shall execute you in the 'Masān' (execution-ground)." As the king ordered the execution of the Kotowāl on account of the escape of the princesses, he (the Kotowāl) being helpless began to pray to the god Krishna just like Sudhannā (of old),

মশানে মনুষ্য বত কেহ নাকি জানে ।
কোঙরে করিল রক্ষা কাটিয়া সিয়ালে ॥
বনবাসে পুত্র তোর বিংশতি বৎসর ।
বিপিনে বিস্তর দুঃখ পাইল কুঙর ॥
বৈধৰ্ব দেশের কত রাজার কুমারি ।
পাঠপড়ে পঞ্চকত রাজার কুমারি ॥
কুঙরে রাখিল কত করিয়া আদর ।
ধূল্যাকুট্যা দিল ভার দুআদশ বৎসর ॥
ধূল্যাকুট্যা বল্যা ধনি সবে ডাকে তারে ।
গোবিন্দের নাম রাখিলেন জে প্রকারে ॥
শ্রীপঞ্চমি স্বরশ্বেতি পুজিল স্তম্ভরি ।
যোগবলে কুঙর জাগিল সর্বরি ॥
বৈকুণ্ঠে বাই আমি বিষ্ট সন্নিধানে ।
তোমার বেটা বন্দি মোরে কৈল সেইখানে ।

saying, "He whom I served so faithfully becomes now my slayer." In order to save the Kotowāl (from the ire of the king) the mother Kokilbahini herself descended to the northern execution-ground (lit. north Masān). She said, "Listen to me, oh fool of a king! give up your pride. This Kotowāl saved the life of your son. If you kill the Kotowāl then it will be such an act of injustice that mother earth will hardly be able to bear it. Listen to the previous history of your son. The Kotowāl was once ordered to decapitate the prince. He never took him to the execution-ground but killed a jackal in his place and thereby saved him. Your son thenceforth remained in the forest for about twenty years, when he suffered much. The daughters of the king of Vaideha (lit. Vaidarbha) being princesses were (at that period) prosecuting their studies. They kept the prince well in their service. They gave unto him the charge of 'dust and reed' (lit. Dhulākutyā) for twelve years. All the fair girls called her by the name of

কুলিনের কণ্ঠা এই রাজার কুমারি ।
 কতরূপে করিলাম কপট চাতুরি ॥
 তোমার পারা কত গণ্ডা পড়্যাতার হেতা ।
 তবু না কাহার সঙ্গে করে কুটম্বিতা ॥
 মাআনদি করিলাম পক্ষ রাজ তার ।
 কামিনি কুণ্ডর বল্যা পবনে কাণ্ডারি ॥
 দুমাসের পথ গেল দগু ছয় রাত্রে ।
 জেইরূপে হৈল বিভা দেখিল জগতে ॥
 কতবার কুণ্ডর আইল তব ঠাঞি ।
 পুত্রকে পাপিষ্ঠ রাজা তবু চিন নাই ॥
 অতএব এতেক দুষ্কৃৎ হৈছে কপালে ।
 যুনরে পাপিষ্ঠ রাজা কহি হেন কালে ॥
 অজামিল কষ্ট পাল পুত্র বধু হইতে ।
 যুনিতে পরম সুখ যুন ভাগবতে ॥

Dhulā-kutyā. Adoption of such a name may be compared to the name 'Govinda' given to Sree-Krishna. These girls once performed the worship of the goddess Saraswati and through the influence of 'yoga' the prince (then Dhulākutyā) kept himself awake throughout the whole night. When I was returning to Baikuntha (my heavenly abode) from the place of the princesses, your son kept me under bondage. These girls are daughters of a kulin king. I played tricks with them. Many kings of your status solicited matrimonial alliances with their family but still the king (the princesses' father) did not enter into any such alliance. I created a false river and a swift-going boat (lit. Pakshirāj-boat). The princesses and the prince took their seats on it and being guided by wind the boat reached swiftly a place six months' journey in course of the same night—the time taken being about two hours and a half. Everybody knows how the marriage of the princesses with the prince came about. The prince came to you many times still, oh hateful king, you could not recognise your own son. Therefore you suffer misery. Listen, oh vile king! Ajāmil received the grace of the god Krishna through his son and daughter-in-law. This story (of Ajāmil) is very interesting as recited from the Bhāgavata. You thought of your son as

মোক্ষ'পুত্র বলিআ করিআছিন মনে ।
 তারপারা পণ্ডিত নাই ত্রিভুবনে ॥
 পূর্ব্বোতে পড়িআ পাট না দিল দক্ষিণে ।
 সেই পাপে পুত্র তোর পাইল জন্মনী ॥
 কোটালে কাটাবে রাজা কিসের নিমিত্তে ।
 পুত্রবধু আলা তোর তাহার পুণ্যেতে ॥
 জান নাঞি ভূপতি কোহিআ দিলাম আমি ।
 পুত্রবধু লঞা যুখে ঘর কর ভূমি ॥
 বৈকুণ্ঠে জাই আমি বিহু সন্নিধানে ।
 যুনিঞা পড়িল গিআ সারদা-চরণে ॥

illiterate. But no Pandit (learned man) like him will be found in the three worlds. This prince in his previous life did not pay the requisite fees of his teacher after finishing his studies. It is for this reason that your son felt so much pain. For what reason, oh king, will you kill the Kotowāl? It is his merit that brought to you your son and daughters-in-law. You did not know of this so long, for which I disclose these things to you now. Now you enjoy the felicities of domestic life with them. I am going back to Baikuntha to the god Krishna." On hearing this, the king at once fell prostrate at the feet of the goddess Sārādā (i.e., Saraswati). The Raja in folded palms worshipped her and said, "This land is purified by the dust of your feet. My son and daughters-in-law have also come to the royal palace as the night passed away." Dayārām Das solicits the (protecting) shadow of your feet, O mother. Let the compassionate mother show compassion to the chief singer (lit. "Nāyak—meaning the poet himself).

কর জোড় করি রাজা করিল যশনে ।
 পবিত্র হইল দেশ তব পদধূলি ।
 পুত্রবধু আলো যবে পূহাল রযনি ॥
 দআরাম দাস মাগে চরণের ছায়া ।
 করগো করুণা মই নাএকেরে দআ ॥

সারদা চরণে ভূপ যুনি এত অপক্লপ
 অবনি লুটায়্য করে স্তুতি ।
 কোকিল বাহিনী তুমি কেমনে জানিবো যামি
 কোলিঙ্গে রাখিল খিআতি ॥
 রাজা কোটল করেন জিঙ্গ্যাসন ।
 দ্বাদশ বৎসর হৈল অস্তি চন্দ্রসার হৈল
 দিবানিশি মারিল ব্রাহ্মণ ॥

The king further said, "That you are Kokilbāhini, (goddess Saraswati), how could I know? The episode remains famous in Kalinga." The king after making enquiries of the Kotowāl about his son addressed the goddess as follows:—"For a period of twelve years the Brahman (teacher) used to beat the lad and as the result of such treatment he became quite emaciated. Still he could not acquire learning. The incidents gradually spread everywhere and you mother still heaped insults on the boy. It is due to the good fortune (lit. piety acquired in previous life) of the boy that the Kotowāl acted as his father (all results of his merit) and saved my son's life. All these incidents are nothing but the result of your power of creating illusion. Listen carefully, mother: this body I submit to your feet. This palace of mine has been sanctified by your presence" and in these terms the king worshipped the feet of the goddess. Witnessing such devotion on the part of the king, the goddess became pacified and delivered unto the king the princesses

তবু না বিত্তা পাল্যে ত্রিভুবনে খ্যাত হৈল্যে
 তুমি কত কৈল আগমন ।
 কেবল পুণ্যের কথা কোটাল পুণ্যের পিতা
 পুত্রে মোর দিল প্রাণদান ॥

সকল তুমার মাআ হুন মাতা মন দিআ
 এই অঙ্গ সপিলাম চরণে ।
 পোষিত হইল পুত্রি পাদপদ্মে সেবা করি
 স্তুতি করে সারদা সাক্ষাতে ।
 দেখিআ তাহার স্তুতি স্বস্তি হইল স্বরেশ্বতি
 পুত্রবধু সোপ্যা দিল হাতে ॥

পঞ্চরত্ন অলঙ্কার পুত্রবধু দেখি রাজরাণি ।
 সারদা করিঞা ধ্যান দআরাম দাসে কন
 দোষ ক্ষেম কোকিল বাহিণী ॥

(so long kept under her charge). The queen saw the daughters-in-law and adorned their fair persons with five bejewelled ornaments (lit. পঞ্চরত্ন অলঙ্কার, *i.e.*, five ornaments made of five kinds of gems). The (poet) Dayārām Das sings of the goddess Kokilbāhini meditating about her in his mind. He also solicits pardon for all shortcomings from her. Bringing the daughters-in-law in great joy, the king rewarded the Kotowāl by bestowing on him one-half of his kingdom. The prince addressed the Kotowāl as his foster-father and remarked, "What can I hope to do with my limited merit to clear up the debt of gratitude that I owe to you?" The prince bowed unto the Kotowāl and talked to him in this strain. He next bowed unto his parents. Then the boy saluted the feet of his relations, friends and other well-wishers. All the stores of gold of king Subāhu were then distributed among the Brahmans, still it was seen that the store remained full. All these (*i.e.*, the stores remaining intact without anything falling short) were due to the favour of the goddess Saraswati. In an auspicious moment the great king Subāhu worshipped the

পুত্রবোধু আলা ঘরে পরম কৌতুকে ।
 কোটালে ইনাম দিলাম অর্ধেক মলুকে ॥
 কোটালে কুণ্ডর বলে তুমি ধর্ম পিতা ।
 যুধিব তোমার গুণ কি মোর জগ্যতা ॥
 প্রণাম করিঞা কত কহেন কুণ্ডর ।
 পিতামাতা চরণে বন্দিল তারপর ॥
 ইষ্টমিত্র আদি করি জত বন্ধুজন ।
 সভার চরণে শিশু কোরিল বন্দন ॥
 সুবাহু নৃপতির যত সুবর্ণ ভাণ্ডার ।
 ব্রাহ্মণে বিলায় ধন জত ছিল তার ॥
 সারদার বরেতে হরিল জে ভাণ্ডার ।
 দেবির কৃপাঅ কিছু কমি নাঞি তার ॥

goddess Sārādā with full sixteen items of worship. The injunctions of the Vedas, the Brahmans (priests), the method of worship, the golden temple, and the bejewelled throne of the goddess were all arranged and followed by the attending Brahman (priests).

Ātap rice, sugar, ghee, the “Pāni-Phal” (a kind of fruit), the juice of sugarcane, cocoanuts, various “Naibedyas” (offerings), sweets (in great quantities), uncooked rice, various juices, fruits and roots—were all offered to the goddess. Dhup and Dhunā (resins) were burnt and their glow brightened the place. The king thus worshipped the goddess Sārādā. All the people of the world then shouted, “Glory be to this king.” The finishing touch to the occasion was given by the offering of betels and camphor. Now, as the ceremony was finished, immersion of the goddess in water was duly performed and all uttered the name of god Hari. After this was over ‘Prasāds’ or remnants of the offerings were distributed among the votaries. These increase the wealth,

সুভক্ষণে সুবাহু নৃপতি মহারাজা ।
 শোড় উপাচারে করে সারদার পূজা ॥
 বেদবিধি ব্রাহ্মণ পূজার বিধান ।
 শৌবন্ত মন্দির সব রত্ন সিংহাসনে ॥
 কোরিল পূজার বিধি ব্রাহ্মণ সকল ।
 আতপ তণ্ডুল চিনি ঘৃত পানি ফল ॥
 ইক্ষু রস নারিকেল নৈবিদ্য নানামত ।
 মিষ্টান্ন অনেক আয়াত্রে কৈলে কত ॥
 ছেনা পান্য কৈল ঘন পত্র হৈল নানা ।
 ধূপ ধূনা চন্দনে করিআছেন আনা ॥
 সারদা চরণে রাজা কোরিলেন পূজা ।
 ধরণির লোক বলে ধৃত এই রাজা ॥
 তাহুল কপূর শোধে কৈল নিবেদন ।
 পুত্ৰ করি বলো হারী পূজাবিসজ্জন ॥

male children and fame of the participators day by day.
He who listens to this song, the goddess Sārādā (blesses him).


পচ্যাতে প্রসাদো পানে জত ভক্তগনে ।

ধন পুত্র জন আর বাড়ে দিনে দিনে ॥

এই গিত জেবা যুনে সারদা.....।*

—সারদামঙ্গল সমাপ্ত ।

THE END.



A STUDY IN THE DIALECTICS OF SPHOṬA

By

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INTRODUCTION

We do not know when and by whom the doctrine of *sphoṭa* was first promulgated. There is no reference to it in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini nor in the *vārttikas* of Kātyāyana. But in the Pāṇ. Sū. VI. i. 123, there is the name of a grammarian named Sphoṭāyana. The name may suggest that the grammarian was an exponent of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*.¹ It is, however, Patañjali who for the first time appears to make a reference to *sphoṭa* in his epoch-making work on Sanskrit grammar, the *Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya*. Therein he acknowledges in clear terms the distinction between two kinds of word (*śabda*)—permanent (*nitya*) and created (*kārya*);² and it is with reference to the former that he uses such epithets as “abiding” (*dhruva*), “unchangeable” (*kūṭastha*), etc., epithets that are ascribed to *Brahman* with which *Śphoṭa* has been identified. But Patañjali has not only hinted at *sphoṭa* by noticing the distinction referred to above; he has also actually used the term in his work and has given us a definition of the same. Thus Patañjali observes a distinction between *sphoṭa* and sound by holding that the

¹ Cf. *sphoṭāyanas sphoṭapratipādanaparaḥ vaiyākaraṇācāryaḥ*. PM. on the Pāṇ. Sū. VI. i. 123.

² *kiṃ punar nityaś śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ*. MB., Vol. I, p. 54.

latter is only a quality of the former and serves to manifest it.¹ And he defines *sphoṭa* as what is perceived by the auditory organs, apprehended by the intellect, manifested by sound and pertaining to ether.²

It is Bhartrhari, the celebrated author of the *Vākyapadīya*, who, to our knowledge, is the first grammarian to have presented to us a systematic treatment of the conception of *sphoṭa*. Bhartrhari has looked at *sphoṭa* from two standpoints—metaphysical and empirical. From the metaphysical standpoint, Bhartrhari conceives *Sphoṭa* as identical with the *Brahman* of the Vedāntists, the material cause of the phenomenal world. From the empirical point of view, *sphoṭa* is an indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense. His attitude towards word, syllable and letter is that they are no better than mere artifices resorted to for the purpose of helping the subject to grasp the indivisible character of *sphoṭa*.

It is, however, a fact that the doctrine of *sphoṭa* as conceived by Bhartrhari has not been elaborately discussed and the philosophy underlying it has not been presented before scholars in a systematic form. And the reason for this is not far to seek. The subject is intricate and, to add to the difficulty, the materials available are too scanty to guide the student in his study of the knotty problems. In this connexion, let us state that in the Benares edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, we find that three different commentators have written their commentaries on the three different chapters of the work and that a commentary from the pen of one single commentator on the whole of the work is not yet available to us.³ Of the three commentaries again, the one on the first chapter is not at all elaborate. Even the newly

¹ *evam tarhi sphoṭaś śabda dhvaniś śablaguṇaḥ*. MB., Vol. I, p. 517.

² *śrotopalabdhir buddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogenā'bhihvalita ākāśadeśaś śabdaḥ*. *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

³ The commentator on the third chapter says in more places than one that he has written a commentary on the first chapter, but the work is not available. (*Cf. jñānañeyai-vā 'vidye 'ti brahmakāṇḍa eva prapañcenā 'yam artho 'smābhir nirṇītaḥ* : Hel., p. 92. Also Hel., p. 39; p. 91; p. 132.)

published commentary on this chapter (edited by Pandit Cārudeva Śāstrin) is not of much help. Fortunately for us, the commentary on the third chapter is rather full and is thus of great help for the understanding of Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

In our present thesis, we have for the first time tried to construct Bhartṛhari's philosophy. In the opening portion of the first chapter, we have pointed out that Bhartṛhari seems to be out and out a *monist* and further that his monism appears, to all intents and purposes, to run parallel to Śaṅkara's monism. Bhartṛhari, however, is reticent with regard to the question whether his Absolute is of the nature of bliss. It has been very cogently established by the Vedāntist dialecticians that a spiritual entity must partake of the character of bliss; otherwise, the spiritual character cannot be advocated.¹ But it would be a bold step for us to suppose that Bhartṛhari was conscious of this logical necessity of admitting the identity of consciousness with bliss. We would rather leave it an open question.

We have further shown in the first chapter that the Āgamic conception of *śabdabrahman* is different from Bhartṛhari's conception of the Ultimate Reality. To quote Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj: "There is no denying the fact that there is some slight difference between the two systems regarding the character of Vāk, in so far as one holds it to be independent and self-subsistent, while the other makes it a power subordinate to the substance with which it is identical."²

In the second chapter, we have fully explained Bhartṛhari's conception of *sphoṭa*—its relation to sound (*dhvani*), its manifestation, and other allied issues.

In the third chapter which is divided into three sections, we have discussed the polemics which have been given rise to by

¹ ānandatve jñānatā jñānatāyām ānandatvaṁ vidyate nirviśaṅkam |
satyaṁ apy evaṁ nā 'tīrekāvakāśaḥ pūrṇe tattve jñānasaukhyopapatteḥ ||

— Sāh. ŚPr. I. 187.

² ABI., Vol. V, p. 114.

the doctrine of *sphoṭa*—how the doctrine has been criticised by the rival schools of philosophers, specially the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Naiyāyikas*. In the third section of this chapter, we have specially stated the advantages of the grammarians' theory.

In the fourth chapter which is also divided into three sections, we have successively studied the positions of *Kumārila*, *Śabara* and *Jayanta* in detail and have attempted from the standpoint of the grammarians to meet the charges levelled against the doctrine of *sphoṭa*.

In the fifth chapter, we have given an account of the classification of *sphoṭa* as found in later standard works.

In the sixth and last chapter, we have cited Vedic texts in support of the theory of *sphoṭa* and have concluded with the statement that the philosophy of *sphoṭa*, like all other Indian philosophies, ends in mysticism (*sādhana*).

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTION OF ŚABDABRAHMAN

1. *Bharṭṛhari's Philosophy*

In the history of grammatical thought in India Bharṭṛhari is a most outstanding figure, second only to Patañjali, the author of the *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*. Though Helārāja, the astute commentator of the *Vākyapadīya*, the monumental treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bharṭṛhari, points out that the school of grammarians beginning with Patañjali adheres to the principles of monistic thought,¹ we think, we are not far from the truth if we say that it is Bharṭṛhari who should be looked upon as the most representative exponent of monism in the realm of grammatical speculations in this land of ours. It is worthy of note that Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita in his well-known work, the *Śabdakaustubha*, says in so many words that Bharṭṛhari while dealing with the nature of word (*śabda*) incidentally discussed the illusory creation of the objective world from the Eternal Verbum or *Śabdatattva* or *Sphoṭa* with a view to helping the student to comprehend the nature of *Brahman* as discussed in the *Upaniṣads*. And he further states that by drawing an analogy between *Śabdatattva* and *Brahman*, Bharṭṛhari has found out a precious gem in his quest of an insignificant cowrie.² According to Bharṭṛhari, the Word is on a par with the Absolute *Brahman* of the monistic school of Vedāntic thought—like *Brahman* it is all-pervasive and is deathless and without any beginning ;³ and as *Brahman* cannot possibly transform itself

¹ darśitam ity advaitanayāvalambibhir bhāṣyakāraprabhṛtibhiḥ. Hel., pp. 179-80.

² varāṭīkāṇveṣaṇāya pravṛttaś cintāmaṇiṁ labdhavān iti vāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇoktābhāṇa-kanyāyena śabdavicārāya pravṛttas san prasaṅgād advaite aupaniṣade brahmaṇy api vyut-padyatām ity abhiprāyeṇa bhagavān bharṭṛharir vivartavādādikam api prasaṅgād vyudapādayat. Śab. K., p. 12.

³ Vide expl. of *anādinidhanam*. NM., p. 531.

into the forms of this gross world but is only taken to appear as the product, so the Word in Bhartṛhari's conception only appears as the objective world. Thus Bhartṛhari says that the Absolute Word is one and immutable, but when it undergoes the first evolution, it seems to bifurcate itself into two—the denoter (*vācaka*) and the denoted (*vācya*), the name and the nameable.¹ The Absolute Word *quā* denoter is also called *sphoṭa* while the same *quā* denoted is *mahāsattā*. Now, both the denoter and the denoted should be looked upon as the two aspects of the One Ultimate Reality and, therefore, identical in essence. And it is worthy of note that this order of the denoter and the denoted exists only in the empirical plane—the transcendental reality is far beyond the range of the name and the nameable. But when we do not soar in the transcendental plane where all distinctions sink into nothingness and the Absolute reigns in its entirety, when we speak in terms of this gross material world, we assume that the first evolutions of the Absolute have undergone further evolutions and we conceive a denoter or name for each denoted or nameable.

Let us see how Bhartṛhari explains the evolution of the Eternal Verbum as the material world. Bhartṛhari opines that the Eternal Verbum is possessed of an infinite number of *śaktis* or powers which come out of it and stand apart, as it were, under the influence of another Supreme *śakti* (power), the *zeitgeist* (Time-Force) or *kāla-śakti* as it is called, and these powers are but the source of the phenomenal world in its various phases.² Harivṛsabha, the commentator on the first chapter of the *Vākyapadīya*, observes that the Eternal Verbum is not limited by time as time only functions in the plane of phenomenal existence.³ When the Absolute Word ceases to evolve into the

¹ ekasyai 'vā 'tmano bhedau śabdārthāṇ aprthak sthitau | Vāk. II. 31.

² avyāhatā kalā yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ |
janmādayo vikārāḥ śad bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ || Vāk. I. 3.

³ nityānām hi sthitau saha-kāriṇyāḥ kilaśakter vyāpāro na vidyate. Har. (CS.), p. 97.

objective world, the Time-Force lies absorbed in it and has no function to discharge. It is only when the Word-Spirit undergoes formal transformation that the Time-Force is found to make its appearance and its task lies in bringing out the various other powers that lie embedded in the Absolute. Bhartr̥hari's conception of this Time-Force is that it is an inherent (*samavāya*) force of the Absolute, that it exerts its influence in bringing into play the other powers of the Eternal Verbum.¹ Taken by itself, the Time-Force is an unreal fiction which cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent.² But Bhartr̥hari has spoken of yet another power of the Absolute and this is called *avidyā*. Helārāja describes it as being possessed of a twofold function, viz., *veiling* and *projectivity*. Thus *avidyā* is described as nescience or darkness that covers the light of the Absolute and as the power that presents the unreal phenomenal world in its various forms before the individual soul.³ It is again pointed out that the individual soul is but the limited form of the Absolute as conditioned by *avidyā*.⁴ It is only through a proper realisation of the nature of the Ultimate Reality that the individual soul can aspire to get rid of the limitations which have been imposed upon it by the influence of *avidyā*.⁵ The stupendous hoax of this objective world will fade away leaving no trace behind when the individual soul in its naked glory will stand face to face with the Transcendental Reality. Thus the difference of nature between *avidyā* and Time-Force is easily intelligible—the former shuts out the vision of the Ultimate Reality and exhibits the phenomenal world, while the latter presents the phenomena in temporal succession only.⁶ We have already

1 tām śaktim samavāyākhyāṁ śaktinām upakāṣiṇīm | Vāk. III. 10, p. 101.

2 tattvānyatvābhyāṁ sattvāsattvābhyāṁ anirvācyā. Har. p. 3.

3 (i) aprakāśas tu tamo 'vidyā. Hel., p. 89.

(ii) avidyāśād vyavasthā nānārūpā drśyate. Op. cit., p. 130.

4 draṣṭā 'pi jīvātmā 'vidyākṛtāvachchedo niyataḥ. Op. cit., p. 92.

5 vicāreṇā 'vidyāvilaye brahmaikaṇiṣṭhatādarśanam. Op. cit., p. 89.

6 brahmaṇā bhedāvabhāsanam avidyākṛtam. tatrai 'va kramābhāsanam kālākhyā. svātantryaśaktikṛtam eva. Op. cit., p. 136.

pointed out that Hariṇṣabha calls the Time-Force a false appearance and it is remarkable that Helārāja thinks that the *avidyā*, too, is no better than a false principle.¹

There is abundant evidence both from the text of Bhartṛhari and from the commentaries that Bhartṛhari's philosophical position is strictly monistic.² The phenomenal world is only a false appearance superinduced upon the foundational reality of *Brahman* by the operation of *avidyā* and Time-Force. These two principles, though existing from eternity in close touch with the Absolute, are not co-ordinate existents—they are essentially as false as the phenomenal world which is their product. The position so far is on a par with the monism of Śaṅkara in whose philosophy *Brahman* is the only reality, though *māyā* as the cause of illusion is associated with it. But this *māyā* is not a reality and as such does not detract from the monistic character of the Ultimate Reality. But there seems to be a fundamental difference between the two in their metaphysical nature of the Absolutes. Although the Absolute of Bhartṛhari is one unqualified and undifferentiated unity of existence just like the *Brahman* of Śaṅkara, Bhartṛhari conceives *Brahman* to be of the nature of an infinite number of powers and potentialities which, however, are in their essence identical with their substratum.³

¹ *avidyā* 'pi satattvānyatābhyāṁ parasyā 'vinirvācyā. Hel., p. 132.

² (i) yatra draṣṭā ca dr̥ṣyaṁ ca darśanaṁ ca vikalpitaṁ | tasyai 'vā 'rthasya satyatvaṁ śrītaṁ trayyanta vedinaḥ || Vāk. III, p. 132. (ii) Har. interprets '*vicārita*' in the sense of false appearance as in dreams and says that the Absolute does not forsake its own nature while passing through evolutions. *Vide* Har. on Vāk. I. 1. (iii) *svanikāya-siddhādhyāśa darśanāśrayeṇa* Hel., p. 16. (iv) *na ca parinatidarśanābhiprāyeṇā 'yāṁ vikāśābdo 'nityatvaprasaṅgād, api tu vivartaparyāyo* 'yam. *Op. cit.*, p. 31. (v) *sva-darśanaṁ vivartaṁ siddhāntayitum āha. Op. cit.* p. 134. (vi) *saṁvic ca paśyāntīrūpā pāra-vāk śābdabrahmamayī 'ti brahmatattvaṁ śābdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate. Op. cit.* p. 91. Hel. says that what persists in the countless phenomena of the world is the Truth or the Ultimate Reality. This Truth is Consciousness, the *Brahman* of the Vedāntists, which is equated with *Sphoṭa* or *Śabdātattva*. Apart from the aforesaid references in the Vāk. and its commentaries, we find that Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* says that if *sphoṭa* be regarded as a conscious principle there is little difference between Advaitavāda and Śābdabrahmavāda: *Cf. vibhūtvam iva cetanatvam api śābdabrahmaṇo varpyate tarhi 'śvarasyai 'va śābdabrahme 'ti nāma kṛtaṁ syāt. NM.*, pp. 535-36.

³ *śābdātattve brahmaṇi...ātma bhūtās śaktayaḥ. Har.*, p. 2.

The Absolute is one but is conceived to be an infinite plurality of *śaktis* or powers. These *śaktis* are as real as *Brahman* because they are one with it. Śaṅkara, however, would not lend countenance to such a conception of a plurality in the Absolute Unity as the identity of unity and plurality is not logically conceivable. Thus Bhartṛhari's Absolute is a *supra-logical* or rather, *alogical* principle. It will be rather unfair to Bhartṛhari if we conceive his position to be a qualified monism; because, the ontological difference of *śaktis* is emphatically denied by him.¹ The pluralism of the *śaktis* is rather the representation of the logical mind conjured into existence by the necessity of the laws of logical interpretation and is not a metaphysical pluralism. So metaphysically the Absolute of Bhartṛhari is strictly a monistic principle and the pluralism is only a logical construction serving as the *prius* of the phenomenal plurality.²

But we have found passages where Helārāja speaks of all *śaktis* as *quasi-real* in character, and if the plural number be supposed to include even the *śaktis* which are called eternal, the monism of Bhartṛhari will be parallel to Śaṅkara's position,³ the only difference being that there is no evidence to prove that *Sphota*, like the *Brahman* of the Advaita Vedānta, is possessed of a blissful character.

2. Āgamic Conception of Śabdabrahman

We have carefully represented Bhartṛhari's conception of *śabdabrahman*, but let us point out that the Āgamic conception of *śabdabrahman* is not identical with it.⁴ In the *Tantras* we

¹ ata evā 'vidyāśaktibrahmaṇor bhede na dvaitāpatih. Hel., p. 172.

² ātmīyā eva śaktayo yogastākhyās tathāvidhās santi. *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

³ tattvānyatvābhyām anirvācyā hi śaktayaḥ. tatho'ktam—śaktīnām vasturūpatve tattvānyatvavicāraṇā | yujyate, kalpitānām tu yuktādvayavikalpitā || *Op. cit.*, p. 102. Mark the plural in "*śaktayaḥ*" and "*śaktīnām*." But, in another context, Hel. definitely says that "all" powers are false: anirvācyā hi bhedābhedābhyām sarvās śaktayaḥ. Hel., p. 172 (under śl. 27).

⁴ Vide ABL., Vol. V, pp. 113-14.

come across two forms of *Śiva*, the *nirguṇa* and the *śaṅguṇa*. And therein it is stated that *śakti* emanates from the latter who is endowed with the wealth of existence, consciousness and bliss.¹ The relation of *śakti* to *Śiva* has been described in various ways. *Śakti* is the divine nature of *Śiva* by which he realises his own self. Puṇyānanda in his *Kāmakalāvīlāsa* explains the point by means of a beautiful simile. *Śiva* is like a handsome king who while looking at his reflection in the mirror of *śakti* knows it to be his own self.² Ādyanātha views *śakti* as the power by which *Śiva* limits himself and appears as the world of objects.³ Abhinavagupta opines that *Śiva* assumes the state of *śakti* for purposes of self-enjoyment.⁴

We are told that the creative impulse of *Śiva* inseparably connected with *śakti* assumes the form of a *bindu*, a highly subtle entity and comprising three *guṇas*.⁵ *Bindu* is again described as the state of *śakti* in which the germ of action sprouts increasingly and so it has been viewed as the proper condition for creation.⁶ *Bindu* again divides itself into three aspects—gross, subtle and extremely subtle—and they are respectively called *bindu*, *nāda* and *bīja*. Rāghavabhaṭṭa carefully points out that the two *bindus* spoken of above are not one and the same thing—the one is the cause (*kāraṇa*) while the other is the effect (*kārya*).⁷ Now the *kāryabindu* is the conscious aspect of the *kāraṇabindu* while the *bīja* is its unconscious aspect, and the resultant of the conscious and the unconscious aspects is represented by *nāda*.⁸ When *bindu* bifurcates itself, there

¹ ST. I. 7.

² yathā kaścit rājā 'tisundaras svātmābhīmukhaśchītasvacchādarasatule svātmāpratibimbam samyak prasamīkṣya tatpratibimbam abhin itī jñānāti, evaṃ paramēśvaro 'pi svādhīnabhūtān svātmaśaktīm samyag avalokya svasvarūpam avagacchati. Com. under KKV., śl. 2.

³ prakāśo 'nanyato bhāvas svātantryollāsakevalaḥ |
paricchinātmikā śaktiś śambhor viśvātīśāyinaḥ | APP., śl. 9.

⁴ devo bhoktai 'va kathyate | TL. III. 190.

⁵ tato bindurūpam avyaktam triguṇam jāyate. VSLM., p. 142.

⁶ nāda-bindū śṛṣṭyupayogāvasthau. Com. under ST. I. 7.

⁷ etau nāda-bindū prathamoktanāda-bindubhyām anyau tatkāryarūpau. Op. cit., I. 8.

⁸ VSLM., p. 142.

happens to arise an indistinct sound which the teachers of the *āgamas* call *śabdabrahman*.¹ This *śabdabrahman* is identified with *parā vāk*. Nāgeśa says that *śabdabrahman* is *nāda* in which there is no distinction of letters and syllables, which in its nature is a cognition, which is the particular state of *śakti* suitable for creation and the resultant of consciousness and unconsciouness.² In the *Tantras* this *śabdabrahman* is said to be the *kuṇḍalinī śakti* that resides in the individual living being.³

When *nāda* becomes manifested a little, the internal air which reveals it comes up as far as the naval region from the *mūlādhāra*, the seat of *parā vāk* or *nāda*, and this stage is called the *paśyantī* which can be comprehended by the mind. Both *parā* and *paśyantī* are highly subtle stages and are cognised by the *yogins* through indeterminate and determinate cognitions respectively. The next stage after *paśyantī* is *madhyamā* which is revealed as soon as the air comes up to the region of the heart. It is also described as being subtle in nature for it cannot be perceived by persons other than the one who utters it and that again only when he has shut his auditory organs.⁴ The next stage is the *vaikhārī* which is the form of speech spoken by human beings. It is produced by the internal air as it passes through the throat and finally reaches the mouth.

Nāda or *parā vāk*, according to Trika writers, is nothing different from *vimarśa śakti*. Thus *vimarśa*, *nāda* or *parā vāk* has the characteristic of an infinitely subtle kind of speech. Rāmakaṇṭha describes *nāda* as being in its nature an inner discourse (*antassamjālpa*) which is the root principle of all kinds of speech.⁵ The Trika writers describe the *nāda* stage as the

¹ bhidyamānāt parād bindor avyaktātmā ravo 'bhavat |
śabdabrahme' ti tām prāhus sarvāgamaviśāradaḥ || ST. I. 11-12.

Also PS. I. 43.

² VSLM., p. 145.

³ tat prāpya kuṇḍalirūpaṁ prāṇinām dehamadhyagam | ST. I. 14.

⁴ VSLM., p. 148.

⁵ N. Kār., śl. 10, and com. thereunder.

white and yellow liquid in a peacock's egg where the limbs of the bird and its variegated colours 'remain in a form of total non-distinction.' In the *paśyantī* stage the order of the denoter and the denoted (*vācakavācyabhāva*) is not prominent and *śakti* stimulated by her self-dependence is anxious to be externalised.¹ Vātulanātha views *paśyantī* as identical with the seer when it assumes the form of the yet unstruck sound, is undifferentiated and possesses all the letters in their germinal state, like unto the seed of the banyan tree holding the banyan.² One point to be noted in this connection is this that while Nāgeśa describes *madhyamā* as the form of the unstruck sound, Anantaśakti regards *paśyantī* as such.³ In the *madhyamā* stage, the order of the denoter and the denoted is not yet fully expressed but can be comprehended by the intellect. Anantaśakti says that the *madhyamā* form of speech holds the group of letters as the pod does the grains. In the final stage, viz., the *vaikharī*, the above order becomes completely expressed. We may conclude this section by pointing out that Bhāskara in his *Lalitasahasranāma* illustrates the gradual evolution of *vāk* in an admirable manner. The *parā* form is mere sound (*nāda* or *śabdabrahman*). It is the potentiality of growth and development lying dormant in the seed. *Paśyantī* is the seed about to sprout. *Madhyamā* is the particular stage when the seed has burst open and two small leaves have just appeared, and *vaikharī* is when the leaves are separated but joined at the root.

✓ up to this.

¹ Com. under TL., III, 336.

² Com. under VNS., No. 7.

³ svayaṁ tu karṇapīdhāne...śrūyamāṇā. VSLM., p. 148.

Also sai 'vā 'nāhatanādasavarūpatām avāptā. Com. under VNS., No. 7.

CHAPTER II

BHARTṚHARI'S CONCEPTION OF SPHOṬA

TWO KINDS OF MATERIAL WORDS

In the opening chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* known as *Brahmakāṇḍa*, Bhartṛhari discusses the nature of *sphoṭa*, its relation to sound (*dhvani*) and its various aspects and manifestations. In his answer to the important question—"What is word (*śabda*)?" Bhartṛhari says that the grammarians (*śābdika*) have recognised two kinds of words—or, to be more precise in our statement, two kinds of material words (*upādāna-śabda*). Of these two, the one is said to be the cause of sound (*dhvani*), while the other is described as being associated with meaning or import.¹ The former is called *sphoṭa* which lies in the intellect and has been compared to the light hidden in the fire-sticks (*arāṇi*).² Light is self-luminous—it does not require any assistance to manifest itself; on the other hand, it is a fact that while revealing itself, it reveals others as well.³ Thus it is that light dispels the darkness which envelops the diverse objects of the world and consequently makes it possible for us to cognise them. It is only when light has removed the veil of darkness that the various worldly objects present themselves to our view. Bhartṛhari says that *sphoṭa*, likewise, is self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*) and when it manifests itself, it serves to manifest sound as well. This self-revealing character of *sphoṭa*, as set forth by Bhartṛhari particularly, goes a great way to explain the identity of *Sphoṭa* with *Brahman*—the thesis worked out by the grammarians with great ingenuity.

¹ dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ |
eko nimittam śabdānām aparo 'rthe prayujyate || Vāk. I. 44.

² arāṇiṣṭhaṁ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam |
tadvac chabdo 'pi buddhiṣṭhaś śrūtinām kāraṇam prthak || Op. cit., I. 46.

³ grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śakti tejaso yathā |
tathai 'va sarvaśabdānām ete prthag avasthite || Op. cit., I. 55.

Next we turn to explain the nature of the other kind of material word (*upādāna-śabda*). To the grammarians the meaning of any word is not something absolute or unqualified in character. It is their contention that both the word-element and the sense-element constitute the meaning of a word.¹ For purposes of grammatical operations it is necessary to admit that the word-element is more prominent than the sense-element, for there we are primarily concerned with the former. But outside the province of grammar where we are concerned only with objects (*artha*), the relative prominence belongs to the sense-element and the word-element is looked upon as an attribute of it, the two together comprising a unified whole which is the meaning of word. To the grammarians it is the Word which has been described as the material cause of worldly phenomena. And as it is a truism that the material cause persists in its manifestations or transformations, it is quite in the fitness of things to suppose that the Word also abides in the different objects of the world which are said to be its different manifestations. To be explicit, clay which is but the material cause of the jar is found to persist in the latter when the same is made out of it. Likewise the Word persists in every form of its manifestations.

It should, however, be pointed out in this context that of these two material words (*upādāna-śabda*), the one (*viz.*, *sphoṭa*) which causes sound, is strictly worthy of the designation; while the other (that is, which enters into the import) is so called by a transference of epithet. To be clear, it is not an *upādāna* (the material cause) but an *upādeya* (given in the effect).²

The question that next arises in this connection is the one relating to the nature of the relation subsisting between the two types of material words. Bhartṛhari answers the question by recording the views of different schools of philosophers. Those who believe with the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas that

¹ *vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho 'rtha ity abhyupeyatām. Hel., p. 17.*

² *vācaka upādānasvarūpavān iti. upādeyo vā samudāya upādānah. Har., p. 20.*

the cause and the effect are different in nature, will admit that the two material words are not one and the same thing—they cannot discover the identity of the one with the other. But, those who acknowledge, with the exponents of Monistic Vedānta, that the material cause and its transformation are but one and the same thing, that the two are identical in nature, will surely say that the two material words are but aspects of one and the same principle.¹

RELATION BETWEEN WORD AND SOUND

Having described *sphoṭa* as the material cause of the multitudinous forms of the world, Bhartṛhari explains fully the position of Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, who draws a distinction between word and sound as hinted at before. Bhartṛhari says that the relation between sound and word is one of the helper and the helped (*anugrahaka-anugrahya-bhāva*).² *Sphoṭa* is said to be revealed by sounds that are produced by means of different efforts (*prayatna*). Now, the problem that arises in the event of this supposition may be summed up in the following way. In a preceding paragraph, we have spoken of the self-revealing character of *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* manifests itself, and along with its self-manifestation, the sounds are revealed as well. But with the supposition that *sphoṭa* is manifested by sound, it appears that the self-revealing character of *sphoṭa* ceases to function. The anomaly, however, presents itself to those who fail to grasp the subtler truth underlying the whole point. And, we think, a clear exposition of the proper position will remove all the difficulties that are found to make their appearance that way. *Sphoṭa*, like *Brahman* of the Vedāntists, has been described as self-revealing in nature. But, just as we finite beings with our various limitations cannot have a vision of the Ultimate Reality, viz., the *Brahman*, which is also of a self-revealing character, without the help of cognitive instruments (*pramāṇa*) that alone can remove the veil of *avidyā* that shrouds

¹ Yāk. I. 45.

² Op. cit., I, 47.

it, so *sphoṭa* though self-revealing in nature, cannot be cognised by us unless sound reveals it ; it is owing to our innate ignorance that we cannot cognise a self-revealing entity like *sphoṭa* without an extraneous assistance. It is for this reason that the position that *sphoṭa* is manifested by sound is not at all incompatible with the one that *sphoṭa* manifests itself and sound as well.

We think, we have so far clearly explained the apparent anomaly that crops up from a casual perusal of Bhartṛhari's position. And if it is once clear that Bhartṛhari approaches his subject not only from the transcendental but also from the practical view-point, taking notice not simply of the metaphysical nature of the Ultimate Reality, the Word-spirit (*śabdabrahman*), but also of the fact how that Reality is in our practical life realised by the finite human beings with the gradual dawning of right knowledge (*vidyā*) and the corresponding disappearance of ignorance (*avidyā*) to which every individual is more or less subject, we may go a step farther and explain how the inefficiency on the part of the cogniser (*jñātr*) is responsible for transferring the attributes and properties of sound to *sphoṭa* to which they do not in reality belong.

Thus according to Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is one and eternal and neither the question of sequence (*krama*) nor of plurality (*bahutva*) can arise in the conception of *sphoṭa*. It is sound (*dhvani*) or *nāda* as it is differently called which is produced at different moments of time ; and the notions of sequence and plurality that really pertain to sound are wrongly attributed to *sphoṭa*.¹ We have already stated that sound reveals *sphoṭa*, and what happens in this case is that the properties of the manifestor find their reflection in the manifested and the finite human intellect which is blurred by ignorance fails to understand the real state of affairs. Thus, strictly speaking, *sphoṭa* has a permanent and indivisible character ; but, because it is a spiritual entity requiring the aid of sound in the process of

its manifestation before the finite minds, the character of sound invariably colours the real nature of *sphoṭa*. To be more explicit, it is sound which is either short or long, palatal, cerebral or nasal. But *sphoṭa*, in reality, always remains unaffected—it is unchangeable. The confusion only arises with us who cannot apprehend *sphoṭa* without the help of sound.

Bhartr̥hari has clearly explained this fact with apt illustrations. Thus he says that the moon shining above in the blue canopy of the sky is one and fixed, but when she is reflected in the dancing ripples of the lake down below, do we not see a thousand and one moons all moving about in the water ? ¹ What is one appears to be many, what is fixed appears to be unsteady and full of movement. It is practically impossible on our part to imagine that the moon shining above is one and fixed when our eyes are riveted on the ripples that have caught the reflection. Likewise, *sphoṭa* or *śabdātattva* is one and eternal and the character of plurality or of sequence is but superimposed ^{उपरि} on it. So long as *sphoṭa* lies embedded in the intellect, it is like the fluid in the peacock's egg (*mayūrāṇḍarasa-vat*) with all its potentialities lying hidden.² At that stage, *sphoṭa* is one and divisionless—it is a homogeneous entity. But, as soon as we feel the necessity of conveying our thoughts to others, *sphoṭa* finds its expression through sound in the shape of letters, words and sentences, and as this is the practice current from time immemorial, we confuse the real characters of *sphoṭa* and sound, and in the absence of a proper and correct understanding of the real position, we invariably fail to distinguish between the two and their individual characteristics.

We have said above that sound helps *sphoṭa* in its self-manifestation and Bhartr̥hari tells us how this 'help' is rendered. Bhartr̥hari has recorded three different views on this point

¹ Vāk. I. 49 and com. thereunder.

² *Op. cit.*, I. 51.

* including one of his own. According to some, sound is produced by the vocal apparatus and when it is cognised by the auditory organs, it becomes instrumental in manifesting *sphoṭa*. There are others who opine that sound at first reveals *sphoṭa* which is subsequently comprehended by the auditory organs. But there is yet another view according to which sound prepares the auditory organs to be receptive and serves to reveal *sphoṭa* as well.¹ Bhartṛhari seems to be an upholder of this last view.

We should not think for a moment that the three views have been recorded by Bhartṛhari for the purpose of making a parade of his erudition and scholarship. The Mimāṃsakas, as we shall see later on, do not acknowledge *sphoṭa*, but they believe in the eternality of words and their manifestation through sound. Now Kumārila has said that the manifestation is possible in three ways: it is possible through a change (*samskāra*) in the word itself, or through that of the sense-organ (the ear), or through that of both.² Śabara, of course, has spoken of the first alternative and his position has been strenuously criticised by Śāntarakṣita, the celebrated Buddhist scholar, in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*.³ If we closely study the views of Bhartṛhari and Kumārila referred to above, we shall find that they agree in saying that the manifestation of word is possible in three ways—they only differ in this that word to Bhartṛhari means *sphoṭa*, while to Kumārila it is the combination of letters. Now let us see why the two great masters opine that the manifestation may be in three ways only, neither more nor less. The point is that a particular action sometimes acts upon or benefits the sense-organ (*indriya*), while at other times, it is the object (*viṣaya*) and not the sense-organ that happens to enjoy the fruit of an action, and also there are occasions when the action helps both the sense-organ and the object.

¹ Vāk. I. 79 and com. thereunder.

² Chap. on "Śabdānityatā" ŚV., śls. 51-2.

³ ŚB. under MS. I. i. 6. And TS., śl. 2509.

Let us explain our point by means of appropriate illustrations. Concentration of mind or the application of collyrium enables the eyes to see objects. In either case, therefore, it is the cognitive instrument that enjoys the benefit. But when the ground is watered and we perceive some smell, we cannot say that the watering of the ground has benefited the sense-organ (*viz.*, the nostrils) in any way. The water has evidently contributed some attribute to the ground whereupon the smell heretofore unperceived, can be perceived now. This is a case in which the object and not the sense-organ is benefited. Let us take another instance. We light a candle and the eyes become competent to perceive an object hitherto hidden in darkness and the object too becomes fit for being comprehended by the eyes. In this case, it is not possible for us to deny that the object has been benefited. For it is a matter of common knowledge that a person standing in the open air where there is ample light, cannot see an object lying in darkness.¹ This is an instance of both the sense-organ and the object having received benefit from the light. Bhartṛhari, likewise, maintains that sound being produced not only makes the auditory organs receptive but reveals *sphoṭa* at the same time.

THE COMPREHENSION OF SPHOṬA AND SOUND

Having fully discussed the nature of the relation that subsists between *sphoṭa* and sound, Bhartṛhari proceeds to take up the problem—How are the two comprehended? He states four different views on this point. Thus he says that according to some, *sphoṭa* is cognised as identical with sound; the two cannot be comprehended separately with their individual distinctions completely kept apart and *not* intermingled.² Bhartṛhari's representation of this view has found a happy elucidation from the pen of Harivṛṣabha who says that just as a piece of crystal appearing crimson in contact with a crimson *jaṇā* flower (*Hibiscus Rosasinensis*), cannot be conceived without

¹ Vāk. I. 80-81.

² *Ibid.*, I. 82 and the com. thereunder.

the colour contracted from the flower, so *sphoṭa* cannot be comprehended without the characteristics of sound that invariably find their reflection in the former. According to the second view, the comprehension of *sphoṭa* does not require the cognition of sound as a condition. The advocates of this theory seek to explain their position by saying that it is an established fact that the attributes or properties of the sense-organs are not required to be known for purposes of the cognition of the object (*viṣaya*). We have already seen that Patañjali describes sound as the attribute of *sphoṭa*, and it is contended, therefore, that sound is not required to be known prior to the cognition of *sphoṭa* though the former is said to be indicative of the latter.¹ There are again a few thinkers who believe in the metaphysical existence of *sphoṭa* but are of opinion that though existent, it is not perceived on account of the distance separating it from the cognising subject. We know that distance prevents perception of remote stars. Others do not deny the perceivability of *sphoṭa*, but think that distance does not remove it entirely from the ken of perception. It fails to be perceived as a distinct entity.²

Of the four views recorded above, the third and the fourth ones cannot obviously find favour with Bhartṛhari. For, he has specific discussion on the nature of the comprehension of *sphoṭa*, that is, whether it is distinct or otherwise. In his opinion, *sphoṭa* is comprehended and completely too. As for the second view that sound cannot be cognised, it may be said that Bhartṛhari cannot have any sympathy for it. For, he has himself raised the problem whether when *sphoṭa* is maintained to be the denoter (*vācaka*), there is any justification for admitting sound as well; and in his answer to this problem he states in clear terms that the existence of sound cannot be disowned in view of the fact that it is directly perceived. It is for this reason that we are inclined to think that the first view is Bhartṛhari's own and the explanation is in perfect accord with Bhartṛhari's doctrine.

¹ and ² Vāk. I. 82 and com. thereunder.

THE COMPREHENSION OF SPHOṬA

Bharṭṛhari, next, passes on to consider the problem how *sphoṭa* is comprehended. *Sphoṭa*, as it has been said before, is regarded as an indivisible unit. Now it is argued that the oneness pertaining to *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa* or *varṇasphoṭa*¹ cannot be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that sound reveals *sphoṭa*. To be explicit, it is contended that we are required to make separate efforts to produce different sounds which in their turn reveal *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa* or *varṇasphoṭa*, as the case may be. And as we are, therefore, constrained to admit that the different letters are comprehended in succession and not simultaneously, the comprehension of unity pertaining to *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa* or *varṇasphoṭa* seems to be quite impossible.

Bharṭṛhari discusses this particular point with his characteristic insight and his observations throw a flood of light on the implications of the theory of *sphoṭa* as understood and explained by him. Let us study the view-point of Bharṭṛhari by means of a concrete example. Let us take the time-honoured illustration of *padasphoṭa*, viz., *gauḥ* (cow). Bharṭṛhari observes that each one of the three sounds or letters, 'g,' 'au' and 'ḥ,' reveals the same *padasphoṭa*, and it will be wrong to suppose that the *padasphoṭa* which finds its expression through the medium of the three sounds, different in nature from one another, is different on each occasion. It is the one and the same *sphoṭa* that is manifested by each one of the three successive sounds. And Bharṭṛhari strengthens his point by means of apt illustrations. Thus he says that each time a particular Vedic section (*anuvāka*) or a particular verse is read, we do not seem to have the experience that we are reading a new *anuvāka* or a new verse quite different from what has been

¹ The conceptions of these three terms have been fully explained in the chapter on the "Classification of *Sphoṭa*."

read before. Thus, with each reading the notion of distinction disappears yielding place to the idea of identity. Likewise, in the present case, each sound serves to manifest the one and the same *padasphoṭa*, and consequently, the apprehension that the idea of unity cannot be obtained in the case of *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa*, and *varṇasphoṭa*, is absolutely without any foundation.¹

We must note, however, that there are outstanding difficulties lying in the way of such an explanation. Thus in the particular instance cited above, when it is a fact that each one of the three sounds is quite competent to manifest the required *sphoṭa*, we do not see any reason why we should make efforts to produce all of them. In his answer to this particular difficulty Bhartṛhari unravels the deeper implications of his favourite theory. Thus he says that the sounds that are produced in succession, respectively leave their impressions on the mind, and it is the final sound which together with the previous impressions completely reveal *sphoṭa*.² This statement of Bhartṛhari is highly significant and deserves careful and intensive study to reveal the deeper truth of his conception.

All the different sounds preceding the final one serve to give rise to cognitions enabling the cogniser to understand *sphoṭa* only in an indistinct manner and sowing also the seeds of impressions calculated to determine *sphoṭa* in a complete and distinct way in future when all the sounds are produced. Thus the final sound which is accompanied by the previous impressions (of the preceding sounds) as influenced or coloured by the indistinct manifestations of *sphoṭa* from the preceding sounds and in which the complete manifestation of *sphoṭa* lies as in an image, will give rise to a clear, distinct and complete cognition of *sphoṭa*. To be explicit, the first sound reveals

¹ Vāk. I. 84. Also *vṛtti* on SS., 41. 18.

² *nāḍair āhitabijāyām antyena dhvaninā saha |*

āvṛttaparipākāyām buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate || Vāk. I. 85.

sphoṭa only in an indistinct manner, and the same *sphoṭa* finds more and more distinct expression through the medium of successive sounds till at length it is completely and definitely manifested with the perception of the final sound. That being so, we can no longer say that the successive sounds are not necessary when the first sound is endowed with the power of manifesting the *sphoṭa*.¹

We think, we have correctly expressed the view-point of Bhartr̥hari, and it seems that the position is free from all anomalies. But the opponents as yet do not give ground and raise further difficulties to thwart the position that Bhartr̥hari has taken up. Thus they say that what is manifested by each of the sounds in *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa* or *vākya-sphoṭa* as the case may be, is but a letter and nothing else. Thus for instance, in the case of “*gauḥ*,” the first sound does not reveal in an indistinct way the required *padasphoṭa* in question nor does the second sound reveal the same in a more distinct way. The point is that the three sounds reveal the three letters, ‘*g*,’ ‘*au*’ and ‘*ḥ*’ respectively and not the *padasphoṭa* as contended by Bhartr̥hari. The grammarians may argue that the *sphoṭa* is not revealed in its own nature when the individual letters are pronounced; it is then revealed in the shape of letters ; and it is only in the final stage that it comes to be presented as *sphoṭa*. But it has been strongly urged that such a supposition is hardly justified, on the ground that the initial appearance of *padasphoṭa* as letters and the invariable subsequent manifestation of its reality are mere postulations) lacking adequate proof to substantiate them. Thus it is laid down that wherever something appears to be different from what it really is, we must show cause to account for the abnormality. In the present case, however, we cannot satisfactorily explain why a particular *padasphoṭa* will be at first manifested not as such but as something different from it. We cannot maintain

¹ Vide SS., pp. 129-33.

that the sounds will be responsible for this unexpected *appearance* for the simple reason that they have been described to be giving us the knowledge of the *reality*, viz., *padasphoṭa*. It is hardly justified to say that what gives us the knowledge of the *reality* is also competent to give us the knowledge of the *appearance* ; for the same cause can never give rise to two different effects under the same circumstances.

Moreover, it is a well-known fact that in all cases of the knowledge of the *appearance*, there cannot be any law restricting the *appearance* to showing itself invariably in the same form. Thus it is a matter of common knowledge that the rope or the mother-o'-pearl does not of necessity appear as a snake or a piece of silver respectively. It is not uncommon that the rope is mistaken for a line of water or the mother-o'-pearl for something other than the white metal. Further, we cannot even maintain that a particular object should at all times invariably appear as something else. It is obvious that the rope is not always mistaken for a snake or the mother-o'-pearl for a piece of silver by all men alike.

Bhartṛhari, however, has anticipated all these objections advanced by his opponents, and he has set forth convincing arguments to baffle those of his antagonists. Thus he says that it is a fact that objects do appear as something quite different in nature from themselves on various occasions. The tree appears to be an elephant when it is seen from a long distance ; and when a man enters a dark room from outside where there is much light, he mistakes the rope for a snake. But on more close and careful observations at subsequent moments of time, the tree is recognised as such and the rope ceases to look like a snake any longer.¹ So we must remember that careful observations on several occasions enable us to cognise a thing accurately and in its proper form ; and that being so, we can scarcely afford to dispense with these observations as

¹ Vāk. I. 90. Also SS., śl. 19 and *vṛtti* thereunder.

being totally unnecessary and futile. On this analogy, Bhartṛhari says that *vākyasphoṭa* appears as something different from itself when the first sound and the following ones excepting the final are pronounced; it is when the final sound is uttered that *vākyasphoṭa* appears in its real form.¹ It may be argued here that in cases of error, there is similarity between the *reality* and its *appearance*; but in the present case we cannot explain why *vākyasphoṭa* is not revealed in its own nature when the first sound is pronounced. Maṇḍana in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* and following him, Vācaspati in his commentary on the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* of the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali, have stated that the efforts required to produce a sound that manifests an isolated letter on the one hand and the one that serves to reveal a *varṇasphoṭa*, a *padasphoṭa* or a *vākyasphoṭa* as the case may be on the other, are somewhat similar in nature and it is because of this similarity that the latter appears as the former.² It is said that the effort required to produce a sound revealing the letter 'h' is different from the effort necessary for uttering the sound which reveals the *varṇasphoṭa* "han-" or the *padasphoṭa* "hananam;" for the 'h' in "han-" or "hananam" is not a mere isolated unit having a reality by and in itself but finds its realisation within the *whole*. That being so, it becomes clear why the effort necessary to produce a sound that reveals an isolated letter is different from the effort needed to produce a sound that manifests a *varṇasphoṭa*, a *padasphoṭa* or a *vākyasphoṭa*. But as there is similarity between the two efforts, it becomes explicable why the latter appears as the former in spite of their differences.

The grammarians further point out that it is sound and sound only that serves to show *sphoṭa* as letters in the first instance and subsequently in its real nature. And as they do not postulate any other phenomenon to account for the *appearance*,

¹ Vāk. I. 91.

² SS., śl. 20. Also com. on YSB. III. 17.

it is intelligible why the *appearance* invariably happens in the same way.

Bhartṛhari has studied the aforesaid problem more intensely and has thrown further light on the inner significance of the position that he takes up. It is admitted on all hands that the knowledge of a number, say, 'three,' depends upon the knowledge of its preceding number, *viz.*, 'two.' But certainly the knowledge of the number 'three' is different from that of 'two,' and hence when the knowledge of 'three' is obtained, we cannot say that the knowledge of 'two' is also present. Now when the knowledge of 'two' is indispensably necessary for the knowledge of 'three,' we are constrained to admit that the knowledge of 'two' appears to be present, though it is not actually so and gives us the knowledge of 'three.' And it is a matter of common knowledge that even *appearance* is capable of giving rise to real consequences. A man may die of heart-failure from the false knowledge that the rope is a snake. Coming to the point, we may observe that *spṛṣṭa* is manifested by the first sound but we fail to understand it on account of the limitations to which our intellect is subject. It happens that with the perception of the first sound, *spṛṣṭa* appears to be nothing other than a letter,¹ but the knowledge of letter which is an *appearance* after all, serves as the medium giving us ultimately the knowledge of *spṛṣṭa*.

Bhartṛhari further substantiates his position by pointing out that whatever happens must pass through definite stages in course of its development or manifestation. Thus the seed goes through several stages before it turns into a tree. The milk, too, before it changes into curd, gradually changes its form till the transformation is complete. Similarly, sound reveals *spṛṣṭa* and before the latter is fully manifested, we must seek to realise it step by step.² But Bhartṛhari does not stop here. In fact, the whole truth remains unsaid if he does not explain his point more fully. And Bhartṛhari states, with all the boldness and perspicuity that he can command, that the process in which

¹ Vāk. I. 88.

² *Op. cit.*, I. 92.

sphoṭa has been said to be revealed is postulated only to explain how the ordinary individual understands *sphoṭa*. But it is a fact that the sages to whom the Eternal Light of *Śabdabrahman* has manifested itself, always understand *sphoṭa* without going through the course described above. To them the first sound manifests *sphoṭa* fully and completely. The *reality* dawns at the very outset and the question of *appearance* cannot arise under the circumstances. To understand *sphoṭa* with the perception of the first sound depends entirely upon the understanding power of the cogniser. Those who cannot understand it with the perception of the first sound must try to realise the same by some means or other, and whatever these means are, they have their own value in so far as they enable us to have a vision of the *reality*.¹

BHARTṚHARI ON PATAÑJALI'S CONCEPTION OF SPHOṬA

Bhartṛhari has criticised the views of those who interpret Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* in a different way from what he himself has said. Thus it is said that *sphoṭa* means a class (*jāti*). Patañjali has spoken of the eternally established relation between word (*śabda*) and import (*artha*),² and when he says in that connexion that word is eternal, he means that word-ness (*śabdātva*) is so. Now word-ness pertains to all words and is, therefore, regarded as a class (*jāti*) and so it is said to be eternal. If word-ness be regarded as a class, it has been maintained that word-individuals (*śabdavyakti*) are suggestive of word-ness. In other words, it is the individuals (*vyakti*) that serve to manifest the class (*jāti*). According to this view, therefore, the word-individuals should be conceived as being on a par with sounds which according to Bhartṛhari manifest *sphoṭa*.³ Bhartṛhari, however, does not accept this view. To him, word is not a class (*jāti*) but one indivisible unity.

¹ Vāk. I. 86. Also SS., pp. 152-57.

² nityaparyāyī siddhaśabdah. MB., Vol. I., p. 56.

³ Vāk. I. 94.

SPHOṬA—IS IT AN ETERNAL ENTITY ?

Bhartṛhari, next, studies the views of some philosophers who opine that *sphoṭa* cannot be conceived of as an eternal entity. It is well known to a student of Indian Philosophy that there is twofold conception of word, some holding that it is revealed while others maintaining that it is produced. It is contended that in either case, word must be transient ; for, whatever is revealed or produced is of an evanescent character. The jar is revealed to our view by light and we know that the jar is subject to destruction. And it goes without saying that a thing which is produced must die one day. Bhartṛhari does not think it necessary to discuss the question of the production of word, but he makes a cogent answer to the statement that whatever is revealed must be non-eternal. Thus he says that it is an admitted fact that the *class* is manifested by the *individual*, but it is never held on that ground that the former is a non-eternal entity.¹

MANIFESTATION OF SPHOṬA—IS IT TENABLE ?

It has been argued that the revelation of *sphoṭa* as explained by Bhartṛhari is not justified ; for, it is an established fact that the manifestor and the manifested always reside in the same place (*adhikaraṇa*). The light that reveals the jar must necessarily be present on the same spot where the jar is. We have never seen that the jar lying in our chamber is revealed to our view when a lamp is lit in another room separated from it by means of brick-walls or wooden partitions through which light cannot pass. If it is maintained that the relation between sound and *sphoṭa* is one of the manifestor and the manifested, it follows that they reside in the same substratum. But, we know that *sphoṭa* lies in the mind while sound is produced

¹ Vak. I. 96.

in the mouth, and as they, therefore, do not reside in the same place, we are hardly justified in saying that the aforesaid relation subsists between them.

Bhartṛhari steers clear of the difficulty by asserting that the analogy does not hold good ; for, it is only in the case of concrete substances (*mūrta*) that the imposed condition is necessary. But as neither *sphoṭa* nor sound has any concrete existence, the said condition cannot be legitimately demanded.¹

TWO CLASSES OF SOUND

Having carefully explained the nature of *sphoṭa* and its relation to sound, Bhartṛhari draws a line of demarcation between two classes of sounds. And he says that sounds are of two types, one *prākṛta* (the original sound) and the other *vaikṛta* (the derivative transformation). The former is one without which the unmanifested *sphoṭa* cannot be comprehended, while the latter enables the manifested *sphoṭa* to be comprehended for longer and longer lengths of time without any cessation.² Though *nāda* and *dhvani* are generally regarded as one and the same thing, Bhartṛhari distinguishes between the two, and he says that the notion of sequence attributed to *sphoṭa* is after all due to *nāda* while it is the *prākṛta* sound that determines the question of shortness or length. And it should be remembered that the question of rapidity or prolongation is to be decided with reference to the *vaikṛta* sound.³ The procedure seems to be an elaboration of the main thesis that sound is only indicative of the metaphysical *sphoṭa* and the differences of sound do not have any bearing on the nature of *sphoṭa*. When we say that a word is short or long, we only ascribe the attribute, *viz.*, shortness or length, attributes pertaining to *prākṛta*

¹ Vāk. I. 97.

² Op. cit., I. 75-78.

³ Op. cit., I. 102.

sound, to *sphoṭa* which is one and indivisible. The nature of *vaikṛta* sound has been explained by Harivṛṣabha in the following way. When we beat a drum, the sound produced is heard from a long distance, but when we strike a gong, the sound reaches only a short distance and is heard for a long time without cessation. The difference in the nature of the two sounds explains the conception of *vaikṛta* sound.¹ *Prākṛta* sound, on the other hand, is what serves to manifest *sphoṭa* and is confounded with *sphoṭa* by the average man and philosophers of the opposite school.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF WORD (ŚABDA)

Bharṭṛhari concludes his observations on *sphoṭa* by referring to the three well-known theories about the nature of word. It has been said by some that the internal air striking against the different vocal organs assume the state of word; while there are others who believe that word is made up of physical atoms; but Bharṭṛhari following in the wake of Patañjali, observes that word is nothing but internal consciousness.² Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇ. Sū. I. iv. 29 has made the suggestion that the internal consciousness remains in the form of subtle speech and when it becomes manifest, it takes the form of word.

The first theory stated above is a very old one and we find that the ancient phoneticians speak of the internal air as the creative factor of word.³ Śabara has rejected the theory on the ground that if words were air-products, we should have felt the air-atoms by touch.⁴ The Naiyāyikas, too, have controverted the theory by pointing out that if words were air-products, they could be cognised only through the tactile organ. The auditory organ cannot be supposed to be made of air-atoms and as such it would be perfectly incompetent to envisage words. Moreover, if

¹ Har. on Vāk. I. 104.

² vāyor-^ṛpūnām jñānasya śabdatvāpattir iṣyate | Vāk. I. 108.

³ *Op. cit.*, I. 109. Also tathā ca śikṣākārā āhur vāyur āpadyate śabdatām. ŚB., pp. 90-91.

⁴ na ca vāyaviyān avayavān śabde sataḥ pratyabhijānimaḥ syāc ced evaṁ sparsānena upalabhemahi. *Loc. cit.*

words or sounds be supposed to be made up of air-elements, they would be non-eternal. If words be conceived as the products of an aggregate of air-atoms or if they are thought to be attributes of air-atoms, they would be imperceptible like the tactile properties inhering in the same atoms. But none of these alternatives can be entertained as a plausible theory simply because air-products are invariably perceived through tactile sensations and certainly it would be absolutely futile to make out that words or sounds are possessed of tactile properties—a supposition for which there is no warrant in experience.¹

The grammarians, however, do not believe that word is made up of air particles inasmuch as word is an eternal entity. It is sound or *dhvani* which is believed to be modifications of an airy substance. The objection of the Naiyāyika that airy particles cannot be perceived without their tactile qualities, does not seem to be cogent, as there is no restriction that all the qualities of a particular substance should be cognised together. Only those properties which are evolved, are amenable to perception; otherwise, the non-perception of the colour in hot air could not be explained. The next objection of the Naiyāyika is that sound cannot be cognised through the auditory organ if it is believed to be airy (*vāyavīya*) in nature, because sense-organs are competent to perceive those qualities alone which belong to substances kindred to that of which the sense-organs also are constituted. Thus the eye perceives colour because colour is an attribute of fire which is also the formative principle of the visual organ. So, if sound be believed to be a property of air, it would be incapable of being perceived by the auditory organ as the latter is not made up of air. This objection has not been anticipated by the grammarians and so we do not know the precise answer they might return to it.

¹ N. Kū. II, pp. 33-34.

² There are texts which seem to suggest that sounds are products of air. But we think that these texts can be consistently explained if air is supposed to function as a manifesting medium (*vyāñjaka*) and sounds are regarded as the properties of ether.

The objection, however, can be refuted if we think that sounds are properties of ether² and that length and pitch, intensity and feebleness, are the properties of sounds and not of *sphoṭa* which is revealed by them. The objection of Udayana that these properties are invariably felt to be associated with words, and that the distinctive existence of word apart from sound is not perceived, and that therefore is no proof for *sphoṭa*, has been fully discussed and refuted. The alleged non-perception cannot be regarded as a sound argument against the possibility of *sphoṭa* which has been proved by abundant logic, and the empirical evidence is after all inconclusive.

Let us discuss the theory of the atomic constitution of word referred to by Bhartṛhari. Though the commentators have not thrown any light on this theory, we are fortunately able to trace it to the Jaina system of thought. The Jainas believe that words are material substances made up of atoms which are distinct from other material atoms in nature. These atoms have been designated as sound-atoms in order to distinguish them from the acknowledged kinds of atoms, *viz.*, air, earth, etc. The Naiyāyikas have criticised this theory on various grounds. The first objection is that words made up of an aggregate of atoms are not conceivable apart from tactile qualities. But words are never cognised to be possessed of tactile properties. The second objection is that if word were possessed of mass, it could not but be obstructed by a barrier. Thirdly, there is no experience of the parts of a word. Fourthly, being possessed of corporeal magnitude, it should be felt to come into clash with other small particles and so should displace them. But none of these possibilities is seen to be the case.

The Jainas, however, do not think these objections to be serious obstacles to their conception. Words may be conceived to be possessed of tactile qualities though these qualities may by their very nature remain unmanifested and as such may escape detection. This is quite evident from the fact that the perception of words is contingent upon the course of the wind and so with a

forward wind distant words are perceived and when the course of the wind is in a different direction, even proximate words are intercepted from coming within the range of our auditory organs. It is easily explicable if word or sound is supposed to be possessed of tactile properties like other material substances. The second objection, too, is unsubstantial. Because, the influx and efflux of odorous particles are seen to take place even in a closed area though these odorous molecules are acknowledged to be possessed of magnitude. If to escape this difficulty, it is assumed that these small particles are not prevented from effecting an entry through small apertures in the barriers, the same explanation can be offered by the Jainas. The third objection is also based upon a false analogy. Because, in such phenomena as a flash of lightning and the like, the parts are not distinctly felt. So the mere existence of parts is no guarantee for the perception of the same. Nor again, non-perception of parts can be construed into evidence of their absence. The fourth objection, too, does not seem to be convincing as the alleged consequence is not seen to take place when odorous particles effect their entrance into the nasal membrane. These particles in spite of their magnitude, do not shake the hairs in the nostrils. If extreme lightness is trotted out as an explanation in the case of odorous particles, the same may be accepted by the Jainas in the case of sound-molecules.

The grammarians, however, refuse to accept the Jaina theory exactly on the same grounds on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory has been rejected. The postulation of an infinite number of sound entities is in direct opposition to recognition of identity of words. And it has been sufficiently proved by the philosophical investigations that word is not anything distinct from consciousness and as such it is spiritual in nature and all these theories proceed upon a misconception of the fundamental nature and function of word.¹

¹ For the Jaina conception of word, see PNT, III. 9 and the com. (RKT.) thereunder.

CHAPTER III

DIALECTICS OF SPHOTA

1. *A Critique of the Objections from the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Schools.*

NATURE OF WORD AND SENTENCE

Jayantabhaṭṭa opens the chapter on the authority of word (*śabda*) as a cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*) by starting an enquiry into the nature of word and sentence. It is an established fact that sequence plays an important rôle in determining causal relation. And Jayanta argues that it is absolutely a matter of common knowledge that the cognition of a word or a sentence is immediately succeeded by the cognition of its import. But the difficulty, with which we are confronted, lies in determining the nature of the two terms "word" and "sentence." It is generally maintained that a word comprises several letters while a sentence is nothing more than an aggregate of a few such words. But on a critical examination of the real position it will appear that the definitions cited above are not strictly scientific.

VĀCASPATI'S PRESENTATION OF THE GRAMMARIANS' THEORY

Vācaspatimiśra in his *Tattvabindu* has the most important observation on this point. He starts by saying that none can deny the fact that when several words constituting a sentence are cognised, we understand the import. But the point arises: is the sense expressed by the words themselves which are like so many individual units or is it expressed by the letters constituting those words?

The Mīmāṃsakas believe in the eternal and all-pervading character of letters. And Vācaspati rightly points out that it is for this reason that the Mīmāṃsakas cannot maintain that words admit of division into letters. The plain sense of Vācaspati's viewpoint may be expressed in the following way. It is a general rule that the magnitude of the whole (*avayavin*) is

greater than that of the parts (*avayava*). But if the all-pervading nature of letters is assumed and if letters be held to be the constituents of word, the magnitude of word would be greater than that of letters.¹ But as the latter magnitude is assumed to be ubiquitous, the position would become absurd; for the composite word made up of such ubiquitous letters would come to occupy a magnitude which will be larger than that of the parts (*i.e.*, letters). But even if it is argued that such a magnitude being inconceivable, the whole in this case will not be possessed of a greater magnitude, as both the whole and the parts possess the maximum magnitude *ne plus ultra*, this, too, will lead to a preposterous issue; for the relation of whole and parts between two ubiquitous substances is logically absurd.²

Vācaspati, next, examines the position of the Vaiśeṣikas and says that if it, however, be assumed after them that sound and, for the matter of that, letter is the property of ether,³ we can no longer maintain that letters form the constituents of words in view of the fact that attributes (*guṇa* entities) have no title to be treated as the constitutive or the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), a characteristic which invariably belongs to substances (*dravya*).⁴

Vācaspati next turns to the school of philosophers who opine that letters are formed of the molecules of air⁵ and that they are destroyed as soon as they are produced. That being so, it is argued by the grammarians that we can never speak of the co-existence of letters which are said to build up a particular word. Let us, for illustration, take up a word (*cow*, for example) in which there are three letters. Now, it is never possible for us to pronounce all the three letters at one and the same time. For it is a fact that the first letter dies out before the third one is

¹ *parimāṇasya svasamānājātiyasvotkr̥ṣṭaparimāṇajanakatvaniyamāt*. SM. under BP., kār. 15.

² *avayavinyūnaparimāṇatvād avayavānām paramamahatāṁ ca varṇānām tadanupapattēh*. TB., p. 2.

³ *ākāśasya tu vijñeयāś śabdo vaiśeṣiko guṇaḥ*. BP., kār. 44.

⁴ *samavāyikāraṇatvaṁ dravyasyai've'ti vijñeyam*. *Op. cit.*, kār. 23.

⁵ This theory has been discussed at length in Chap. II, pp. 30-32.

pronounced. Therefore it stands that the conception of a word as being the aggregate of several letters is something fictitious, since there can be no combination of things that are not simultaneously present.

But this position involves a further absurdity. The individual letters that perish after they are uttered and do not persist up to the time the final letter is pronounced, cannot be regarded either as the constitutive cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) or as the proximate non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) with regard to word. Now the constitutive cause is that which enters into the composition of the product as a constituent factor. Or, to be precise, it is the persistent causal entity in which the effect is seen to inhere. And the non-inherent cause is that which inheres in the causal entities and determines the effect, though it does not enter into its composition. Letters being momentary phenomena cannot enter as componental factors into the constitution of word. Consequently, the question of their being the constitutive cause of word cannot arise. And there being no co-existence among letters that are said to build up a word, they cannot be supposed to be the bearer of a relation—which is usually the non-inherent cause. In the circumstances, a word will be destitute of a constitutive and a non-inherent cause and as such, though a product, cannot be subject to destruction.

Let us pursue the point in detail. It is an admitted fact that of the three causes contributing towards the production of an effect, it is the non-inherent cause which is the most proximate; and it is a truism that the destruction of a product is due to the disappearance of the non-inherent cause. If the disappearance of the inherent and not of the non-inherent cause be regarded as the cause of the destruction of a product, such entities as "aggregate of two atoms" (*dvyanuka*) would come under the category of eternal (*nitya*) entities. A *dvyanuka* is said to be formed of two atoms (*paramāṇu*) and as the latter are believed to possess an eternal character, they cannot be destroyed under any circumstances. That being so, *dvyanuka* will never

admit of destruction. Hence the Neo-logicians maintain that it is the disappearance of the non-inherent or the proximate cause and not of the inherent one that leads to the destruction of a product. Thus, whenever the connection between the two *paramāṇus* constituting a particular *dravyaṇuka* will be severed, the latter will cease to exist.¹

To come to the point, we have already stated that the several letters which are said to make up a word, are pronounced in succession and as such the question of the non-inherent cause and consequently of its disappearance cannot arise. It is, therefore, that Vācaspati points out that we cannot conceive of the destruction of a word which is said to have been produced. And to say that a thing has birth and no death is nothing more than a dogmatic statement.²

From what has been said above, it becomes clear that *conjointly* letters cannot express the sense. And it is quite obvious that they are incapable of expressing the required import *singly*; for, in that case, there will hardly be any justification for using a number of letters when any one of them is sufficient for the purpose.

The grammarians thus show the outstanding difficulties for those who opine that letters are expressive of sense. And in order to explain satisfactorily all the points at issue, they have themselves propounded their own theory according to which the sense is expressed by *sphoṭa* which in its character is indivisible and is revealed more and more clearly by each one of the different sounds (or, different letters) in succession and finally and completely manifested by the last sound (or, letter).³

¹ *asamavāyikāraṇanāśasya dravyanāśajanakatvāt. Din. on SM. under BP., kār. 18.*

² *vāyaviyāvayavārabdhavarnavādinām apy āśutaravināśaśīlatayā varṇānām parasparam asahabhuvām asambaddhānām avayavyārambhasambhavāt. no khalv ete kramabhāvino 'vayavinām vā tadasamavāyikāraṇam vā vyatīṣaṅgam bibhrati. abibhṛāpās ca katham avayavā vyatīṣaktā vā. ekadravyasya ca kāryadravyasya' nupapatter dravyavināśakāraṇa-dvayābhāvena kṛtakāṇītyatvaprasaṅgāt. TB. pp. 2-3.*

³ *Vāk. I. 85.*

We propose to discuss the merits of the theory in course of our subsequent disquisitions. But it is necessary at the outset to know for ourselves the material grounds of objection put forth by those who oppose the theory.

THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS AND THE NAIYĀYIKAS : THEIR MATERIAL GROUNDS OF OBJECTION

Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas vehemently criticise the theory of *sphoṭa* on material grounds. The *Sabara-bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.i.5. makes it sufficiently clear that the theory of *sphoṭa* has been discarded by the Mīmāṃsakas on the ground that it strikes at the root of some of the fundamental principles of the system of their philosophy. It has been already remarked in a foregoing chapter that Bhartṛhari understands by *sphoṭa*, an indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense. He has definitely stated that a word or letter has no reality by itself apart from that of the sentence. Following in his wake, the later grammarians of his school have said in unambiguous terms that *vākyasphoṭa* is the only type of the denoter (*vācaka*), the other classifications of *sphoṭa* being mere artifices resorted to for the purpose of enabling the beginner to comprehend the sentence as a totality by itself.¹

The Mīmāṃsakas point out that if the word, in particular, be regarded as being fictitious and carrying no meaning of its own, such operations as *ūha*, *prasāṅga* and *tantra*²

¹ pade na varṇa vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā iva |

vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana || Vak. I. 73.

Also :—

vākyasphoṭo 'tiniṣkarse tiṣṭhati' ti matasthitiḥ | VBS., śl. 61.

Also :—varṇasphoṭādīnām śkāṅkṣānivartakatvābhāvād avāstavatvaṁ śāstriyapraṁkriyā-nirvāhāya param siddhānte tatsvikāraḥ pāramārthikatvaṁ tu vākyasphoṭasya. VBSD. under VBS., śl. 61.

² *Ūha* :—prakṛtāv āmnātasya mantrasya vikṛtau samavetārthatvāya taducitapadāntara-prakṣepaṇa pāṭha ūhaḥ. RVB., p. 21.

Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*, has mentioned the manifold importance of the study of Sanskrit Grammar. He says that in the Vedic hymns no word is found to have been used in various inflexions and conjugations, as the case may be, to suit various practical purposes

which they have discussed at length, become absolutely meaningless.¹

The Vedas sanction a change in the wording of a hymn according to change of circumstances. While discussing the question—"Are Vedic hymns intended to convey any meaning?" Sāyaṇa strongly maintains that the Vedic hymns are expressive of sense on the ground that it has been enjoined to make necessary changes in wording in the case of a derivative sacrifice.² It has been laid down in the *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa* III. vi. 6. ii, that for purposes of a principal animal sacrifice, only one animal is sufficient and hence the hymn reads thus:—*anv enam mātā manyatām anu pitā anu bhrātā*. But in the case of a derivative sacrifice where two or more animals are required, the authorities sanction a change in wording and the term "*enam*" (which is in the singular) is replaced by "*enau*" (i.e., the dual) or "*enān*" (i.e., the plural) as the case may be. It is why Śabara remarks that the injunction of the *Brāhmaṇa*—Neither "*pitā*" nor "*mātā*" should be increased (in the case of a derivative sacrifice), leads us to infer that the word "*enam*" is required to be increased and he

for which they are enjoined. It is, therefore, that the priest makes necessary changes in the wording according to circumstances. This change in the wording is called *ūha*. And it is for this purpose that a knowledge of the principles of grammar is necessary. Kaiyaṭa explains the point by saying that in a sacrifice in honour of the Sun-god, the term "*agnaye*" in the expression—*agnaye tvā jṣṭam nirvāpāmi*—should be substituted by the term "*sūryāya*."

Prasaṅga :—When a particular thing which is prescribed in connexion with a particular sacrifice, is incidentally prescribed in connexion with another we have a case of *prasaṅga* : anyoddeśena anyadiyasyā'pi sahanuṣṭhānam prasaṅgaḥ. JNM., p. 666.

Tantra :—When a subordinate sacrificial act (*aṅgayāga*) is prescribed only in connexion with a number of principal sacrifices, we have a case of *tantra* : ubhayoddeśena sakṛd anuṣṭhānam tantram. *Ibid*, p. 666.

¹ yātas sphoṭapakṣe hi niravayavam vākyaṁ niravayavasya vākyaṛthasya vācakam, avayavās tu padātmakā varṇātmakāś ca mṛṣābhūlā itī'ṣyate. tatas ca padatatavayavāśritasyo 'hāder mahāvākyaavayavāntaravākyaṛthaprayājādyāśritasya prasaṅgatantrādeś ca uttaratra vicāryamāṇasya mṛṣātvaṁ syāt. atas tatsatyatāsiddhyartham sphoṭanīrākaraṇam iti na nīṣphalam. Prabhā under ŚB. I.i.5, p. 49.

² The sacrifice in which the details of the ceremony are described and according to which other sacrifices are performed is called the principal sacrifice while the latter are called the derivative sacrifices. *Vide MBP., Vol. I, p. 20.*

explicitly states that this *increase* refers to an *increase in sense* as represented by a change in the forms of declension. Sāyaṇa says it in so many words that the singular in “*enam*” should be replaced by the dual or the plural according as there is a change in meaning. That being so, it is established that every Vedic word has a meaning attached to it and the same is expressed through its power of denotation.

The exponents of the theory of *sphoṭa*, as we have already observed, believe that it is not the word or the letter but the indivisible sentence which is endowed with the power of expressing a coherent sense; and it is on this account that the Mīmāṃsakas cannot accept the theory of the grammarians.

THE GRAMMARIANS' REVIEW OF THE POSITION OF THE MĪMĀMSAKAS

The grammarians point out that the Mīmāṃsakas have taken a wrong view of the whole point. The grammarians have adopted a twofold attitude towards word—one, metaphysical or transcendental, the other, empirical or practical. From the metaphysical or transcendental point of view, the Ultimate Reality is the Absolute Word or *Śabdabrahman* as it is called, which is bereft of all distinctions and as such is a homogeneous entity without a second, just like the *Brahman* of the Vedāntists so far as it is explained by Śaṅkarācārya. From the empirical point of view this *Śabdabrahman* is susceptible of further and further divisions from *vākyasphoṭa* down to *varṇasphoṭa*. There is, therefore, little ground for apprehension on the part of the Mīmāṃsakas, as *vākyasphoṭa* has obviously no title to be regarded as superior in merits to *padasphoṭa*, both of which are fictitious divisions necessitated by the operation of *avidyā* to serve the practical purposes of our everyday life.

From what has been said above, it may appear to the casual student of Sanskrit Grammar that the position of Bhartrhari cannot be satisfactorily explained, for he accords a place of

honour to *vākyasphoṭa* and does not attach much importance to *padasphoṭa* and *varṇasphoṭa*. It is for this reason that we propose to enter into an intensive study of the whole issue so that the viewpoint of the grammarians is presented in its proper perspective and there is little room for any misunderstanding whatsoever.

From the empirical point of view, Bhartṛhari puts premium upon a complete self-contained proposition (*vākya*) as the unit of verbal usage which alone possesses the power of expressing a coherent sense capable of being turned into practical use. Letters and words do not independently possess this denotative capacity which is rather ascribed to them in virtue of their necessary contribution to the formation of proposition. Although Bhartṛhari seems to put words on the same level with letters, both being subservient to the constitution of a proposition and as such they are relegated to the position of unmeaning expressions, it would be rather wide off the mark to suppose that words are pure nonsense like unmeaning sounds. The purpose of Bhartṛhari seems to be not to disparage the value of words but rather to emphasise the self-sufficiency of a proposition as the minimum of linguistic usage. So the Mīmāṃsakas have no reason to be alarmed, because even from their standpoint, words cannot be regarded as self-sufficient units of expression. Of course, contribution of words to the formation of a proposition is *not disregarded or denied* even by the grammarians. But it should always be carefully remembered that the grammarians ~~do not~~ denied the transcendental validity of parts of speech as they are always *parts* and never *wholes*. So, even from the empirical standpoint, the status of parts of speech may be described as being lower than a proposition which the Mīmāṃsakas, too, cannot deny. And if the denial of trans-empirical validity be the ground of complaint, the grammarians would fain plead guilty. It has been proved ever and anon that such transcendental validity has no bearing upon our practical conduct which is satisfied by the empirical standard of validity.

We think, we have made the position of the grammarians sufficiently clear and the Mīmāṃsakas cannot evidently have any cause for apprehension. But we should not stop here but go a step further to show that Maṇḍanamiśra, a great pioneer of the *Pūrvaṃmīmāṃsā* system of Hindu Philosophy, has said that there is absolutely no valid ground to deny the existence of *sphoṭa* as a spiritual entity. In his *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Maṇḍana has refuted the arguments of Kumārilabhaṭṭa who in his monumental work, the *Ślokarārttika*, has tried to prove that there is hardly any necessity for postulating *sphoṭa*.¹ Maṇḍana carefully examines the views of the great master and finally establishes the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. And it should be mentioned in this connection that Maṇḍana has, in particular, discussed the nature of *padasphoṭa*, though, of course, he has spoken of *vākyasphoṭa* as well.² That being so, each word is shown to be significant and there is ample justification for a change in the wording of a hymn with corresponding change in the meaning.

THE NAIYĀYIKAS AND THEIR OBJECTION

The Naiyāyikas also do not accept the grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa* for more reasons than one. Jayantabhaṭṭa clearly points out that it should not be supposed that the Naiyāyikas criticise the doctrine of *sphoṭa* only to make a parade of their power of argumentation. The theory of *sphoṭa* is opposed to the vital principles of their philosophy. The Naiyāyikas have established the authority of word (*śabda*) as a cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*) by proving that it was created by God. We

¹ Vide *Sphoṭavāda* in SV.

Also : durvidagdhair avakṣipte darsane padadarśinām |

yathāgamaṃ yathāprajñam nyāyaleśo nidarśyate || SS., śl. 2.

² nirastabhedam padatattvam ekam |

vyadarśi yuktyāgamasamśrayeṇa || *Ibid*, śl. 36.

Maṇḍana's sole object was to criticise Kumārila who apprehended that if the doctrine of *sphoṭa* be accepted, words would be meaningless. Maṇḍana, therefore, discussed *pada-sphoṭa* chiefly, but also referred to *vākyasphoṭa* as well (cf. SS., śl. 29).

have pointed out that the grammarians describe word (*śabda*) as something eternal. And as an entity which is said to be eternal cannot be created by any being, be it human or divine, the Naiyāyikas cannot but refuse to accept the theory of the grammarians.¹

But the argument of the Naiyāyikas, as stated above, seems to be frivolous and the charge acts like a boomerang upon themselves. The Naiyāyikas make the validity of verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*) conditional on God whereas the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakaṣ make it a self-sufficient instrument of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas, however, once more point out that word (*śabda*) in their system of thought is regarded as one having transient existence—it is said to be produced at one moment, exists for the next moment and dies out at the third moment. But the grammarians conceive word as one endowed with a permanent character. Thus the conception of word being different in the two systems of thought, the Naiyāyikas naturally raise a note of protest against the theory of *sphoṭa* as propounded by the grammarians.

THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW : LETTERS AND NOT SPHOṬA EXPRESS SENSE

The Naiyāyikas observe a relation of agreement in presence and absence between perception of letters and cognition of sense; and it is for this reason that the two are described to be causally related.² They maintain that with the perception of letters (*k, kh, g, etc.*), we understand some sense and that the cognition

¹ *tasmād anityānām varṇānām eva vācakatvaṃ pratiṣṭhāpanīyaṃ parākramaṇīyaś ca sphoṭah. NM., p. 367.*

² *Cf. The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference in Western Logic.*

To determine causal relation, this method is often resorted to by Sanskrit logicians and writers. The rhetoricians have laid down as a rule that in order to distinguish between *śabdaguṇa*, *śabdadoṣa* and *śabdālankāra* from *arthaguṇa*, *arthadoṣa* and *arthālankāra* respectively we should always apply this method. *Cf. SD., p. 429.*

of sense cannot proceed without the perception of letters. It is, therefore, reasonable to admit that letters are endowed with the power of expressing sense ; and to posit a transcendental entity (*viz.*, *sphoṭa*) is hardly warranted. The Naiyāyikas again, point out to their advantage that letters are designated as *śabda* (word) for the only reason that they are perceived by the auditory organ.¹ *Sphoṭa*, on the contrary, can be cognised only through mental perception.² It has been said that the realisation of *sphoṭa* requires a mental discipline and spiritual meditation. Hence the Naiyāyikas opine that when we do not perceive the existence of *sphoṭa* in the usual course, it is certainly desirable that letters which are ordinarily perceived, should be regarded as being expressive of sense. Thus when verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*) can be easily explained as accruing from the perception of letters, the Naiyāyikas do not find any justification for postulating a spiritual entity like *sphoṭa* as causing the cognition of meaning.

THE GRAMMARIANS' REPLY TO THE NAIYĀYIKAS

The grammarians, however, criticise the view of the Naiyāyikas on this point. They maintain that the arguments

¹ *ataś śravaṇagrahaṇatā eva śabdalakṣaṇaṁ nyāyām. vārṇā eva ce'daṁ śabdalakṣaṇam anupatanti'ti abhidheyadhīhetubhāvam anupayanto'pi lokaprasiddhes ta eva śabdāḥ.* SS., p. 13.

² According to the grammarians, *sphoṭa* can be perceived through the mind. Vācaspati in his *Tattvabindu* states that *sphoṭa* or *śabdātattva* is cognised by means of mental perception :—*tad eva hi sarvajanīnamānāssapratyakṣapavedanīyaprayatnabhedabhinnanānādhvani-pratyekavyañjanīyaṁ jñātvam.* TB., p. 3. Śāṅkarācārya in his *Sārīrakabhāṣya* quotes the view of those who support the theory of *sphoṭa* by saying that it is cognised by perception :—*na kalpayāmy ahaṁ sphoṭaṁ pratyakṣam eva tv enaṁ avagacchāmi.* Sār Bh., p. 327. It should be observed, however, that Jayanta describes *sphoṭa* as an entity which is cognised through the auditory organ :—*paramārthatas tu śrautṛe pratyaye prātibhasamānaḥ.* NM., p. 371. Thus we find that it is unanimously believed that *sphoṭa* is cognised by perception. But we must admit that we do not subscribe to Jayanta's views when he says that *sphoṭa* is perceived by the auditory organ; for, had it been so, the charges generally levelled against the theory by the Naiyāyikas, namely, that it is neither perceived nor inferred, would hardly have any significance.

of their adversary are based on flimsy grounds. With the help of a dilemmatic argument, they point out the weakness to which the Naiyāyika theory is exposed. Do letters *singly* or *conjointly* express sense?—ask they. Evidently, the first alternative is untenable. If the second alternative be accepted, a question may be asked further: is it required to have an aggregate of letters alone or is the cognition of that aggregate also compulsory?

It should be noted that the Naiyāyikas cannot contemplate such an aggregate on the ground that each letter is transient and not permanent. It may be argued, of course, that according to the Mīmāṃsakas who follow the illustrious teacher Upavarṣa of respectable fame and antiquity, letters are not supposed to be perishable in character—they are not destroyed as soon as they are pronounced; and as such an aggregate of letters may be logically comprehensible. But before we criticise this point, we propose to examine the views of Upavarṣa regarding the permanent character of letters.

UPAVARṢA'S CONCEPTION OF LETTERS

Vācaspati in his *Bhāmātī*, the celebrated commentary on the *Śārīrakabhāṣya* of Śaṅkarācārya, explains the position of this school by asserting that there is no authority to substantiate the truth of the proposition that letters are perishable and have momentary existence. The *Śārīrakabhāṣya* has the most important observation on this point. Letters are not of a momentary character on the ground that at the time of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), they are recognised not as something *similar* to what have been previously perceived but as *identical* with them. The *Bhāmātī* clearly puts it that even when we utter the word “cow” for a thousand and one times, we do not perceive that the word on each occasion is a different one and that each closely resembles the other. On the contrary, we perceive that the same word is pronounced on each occasion. But when we

observe one cow after another, we never say that the second animal is the same as the first. What we say is that the second one is something like the first. It is exactly for this reason that Upavarṣa maintains that when a letter pronounced at different times is not different in character, there is absolutely little justification for the assumption that it is transient.¹

CRITICISM OF UPAVARṢA'S CONCEPTION OF LETTERS

Let us now point out the difficulties that make their appearance in the event of the supposition that letters which are said to have permanent character, are expressive of sense. In the first place, when all letters are permanent, it is difficult to ascertain which particular sense is expressed by which particular group of letters. Secondly, we cannot speak of the *sequence* of letters with reference to either time or space in view of the supposition that they are eternal entities. Letters are regarded by the Mīmāṃsakas as all-pervasive like space and as such it is inconceivable how there can be any *sequence*, temporal or spatial, between letters.

As for the problem whether the aggregate of letters is required to be known prior to verbal cognition, a few words are necessary in order that the implication of the query may be clearly understood. In all cases of perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣajñāna*), it is necessary that the sense-organ (*indriya*) comes in contact with the object (*viṣaya*) to be perceived. A jar, for instance, is said to be perceived when the eyes fall upon it or the hands feel it. It should be carefully noted that besides the contact between the sense-organ and the object (*viṣayendriyasan-nikarṣa*), the cognition of the sense-organ is not needed in a case of perceptual knowledge. But in all cases of mediate knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*), the causes must be known by themselves and in relation to their parts. For instance, in the case of an inferential knowledge, the *probans* itself is required to be known and that

¹ *yadi hi pratyuccāraṇaṁ gavādivyaktivad anyā anyā varṇavyaktayaḥ pratiyeran tata ākṛtinimittam pratyabhijñānam syāt, na tv etad asti.* Śār Bh., p. 325. Also *Bhāmati* thereunder.

it is invariably concomitant with the *major term* (*sādhya-vyāpya*). In the time-honoured example of *inference* in Hindu Logic—"There is fire on the top of the mountain because there is smoke" (*parvato bahnimān dhūmāt*), we may observe that prior to our drawing the inference there should be in us the knowledge of smoke (*i.e.*, the *probans*), of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire (*i.e.*, the *major term*) and the like.

To come to the point, verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*) being a case of mediate knowledge, it is required that we should also have a perception of both the letters and their aggregate before any verbal knowledge is obtained. Thus we find that the cognition of the aggregate of letters becomes a necessity for purposes of verbal knowledge and it is to be seen whether such a cognition is logically possible.

It has been maintained that the conception of an aggregate of letters is not altogether impossible, provided the different letters are pronounced by different persons all at one and the same time. It should, however, be pointed out that though an aggregate of letters may be contemplated in this way, the cognition of that aggregate cannot be obtained. For when several men speak at a time there is a confused noise and as such it is quite impossible to understand which particular letters have been pronounced. But even granting for argument's sake that one is competent to comprehend the different sounds simultaneously as pronounced by different persons at the same moment, it is never given in experience that such an aggregate of letters does express any sense.¹ And if it be maintained that the letters will be pronounced by one man, it is obvious that each letter will have to be uttered at successive moments of time; for different letters require different efforts to pronounce them and consequently an aggregate is out of the question and further still is the knowledge of the same.²

¹ *saty api vā tathāvidhe sāmastye nā'sty evā 'rthapratītiḥ*. NM., p. 368.

² *asahabhāvitvād eva anubhūyamānatayā'pi avayavabhāvaḥ parāsto veditavyaḥ*. TB., p. 3.

N.B.—The discussion on the possibility or otherwise of obtaining the cognition of the aggregate of letters has been undertaken along the lines of Jayanta (*vide* NM., pp. 367-68).

2. A Critique of the Objections from the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Schools—contd.

LOGICAL OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE GRAMMARIANS

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas that though letters cannot express sense either singly or conjointly, it may be legitimately supposed that the cognition of the final letter (in a word) accompanied by the memory-impressions (*saṃskāra*) produced by the perception of the preceding letters, is capable of expressing the required sense.¹

But the aforesaid view is open to serious logical objections. It is admitted on all hands that the nature of impression (*saṃskāra*) is such that a particular impression caused by the perception of a particular object, is endowed with the power of reviving the particular object to our memory and nothing else. That being an established fact, it is only natural that the impressions of letters are capable of reviving letters to our memory and it is not expected that they will express import as well.² —

To say, therefore, that these impressions are competent to function that way is tantamount to denying an admitted fact. But Kumārila still maintains that nobody disputes the fact that unless there lie in us the impressions of letters already perceived, we cannot remember the import and it is, therefore, reasonable to posit that impressions are capable of expressing the sense. He, therefore, sees no reason why a new spiritual entity like *sphoṭa* should be posited at all.

¹ *athavā vāsanai' vā' stu saṃskāras sarva eva hi !*

dr̥ghajñānagr̥hītarthe saṃskāro 'sti 'ti manyate || SV., śl. 99.

Also : *pūrvapūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahito 'ntyo varṇo vācakaḥ.* NM., p. 368.

² *yo hi yadgocarānubhavayonis saṃskāras sa tatrai 'va dhiyam ādhatta iti tasya avabbāvaḥ. yadya 'nyasminn apy ādadhāti kiñcid evai 'kam anubhūya sarvas sarvame artham vijānīyāt. api ca saṃskāra iti ca vāsane 'ti ca bhāvane 'ti ca prācīnānubhavajanitātmanas samarthyaabhedam eva smṛtijñānaprasavaḥ etum ācakṣate. na cā 'syai 'vā 'rthapratyayaprasavaśaktiś śakyā kalpayitum.* TB., p. 6.

MAṆḌANA CRITICISES KUMARILA

Maṇḍana opines that impression which is regarded as a power (*śakti*) itself cannot be supposed to be endowed with another power (*śakti*). Parameśvara, the author of *Gopālikā*, a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Sphotasiddhi*, explains the point by saying that impression should be looked upon either as a power (*śakti*) of the previous cognition and residing in the soul or it is a power (*śakti*) of the soul and emanating from previous cognition.¹ But if this power (*śakti*) be supposed to be possessed of another power (*śakti*), the latter in its turn may be similarly supposed to be possessed of another again, and the process continuing, there will be no limit to our suppositions.²

CRITICISM OF MAṆḌANA'S VIEWPOINT

It should be clearly pointed out that the arguments advanced by Maṇḍana are not very sound. It is a fact that we find that the cognition of import proceeds from the impressions arising out of the cognitions of letters and hence it becomes necessary to admit that the impressions are endowed with the power of expressing the sense. But when we do not find that this power has any other operation (*kārya*) to perform, there is absolutely no scope for the apprehension that this power being endowed with another, there will be no limit to our suppositions. To be explicit, a power (*śakti*) is admitted in order to explain any particular effect and when such an effect is not forthcoming, the question of the supposition of power (*śakti*) does not arise at all.

Maṇḍana in all probability saw through the weakness of his own position and it is, therefore, that he says that the arguments of his adversary who admits the power of impressions to express import, seem to be based on flimsy grounds. (*Cf.*

¹ eṣa prācīnājñānasya śaktiḥ ātmani ca tiṣṭhati. athavā ātmanāś śaktiḥ pūrvajñānena janyate. *Gop.* under SS., śl. 7.

² śakteś śaktyantarāyogas tatra saty apy adarśanam |
vilakṣaṇasyopajano nā 'viśeṣāc ca kāraṇāt || SS., śl. 7.

tad idam asamañjasam iva lakṣyate—SS., p. 52.) Thus he strikes at the fact that impressions may be supposed to be endowed with the power of giving us the cognition of import.

Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* has criticised the position of Maṇḍana so far as this particular point is concerned. Thus he says that there is absolutely no authority to say that impressions cannot express import. And he openly admits that it is certainly more economical to posit that impressions are capable of expressing the meaning than to admit *sphoṭa* and its power of denotation as well.¹

We may further add that it is the Mīmāṃsakas who admit impression (*saṃskāra*) to be a power (*śakti*); but the Naiyāyikas regard the same as an attribute (*guṇa*). That being so, Maṇḍana's objection that the position of the Mīmāṃsakas involves *regression* (*anavasthā*) is quite inconsequential with regard to the Naiyāyikas. It is only for this reason that Maṇḍana starts a new line of criticism. He drags in the question of *sequence* or *order* (*krama*) and points out that in the case of words having the same letters but in different orders, we cannot explain the difference in meaning as there is nothing to prove that the impressions arising out of the identical letters are different in their nature.²

CRITICISM OF THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS AND THE NAIYĀYIKAS

The explanation offered by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas that the auditory perception of the final letter reinforced by the memory-impressions of the previous letters results in the

¹ *yo hi sphoṭam kalpayati tena sphoṭasyā 'rthapratipādanāśaktir api kalpaniye'ti kalpanāgauravam. ubhayasiddhasya saṃskārasya sāmāthyakalpanāyām tu lāghavam asti.*

yady 'api smṛtihetutvaṃ saṃskārasya vyavasthitam |

kāryāntare 'pi sāmāthyam na tasya pratihanyate || NK., p. 271.

² *na khalu kramabhede 'pi pratyekam akṣaropalambhaprabhāvītās saṃskārāḥ paraspāram atīśerate. Gop. under SS., śl. 7.*

idea of one unitary word which is expressive of sense, appears to be a farfetched hypothesis. For there is no such instance on the analogy of which this explanation could be accepted. The case of recognition in which a particular sense-organ as assisted by the previous memory-impressions produces a judgment of identity, stands altogether in a different category. Because, the resultant knowledge is but a judgment in which the identity of a present datum with a past datum is cognised ; but in the case of word-cognition, the resultant knowledge, supposed to be produced by the auditory organ aided by the memory-impressions of the previous letters, is a simple cognition and not a judgment of relations. So the analogy of recognition is absolutely irrelevant to the present case.

IMPRESSIONS EXPRESS SENSE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF RECOLLECTION

But it has been contended that the impressions will not directly express the sense but will serve the purpose through the medium of recollection (*smṛti*).¹ To be explicit, the sense will be expressed by the final letter which is perceived together with the preceding letters that are recollected.

It may be pointed out that this policy of shifting the ground has proved to be of little avail. It will be a fair question to ask whether the last letter will be perceived at the same time when the preceding letters are recollected or whether the recollection of the preceding letters will follow the perception of the last letter. And we shall prove that either of the alternatives is not a safe plank to take one's stand upon. If it be maintained that the perception and the recollection happen at one and the same time, we may be permitted to point out that this leads us to admit a concurrence of cognitions at their birth (*jñānayaugapadya*); and we all know that such a concurrence of cognitions is hardly accepted by philosophers. If it be maintained, on the other hand,

¹ *smṛtidvāreṇa tarhi arthapratyāyako 'sau bhaviṣyati.* NM., p. 368.

that the said recollection will follow the perception of the final letter, the question of sequence comes in once again and with it all the difficulties standing in the way of obtaining an aggregate of letters. We may further point out that even if the preceding letters are recollected, there is no reason why they will be recollected in the same order in which they are perceived.¹ Vācaspati clearly states that it may be assumed that the recollected letters are expressive of sense but there is hardly any justification for the assumption that they will be recollected only in the same order in which they have been perceived before; for they may as well be recollected in a different order. The *Sārīraka-bhāṣya* while describing the grammarians' point of view, says that under the circumstances, such words as "jārā" and "rājā" or "kapi" and "pika" will denote one and the same thing.² But when in the two cases cited above, we notice the same letters but find a difference in meaning, we must admit that something besides the letters expresses the sense; and if this is once conceded, we have practically no difficulty in establishing *sphoṭa*. But, let us turn to see how our opponents propose further modifications of their hypothesis which we have been criticising so long.

In order to obviate the difficulty, it has been proposed that the different impressions (*samskāra*) resulting from the separate cognitions of the various letters in succession, will give rise to *one single recollection* and all the letters that have been cognised before will flash in the mirror of this recollection and because the successive letters can thus be collectively recollected at one and the same time, it will enable us to affirm the co-existence of letters and to uphold that these letters may be looked upon as being expressive of sense.³

¹ smṛtisamārohiṇo varṇā vācakās tan na gauravam iti cen na. kramākramaviparītakramāṇām tatrā 'viśeṣeṇā' rīthadhisamutpādanaprasaṅgāt. TB., p. 7.

² tato rājā jāṛā kapiḥ pika ityādiṣu viśeṣapratipattir na syāt. Śār Bh., p. 327.

³ pratyekapadapadārthānubhavaḥ bhāvitā bhāvanā nicaya labdhajñanmasmṛtadarpanārūḍhā varṇamālā ity anye. TB., p. 2.

SUPPOSITION OF ONE COLLECTIVE RECOLLECTION
CRITICISED

But let us point out that this modification has been of little avail on the ground that the theory, as it stands, is still open to some serious objections.

First of all, the hypothesis that a collective recollection emerges after the perception of the different letters, does not give us a better explanation on the ground that it makes an assumption which is not warranted by introspection. The evidence of our introspection is invariably of the form that we understand the meaning from the word heard (*śruta*) and not the word recollected (*smṛta*). So far as the psychological evidence is concerned, it is absolutely non-existent with regard to recollection. Secondly, granting for the sake of argument that in order to achieve the co-existence of letters, we must posit a collective recollection between the perception of letters and the cognition of sense, there is practically no authority to say that this is recollection at all. We cannot even say that when this is not an apprehension it must, by the Method of Residue, be regarded as recollection ; because it is never felt as recollection by the introspective knowledge following upon it and as such there is no proof in favour of the knowledge of the word being regarded as recollectional in character. Thirdly, we may observe that impression (*samśkāra*) arises when cognition has died out ; for the former being but a subtler form of the latter cannot come into being so long as the latter is present. If it be maintained, however, that an impression may be had at a time when the particular cognition that causes it has not yet died out, we may

Also :—*antya varṇe ca vijñāte sarvasaṁskāra-kāritam |
smaraṇam yaṅgapadyena sarveṣv anye pracakṣate || ŚV., śl. 112.*

Also :—*Vide the introductory vṛtti to SS., śl. 8, pp. 58-61.*

A detailed examination of the several views found therein has been undertaken hereafter (*vide pp. 59-62 of this chapter*).

point out that those who believe in the permanent knowledge of God, will be compelled to admit that God also recollects—a viewpoint to which they do not obviously subscribe. From what we have said above, it is clear that only when the perception of the last letter has died out in the third moment the impression due to the perception of the last letter can arise in us ; and if we are to suppose a recollection resulting from that impression, we shall have to posit that the collective recollection happens long after we have heard the letters. But it is admitted on all hands that the cognition of import does not come at such a long interval.

We may further point out that in positing the collective recollection, it is also necessary to posit an entity which will invariably arouse the impressions lying in us to effect the said recollection. And as we do not find any tangible (*dr̥ṣṭa*) entity before us which will serve the purpose, we shall be required to assume an unseen destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*). But the difficulty does not end here ; for an unseen destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) may at best arouse the impressions occasionally but not regularly and as such we shall have to posit a number of unseen destinies (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Moreover, it is not possible for one unseen destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) to arouse a number of impressions which are different in their nature. So we cannot but admit a number of unseen destinies (*adr̥ṣṭa*) to explain the point satisfactorily. But even now the difficulties are not over. There is no guarantee why these different unseen destinies (*adr̥ṣṭa*) being invariably combined will serve to arouse the impressions. Hence, in order to account for the invariable combination, we shall be required to posit another unseen destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Moreover, it is not reasonable to hold that different recollections will not accrue from different impressions but that there will be one collective recollection invariably arising from them. To be explicit, each letter being in its nature different from the rest, the impression arising out of the cognition of each of them is different and this difference in the nature of impressions will bring about a difference in the nature of recollections

and it is, therefore, in the fitness of things that we should have *different* recollections instead of *one collective* recollection.

We may again observe that in all cases of recollection the object of recollection (*tattvāṁśa*) is invariably mentioned. But if we maintain a similar reference to objects of recollection in the present case, it will be difficult to obtain the cognition of oneness pertaining to word. Hence it becomes necessary on our part to concede to recollection in which the object of recollection is lost (*pramuṣṭatattvākasmṛti*). And we all know that such a recollection, if at all possible, may happen only if there is some defect. But no such defect can be detected in the present case. Moreover, a recollection without being cognised as such is only a figment of the imagination. This explanation, therefore, appears to be an argument of the desperate man.

Then again, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas do not make any gain by positing the existence of an intermediate factor in the shape of recollection standing midway between word-perception and the comprehension of meaning. Of course, it may be contended that the upholder of *sphoṭa*, too, makes the assumption of a *tertium quid* in the shape of *sphoṭa* and there is no economy in the assumption of causal conditions. To be explicit, first of all, there is the perception of word or sound ; secondly, the cognition of *sphoṭa* and thirdly, the comprehension of meaning. But this is exactly the position of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, only with this exception that recollection is substituted for *sphoṭa*. The contention of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas is quite plausible. But the grammarians have this advantage over the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas that their (*i.e.*, the grammarians') theory has the sanction of experience. *Sphoṭa* is a perceived fact and from this meaning is understood. And such is the testimony of our introspective experience too. The hypothesis of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas is absolutely destitute of this sanction of experience. It is never felt by us whenever a word is heard that there is the recollection of a word or of letters.

Furthermore, this collective recollection is subject to the same limitations to which all recollections are liable. For instance, a recollection is only a reproduction of a previous perceptual knowledge and is never credited with the capacity for giving us any new information which was not known before. So collective recollection is only possible if there is a collective perception behind it. And if a collective perception is admitted, the hypothesis of collective recollection would be absolutely futile ; for the former would give us the knowledge of the word for which the latter hypothesis was requisitioned.

JAYANTA'S EXPLANATION AND ITS CRITICISM

Jayanta, the astute Naiyāyika, was shrewd enough to perceive the drawback in the previous theory and so he comes forward with another hypothesis. The resultant cognition of an entire word is not regarded as recollection but rather as a mental judgment. Jayanta contends that though the different cognitions of the constituent letters occur successively and as such the letters are never perceived together, still a cognition of totality is not impossible as in the judgment that "Devadatta has eaten a hundred fruits."¹ The successive consumptions of the different fruits are synthesised in one judgment. So also in the case of letters, a synthetic judgment comprising within its scope the successive presentation of letters and thus giving us the knowledge of the unitary whole is not at all an impossible phenomenon. If, on the contrary, such mental judgments are declared to be impossible on the ground of the successive presentation of the data, all our activities resulting from such judgment will be reduced to impossibility and synthetic unity of our personal

¹ *atha vā kramopalabdheṣv api varṇeṣu mānasam anuvyavasāya-rūpam akhilavarṇaviśayaṁ saṅkalanāññānam yad upajāyate tad arthapratyāyanāṅgaṁ bhaviṣyati. drśyate ca vinasvareṣv api padārthāntareṣu kramānubhūteṣu yugapad anuvyavasāyo mānasaś śatam āmrāṇi bhakṣitavān devadatta iti.* NM., p. 376.

conscious life, which is being continuously enriched by the contributions of our past and present experiences, will be impossible.

While admiring the philosophical insight of Jayanta, we cannot help thinking that Jayanta has been led by specious similarities and the cases cited by him as precedents are absolutely without any bearing on the issue. The knowledge of a number, say, a hundred, is only a memory-judgment at bottom. Or, if it is regarded as a new intellectual judgment as the knowledge of the number was not given in the individual perceptions, still the analogy of such judgments with the simple experience of word-units is not at all patent to our understanding. The knowledge of the number is after all a synthetic construction and not a simple presentation, and it is made possible by the knowledge of relations of the constituent units. The content of such a judgment is not a simple unity but rather a group-concept in which the different individuals are comprised in one group with their distinctive individualities unimpaired. But the cognition of word-units is not a case of group-conception. It is, on the contrary, a simple apprehension of a simple identity without any reference whatsoever to its individual constituents, the existence of which is simply uncognised. The analogy could hold good if our cognitions of word-units were conversant with the presence of the different letters as constituent factors. When I judge that I have eaten a hundred fruits, this judgment though unitary in character, does not annul the separate cognitions of the different fruits that have been consumed. But when I say that Devadatta is the name of a person, I am not at all aware of the fact that the name "Devadatta" is a collection of letters. My experience, on the contrary, is that the word "Devadatta" is a simple unit. The whole argument of Jayanta, therefore, seems to be based upon superficial similarities and far-fetched constructions designed to vindicate a weak case for which there is no support from experience. Jayanta seems to have been conscious of the weakness of his position and, therefore, gives his blessings to

the theory of Śabara, viz., that the final letter together with the memory-impressions (*saṃskāra*) of the previous letters produces a direct cognition of the meaning.¹ The implication of this theory of Śabara as we have fully discussed before, is that memory-impressions though generally productive of recollection, may produce a direct cognition as well.

The whole pleadings of Jayantabhaṭṭa are, no doubt, admirable for their ingenuity ; but we must admit that they have failed to carry conviction. We have exposed the defects of his theory of synthetic cognition and this theory, too, does not stand a better chance. Why should Jayanta go out of his way to put so much power to the credit of memory-impressions. Its purpose is obvious ; namely, to refute the doctrine of *sphoṭa* for which he has no patience. This is altogether an unwarranted assumption to suppose that memory-impressions can achieve the impossible task of giving us a direct cognition of a simple unity though that unity is not in existence. Jayanta in his zeal against his opponents forgot to take notice of the consequences of his theory. The theory makes the knowledge of words and sentences a case of unmitigated illusion. The plurality of letters is believed to be a simple unity which it is not. Certainly, there is no logical necessity to suppose that our cognitions of word-units or sentence-units as simple unities, are false cognitions.

Likewise, the possible contention of the Neo-logicians that the previous letters may be present through their cognitions or memory-impressions and these together with the final letter may result in the cognition of a word-unit, is not reasonable. Because the presentation through cognition which is called *jñānalakṣaṇāsannikarṣa* is not universally accepted ; and even according to the Naiyāyikas' theory it is not found to result in the knowledge of a simple unity, but rather in a complex judgment, the presented data through such cognition being added as

¹ *yathā pūrvavarṇajanitasamśkārasahito 'ntyavarṇa iti tatrābhavatā mīmāṃsābhāṣya-kṛtā varṇitaṃ tathā vā varṇāṇāṃ arthapratyāyakatvam astu. NM., p. 376.*

adjectival elements as in the judgment—"I see a fragrant piece of sandal-wood." And so the Naiyāyikas' explanations are found to be at variance with their accepted conclusions and this shows more zeal than logic.

Moreover, Jayanta does not make any economy. As we had occasion to remark before *sphoṭa* is dispensed with only to make room for an intermediate condition, *viz.*, memory-impression or memory. Jayanta is obviously under the illusion that the upholders of *sphoṭa* assume all these conditions and *sphoṭa* as an additional category. But this is not the case. The *sphoṭavādin* need not assume the existence of memory-impressions as the condition of the perception of *sphoṭa*. The individual letters successively reveal the same *sphoṭa* and this revelation becomes more and more decisive and clear, the final letter resulting in the complete revelation of *sphoṭa*.

MAṆḌANA'S REVIEW OF THE POSITION OF THE NAIYĀYIKAS AND THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS

We cannot close this section without referring to the views of Maṇḍana on this particular point. Maṇḍana has recorded no less than three different views of his opponents as to how the import is obtained. In the first place, he states that the different cognitions of the different letters will give rise to different impressions which will enable the letters to flash in one single recollection in the same order in which they have been perceived. Next he refers to the view according to which a single cognition, in which the last letter will be cognised and the preceding ones recollected in the same order in which they have been perceived, will be the medium through which letters will express the required sense. And the third view is that there arises one recollection immediately after the cognition of the last letter, and in this recollection flash all the preceding letters in the same order in which they have been perceived.¹ Thus on the second moment of the

¹ Vide SS., pp. 53-63.

cognition of the last letter we have the recollection. And as there is no bar to the simultaneous existence of two cognitions, there is absolutely no possibility of any difficulty making its appearance. Maṇḍana, however, remarks that of these three views it is the last one that is generally accepted by the opponents.)

Before we pass on to see how Maṇḍana criticises the three views cited above, we should do well to discuss the niceties of distinction between the first view and the third. It is a fact that Maṇḍana's own language is not as clear and lucid as it should have been in order that we may form a correct and precise idea of his viewpoint and it is also unfortunate that the commentator, Parameśvara, does not give us any satisfactory explanation. We, therefore, propose to study the views independently of ourselves so that the real position may be fairly understood.

According to the first view, the single recollection happens only when we have the impressions of all the different letters in us. But it has been discussed before that the impression of the final letter can only arise when the perception of the same has died out. So the recollection supposed happens long after the perception of the letters. It is for this reason that the attempt has been made to show that the recollection does not happen at a long interval—it happens on the second moment of the perception of the final letter. And this is exactly the position in the third view.¹ Now it may be argued that the impression of the last letter which also contributes to the birth of the recollection cannot be obtained on the second moment of the perception of the final letter. For it is a general rule that the cause precedes the effect; and the impression which is said to be caused by the perception, cannot come into being simultaneously with the latter. But we may point out that the above rule does not always hold good. In a case of perceptual knowledge we find that the object which is said to be the cause of its perception is designated

¹ The force of the term "*samanantara*" (immediately) in the *vṛtti* of SS., p. 61, should be carefully studied.

as such only with reference to its simultaneous existence with the perception. Similarly, the perception of the final letter is the cause of the impression only in this way that the two exist simultaneously—there is no question of sequence. Thus it will not be difficult for us to obtain the recollection on the second moment of the perception of the final letter.

Maṇḍana draws our pointed attention to the fact that in all the three views we find that the letters flash in the subsequent recollection or cognition exactly in the same order in which they are perceived. And it seems, therefore, that the opponents want to make their positions particularly safe by incorporating this fact in the exposition and explanation of their particular theories on verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*). Maṇḍana criticises all the three views and his criticism is mainly directed along the following channel. There is practically nothing in favour of his opponents to maintain that letters will be invariably recollected or cognised in the same order in which they are perceived. For he strongly asserts that the previous perceptions which have died out, cannot in any way effect any distinction with regard to the letters that have not come into existence. And he has made it sufficiently clear on more occasions than one that there is no difference in nature between what has not come to pass and what has happened but has died out without leaving any trace behind.¹ Furthermore, we are hardly justified in bringing in the notion of sequence in a unitary recollection. For sequence or order invariably implies distinction (*bheda*). And when the recollection that is posited is a unified whole, the question of sequence cannot arise in this case—for unity and distinction are contradictory in nature and we can never speak of them both with reference to one and the same thing.² It is only when the notion of distinction has completely vanished that we are in a position to have the recollection that “cow” (*gauḥ*), for instance, is one word.

¹ *asamprāptaniravayaniruddhayor viśeṣābhāvād ity uktam. SS., p. 66.*

² *ekopalabdḥau tu yangapadyān nā 'nupūrviko viśeṣaḥ. Loc. cit.*

Thus Maṇḍana deals a staggering blow to the theory of the Naiyāyikas who have been maintaining that the sequence of letters will also appear in the recollection. The Mīmāṃsakas, too, cannot raise the question of sequence at all; for, according to them, letters are eternal and all-pervasive and as such there can be no sequence, temporal or spatial, between letters.¹

Thus we conclude that we cannot conceive of any one collective cognition—be it in the nature of one in which we have all the letters recollected or the last one perceived and the rest recollected—in which we have all the letters at one and the same time and also in the order in which they are successively perceived.

KUMĀRILA FINDS A WAY OUT OF THE DIFFICULTY

Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārttika* makes an attempt to steer clear of the difficulty. He argues that the sense which a particular word is found to express is determined by usage—that is, how it has been practically used and understood; and as such the particular number of letters (uttered by one individual and in a particular order too), which has expressed the import to us when we have first learnt the word from our elders will express the same sense at all future times.² And Kumārila believes that this explanation is quite sufficient to put an end to all the difficulties raised heretofore.

CRITICISM OF KUMĀRILA'S EXPLANATION

Maṇḍana carefully summarises the viewpoint of Kumārila and he opines that according to Kumārila, it is letters that are endowed with the power of denotation; but these letters should

¹ svato varṇā nityatayā vibhutayā vā na deśanibandhanam nā 'pi kālanibandhanam parāparabbhāvam anupatanti 'ti prakhyānanibandhana eṣa samupāśrīyate. SS., pp. 66-67.

² yāvanto yādrśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane |

varṇaḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ || ŚV., śl. 69.

not be understood in their absolute but in their qualified character. It is why, says Maṇḍana, Kumārila posits that letters as found in traditional usage will express the required import. But Maṇḍana points out that this explanation does not improve the position in any way. For the question that still remains to be decided is : whether such letters will express the sense singly or conjointly ? And Maṇḍana maintains that in order to decide the problem, we shall be once more required to cover the same ground hitherto traversed.

We may also criticise Kumārila in a different way. The apprehension of the import of a word depends upon how our elders have understood the same. But it is not possible for us to know how the import of a particular word has been understood by our elders ; and in that case it is only necessary to point out that this explanation of Kumārila only seeks to evade a clear difficulty. Kumārila lays stress upon the number and the order of letters in a word and puts the expressive power to their credit. But we have seen that this order cannot be substantiated by argument. Order is ultimately a question of sequence and this sequence could be realised if the preceding letters or their cognitions could be shown to be coincident or synchronous with the subsequent letters and their cognitions. The preceding letters or their cognitions have completely died out without leaving any legacy behind and the subsequent letters have not yet come into existence. So there can be no co-operation among them. And bereft of mutual co-operation the letters or cognitions are to be treated as isolated facts without any additional efficiency that may be supposed to be derived from mutual assistance. The extinction of preceding cognitions and the non-production of succeeding cognitions are both equally cases of non-existence and non-existent facts cannot be supposed to have any efficacy. The difficulty may be obviated by the supposition of the presence of legacies in the shape of memory-impressions ; but we have weighed them in the scale and found them to be wanting in the efficiency sought to be put to their credit.

3. *The Grammarians' Theory and its Advantages*

THEORY OF SPHOṬA INVOLVES NO DIFFICULTY

It is for this reason that the grammarians point out that when the theory that letters are expressive of sense involves a lot of complications, a better and more satisfactory solution should, by all means, be found out.

The grammarians, therefore, engage themselves in an intensive study of the problem and finally assert that it is *sphoṭa* which is really endowed with the power of denotation. And they describe *sphoṭa* as an indivisible unit having an eternal existence gradually revealed by the articulation of letters. From the trend of discussion it has become quite clear that it is the problem of sequence which has practically dealt a staggering blow to the theory of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas according to which letters are said to be expressive of sense. But when the grammarians describe *sphoṭa* as an indivisible entity, all the difficulties lying that way are removed once for all.

THE THEORY HAS THE SANCTION OF USAGE

The grammarians point out that the indivisible character of *sphoṭa*, as conceived by them, is warranted by various use in language. They assert that the term "word" (*śabda*) refers to *sphoṭa* and not to letters. It is a known fact that in such expressions as "We learn the import from the word" (*śabdād artham pratipadyāmahe*) the singular number in the term "word" can only be justified provided the said term means *sphoṭa* which is one and indivisible. But if letters were signified by the said term, there would have been little justification

for the use of the singular number instead of the plural. Besides it is argued by the grammarians that such expressions as "We learn the import from letters" (*varṇebhyo'rtham pratipadyāmahe*) are seldom found in use. Moreover, the respective imports of the stem and the suffix need not be modified, provided the term "word" means the indivisible *sphota* and not letters. They further point out that the Naiyāyikas regard the term "word" as one denotative of *class* (*jātivācaka*). But we know that when a word denotative of *class* is used in apposition with a word denotative of *individual* (*vyaktivācaka*), the former cannot be used in the singular number if the latter be used in the dual or the plural. This being an established fact, the term "from the word" (*śabdāt*) ought to have been replaced by the term "from the words" (*śabdebhyaḥ*). We may observe, for instance, that such expressions as "Yajña-datta and Devadatta are a man," or "Dhava, Khadira and Palāśa are a tree" are nowhere to be found in use.¹ Similarly, we do not come across such an expression as "c" "o" and "w" are a word.

The Naiyāyikas realise the weakness of their position and so they shift their ground by maintaining that the term "word" is not denotative of *class* but of *whole* (*samudāya*). And they opine that in the case of two words, one of which is denotative of *parts* (*avayavavācaka*) and the other of *whole*, it is not uncommon that the two show a difference in number when they are used in apposition. Thus, for instance, such expressions as "The forest is trees" (*vanam vṛkṣāḥ*) are not infrequent. But we shall show that the Naiyāyikas cannot carry their point even now. It should be carefully noted that in the case of two words one of which is denotative of *part* and the other of *whole*, we may use them either in apposition or in their natural relation. Thus we often use such expressions as "The forest of mango trees" (*āmrāṇām vanam*), "The forest of wood-apple trees"

¹ Vide SS., pp. 74-5.

(*kapitthānāṃ vanam*), etc., etc. But do we ever come across such expressions as "The word of c, o and w"? It is therefore that we cannot say that the term "word" is denotative of *whole* (*samudāyavācaka*).

We should not, however, stop here but enter into a detailed discussion of the point at issue. In the case of such terms as "forest" and "tree," there is a marked difference between the *part* (i.e., tree) and the *whole* (i.e., forest), because the latter cannot be predicated of each one of the parts which go to constitute it; and so in such cases we may be permitted to imagine the relation of apposition subsisting between the two. But the difference between word and letters cannot be conceived and so the supposition of identity is absolutely out of question. Thus we conclude that word is not an entity which is denotative of *whole*; and we have already proved that word is not denotative of *class* too. Hence we practically deal a staggering blow to the Naiyāyika theory.

HOW TO EXPLAIN THE ONENESS PERTAINING TO WORD ?

The grammarians again raise another subtle and interesting point. It is said that the *oneness* pertaining to a word is an established fact. But the difficulty crops up when the Naiyāyikas are asked to explain the same. Jayanta takes up the discussion and says that the cognition of *oneness* pertaining to word is not natural but due to foreign association (*upādhikṛta*). Thus he maintains that the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word is reflected, as it were, in the cognition of word itself. But the grammarians point out that the aforesaid exposition involves a fallacy of reasoning. For it is a fact that the cognition of *oneness* pertaining to word is regarded as the cause of the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word; and to say that the latter is the cause of the former is liable to involve interdependence. But the Naiyāyikas argue that it is the aggregate of letters, the last one of which

is perceived and the rest recollected, that should be regarded as the cause of the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word ; and thus they appear to steer clear of the difficulty. But the grammarians point out that it is the *oneness* pertaining to word that determines the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import. Jayanta, however, says that the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word presupposes the *oneness* of the import which is the matter (*viṣaya*) of cognition and not of the word which is instrumental in effecting the same. For he asserts that the *oneness* or otherwise pertaining to the cognition implies the corresponding *oneness* or otherwise pertaining to the matter of cognition and not to the instruments (*upāya*).¹ Jayanta explains his point by means of an illustration. He says that in the case of perception, there are more than one instrument of cognition, *e.g.*, the eyes, sufficient light, the mind and others. But all these instruments certainly enable us to obtain *one* cognition. Thus when we perceive a pot, the matter of perception being one we are said to have *one* cognition and not *many*.

CRITICISM OF JAYANTA'S EXPLANATION

But we beg to criticise Jayanta in the following way. It may be pointed out that when the finger presses against the eyeball we find that the object which is really one, appears to be many in view of the fact that the instrument of perception, *viz.*, the eye, is not one at that time ; the eye being pressed, is divided into several sections and so we do not obtain only one perception but more. Moreover, the illustration which Jayanta has cited is not a happy one. According to Jayanta, there is a plurality of instruments in the case of perception. But may we point out that in the aforesaid example, there is only one instrument of

¹ brūyāt padavākyaḥ ekatvam antareṇa katham padavākyaṁ prapitir ekarūpā bhaved iti so 'yam atīva mugdhālapaḥ. pratītibhedābhedau hi viśayabhedābhedāv anurūdhya te no 'pāyabhedābhedau. NM., pp. 382-83.

perception, and that is the eye, the rest being regarded as auxiliary (*sahakārin*) to it. Further, it is not proper to say that the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word presupposes only the *oneness* pertaining to the import on the ground that the same matter can be cognised by means of both perceptual and non-perceptual knowledge, and in that case it is the instrument of cognition that settles whether the cognition is perceptual or non-perceptual. Hence the *oneness* pertaining to word is also of necessity presupposed by the *oneness* pertaining to the cognition of the import of word.

THE GRAMMARIANS' CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA CONCEPTION OF WORD

The grammarians further criticise the view of the Naiyāyikas according to whom 'word' (*śabda*) is used to refer to what is perceived by the auditory organs ; and letters being perceived through the auditory organs, can rightly be called 'word.' According to Jayanta's exposition of the grammarians' view-point, *spṛṣṭa* is apprehended through the auditory organs ;¹ and as such it is entitled to the designation of 'word.' But we have discussed before that the grammarians do not maintain that the auditory perception of *spṛṣṭa* is possible. So they state their own conception of 'word' and criticise the aforesaid view of the Naiyāyikas.

The grammarians aver that the Naiyāyikas have got to admit that like 'word,' 'wordness,' too, is cognised through the auditory organs ; and that being so, the murmur of the wind or the splash of the waves is entitled to be designated as 'word.' But we may point out that such sounds are not included in the category of 'word' on the ground that they do not express any sense. Hence the grammarians conclude that the Naiyāyika conception of 'word' is not at all satisfactory.

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not drop the controversy here. They in their turn criticise the definition of 'word' as set

¹ *śrautṛe pratyaye pratibhāsamānaḥ pratyakṣa eva spṛṣṭaḥ.* NM., p. 371.

forth by Patañjali and say that the definition is wide¹ and not strictly scientific. According to Patañjali, 'word' is that which is expressive of sense.² Now the grammarians point out that if anything that expresses meaning be regarded as 'word,' the *probans* in an inferential knowledge has a right to be called such. When we, for instance, infer the existence of fire on the hill-top from the sight of smoke, we may be logically justified in drawing the conclusion that smoke (which is really an object) is a 'word' inasmuch as it enables us to obtain the knowledge of fire.

The Naiyāyikas further point out that if 'word' be defined as one which is expressive of sense, the difficulty arises that 'word' cannot be designated as such unless it is known to be expressive of sense. Thus prior to our knowledge of the fact that a particular word is expressive of a particular sense, it cannot be logically described to be as such and it is only when we have come to know that the sense is conveyed by it that we shall be justified in calling it a 'word.' Thus we find that one and the same thing happens to be a 'word' and also not it—a position which we do not seem to experience.³

The grammarians, however, point out that the charges levelled against their theory cannot be substantiated in any way. At the outset, let us point out that the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, too, have thoroughly misunderstood Patañjali's standpoint. Patañjali argues that as the word "cow" is uttered or heard, various ideas present themselves to our mind ;⁴

¹ Indian logicians lay it down that a definition must be neither wide (*atiryāpta*), nor narrow (*avyāpta*) nor wholly absurd (*asambhava*). If "man" be defined as a biped animal, the definition is said to be wide for the denotation of the term in question is increased. And if the definition happens to decrease the denotation, it is said to be narrow. Again if we define a thing in such a way that the definition does not enable us to understand the thing itself ; on the contrary, it is applicable to another thing quite different from it, our definition is said to be absurd. (Cf. O. Read, p. 377.)

² *yeno 'ccāritena śāsnālāṅgulakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyaayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*. MB., Vol. I, p. 16. Maṇḍana summarises the idea in the third *kārikā* of his work : *arthāvasāyaprasavanimittam śabdaḥ* iṣyate ।

³ *anyo 'pi vācakas saṅgatisaṁvedanasamayataś ca purāś śravaṇendriyāvaseyo 'pi na śabda itī nigadyeta, paścāc ca tatho 'cyeta*.—SS., p. 12.

⁴ MB., Vol. I, p. 12, and Pradīpa thereunder.

but can any one of them be taken up to explain what forms the word-element in the word "cow" as contradistinguished from the sense-element? Hence it is that Kaiyaṭa clearly explains the implication of the query—"atha gaur ity atra kaś śabdaḥ?" by saying that word and sense being identically used, it is necessary that the meaning of the word-element should be explicitly stated in the beginning of a treatise on the Science of Grammar. The word "cow" is found to denote the dewlap, the tail, the hoofs and the horns of the animal; but Patañjali is careful enough to point out that all of these form the sense-element on the ground that each of them is a substance (*dravya*) and not a word.¹ Kaiyaṭa explicitly states that each one of the substances (dewlap, hump, etc.) referred to above may be cognised by means of different cognitive instruments (*pramāṇa*) other than the auditory organ; and as such none can be regarded as 'word.'² Having dismissed the claims of substances to be called 'word,' Patañjali on selfsame grounds states that neither action (*kriyā*), nor attribute (*guṇa*), nor even configuration (*ākṛti*) can come under the scope of the word-element.³

We may, therefore, conclude that in the opinion of Patañjali, 'word' is one of those that can be cognised through the auditory organ but is expressive of sense. And this definition does not apply to the logical *probans* in a syllogism.

Maṇḍana also observes that the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas have failed to understand the viewpoint of Patañjali; and he explains his point by means of an apt illustration. Suppose there are several men in a room and Devadatta is one of them. Now, if we are asked to point out Devadatta, it is evidently meant that we are required to find him out from amongst his companions in the room and not from other objects, we mean, the different articles of furniture there. Similarly, when 'word'

¹ *dravyaṃ nāma tat*. MB., Vol. I, p. 14.

² *bhinnendriyagrāhyatvān na dravyaṃ śabda itī pratītam, api tu dravyam itī*. MBP., Vol. I, p. 14.

³ *Vide* MB., Vol. I, pp. 14-15.

has been defined as one endowed with the expressive power it is understood that whatsoever happens to be expressive of sense is not 'word.' On the contrary, what is meant as 'word' is only a particular class of things that are apprehended through the auditory organs, and not anything that is meant by it. It may mean the class (*jāti*), the individual (*vyakti*), action (*kriyā*), attribute (*guṇa*), letter (*varṇa*), *sphoṭa* and the like and these are meant by it as things distinct from it—as the expressed or suggested meaning in contradistinction to what it is in and by itself. So there is no ambiguity in the meaning of 'word' itself. Word is therefore regarded as self-meaning and this is evident from the query, "What is word?" The meaning of the term "word" is here something in which what expresses the meaning is also included in what is expressed by it. It is, as it were, by an act of self-alienation that the same thing is regarded as the subject and the object both at the same time. Bhartṛhari is emphatic on this point of the self-expressive character of 'word.' The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas only make themselves ridiculous by raising a quibble which is altogether out of place.¹

CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PERCEPTION OF LETTERS AND THE COGNITION OF SENSE CANNOT BE PROVED

The grammarians, next, point out that the causal relation which the Naiyāyikas seek to establish between the perception of letters and the cognition of sense, is absolutely untenable. The Naiyāyikas prove that the cognition of sense is invariably preceded by the perception of letters and as such the former can be regarded as the effect of the latter. But it should be noted that mere invariable sequence cannot establish causation. Mill says:—"Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. There are sequences, as uniform in past

¹ Vide SS., pp. 15-19 and Gop. thereunder.

experience as any others whatever, which we yet do not regard as cases of causation, but as conjunctions in some sort accidental. Such to an accurate thinker is that of day and night.”¹ Indian logicians have also made similar observations on this point when they define a cause as an invariable antecedent, which is not *anyathāsiddha* (irrelevant).²

To come to the point, we may show that the perception of letters is not the unconditional antecedent of the cognition of sense. For it is with the perception of each one of the successive letters that *sphoṭa* is more and more definitely revealed till it is finally and completely manifested by the perception of the last letter; and *sphoṭa*, thus revealed, is expressive of sense. Thus we observe that the perception of the different letters is not causally related to the cognition of sense; the perception of the letters should rather be looked upon as being *anyathāsiddha* in so far as the cognition of sense is concerned.

¹ Mill, System of Logic, Vol. I, p. 379.

² *anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatā pūrvavartitā* |

kāraṇatvaṁ bhavet..... || BP. kār. 16.

The term *anyathāsiddha* requires elucidation. Logicians have spoken of the fivefold varieties of *anyathāsiddhi*. First, the essential attribute (or attributes) which determines the cause of an effect is said to be *anyathāsiddha* and is not, therefore, regarded as the cause of that effect. For instance, staff determined by staffhood is the cause of the pot and so staffhood should not be regarded as the cause of the pot. Secondly, a phenomenon the agreement in presence and absence of which in relation to the effect, is only possible through the medium of another (the real cause) is also *anyathāsiddha*. The form of the staff is not the cause of the pot in view of the fact that its agreement in presence and absence with the pot is possible through the medium of the staff and not by itself. Thirdly, an *anyathāsiddha* is one which is known to be the antecedent of another phenomenon only when it is known to be the antecedent of a different one. The sky, for example, is not the cause of the pot, for we know that the sky contributes to the production of the pot only when we know that it is the inherent cause of word (*śabda*). Fourthly, what happens to be the cause of the cause of a given effect is also *anyathāsiddha*. The father of the pot-maker cannot be the cause of the pot made by his son. Lastly, anything other than the least antecedent which suffices to produce the consequent, is regarded as *anyathāsiddha*. It may be a fact that at the time when a pot is made, a cow is present on the spot; but it will be ridiculous to say that the animal contributes to the production of the pot.

CHAPTER IV

DIALECTICS OF SPHOṬA—*contd.*

1. Kumārila on Sphoṭa

THE GRAMMARIANS' THEORY MAKES NO IMPROVEMENT

The theory of *sphoṭa*, as we have said in the previous chapter, has been strongly criticised by the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. And both the criticism and the rejoinder to the same by the grammarians go to testify to the sharp critical acumen of Indian philosophers. Kumārila opens his criticism of the theory of *sphoṭa* by asserting that the difficulties which confront us when we say that letters are expressive of sense, are sure to crop up with the grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa*. Do letters singly or conjointly reveal *sphoṭa*?—asks Kumārila. And he claims that the theory of *sphoṭa* is not immune from the charges that are levelled against the theory of the Mīmāṃsakas.¹

Kumārila points out that letters cannot be said to reveal *sphoṭa* singly for the obvious reason that if any one letter in a particular word is competent to reveal *sphoṭa*, the remaining letters will obviously be redundant. The grammarians meet the objection by saying that *sphoṭa* will be revealed on the very moment when the first letter is perceived; but it becomes more and more definitely manifested with the perception of each one of the succeeding letters. Vācaspati, Maṇḍana and Jayanta elucidate the viewpoint of the grammarians by means of an illustration. A piece of diamond is recognised as such at the very first glance but the real worth and excellence of the gem can exactly be determined only on careful observation for a number of times. That being so, the later observations cannot be called futile; on the contrary, they

¹ *yasyā 'navayavas sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ |*
so 'pi paryannyogēṇa nai 'vā 'nena vimucyate || SV., śl. 84.

are necessary for enabling us to determine the actual worth of the gem. Thus the first observation enables us to get a general or, rather, a rough knowledge of the thing ; while the succeeding ones are calculated to determine the thing more and more thoroughly till we arrive at a correct estimate.¹

Hence the grammarians point out that with the perception of the first letter, *sphoṭa* becomes, no doubt, manifested ; but so long as the final letter is not perceived, it is not definitely and clearly revealed.² And so Kumārila's apprehension that the succeeding letters will be redundant, is absolutely without any foundation.

It has been argued, however, that if letters in their respective capacities can go to manifest *sphoṭa* more and more clearly, there is no reason whatsoever why they should not express sense in like manner. To be precise, the first letter will express the required sense in a more or less general way, while the succeeding letters will express the same more and more definitely till with the perception of the final letter it is fully expressed.

KUMĀRILA'S ANALOGY DOES NOT HOLD GOOD

But we may be permitted to point out that unfortunately the analogy does not hold good. It is an established fact that we can speak of the imperfect or doubtful character of perceptual knowledge but never so of non-perceptual knowledge.³

¹ tad yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ punaḥ punā ratnasvarūpaṁ vīkṣamāṇasya ratna-darśanāni pratyekaṁ ratnasvarūpaṁ avagāhamānāny api na sahasai 'va samānāsamānā-jāṭiyavyāvṛttaṁ ratnatattvaṁ avabhāsayanti kintu pañcaśaḍdarśanajanitabhāvanāśacivacetolabdhañmani caramacetasi cakūṣṭi ratnatattvaṁ. TB., pp. 4-5.

Also : yathā ratnaparīkṣakāṇāṁ...ratnatattvaṁ. NM., p. 370.

Also : yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ...ratnatattvaṁ. SS., p. 131.

² pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānugūṇais tathā |

dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpaṁ avadhāryate || Vāk. I. 84.

³ pratyakṣajñānaniyatā vyaktāvyaktāvabhāsitā |

mānāntareṣu grahaṇam athavā nai 'va hi grahaḥ || SS., śl. 23.

In a case of non-perceptual knowledge, our knowledge is sure to be definite and perfect in view of the fact that the causes in this case are required to be known. If the causes happen to remain unknown, we shall not be in a position to obtain the knowledge at all. Thus we do or do not infer the existence of fire on the hill-top from the sight of smoke according as we have or have not beforehand the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the *probans* with the *probandum* (i.e., of smoke with fire), of the *probans* itself and of the fact that the *probans* resides in the minor term. In the case of perception, to the contrary, our knowledge is at times of an imperfect or doubtful character. For, when we see a person at a long distance we cannot exactly say whether he is sitting or standing, whether he comes this way or goes further. It is only on closer observation that we are in a position to say what he is actually doing.

To come to the point, we have stated more than once that *sphoṭa* is cognised by mental perception ; and as in a perceptual knowledge, the object of cognition is said to be gradually revealed, it may be logically maintained that *sphoṭa* also is gradually manifested. But we can by no means maintain that the import is more and more clearly expressed with the perception of each one of the letters for the obvious reason that the apprehension of import is after all non-perceptual.¹

Moreover, *sphoṭa* is never revealed in its entirety by the individual letters themselves. It is revealed only when all the letters are successively pronounced and the meaning is expressed by the *sphoṭa* as revealed in its entirety. The objection of partial expression of meaning, therefore, cannot arise as imperfect manifestation of *sphoṭa* is never assumed to be possessed of the expressive power.

¹ arthaś ca śabdapratyayāvaseyaḥ sphoṭīmā tu pratyakṣavedanīya itī niravadyam. SS., p. 171.

ANOTHER MODE OF ANSWER TO KUMĀRILA'S OBJECTIONS

We have so long discussed one of the modes of answer which the grammarians make to the difficulties raised by Kumārila. But we shall do well to note that Kumārila has also been answered in a different way. Thus the grammarians opine that letters are nothing more than mere appearances and that *sphoṭa* is revealed by sound (*dhvani*) and not letters. Sound is said to be the breath-wind and as the breath-wind comes into contact with or strikes against the different vocal organs, it apparently assumes different forms which we call letters.¹ Jayanta, while stating the grammarians' viewpoint, says that the breath-wind by reason of its unsteady character seems to represent vowel and consonant sounds which have no metaphysical existence. Now, it may be a fair question to ask that there being in reality no such things as letters, how is it possible for sound to represent them? The answer to this anomaly has been given by the grammarians in the following way. They point out that a thing which is unreal may appear to be real through the medium of a distinguishing mark (*upādhi*).²

¹ *dhvaner udānasya vāgindriyābhighātino yaḥ pariṇatibhedo varṇātmā*. Com. on YSVB., p. 140.

² *Upādhi* is one of those marks that distinguishes an object from others. Logicians recognise three distinguishing marks, viz., *viśeṣaṇa*, *upādhi* and *upalakṣaṇa*. A *viśeṣaṇa* is one which is related to the substantive (*viśaya*) and is present in the substantive at the time when it distinguishes the same from others. For instance, in such expressions as '*vidyāvān puruṣaḥ*' (a learned man), *vidyā* (learning) is related to *puruṣa* (man) and the latter is in actual possession of *vidyā* when he is called *vidyāvān*. Hence *vidyā* is said to be a *viśeṣaṇa*. An *upādhi*, on the other hand, is only present in the substantive but not related to it. The sense-organ for auditory perception is defined as the portion of the sky which is determined by the outer part of the ear (*karṇasaṅskuli*). Here the ear cannot be related to the sky but, being present, distinguishes the particular sky from others (e.g. *ghaṭākāśa*, *paṭākāśa*). The well-known example of an *upādhi* in Indian Philosophy is the crimson *japā* flower (*Hibiscus Rosasinensis*) which contributes to the reddishness in the crystal beside it. (Cf. Vardhamāna's com. on NKu. III, p. 38, and Yogendranātha's com. on AS., Vol. II, p. 587, re "*pratipannopādhi*.") An *upalakṣaṇa*, however, is neither related to the substantive nor is required to be present in it. It distinguishes the substantive at a time when it is not present itself. A man, for instance, once went to the house on the top

A really lovely face reflected in a dirty mirror appears to be ugly ; a round object reflected in a sword, a gem or a mirror, assumes different shapes. The sound produced by a *vīṇā*, flute, drum or kettledrum seems to be different in nature.¹ Vācaspati asserts that the different attributes of letters [*i.e.*, of their being short or long, acute (*udātta*), grave (*anudātta*) or circumflex (*svarita*), nasal or non-nasal] are only imposed on them to serve our practical purposes. When we have, for instance, an “a” (short) attached to “n” as in “*nagaḥ*,” we mean a mountain ; but if it be an “ā” (long), the meaning changes and we understand an elephant.² Now, it is said that *sphoṭa* is revealed by the entire length of sound and not part by part. For instance, the *sphoṭa* underlying a particular word is revealed when the whole word is uttered and not letter by letter. So the objection of Kumārila does not at all affect the doctrine of *sphoṭa* as the conditions of revelation of *sphoṭa* are entirely different from those imagined by Kumārila.

of which there sat a crow. But when he is later on required to distinguish the same house from others, he does so by remembering the fact that he saw a crow on the top of that house. The crow is not present there at the time when he distinguishes the house. The VP. has the following observation on this point : *upādhiś ca kāryānavayī vyāvartako vartamānaś ca. viśeṣaṇaṁ ca kāryānavayī vyāvartakaṁ vartamānam.* VP., p. 97. And we may add : *upalakṣaṇaṁ ca kāryānavayī vyāvartakam avartamānaṁ ca.*

¹ *yathā kṛpāṇamanidarpaṇādīvyāñjakabhedena śyāmadīrghādi rūpaṁ vadanasya. nādātmake hi śabdo vīṇāveṇumṛdaṅgapāṭahādīvyāñjakabhedena nānātvam upagacchati.* NM., p. 370.

² *varṇāc ca samāropitadīrghatvādidharmabhājaḥ pāramārthikārthadhibhedopalambhāt, tatbā hi laukikā naga iti girim upadiśanti nāga iti hastinam.* TJ. p. 5.

2. *Śabara on Sphoṭa*

ŚABARA SURVEYS THE WHOLE PROBLEM

We have fully discussed Kumārila's position and let us propose to enter into a critical examination of Śabara's observations on this subject. Śabara has discussed the propriety of Upavarṣa's theory according to which word (*śabda*) means a number of letters and not *sphoṭa*.¹ Śabara apparently starts with a criticism of the theory of the great master but his real purpose is to bring out the implicit meaning and excellence of the said theory. At the outset, Śabara maintains that word cannot refer to letters on the ground that if it does so, we shall not be able to explain how the sense is expressed—is it expressed by the letters singly or conjointly? We have already discussed in a preceding chapter that either of the two alternatives is untenable. The first alternative cannot be accepted on the ground that the import is not obtained with the perception of any one of the letters. As for the other one, it may be said that letters being transient and not admitting of being pronounced simultaneously, cannot be said to form an aggregate. We have also seen that the supposition of individual recollections of the previously perceived letters at one and the same time enabling us to have the aggregate of letters required for, cannot be logically substantiated. Moreover, if the individual letters are said to be recollected in succession, we can never get hold of an aggregate of letters; because, recollection, too, like perception, is transient and dies out on the third moment.²

Having raised these difficulties for himself, Śabara passes on to set forth his own conclusions. Thus he opines that the continuous effects (*saṃskāra*)³ accruing from the perception of

¹ *atha gaur ity atra kaś śabdaḥ ? gākāraukāravisarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ.* ŚB., on MS I. i 5.

² *smṛter api kṣaṇikatvāt. Ibid.*

³ This *saṃskāra* should be clearly distinguished from *vāsanā* which is also so called. Cf. *mā bhūd eṣa jñānaprasavaḥ smaraṇanimittaṁ saṃskāraḥ, api tu yāgādikarmabhedopa-*

successive letters up to the final one, will never die but the whole of the past *effects* running concurrently with the perception of the successive letters will all live in the present perception of the final letter, together forming an aggregate giving expression to the idea of a word.¹ What Śabara states may be expressed in the following way.

The Mīmāṃsakas posit a metaphysical link called *samskāra* or *apūrva* between work and its result. All actions bear fruits either good or bad. Now, there is in a majority of cases an interval between the performance of an act and the result that it bears. And it cannot be maintained that an act performed this day is capable of effecting the result at a distant date. The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, posit that before passing away, the act gives rise to some unknown effect (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Jaimini assumes the existence of an unseen force which may be regarded as the imperceptible antecedent of the fruit or as the after-state of the act. It has been stated in the Vedas that a man who wishes to go to heaven is required to perform a sacrifice. But it is a well-known fact that the man does not repair to heaven as soon as he completes the prescribed sacrifice. Hence the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that with the performance of a sacrifice, an unseen force is born and does not die out before it produces the effect.

On this analogy Śabara opines that the perception of each letter will give rise to an effect (*samskāra*) which will last even when the final letter is perceived; and the final letter forming an aggregate with these individual effects is said to be expressive of sense.

ŚABARA'S EXPLANATION DOES NOT IMPROVE THE POSITION

But such an explanation does not improve the position in any way. For the popular notion is that the import is obtained directly from word (*śabda*) and not from the last letter

pādita iva svargādinimittam apūrvābhīdhanāḥ. SS., p. 86. Also: ko nu khalv ayaṁ saṁskāro 'bhīmata āyusmataḥ kiṁ smṛtibijam anyo vā prokṣaṇādibhya iva vṛhiyādeḥ. TB., p. 6.

¹ pūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyaka ity adoṣaḥ. ŚB., p. 46.

forming an aggregate with the effects (*saṁskāra*) resulting from the perception of the preceding letters. Moreover, such a procedure is not warranted by authoritative texts. Yāska himself says that a word ending in a verbal inflexion (*ākhyāta*)—such as “*pacati*,” “*gacchati*,” etc.—expresses an action (*bhāva*) that forms the meaning of the root.¹ Śabara boldly declares that he is not prepared to accept *sphoṭa* on the ground that popular notions cannot be justified. He makes no secret of the fact that popular notions are not always correct ; and it will be unwise on our part to posit an unwarranted entity like *sphoṭa* for the simple reason that we cannot justify an incorrect popular notion. But Śabara does not stop here. He goes a step further and openly declares that not only popular notions but even authoritative texts should not always be relied upon, if they fail to stand to reason.²

Śabara, in all probability, realises the far-reaching significance of his remark and so he turns round and explains his own point. He maintains that as letters cannot form an aggregate by themselves, he suggests that the last letter will form the same in conjunction with the effects (*saṁskāra*) which are but the after-state of the perception of the preceding letters. But he clearly points out that the causal relation between perception of letters and cognition of sense is not thereby destroyed. It may be legitimately argued that the causal relation, thus explained, becomes indirect. But Śabara points out that in all cases of causal relation, the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the cause intervenes between the cause and the effect. To come to the point, some operation is necessary in order that the effect may be produced ; and as *saṁskāra* is regarded as an operation of the preceding letter for purposes of the expression of meaning, the causal relation may fairly be called direct.³ Śabara, how-

¹ Nir. I. 1.

² na hi laukikavacanam anupapinnam ity etāvatā pratyakṣādibhir anavagamya māno 'rthas śaknoty upagantum....śāstrakāravacanam apy alam imam artham apramāṇakam upapādayitum. SB., p. 47.

³ svavyāpāravyavāyo 'pi sarvasminn eva kārake |

dr̥ṣṭo vyāpāra idṛk ca śabdasye 'ty avyapetātā || ŚV., śl. 125. Also ŚV., śl. 128, and : na hi svavyāpāravyavāyah kārakāṇāṁ kārakatām vihanṭi. SS., p. 90.

ever, frankly states that he is even prepared to view this causal relation as indirect (*gauna*), but he will never admit an entity which is not cognised through any one of the cognitive instruments (*pramāṇa*).¹

Sabara concludes his discussion on *sphoṭa* by asserting that the term "word" means letters and not *sphoṭa*. He also shows that an aggregate of letters is possible. And he finally seeks to point out that the grammarian's theory is based on two unwarranted assumptions.² In the first place, the grammarians have got to posit *sphoṭa* itself; and secondly, they must suppose that the impressions (*saṃskāra*) due to the perception of letters are competent to manifest *sphoṭa*.³ But the Mimāṃsakas do not posit any such spiritual entity as *sphoṭa*. They only assume that *saṃskāras* are capable of expressing the required sense.

A MISCONCEPTION CLEARED UP

Before we proceed to criticise Sabara's theory, we should strongly assert that the grammarians always describe *sphoṭa* as being directly perceived; it is never posited (*kalpya*) by them to account for the cognition of sense. It may be pointed out in this connexion that Jayanta while summing up the position that seeks to establish *sphoṭa*, says that *sphoṭa* may be cognised by inference (*anumāna*) or implication (*arthāpatti*); but this observation of Jayanta should be interpreted in the light of a rejoinder given by the grammarians to the views of the Naiyāyikas.⁴ For, as we have already observed, Jayanta himself has represented the grammarians' conception of *sphoṭa* by stating that *sphoṭa* is cognised through auditory perception.

¹ na gauṇas śabda mā bhūḍ iti pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno 'rthas śakyaḥ parikalpayitum. SB., p. 48.

² śabdakalpanāyām sē ca śabdakalpanā ca. Loc. cit.

³ pūrvanādhītasamśkārasahitāntīmanādhābhivyāngyas sphoṭa iti avāśyam aṅgikartavyam iti tulyā saṃskāra-kalpanā. Ś Dip., p. 96.

⁴ api ca tārīkākāṇām anumānapriyatvāt tatparitoṣāye 'dam anumānam abhyadhāyi na paramārthataḥ. NM., p. 371.

CRITICISM OF ŚABARA

Let us now examine the merits or otherwise of Śabara's theory. The grammarians point out that Śabara admits a number of unseen forces (*apūrva*) accruing from the perceptions of letters; yet he is unwilling to admit that it is *sphoṭa* which is endowed with the power of expressing sense. Vācaspati humorously puts it that he fails to understand why Śabara is so very hostile to the grammarians that he is even prepared to posit a number of unseen forces rather than acknowledge *sphoṭa*.¹

We, however, propose to criticise Śabara's theory from a different standpoint. According to Śabara, the final letter forming an aggregate with the perceptive effects (*saṃskāra*) is expressive of sense. Now it is admitted on all hands that a perceptive effect is never perceived but is inferred from the result (*kāryānumānaikagamyā*). That being so, it is not possible for us to know that the perception of each one of the letters gives birth to an effect (*saṃskāra*) unless the sense is cognised. Hence Śabara's statement involves the fallacy of interdependence. Again we have said before that in the case of non-perceptual knowledge the causes are required to be known prior to our obtaining the knowledge; and verbal knowledge being non-perceptual, it is only necessary that the knowledge of the final letter forming an aggregate with the effects (*saṃskāra*) should be present before we expect to obtain the cognition of sense. Now the knowledge of the last letter forming an aggregate with the effects, being a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*), it is also necessary that we should be possessed of the knowledge of the effects (*saṃskāra*), that is the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) in this case, before we expect to obtain the knowledge of the last letter—that is, the substantive (*viśeṣya* or *dharmin*), forming an aggregate with the effects (*saṃskāra*).²

¹ aho vatā 'sya svapakṣadrṣṭipakṣāpātaḥ yad bahutarādrṣṭasambhārakalpanākṛteṣāṃ api na cetayate. TB., p. 6.

² The *raison d'être* is this: The knowledge of the attribute is required prior to the knowledge of the qualified. (Of. *viśiṣṭabuddhau viśeṣaṇajñānasya kāraṇatvāt*. SM. under BP. kār. 58).

Hence to say that the final letter forming an aggregate with the effects (*samskāra*) resulting from the perception of the preceding letters, causes the cognition of sense is logically unsound.¹

3. *Jayantabhaṭṭa on Sphoṭa*

OBJECTIONS RAISED BY JAYANTA

We have discussed the views of Kumārila and Śabara on the theory of *sphoṭa*. And now it remains for us to examine the merits of the criticism put forth by Jayanta. We have stated before that *sphoṭa* is more and more clearly manifested with the perception of each one of the succeeding letters ; and we have cited the well-known illustration of a piece of gem in this connexion. Jayanta, however, observes that the analogy does not hold good. Thus he says that *sphoṭa* being an indivisible entity, it is hardly reasonable to opine that some of its parts will be manifested with the perception of the first letter, while others with that of the second and so on until all its parts are completely revealed with the perception of the final letter. In the case of a piece of gem, however, we are justified in maintaining that some of its parts are cognised at first sight, others at a second glance and the rest gradually. There is every chance that some parts will escape our notice at the first or second observation and our knowledge of the thing may be perfect at the fifth or sixth time. But it is certainly absurd to say that a thing which does not admit of any division into parts will be gradually manifested.²

THE GRAMMARIANS' STANDPOINT FULLY EXPLAINED

The objection of Jayanta seems to be unanswerable and in fact it has not been so much as anticipated by Maṇḍana and

¹ na cā 'ntyavarṇamātrasya puras sambandhavedanam |
akṣavartmātivṛttatvāt saṃskārasya na tadvataḥ || SS., śl. 13.

² yat punar avādi prathamavarṇabuddhivelāyām iva vyaktāṃ sphoṭatattvam uttarottarabuddhibhir atīṣayitatarapratyayatām niyate ratnatattvavad iti sa eva viśama upanyāsaḥ. ratnasya hi sāyavatvāt prathamapratyaya viśayikṛtasūksmatarāyavayaviśeṣāgrāhṇām uttarottarapratyayānām asti tatrā 'vakāśaḥ. sphoṭas tu varṇasvarūpavad anaiśa iti tat-svarūpam ādyenaī 'va varṇena vyaktāṃ kim idānīm anye varṇā kariṣyanti. NM., p. 378.

other previous writers. But we meet this difficulty exactly along the lines that have been followed by the Vedāntists. The *Brahman* is the only reality according to *Vedānta* and the *Brahman* being absolute consciousness, is self-revealing and so does not require the help of a medium to reveal its existence. The medium, on the other hand, covers and veils its existence and the help of the cognitive instruments is required to remove this veil of matter or ignorance. *Sphoṭa* is also *Śabdabrahman*—the Ultimate Reality and *prius* of the manifested world—and in itself is absolutely destitute of all distinctions. The *Śabdabrahman* is the homogeneous, undivided, uniform existence and its apparent divisions are due to *avidyā*, which are rather superimposed on it. Bhartrhari is never tired of emphasising the impartite differenceless character of *Śabdabrahman*, which is the only reality behind this stupendous appearance—the magnificent show—the colossal hoax—which the phenomenal world is. The divisions, therefore, are absolutely illusory. But, though illusory, they are none the less felt by us who are in the grip of ignorance and so from the standpoint of finite ignorant subjects, the divisions, though they have no ultimate reality and are only false appearances, are believed to be real divisions. It does not, therefore, lie in us to question the empirical validity of these distinctions and so *Sphoṭa* has got to be revealed part by part as the medium of revelation is so constituted. The light of the sun covers the whole expanse of the world—it is only the barriers of the world that shut it off and divide it into compartments. *Sphoṭa* is self-revealing in itself but that does not avail in the least to those who are separated by barriers from its light and illumination. The barriers may be the creation of our ignorance but they are there none the less and as such cannot be overcome except by the transcendental knowledge of the Ultimate Reality which is the highest consummation to be achieved, but not yet a realised experience with our finite intelligence. So, for our knowledge, *Sphoṭa* has of a necessity to be revealed through vocal sounds just as the Absolute

Spirit, the *Brahman* has got to be realised in and through the cognitive instruments—the windows of the psychophysical organism through which the light comes from the Absolute. *Sphoṭa* is to be realised by us through the medium of sounds which are successively and gradually revealed to us and, so *Sphoṭa*, whose revelation is bound up with the revelation of sounds, is perforce revealed to us bit by bit—in small doses. The objection, therefore, raised by Jayanta¹ and later on by Appayadikṣita in his super-commentary, the *Kalpataruparimala*,² is only a specious difficulty. It seeks to confuse the metaphysical with the psychological issues. That *Sphoṭa* is divisionless is a metaphysical truth, which is logically established and never endorsed by experience. Our experience is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by *avidyā* and it is owing to these limitations that *Sphoṭa* is revealed to us only in small doses and never in its plenary form—in its real essence and magnitude. The difficulties of the psychical apparatus should not be transferred to the Ultimate Reality. The difficulty as pointed out in the objection, therefore, is only the result of confusion of metaphysical and psychical issues which should be carefully kept apart and is thus more apparent than real.

To sum up : we may point out that *sphoṭa* is manifested with the perception of the first letter ; but the perceptions of the succeeding letters are not futile on that account. For, in the case of words beginning with the same letter (e.g., “*kara*” and “*kula*”) it is the perception of the second letter and the following (e.g., “*a*”, “*r*” and “*a*” in the case of “*kara*” while “*u*”, “*l*” and “*a*” in the case of “*kula*”) that

¹ We may note here that the objection which Jayanta has raised, has suggested itself to him from an observation of Kumārila. Kumārila says that letters are indivisible units and as such they will be either clearly and completely cognised or not cognised at all—the question of partial cognition cannot arise in the case of indivisible entities. Arguing on this line, Jayanta advances his objection to the gradual revelation of *sphoṭa*, which the grammarians describe as being indivisible. (Cf. ŚV., śl. 10.)

² *ratnatattvadrṣṭānto*’ pi ayuktaḥ ;....., tadvad atra sphoṭe, pūrvapūrvābhivyaktya- viśayānām abhivyaktiṣayānāṁ ca viśeṣānām abhāvāc ca. VKP., p. 331.

enables us to know that the *sphoṭa* manifested by the first letter in the one is not the same *sphoṭa* manifested by the first letter in the other (though the first letter in either of the two words is the same). Thus when we say that with the perception of the second and the following letters *sphoṭa* is more and more clearly manifested, we mean that the perception of the second and the following letters enable us to distinguish the *sphoṭa* manifested by the first letter in a particular word from the *sphoṭa* manifested by the first letter in another.¹

MANIFESTATION OF SPHOṬA CLEARLY EXPLAINED

Let us speak a few more words on the manifestation of *sphoṭa* through the medium of letters. The letters in succession may be looked upon as a series which is the self-representation of *sphoṭa* itself. We have the characteristic of each member of the series in this that it represents the *whole*. The *whole* belongs to eternity, but yet posits itself in distinctions which are superseded in its comprehension of them. The *whole* is present in every *part* of it and every *part* of it implies the *whole* (*sphoṭa*).² The element of exclusion by which one phase is distinguished from another is a real phase, yet it is not all. It is a phase whose nature is to be forthwith put *past* and *taken up* into a higher comprehension. The *part* must be there as taken up and preserved in a more complete comprehension. The endless aspect of the series is in contradiction with the fact of its limit and, therefore, a higher standpoint for the purpose of which the lower is inadequate but necessary for the solution of the contradiction and the comprehension of the *whole*, must be taken into consideration. *Sphoṭa* includes these distinct letters which go to make up the series to preserve them, not as a mere series but in a higher conception in which they are comprehended

¹ Vide VB. on YS. III. 17. Also Vācaspati's com. thereunder.

² yady api kāryātmanā udricyate tathā 'pi yat svarūpaṁ pūrṇatvaṁ paramātmabhāvaṁ tan na jahāti. BB., p. 729.

in the eternity in which the series is summed up. Every letter is but an aspect in its own self. It comprehends its *unity* with the *differences* in this that the *differences* turn out to fall within *itself* and to form *one whole* with *itself*—the *totality* which embraces them.

We have here a succession of letters which is a great deal more than a succession of isolated units unconnected with one another. The meaning of each arises from its *relation* to the *whole* of the conception and the *whole* is present in every *part* of it. This is because each member of the series is something else than a mere isolated unit. The whole series may be viewed as given in its entirety in the *whole* (*sphoṭa*); and, consequently, as implicit in each member of the series. In the relation of each member to the others, we have got the law of the *whole* that enables us to sum it up; and in that way we have got the series in which it can be viewed as given in its entirety, in its law and implicitly given in its entirety in every member of the series. Thus we are capable of comprehending the *totality* of the series for in each stage it comprehends the series as a *whole*. It is only on the basis of this eternity and within it that *change* has any meaning. Each phase alike, therefore, is what it is but also—implicitly—something *other than* what it is. It is, therefore, *self-transcendent* containing within itself necessary conditions of all else which is *to be*.

The *parts* are only the barriers through which the *whole* has got to reveal itself to finite minds. In its transcendental self-existence, the *parts* are simply *non est* and the *whole* reveals itself in its infinite simplicity. But in the empirical plane the Absolute is perforce manifested only in a peacemeal fashion and thus though we are never permitted to have a face to face acquaintance with the infinite truth, we are not, nevertheless, entirely divorced from it.¹ The *whole* is present as the *whole*

¹ atyantaviviktayor dharmadharminor mithyājñānanimittas satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya aham idaṁ mama 'daṁ iti naisargiko 'yam lokavyavahārah. Śār Bh., pp. 17-18.

in *parts*, only its manifestation is partial due to the distorting medium through which the infinite is perpetually presented to us.

JAYANTA CRITICISES THE THEORY THAT SPHOṬA IS MANIFESTED
BY SOUND, AND OUR REPLY

Jayanta has further pointed out that the theory of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* through the medium of sound is also untenable. For he asserts that if sound were capable of manifesting *sphoṭa*, there would have been no difficulty on our part to understand the import of a word even when it is uttered so quickly that the constituent letters are not distinctly heard.

We, however, do not appreciate this part of Jayanta's criticism. For, to suit our practical purposes alone, sound has been divided into two categories, according as it does or does not manifest *sphoṭa* which is expressive of sense. To the *yogin*, however, each sound serves to manifest *sphoṭa* and so he reads a meaning in every form of it. Thus the moaning of the wind, the murmuring of the rivulet, the clattering of weapons, the pattering of rains, the roaring of the lion and the hissing of the snake—all have a meaning to the *yogin* who has concentrated his mind on word, sense and cognition and to whom the ultimate transcendental vision is perpetually a given fact.¹ But, to an ordinary man these sounds are entirely meaningless. Now, if an ordinary man says on that account that *sphoṭa* is not manifested by the murmur of the rivulet and that no meaning is expressed thereby, we can do nothing else but to request him to enter into the *sādhana* of *śabdātattva* as described in the *Yoga* system of Hindu philosophy. To come to the point, the word which is quickly uttered and the constituent letters of which are not clearly perceived, may not convey sense to those of us who are void of finer sensibilities ; but that does not mean that it is quite impossible to obtain the import in such a case. Individual

¹ YS. III, 17.

incapacity to understand a thing cannot be held as an evidence for its non-existence.

JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF THE GRAMMARIANS' CONCEPTION OF
LETTERS, AND OUR CRITICISM

Jayanta has also insisted that it is not proper to say that letters have no metaphysical existence of their own.

In our reply to this point we should like to say this that the grammarians have taken recourse to various artifices to enable the beginner to gain an insight into the nature of *śabdatattva* and they themselves declare that these artifices have no value of their own—they are but means to an end. It will be only transgressing the limits and encroaching on the exclusive province of the grammarians if we do not agree with them in determining the worth of these artifices which are but creations of their ingenious brain.

CHAPTER V

CLASSIFICATION OF SPHOTA

1. Introduction

Nāgēsabhaṭṭa in his *Paramalaghumañjūsā*, enumerates no less than eight varieties of *sphoṭa*—*varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa*, *vākyasphoṭa*, *varṇajātisphoṭa*, *padajātisphoṭa*, *vākyajātisphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*.¹ It should be noted, however, that of all these eightfold divisions it is *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* which alone represents *sphoṭa*, the other seven being creations of an ingenious brain for the purpose of enabling the student to comprehend the nature of the first. That these seven classifications have been mentioned and described with this end in view, is clearly discernible from Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa's illuminating observation on this point. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa says that though the seven divisions have no real value of their own, they still carry some practical utility. He points out that in the Advaita system of Vedānta philosophy, the Absolute Brahman has been, first of all, identified with the *annamayakośa* and then successively with the *prāṇamayakośa*, the *manomayakośa*, the *vijñānamayakośa* and the *ānandamayakośa*; but on each occasion it is pointed out precisely and in clear terms that the Absolute Brahman is something different from the one with which it is identified. We thus find that when the student fully grasps the conception of the *annamayakośa*, he is told that the Absolute Brahman is not the *annamayakośa* but something else. Then when he acquaints himself with a thorough conception of the *prāṇamayakośa*, he is told again that the Absolute Brahman is not the same thing as the *prāṇamayakośa* and the process continues, till the student is able to form a definite idea about the real nature of the

tatra varṇapadavākyabhedena sphoṭas tridhā. tatrā 'pi jātivyaktibhedena punaḥ ṣoḍhā. khaṇḍapadasphoṭo' khaṇḍavākyasphoṭas ce 'ti saṅkalanayā 'ṣṭau sphoṭāḥ.' PLM., p. 1.

Absolute Brahman.¹ We may also take up another illustration. The young bride who is to see the *arundhatī* (a star in the constellation of the Pleiades), is asked to fix her gaze upon the bigger star *vaśiṣṭha* (another star in the same constellation) and after she has done so, she finds the smaller star *arundhatī* twinkling by its side. So it is said that the identification of the five *kośas* with the Absolute Brahman and fixing one's gaze upon the *vaśiṣṭha* are but means to determine the real nature of the Absolute Brahman and the location of the *arundhatī* respectively. Similarly, it is maintained by the grammarians that the seven divisions of *sphoṭa*, mentioned above, enable the beginner to know the nature of the *akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa*.

2. Conception of *Varṇasphoṭa*

With this brief introduction, we pass on to discuss the nature of *varṇasphoṭa*. At the outset, it is necessary to point out that by *varṇasphoṭa* it is not meant that each and every letter is regarded as *sphoṭa* but the letter or letters constituting either a stem or a suffix is regarded as such. The term *sphoṭa* is derived from the $\sqrt{\text{sphuṭ}}$ and it is defined in two ways. In the first place, *sphoṭa* is defined as an entity which is manifested by letters. Secondly, it is an entity from which the sense emanates.² According to the second definition we may state that when stems and suffixes are found to be expressive of sense, they should be regarded as *vācaka* (denotative of sense) or *sphoṭa*.

But the problem that arises in this connexion may be expressed in the following way. So far as the question of the stem

¹ yathā 'nandavalyāṁ śuddhabrahmajñānārthaṁ annamayaprāṇamayamanomaya-vijñānamayānandamaye 'ti pañcasu kośeṣu apāramārthikabrahmatvapratipādanam upāyaḥ. SC., p. 1.

² ata eva sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇais sphoṭo varṇābhivyāṅgyas sphuṭati sphuṭibhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭo' rthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārtham ubhayathā nirāha. SDS., p. 112.

is concerned, there is hardly any difficulty in calling it *sphoṭa*. But there is a difference of opinion in the matter of the suffix as the latter means either the *sthānin* or the *ādeśa*.¹ The grammarians maintain that in such words as *pacati*, *rāmaḥ*, etc., the *ādeśas*—“*-ti*” and “*-h*,” are expressive of sense and not the *sthānins*—“*-la*” and “*-su*.” The Pāṇ Sū. III. iv. 77, is regarded as an *adhikāra*² or governing rule and “*-tip*”, “*-tas*”, “*-jhis*”, etc., are all *ādeśas* in the place of “*-la*.” And it is contended by the grammarians that the “*-su*” having changed into “*-h*” (as in the case of *rāma-surāmaḥ*), it is the latter which is regarded as the real *vācaka*.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, strongly maintain that it is the *sthānin* and not the *ādeśa* that is endowed with the expressive power. They criticise the view of the grammarians by pointing out that it is certainly more reasonable and economical to hold that the *sthānin* is really expressive of sense on the ground that there is no limit to the number of *ādeśas* while the *sthānin* is more or less of a fixed character. Besides, in such cases where the suffix elides, the difficulty arises on the ground that we have to admit that a thing which is in its nature an *abhāva* (non-existence) is possessed of the power of expressing sense. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas point out that *ādeśas* are not a fixed character and, each being different from the other, it is not possible for us to determine their nature. But if it be maintained that the fact that they all agree in being “*-la*,” enables us to get hold of a common attribute which will serve to determine their nature, the Naiyāyikas aver that it is in that case reasonable to accept that “*-la*” alone is expres-

¹ Grammatically, a *sthānin* is one which is not actually used in a place where it has every right to be used (cf. *prasakto'pi aprayujyamānaḥ*). For instance, when *dadhi-ātra* yields *dadhy ātra* according to the rules of assimilation, it is said that the last letter in *dadhi* (i. e., “*i*”) is the *sthānin* whereas the “*y*” which replaces it, is called the *ādeśa*.

² An *adhikāra sūtra* is a governing rule which exerts a directing influence over other rules. For instance, Pāṇ Sū. VIII. i. 1 is an *adhikāra sūtra* for it has a governing influence over the *sūtras* VIII. i. 2-10. This governing influence is of three kinds—(i) *gaṅgāpravāha*, (ii) *siṃhavalokita* and (iii) *maṇḍūkapluti*.

³ Elision means absence : cf. *adarśanam lopaśabdārtam āha*. Cf. Pāṇ Sū., I. i. 60.

sive of sense. In addition to the arguments mentioned above, the Naiyāyikas point out that in such *sūtras* as Pāṇ. Sū. III. iv. 69, the reference invariably is to the *sthānin* and not the *ādeśa* and further that no authoritative text can be cited to prove that the *ādeśa* is expressive of import.

The grammarians, however, make a most fitting reply to all the charges levelled against them by the Naiyāyikas. According to Patañjali, word is one which is endowed with the expressive power. It is, therefore, argued that a man who has even little or no knowledge of “-la,” does yet understand the meaning of such expressions as *pacati*, *gacchati* and the like. Hence what is actually used in language should be regarded as *vācaka* and not what is necessary only for grammatical operations. The Naiyāyikas, however, assert that it is through mistake that the *ādeśa* is regarded as the *vācaka*. But the grammarians enquire about the causes of this error. It is admitted on all hands that in all cases of error, the object must contradict our mistaken cognition of it. When we take a rope for a snake or a mother-o’-pearl for a piece of silver, our knowledge of the snake or the piece of silver is contradicted by the rope or the mother-o’-pearl. But in the case of a valid knowledge, there is no scope for such a contradiction. To come to the point, we see nothing which may go to contradict our observation that it is the *ādeśa* which is really expressive of sense. As to the charge that *ādeśas* being numerous, it is not desirable to maintain that they are denotative of sense, it is replied that the *sthānins*, too, are none the less numerous and hence the grammarians see no reason why the *ādeśa* should not be regarded as the denoter. Then again, there is hardly any truth in the statement that the *sthānin* is fixed while the *ādeśa* varies. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa comments that different grammarians have wilfully accepted different *sthānins*.¹ The serious objection

¹ *ādeśinām api tattadvaiyākaraṇais svecchayā bhinnānām abhyupagamāt.* VBS., pp. 418-19.

to the Naiyāyika theory is that it involves unnecessary cum-
brousness (*gaurava*). According to the Naiyāyikas, the *sthānin*
by itself cannot be regarded as *vācaka*, for it is replaced by the
ādeśa on each occasion and is not therefore present. Hence
the Naiyāyikas have got to admit that the *sthānin* recollected by
the *ādeśa* expresses sense. And this involves unnecessary cum-
brousness. The Naiyāyikas, as we have already said, claimed the
credit of economy ; but the manner in which they expound their
theory makes them liable to the charge same as they themselves
charge against.¹ Koṇḍabhaṭṭa again says that of all those that
determine the denotation of words, usage (*vyavahāra*) is deemed to
be the most important (*śaktigrāhakaśiromaṇi*). That being so,
the *ādeśa* which is actually found to be used in language, should
in the fitness of things be possessed of the power of denotation.
The grammarians again raise a very interesting point. They
point out that the Naiyāyikas believe that it is the “-*la*” which
is endowed with the power of denotation and so, they put the
following question : had “-*la*” been really capable of expressing
the sense it would have been only natural to expect that even at
the stage of grammatical operations (*e.g.*, when we have the form
bhū-la, the “-*la*” not yet replaced by any one of the *ādeśas*), there
would have been no bar to the sense being expressed. But it is
admitted on all hands that we do not understand the meaning at
that stage. To obviate the difficulty the Naiyāyikas point out that
the meaning cannot be expressed until we have some particular
order of letters. In the circumstances the grammarians aver that
the position of the Naiyāyikas is somewhat curious ; for after
positing that it is the “-*la*” which alone is expressive of sense,
they have further got to admit that the particular order must also
be regarded as the cause of denotation. The grammarians, on the
contrary, point out to their advantage that it is the particular order
of letters that is endowed with the power of expressing import.

¹ *evaṃ ca sthāny eva vācako lāghavāt na tvā'deśo gauravād iti tārīkīkṣitam apāstam.*
SC., p. 1.

But, even then, the grammarians cannot cross the zone of controversy. The problem they are yet to solve, may be stated in the following lines. From what has been already said, it is not clear that letters in some particular order (comprising of the stem and the suffix as used in language) will be expressive of sense. On the contrary, it seems that the particular order of letters is endowed with the power of denotation. Kōṇḍabhaṭṭa does not answer the question. Harivallabha, however, takes note of the fact and sets forth a really cogent answer. He says that if the particular order of letters be regarded as expressive of sense, the determining factor of *vācakatva* (expressiveness of sense) will be so many letters; but if the letters (building up the stem and the suffix) in some order be regarded as *vācaka*, it is one *ānupūrvī* (order of letters) that will determine *vācakatva*;¹ so there is every justification for discarding the Naiyāyika theory which involves unnecessary cumbrousness. The grammarians further point out that the Naiyāyika theory is open to another inconsistency. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the *kṛt* suffixes express the sense of the nominative while *tiṅ* suffixes are expressive of *bhāvanā*.² But

¹ vastutastu samabhihyābhārasya vācakatve tadghaṭakanānāvārṇānām avacchedakā-tāyān gauravam. varṇānām vācakatve tu uktānupūrvyā ekasyā eva tattvam iti lāghavasyai'va vinigamakātvam iti bodhyam. VBSD., p. 421.

² The *Nirukta* defines a verb (*ākhyāta*) as one in which the operation (*bhāva*) is prominent. The term "prominent" requires elucidation. It has been laid down that in the case of verbal knowledge, the operation must appear as the substantive and never as an attribute. And this is the significance of the term "prominent." According to the grammarians, the operation is called *bhāvanā*. Thus, for instance, the *bhāvanā* in the case of *pacati* refers to the following operations:—applying heat to the pot, placing the pot on the furnace and the like. According to the Naiyāyikas, however, the term means the exertion (*kṛti* or *prayatna*) which is instrumental in bringing about the operation. The difference between the two views is that *bhāvanā*, according to the grammarians, means the operation which is caused by the exertion while the Naiyāyikas regard the exertion itself as the *bhāvanā*. In the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, this exertion is denoted by the *tiṅ* suffixes while the sense of the nominative is denoted by the *kṛt* suffixes.

The Mīmāṃsakas define *bhāvanā* as the operation on the part of the causer (*prayojaka-kartṛ*) which serves to help the one to be produced (i.e., the exertion of the doer) in the matter of its production. (*bhāvanā nāma bhavitur bhavanānukūlabhāvavakavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ*. NP., p. 2). And this *bhāvanā* has been divided into *sābdī* and *ārthī*, according as it pertains

this distinction cannot be logically maintained if “-la” alone be regarded as the denoter. On the other hand, granting that the *ādeśa* is expressive of sense, we can boldly assert that when the *ādeśa* is a *liṅ*, it denotes *bhāvanā* and when it is a *kṛt*, it expresses the sense of the nominative. Thus we establish the grammarians’ theory of *varṇasphoṭa* according to which the stem and the suffix (we mean the *ādeśa* and not the *sthānin*) are denotative of sense.

We have already stated that Indian grammarians started with the physical analysis of words and sentences and gradually proceeded to grasp the remotest form of speech which is known to be *sphoṭa* or *śabdātattva*. And it is a fact that in the case of all philosophical discussions, we start with the most concrete and arrive at the most abstract. The Absolute Brahman, for instance, is identified in the first place with the *annamayakośa* which forms the most concrete portion in human bodies;¹ next it is identified with the less concrete--the *prāṇamayakośa* and so on. Similarly, in our study of *sphoṭa*, we discuss *varṇasphoṭa* in the beginning and next propose to examine the nature of *padasphoṭa*.

to the word-element and the sense-element respectively. The former has been defined as the operation of the *causer* which causes the exertion of the performer of sacrifices. The verb comprises the root and the suffix. The latter is marked by two attributes:—(i) that it is an *ākhyāta* (verb) and (ii) that it is a *liṅ*. (N. B.—We are dealing here with Vedic injunctions.) Now in the Vedas, it is from the use of the *liṅ* that we know that such and such actions are enjoined to be performed. Hence it is the *liṅ* that serves to express the *bhāvanā* which is known to be *śābdī* pertaining as it does to the form of *liṅ*. It has been maintained that *śābdī bhāvanā* cannot be complete unless the following three things are known:—what is to be produced by the operation (*śābdī bhāvanā*), how and by whom. It is asserted that the *ākhyāta* element in the suffix answers to the first part by saying that the exertion of the doer is produced by the operation on the part of the causer. And this exertion of the doer is said to be *ārthī bhāvanā*. We may observe that the *bhāvanā* as conceived by the Naiyāyikas, resembles the *ārthī bhāvanā* of the Mīmāṃsakas. It may be discussed here that Laṅkāśībhāṣakara in his *Arthasaṃgraha* has put the term *vyāpāra* in the definition of *ārthī bhāvanā*; but it has been clearly stated in the *Kaumudī* that this term *vyāpāra* means exertion (*prayatna*)—vide A Sam.,—pp. 22-39. In the end, we like to point out that the term *bhāvanā* has been used by the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsakas; the Prābhākara school has used the term *nigoga* in its place.

¹ *śuddhabrahmajñānāya sarvabahirbhūtānnamayakośavad akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭabodhanāya varṇasphoṭaḥ*. SC., p. 5.

GPT

3. Conception of Padasphoṭa

In our discussion of *varṇasphoṭa*, we have observed that letters in some particular order are expressive of sense. That being an established fact, we may be justified in positing that word which is generally viewed as a combination of letters, is also denotative of sense.¹ It is argued by the advocates of *padasphoṭa* that we do not actually remember the sense as each letter is perceived. On the contrary, we understand the sense of the word as a whole—the word *ghaṭa* (jar) in its entirety expresses the required sense and it is never a fact that each one of the four letters (*gh*, *a*, *ṭ*, *a*) constituting the said word is expressive of a fraction of the entire sense. Besides, a letter cannot be supposed to express a portion of the sense on the ground that the same by reason of its being endowed with the power of denotation, will be regarded as a *prātipadika*² and as such the “*n*” in *dhanam*, *vanam*, etc., will drop. (Cf. Pāṇ. Sū. VIII. ii. 7.) In addition to the arguments advanced above, it is said that a letter can never be regarded as a denoter or *vācaka*; for, had the letter been possessed of the denotative power, the letter “*a*” in *rāmaḥ* would have expressed its sense even if it were uttered a few minutes after the first three letters—*r*, *ā* and *m*—have been pronounced. Hence we find that the question of sequence arises when we are asked to explain how the sense is expressed. And when letters in some sequence are said to constitute a word, it is reasonable to believe that word is endowed with the power of expressing import. Having thus established *padasphoṭa*, the grammarians enter into a more technical study of the subject. According to the grammarians, a word (*pada*) is one which ends in a declension (*sup*) or a verbal inflexion (*tiñ*).³ In our

¹ athā' deśā vācakāś cet padasphoṭas tataḥ punaḥ | VBS., śl. 64.

² The term *prātipadika* technically means a word or a letter which is neither a root nor a suffix but carries some sense. (Cf. Pāṇ. Sū. I. ii. 45). Moreover, a *prātipadika* is one which is formed by the addition of the *kṛt* or the *taddhita* suffix or is a compound word (cf. *op. cit.*, I. ii. 46).

³ Pāṇ. Sū. I. iv. 14.

discussion of *varnāspṛṣṭa*, we have pointed out that both the stem and the suffix are expressive of sense. But if we carefully examine the above statement, certain difficulties are sure to crop up. In such forms as *ghaṭena* (the instrumental singular of *ghaṭa*) it is very difficult to say which portion of the term is the stem and which again is the suffix. An ordinary man of the street who is acquainted with the meaning of the term very accurately, will not be in a position to distinguish the stem from the suffix, in this particular case. Even a man who has made an extensive study of Sanskrit grammar, will find some difficulty in ascertaining whether the “-na” or the “-ina” is the suffix in the form *ghaṭena*, unless he accurately remembers the views of Patañjali on this point. The *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇ. Sū. VII. i. 12 rejects the portion “*ināt*” from the *sūtra* and strongly asserts that the “-na” and “-at” are the respective *ādeśas* in places of “-tā” (instrumental singular) and “-nas” (ablative singular). In his commentary on Pāṇ. Sū. VII. ii. 101, Haradatta asserts that the forms *nirjarasina* and *nirjarasāt* are also available. And in order to strengthen his position he opines that as the word *nirjara* ends in “a,” the suffixes “-tā” and “-nas” will change into “-ina” and “-at” and he effects this with the help of the well-known dictum—*vipratīṣedhe param kāryam* (Pāṇ. Sū. I. iv. 2).¹ But even then he is to get rid of another difficulty. The injunction—*sannipāṭalakṣaṇavidhir animittam tadvighātasya* (*Paribhāṣā*

¹ When two rules of equal strength can be applied for the same purpose, the one which occurs later in order of *sūtras* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* will be given preference. Cf. *yatra dvan prasaṅgāv anyārthāv ekasmin yugapat prāpntas sa tulyabalavirodho vipratīṣedhaḥ*—Kāś., p. 61. To illustrate, *manas-rathaḥ* changes into *manaru-rathaḥ* according to Pāṇ. Sū. VIII. ii. 66. Then, both the *sūtras* VIII. iii. 14. and VI. i. 114 may be applied in the present case. And had it not been for the fact that the *sūtra* VIII. iii. 14 is *asiddha*, the elision sanctioned by the same would have happened by the above dictum. But the term *param* in the dictum has been differently interpreted by Patañjali. Patañjali says that the term *param* also means “desired”; and he refers to such expressions as “*param dhāma gataḥ*” where the said term is used in the above sense. Kaiyaṭa says that what is desired and what is not so, should be understood in the light of the explanations of the authorities (specially Patañjali) on the subject under consideration; *iṣṭāniṣṭāvibhāgaś ca vyākhyānād bodhyaḥ*, MB., Vol. II, p. 207. In the context, Haradatta has followed the second explanation of the term.

LXXXV.—PSS),¹ does not sanction the substitution of *nirjaras* for *nirjara*. And, therefore, Haradatta assumes that the said injunction does not function here and the forms—*nirjarasina* and *nirjarasāt*—are available. Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita in his *Siddhānta-kaumudī* raises a note of objection against the aforesaid statement of Haradatta. He openly declares that not only the two forms mentioned above are wrong but the forms *nirjarasaiḥ* and *nirjarasya* (in the instrumental plural and the genitive singular respectively) are also equally incorrect for the obvious reason that all of them are not sanctioned by Patañjali.² Patañjali has openly rejected the two *ādeśas* “-ina” and “-āt” and has inserted “-na” and “-at” in their places. He has taken recourse to the principle of *yogavibhāga*³ in the Pāṇ. Sū. VII. iii.

¹ Kielhorn translates the injunction thus : What is taught in a rule the application of which is occasioned by the combination of two things, does not become the cause of the destruction of that combination.

It has been argued on the strength of this injunction that the “a” in *rāma* should not have been lengthened in the case of *rāmāya*, the dative singular of *rāma*. For, here, the substitute “-ya” in the place of “-ne” ought not to have caused the application of the Pāṇ. Sū. VII. iii. 102 on the ground that “-ya” owes its substitution to the combination of the base *rāma* ending in short “a” with the termination “-ne”; for, otherwise, the latter by destroying the final “a” of *rāma* destroys that combination. The solution of the difficulty thus involved herein, is found when we see that Pāṇini himself has used such expressions as *kaṣṭhāya* (cf. Pāṇ. Sū. III. i. 18).

² *vṛttikṛtā tu pūrvavipratīṣedhena inātoḥ kṛtayoḥ sannipātaparibhāṣāyā anityatvam āśṛitya jarasi kṛte nirjarasina nirjarasād iti rūpe na tu nirjarasā nirjarasa iti kecid ity uktam. tathā hi bhisi nirjarasair iti rūpāntaram uktam. tadanusāribhiś ca saṣṭhyekavacane nirjara-sye'ty eva rūpaṁ svikṛtam. etac ca bhāṣyaviruddham.* S. Kau., pp. 51-52. Also the T. Bod under it.

³ Patañjali resorted to the principle of *yogavibhāga* which consists in splitting up the rules of Pāṇini into two parts—the first part being prescriptive and the second merely illustrative. For instance, the *sūtra*—*dvitīyā śrītātītapatitagaṭātīyastapṛāptāpannaiḥ* (Pāṇ. Sū. II i. 24).—is divided into *dvitīyā*, meaning any word ending in *dvitīyā* (accusative) may be compounded with another word provided each one of the two is fit (*samartha*) for being compounded, and “*śrītātītapatitagaṭātīyastapṛāptāpannaiḥ*” meaning that words in the accusative are compounded with such words as *śṛita*, *alīta*, etc. Only thus we can explain such forms as *arīhalipsu* and others. But for this *yogavibhāga*, the writing of the best classical writers would have been full of such uses as are never sanctioned by Pāṇini. It is for this reason that later grammarians have not laid down a large number of hard and fast rules for compounds. And Bopadeva, the author of the *Mugdhabodha*, goes so far as to say that in the matter of *kṛt*, *taddhita* and *samāsa*, we must depend upon the use (cf. *kṛttaddhitasamāsānām*

105 and with its help has justified the “e” in *ghatena*. Thus after a careful review of the position of the school of Patañjali, we are sure that it is the “-na” in *ghatena* that should be looked upon as the *ādeśa* in the place of “-ā.” That being so, the Naiyāyikas point out to their advantage that to a man well up in the Science of Grammar, there will be hardly any difficulty in recognising the stem and the suffix; and hence there is no justification for positing *padasphoṭa*. The grammarians, however, assert that the aforesaid distinction between the stem and the suffix cannot be recognised in those cases where the *ādeśa* replaces both the stem and the suffix. Thus Pāṇ. Sū. VIII. i. 21 enjoins that in the accusative, dative and genitive plurals of *yusmad* and *asmad*, the substitutes *vas* and *nas* will replace both the stem and the suffix. In that case it is impossible to find out the parts that should be regarded as the stem and the suffix respectively. So the grammarians carry out their point and *padasphoṭa* is established.

4. Conception of *Vākyasphoṭa*

We have discussed the nature of *padasphoṭa* so far; and we propose to dwell upon *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* along with *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* later on. For the present, let us concentrate on *vākyasphoṭa*. We have already pointed out that from the empirical standpoint, the sentence is the unit of thought and expression. And as such it is only natural that the sentence should be endowed with the power of denotation.

abhidhānam niyāmakam). The avowed object of the Kātyāyana is to criticise Pāṇini and supply the deficiencies (cf. uktānuktaduruktārthavyaktikāri tu vārttikam); but Patañjali defends Pāṇini by trying to show that the *sūtras*, if properly understood, will be found to make provision for most of the forms that are apparently not sanctioned by Pāṇini. We may be permitted to point out in this connexion that it has been the usual practice with Indian scholars to evolve a thing from the existing materials instead of seeking to create a new thing for themselves. (cf. the different systems of philosophy claiming to interpret the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa in their favour.)

According to the grammarians, a sentence is one in which we have at least one word ending with a *-sup* termination and another with a *-tiñ*. It has been argued in the case of *padasphoṭa*, that as the distinction between the stem and the suffix cannot be understood in some places, it is desirable that besides *varṇasphoṭa*, we are required to admit *padasphoṭa* too. Arguing on the same line, the exponents of *vākyasphoṭa* point out that it is difficult to distinguish between one term (*pada*) and another in certain cases of assimilation (*sandhi*).¹ For instance, Kōṇḍabhaṭṭa points out that in the case of “*hare'va*,” the two terms that have combined are not clearly discernible on the ground that the “*e*” which is the substitute for the “*e*,” the final letter of “*hare*” and “*a*,” the first letter of “*ava*,” may be in the opinion of grammarians, looked upon as the last letter of “*hare*” or the first letter of *ava*.¹ Hence Kōṇḍabhaṭṭa asserts that we should do well to recognise another type of *sphoṭa*.²

But there is yet stronger justification for admitting *vākyasphoṭa*. It cannot be denied that for purposes of communication of ideas, sentence is alone able to serve our purpose. The child who is yet ignorant of the technicalities and principles of grammar understands the import of a sentence when between two persons, in its presence, it observes one to do a certain act, after he has been told by the other to do it. For instance, the child knows the meaning of the sentence—Bring a cow (*gām ānaya*)—when it sees that the man

¹ Pāṇ. Sū. VI. i. 85, enjoins that in the case of assimilation of letters the substitute may be regarded as the last member of the first word or the first member of the last word. It should not, however, be supposed that this alternative choice may lead to confusion in some cases. For the grammarians reply that in all cases of doubt, the explanation of the masters will guide us in the proper direction (cf. *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi sandehād alakṣaṇam*. *Paribhāṣā* No. I. PSS.

² *hare've'tyādi drṣṭvā ca vākyasphoṭam viniścina* | VBS. kār. 66.

³ *vastutas tu padaiḥ padārthabodhavad vākyena vākyārthabodha iti padārthasaktiḥ padeṣv iva vākyārthasaktir vākye'bhyupeye'ti padasphoṭavākyasphoṭau vyavasthitau*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 427-28.

to whom it is said, goes away and brings the animal. But as it can never be said that the child knows the individual imports of the constituent words, we must admit that the sentence as a whole is endowed with the power of expressing sense ; and as such *vākyaśphoṭa* is established. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa explicitly states that as words are capable of expressing sense, so sentences are possessed of the power of denotation. And he establishes his point by maintaining that it is from such expressions as “*ghaṭam ānaya*” (Bring a jar) that we understand some meaning but not from “*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtir iṣṭasādhanaṃ*,” on the ground that in the latter case we have no sentence. And if as the Naiyāyikas aver that for purposes of expressing sense expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) is necessary, the grammarians would like to suggest that this *ākāṅkṣā-śakti* is nothing different from the *vākya-śakti* as maintained by them. Jagadīśa in his *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā* says it in so many words that *ākāṅkṣā* is reducible to *ānupūrvī*¹ which is defined as the sequence of letters. And as letters in some particular sequence go to make up a sentence we find that there is hardly any inconsistency in the statement of Koṇḍabhaṭṭa when he emphatically says that the *ākāṅkṣā-śakti* of the Naiyāyikas is identical with the *vākya-śakti* of the grammarians.² Thus we notice how Koṇḍabhaṭṭa establishes *vākyaśphoṭa*.

Now the Naiyāyikas point out that the cognition of the import of a sentence, being in its nature a qualified knowledge,³ cannot be obtained prior to verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*)⁴ and as such it is not possible for us to know how the sentence by itself is

¹ *ānupūrvī*paravyavasthā tu *ākāṅkṣā*. SSP., p. 14.

² *tādṛśāsāṅkṣāniṣṭhabodhabhutvāyāi 'vā' smānmate vākyaśaktitvenā'kāṅkṣāśaktir iti paribhāṣābhede'pi vākyaśphoṭasiddhir nirābādā. VBSD., pp. 428-29.*

³ The cognition of the import of the sentence has been called a qualified knowledge for it involves the cogniton of a particular substantive determined by a particular attribute in a particular relation. Now, prior to the verbal knowledge, either the substantive or the attribute may be known but not both. Both are cognised only at the time of verbal knowledge.

⁴ *nanu vākyārthasya 'pūrvatvāt katham tatra saṅketagrahaḥ. VBS., p. 432.*

endowed with the power of expressing the sense. But the import of a term may be known prior to the verbal knowledge. Hence it is argued that it is the term which is possessed of the power of expressing sense. But the grammarians take up the challenge and solve the difficulty in an efficient way. They point out that the Prābhākaras opine that the import of a term includes the "relation" (*anvaya*) only in its general character but it is only when the verbal knowledge is obtained that we come to know of this relation in its special bearings.

PRĀBHĀKARA THEORY OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

According to the Prābhākaras, the meaning of a term implies not merely what the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas believe it to be, but something in addition. The denoted sense implies the import of the individual term qualified by the relation that subsists between it and the senses of other terms (in the sentence under consideration) to which it is related. The Prābhākaras maintain that in our everyday use, we communicate our ideas by means of sentences and not terms. So it is natural that each term requires to be studied in relation to another and not separately by itself. Hence they point out that the import of a term cannot be identical with what the rival schools of philosophers believe it to be. Moreover, they aver that the *relation* must be shown as lying inherent in the import of the term on the ground that what does not present itself through the medium of terms cannot be the subject-matter of verbal knowledge. But it may be pointed out that this *relation* is expressed by the terms in a more or less general manner and it is only at the time of verbal knowledge that this *relation* is precisely determined. For instance, in such expressions as "Bring a jar" (*ghaṭam ānaya*), so long as we have not used the term *ānaya*, the denoted sense of the term "*ghaṭam*" is the import of the term qualified by the *relation* that subsists between it and the import of another term ; that is, the *relation* is not definitely

ascertained. It is at the time of verbal knowledge alone that we come to know of the same most accurately. Hence the grammarians opine that the import of a sentence is known to us in a general way before the verbal knowledge of the same is obtained; and it is the peculiar character of a sentence that enables us to cognise it accurately at the time of verbal knowledge.

OTHER REASONS FOR ACCEPTING VĀKYASPHOTA

We have so long been occupied with the discussion of a very knotty point to show that sentences are really possessed of the power of expressing sense. But we may point out that there are reasons more simple yet none the less convincing, for accepting *vākyasphoṭa*.

It has been maintained that in the case of such sentences as "There is a hamlet of cowherds on the deep river" (*gabhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣaḥ*), we cannot get at the meaning unless we believe that it is the sentence which is endowed with the power of expressing import. The Naiyāyikas argue that the term "*nadyām*" means the river-side through its power of implication (*lakṣaṇā*). But the difficulty crops up when we ask them to construe the import of the term "*gabhīrāyām*" with it. It is admitted on all hands that in the case of apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*)¹ specially, the import of one term cannot be construed with a part of the import of the other one. In the present case, the import of the term "*gabhīrāyām*" is related to that of "*nadyām*;" but if we through the help of implication, mean the river-side by the term "*nadyām*," the import of the term "*gabhīrāyām*" cannot be construed with it. The Naiyāyikas have seen through the difficulty but the solution they have suggested is far from being satisfactory. They say that the term "*nadyām*" will mean the

¹ The relation that subsists between a substantive and an attribute is known to be apposition. When two senses are thus related they are expressed by the two terms having the same case-ending: e.g., 'nilo ghaṭaḥ.' Hence Prāśastapāda defines apposition as—*ekavibhaktiyantapadaśvācyatvaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. The grammarians, however,

side of a deep river (*nadyām* = *gabhīranadītīre*). But in that case, the term “*gabhīrāyām*” becomes absolutely redundant. The Naiyāyikas still argue that the aforesaid term is necessary in view of the fact that it helps us to understand the nature of the meaning which the term “*nadyām*” will express through its power of implication. This argument carries little weight for in all cases of implication, we do not come across such terms as may enable us to ascertain the nature of the implied sense.

COMPOUND WORDS ARE POSSESSED OF A SPECIAL ŚAKTI

From what has been discussed above, it becomes clear that it is necessary to accept *vākya-śakti*. It will be our endeavour now to point out that in the case of compounded words (which are regarded as *mahāvākyas* by the Naiyāyikas) it becomes absolutely indispensable to accept a *śakti* of compounds to express the required sense. Thus the grammarians point out that in the case of possessive compounds (*bahuvrīhi*), a difficulty arises in the matter of construing the senses of the members of the compound. For instance, the word “*ambara*” in the compound “*pītāmbara*” does not mean ‘garment’ but ‘the person who wears the garment’ (*ambaraviśiṣṭa*). Hence the import of “*pīta*” cannot be logically construed with the import of “*ambara*,” for reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph.¹ It is why the grammarians acknowledge a special *śakti* of compounds; and this *śakti* is technically called *ekārthībhāva*.² Thus the grammarians point out that a

say that when two words with different connotations reside in the same substratum, the relation between them is called *apposition*. Thus the connotation of *nīla* in the opinions of grammarians is ‘blue colour’ and that of *ghaṭa* is the class of jars (*ghaṭatva-jāti*); and both of them can reside in the same substratum, viz., *ghaṭa*. So the two words are said to be in apposition with each other. We may very well refer to the definition of *apposition* as set forth by Nāgesabhaṭṭa under Pāṇ. Sū. I. ii. 42 : *bhinnapravṛttinimittaprayuktasyā 'nekasya śabdasyai 'kasminu arthe vṛttis sāmānādhikarāḥ* (MBP., Vol. II, p. 37).

¹ Jagadīśa anticipates the objection but does not find out a new line of defence. He dogmatically maintains that the import of a term may at times be construed with a portion of the import of another term. Cf. *bahuvrīhāv apy abhedena padārthaikadeśānva-
bodhasya vyutpattivaicitryeṇa sambhavāt*. SSP., p. 66.

² *sāmānyāñ ca dvividhañ vyapekṣālakṣaṇam ekārthībhāvalakṣaṇaṇ ce'ti. ekārthī-
bhāvas tu rājapurusa ityādivṛttāv eva*. T. Bod., p. 154.

compound never expresses the senses of its components merely, but always conveys one united sense based on the meanings of its members. Hence in the case of *rājñah puruṣah*, we may add as many epithets to *rājñah* as we like. But in the case of the compound *rājapuruṣah*, we cannot qualify it in like manner. The Naiyāyikas, however, do not admit the aforesaid *śakti* of compounds for the only reason that it is unnecessary. But the grammarians point out that there are a good many cases where the sense of the compound differs perceptibly from the combined senses of the components. Moreover, they argue that the Naiyāyikas are required to frame many rules for the purpose of explaining many critical points on this subject.¹ Thus we may conclude that when the compound which is regarded as a sentence (*samastavākya*) after all, is endowed with the power of expressing sense, it is certainly reasonable to hold that sentence is also expressive of sense. And so *vākyasphoṭa* is established.

SENTENCES ARE ENDOWED WITH THE POWER OF IMPLICATION (LAKṢAṆĀ)

We may further argue in our favour that the Mīmāṃsakas have recognised the power of implication in the case of sentences. Students of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system of philosophy know it thoroughly well that the *arthavāda-vākyas*² do not embody positive injunctions but are meant to eulogise Vedic injunctions.³ They carry no meaning in themselves but let us know that Vedic injunctions are efficacious. Hence

¹ bahūnām vṛttidharmāṇām vacanair eva sādhanē |
syān mahad gauravaṁ tasmād ekārthibhāva āśritaḥ ||
cakārādiniṣedho'tha bahuvyutpattibhaṭṭjanam |
kartavyaṁ te nyāyasiddham tv asmākaṁ tad iti sthitam ||

² The Vedas have been divided into *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas*; and the latter again, into *vidhis* and *arthavādas*. Āpastamba says that *vidhis* refer to those passages which contain injunctions while the rest are known as *arthavāda* (APB., 32-33).

³ vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhinām syuḥ. MS., I. ii. 7.

Also : vidhyarthavādaṁ śākāṅkṣau prāśastyapuroṣārthayoḥ |

tenai'kavākyatā tasmād vādānām dharmamānatā || JNM. I. ii. 1.

the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that each sentence which contains an *arthavāda*, refers to the excellence of the injunctions through its power of implication. Such being the case, we may argue that the sentence which is not possessed of the power of denotation (as the Mīmāṃsakas maintain) should not be supposed to be endowed with the power of implication.

We have fully discussed the problem whether sentence by itself is expressive of sense and have stated precisely and in clear terms that sentence is endowed with the power of denotation. And we close this section by pointing out once more that the history of languages reveals this fact that sentence is the unit of thought and expression; and so it will be the height of folly to disown the denotative power of sentence.

5. Conception of Jāti-sphoṭa

We have so far discussed the nature of *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* and now propose to enter upon a study of another three varieties: *varṇajāti-sphoṭa*, *padajāti-sphoṭa* and *vākyajāti-sphoṭa*. Both Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and Koṇḍabhaṭṭa say that according to Bopadeva, the denoter or *vācaka* like the denoted or *vācya* (import) should be of the nature of universal (*jāti*). The Mīmāṃsakas have discussed the question of the import of words and they maintain that the individual (*vyakti*) cannot be regarded as the import for the reason that there is no limit to the number of individuals and that they vary widely amongst themselves *ānantya* and *vyabhicāra*). It is, therefore, that the Mīmāṃsakas have sought to find out one common attribute (*sādhāraṇadharmā*), technically known as the universal (*jāti*) which is present in each one of the individuals within the universal; and this universal is denoted by a word. The exponents of *jāti-sphoṭa* argue that when the import that is denoted is the universal, it is certainly reasonable to admit that what expresses the sense is also of the nature of the universal. Hence it is not that the individual word “*hari*” uttered by a certain person is expressive of sense but the universal which finds its expression through the

different use of the said word, goes to express the sense.¹ And this is the conception of *padajātisphoṭa*. Similarly, we have *varṇajātisphoṭa* and *vākyajātisphoṭa*.

Before we close this section, we would like to point out that the exponents of *jātisphoṭa* in their endeavour to assert that it is *jātisphoṭa* and not *vyaktisphoṭa* which is expressive of sense, have in their mind the conception of *Mahājāti* (*Mahāsāmānya* or *Mal āsattā*) or *Brahman* with which *Sphoṭa* has been identified.

upto

6. Conception of *Akhaṇḍasphoṭa*.

We have discussed the nature of *jātisphoṭa* and its three-fold divisions. And, now, we propose to explain the conception of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. The grammarians assert that neither the sentence nor the word admits of any divisions. It has been definitely stated that letters have no metaphysical existence. Bhartṛhari openly declares that a word does not comprise letters.² On more occasions than one it is said that the division of a word into stems and suffixes has been resorted to for practical purposes alone.³ The devices employed in standard works in course of treatment of linguistic problems are at best of a pragmatic value. It will be a grievous error of judgment to suppose that these divisions are ultimately true. They are only ways and means devised to inculcate the final truth, and in and by themselves they

1 śakyatva iva śaktatve jāter lāghavam iṣyatām |

aupādhiko vā bhedo'stu varṇānām tāramandavat || VBS, kār. 71.

Also: śakyatāvachchedikāyā jāter vācyatvavat śaktatāvachchedikāyā jāter vācakatvam iti mate varṇapadavākyabhedena trividho jātisphoṭaḥ. SC., p. 1.

2 pade varṇā na vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā iva |

vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana || Vāk. I. 73.

3 upāyas śikṣamānānām bālānām upalālanāḥ |

asatyē varṇmani sthītvā tatas satyam samīhate || Op. cit., II. 240.

Also: śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair avidyā'vo'pavarṇyate | Op. cit., II. 234.

are not possessed of any metaphysical value. But though figments of imagination, they are not useless as they definitely contribute to the comprehension of the truth. Even a staunch realist will admit that the means is of a lower status than the end, and all the value that the former possesses is derived from its capacity to contribute to the achievement of the end. The Vedāntists and the Mādhyamikas, too, recognise the serviceability of false standards of judgment.¹ So far as the Vedāntists and the grammarians are concerned, the pragmatic utility of fictitious standards can be logically proved from the fact that erroneous conceptions are ultimately grounded in truth inasmuch as they appear over the basic foundation of reality. Thus the exponents of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* maintain that it is the indivisible word that is expressive of sense. But it should be noted that sentence being the unit of thought and expression, should be endowed with the power of denotation and the exponents of *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* believe that it is the indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense. And, according to them, therefore, words, stems, suffixes and letters are absolutely fictitious.²

We have explained the eightfold division of *sphoṭa* according as it has been treated in later standard works of Sanskrit grammarians but we should like to point out that we do not appreciate their conception of *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* as also of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. The difference between *padasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and that between *vākyasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* has been stated by Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa in his *Sphoṭacandrikā*. He says that the difference between *padasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* lies in the fact that in the case of *padasphoṭa*, there is a reference to the stem and the suffix which, however, have been so intermingled that

¹ *katham punar avidyāvadviṣayāni pratyakṣādini pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ce'ti. Sār. Bh., pp. 40-41.*

Also : *dve satye samupīṣṭitya buddhānām dharmadeśanā |*

lokasamvṛtisatyaṇ ca satyaṇ ca paramārthataḥ || M. Kār. XXIV. 8.

² *kecid āhur anavayavam eva vākyam anādyavidyopadarśitālikavarnapadavibhāgam asya nimittam. TB., p. 1.*

it is difficult, if not totally impossible, to differentiate the one from the other and therefore the word is conceived as being endowed with the power of denotation. In the case of *akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa*, however, there is absolutely no reference to the stem and the suffix, rather they are regarded as being fictitious and the word as an indivisible unit expresses the sense. Similarly, in the case of *vākyasphoṭa*, it is the sentence which is said to be expressive of sense but this sentence is not conceived in its indivisible character—it comprises words but the constituent words are not clearly distinguishable. But when we say that the indivisible sentence is expressive of sense, we think of *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*.¹

SOME NEW INTERPRETATIONS SUGGESTED

We are prepared to accept such an interpretation but let us say that such an interpretation serves only to diminish the glory and importance of the indivisible and transcendental character of *sphoṭa*. And any interpretation which tends to impair the indivisible character of *sphoṭa*, cannot be accepted by us. It may be pointed out in our favour that the earlier exponents of the theory of *sphoṭa* mean by *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* what to the later exponents are *akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* respectively. Even Kṇḍabhaṭṭa in course of establishing *vākyasphoṭa* argues that to a child who is yet ignorant of the conventions and technicalities of grammar, the sentence—certainly, indivisible into parts—is expressive of sense. Thus we find that the aforesaid argument advanced apparently in support of *vākyasphoṭa* by Kṇḍabhaṭṭa is in reality one in support of *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*.

¹ tadevā'smābhis sakhaṇḍapada-sphoṭatvena vyavahriyate. khaṇḍaśaktyanusandhāna-pūrvakakośādinā samudāyaśaktigrahāt. yasya tu vyākaraṇajñānaśūnyasya kevalavyavahāreṇa samudāyaśaktigrahas tasya sa evā' khaṇḍasphoṭaḥ. SC., p. 6.

Therefore, if we are to admit the two classifications—*akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*—we like to interpret them in the following manner :—

By *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*, we mean that there is *one* indivisible word which undergoes various formal transformations and this *one* indivisible word is expressive of sense. Likewise, we mean by *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* that there is *one* indivisible sentence which assumes a plurality of forms by undergoing formal transformations and this *one* indivisible sentence expresses the import. The conception of *padasphoṭa* is that there are *countless* indivisible words each of which expresses a particular meaning while the conception of *vākyasphoṭa* is that there are *numerous* indivisible sentences each of which is possessed of the power of denotation.

CHAPTER VI.

1. *Doctrine of Sphoṭa based on Śruti Texts.*

We have fully established the theory of *sphoṭa* and it will be our endeavour in the present section to show from Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇa passages that *śabda* is not a mere aggregate of letters and that it should be regarded as an indivisible entity having a transcendental character. The Rk. X. 71. iv. has found a brilliant and enlightening interpretation from the pen of Bharatamiśra who in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* says that *śabdatattva* unfolds itself in its naked glory only to the man who has made both intensive and extensive study of the Science of Grammar and has been able to shake off his ignorance by meditating on word, sense and cognition. Such a man alone realises that what we call mountains and rivers is nothing but the formal transformation of *śabdatattva*. It is he who understands that from the metaphysical point of view, letters do not constitute a word or a sentence.¹ Bharatamiśra next takes up a passage from the Brāhmaṇa—*saitam mantram apaśyat*, and proves that therein we may find out a reference to *śabdatattva*. He explicitly states that the expression—“He (the sage) saw this hymn”—means that the sage heard the hymn, but as there must be a difference in the hearing of a hymn on our part and that of the sage, it is

1 uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam ।
uta tvaḥ śṛṇvan na śṛṇoty enām ॥
uto tv asmai tanvaṁ visasre ।
jāye'va patye uśatī suvāsāḥ ॥

yathā khalu ṛtusnātā jāyā prāktanām rajodūṣitaṁ vasaṇam apāśya suvāsāś satī sambhogecchuḥ praṇayaprakarsāpanīyamānatrapā tasminn api vāsasi śanaś sraṁsamāne svām tanuṁ anavayavena pariṇāyakāya vivṛṇute, tadvad iyaṁ vāpi vyākaraṇatīrthasānānāpauṭha-duṣṭaśabdācchādānā prayoganiyamānugamyamānaśobhanavarṇavasānā satī uśatī prasīdanti yogābhyāsarūpapraṇayātīśayasīthilikṛtājñānalajjā varṇākāraviparyāśavasane'pi śanaś sraṁsamāne svām tanuṁ anavayavena śābdikapariṇāyakāya vivṛṇute. SS. (Bh.), pp. 28-9.

implied that the sage who is gifted with high spiritual power hears the hymn at a stage when it is not uttered. And the existence of a hymn at a time when it is not uttered, leads us to think that the hymn has a transcendental form—it is not merely the aggregate of a few letters as are ordinarily perceived through the auditory organ. The author of the *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* has followed in the footprints of Bharatamīśra when he in some verses ¹ of rare beauty has given expression to all that Bharatamīśra says on this point. Maṇḍana in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* says that he has established the theory of *sphoṭa* on the authority of *Āgama* texts ² and the *Gopālikā* points out that the Ṛk. X. 71. iv. is one of the Vedic hymns which testifies to existence of *sphoṭa*.

2. Conclusions.

In the course of our thesis, we have sought to establish the theory of *sphoṭa* strictly in conformity with the great teachers of the past. We have, however, differed in certain points from the orthodox interpretations and we invite the critical acumen of the present-day scholars to judge the merits of our exposition. We have made a full survey of all the criticisms to which the theory of *sphoṭa* has been subjected and it has been our endeavour to solve each one of the difficulties raised. It should be borne in mind that all the orthodox systems of Hindu Philosophy—the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, the *Nyāya*, the *Vedānta* and the *Sāṅkhya* ¹—have spared no pains in criticising the theory and finally rejecting it. It is only the *Yoga* system of Patañjali which has lent support to the grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa*. Dr. Chakravarti takes note of the fact when he says: The theory of *Sphoṭa* seems to have a strange fate, as it failed to find any

¹ Cf. SSN., Śls. 211-42.

² vyadarśi yuktāgamasamśrayeṇa | SS., śl. 36.

Also: tathā "uta tvaḥ paśyan" ityādimantravarṇānūsāreṇa varṇātiriktam padatattvam adhyavasiyata iti varṇayanti. Gop., p. 262.


³ Sāṅ. Sū., V. 57, and vṛtti under it.

favourable response at the hands of reputed philosophers.¹ But we do not stop with him when he says : In spite of all adverse criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of an intellectual phenomenon as *Sphoṭa*, the theory of *Sphoṭa* will continue to survive as embodying the most reasonable and scientific interpretation about the origin of sound.² We proceed further to assert that *sphoṭa* is not merely the outcome of careful investigations in the domain of grammatical science, but the conception of *sphoṭa* embodies in itself a truth which speaks for itself. Thus the grammarians have laid down a course of *sādhana* of *sphoṭa* which, they believe, will lead the *sādhaka* on to emancipation to realise the true nature of Word-essence which is equated with the Absolute Brahman of the *Vedānta*—the *prius* of the entire phenomenal world, subjective and objective. There is absolutely no note of hesitancy, no faltering or apologetic tone in the representation of the grammarian-philosophers. On the contrary, we notice in it the same bold and emphatic deliverance of a direct realisation of the Truth as is found in the inspired utterances of the Mystics of the world. The impression insensibly and irresistibly is infiltrated into the deepest recesses of our heart that we are brought face to face with the Ultimate Mystery of the Universe. Intellectual speculations in India were never content to find only an intellectual solution of the problems of life and the Truth discovered was rigorously pursued in and through a well-graduated scale of discipline until a direct and immediate realisation was reached. Of course philosophy knew its limitations and left the scene as soon as it culminated in a rationalisation of experience. But the goal of philosophy in India was not mere rationalisation but rather spiritualisation. Philosophy found its consummation in an enriched life—in the fulness of spiritual outlook—the highest perfection that ethical and intellectual discipline could aspire after. It always aimed at

¹ Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, pp. 110-11

² *Ibid.* p. 125.

the inwardisation of the truth discovered and no philosophy which failed to end in this glorious expansion of spiritual life was deemed to be worthy of human allegiance. The Philosophy of Grammar also did not fail to emphasise this Ultimate Objective of life and like other philosophies ends in Mysticism (*sādhana*).



ABBREVIATIONS

ABI.	... Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute
AP.	... Āpastambaparibhāṣā (edited by S. Sāmaśramin)
APP.	... Anuttaraprakāśapañcāśikā
AS.	... Advaitasiddhi (edited by R. Ghoṣa)
A. Sam	... Arthasaṁgraha (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
BB.	... Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣat (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 1902)
BP.	... Bhāṣāpariccheda (Nirayasagara Press, 1916)
C. Read.	... Logic, Deductive and Inductive
Din.	... Dinakarī : commentary on SM. (Nirayasagara Press, 1916)
Gop.	... Gopālikā : commentary on Maṇḍana's Sphoṭa-siddhi (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 6)
Har.	... Harivṛṣabha's commentary on the Vākyapadīya (Benares Sanskrit Series)
Har. (CS)	... Do. (edited by C. Śāstrin)
Hel.	... Helārāja's commentary on the Vākyapadīya (Benares Sanskrit Series)
JNM.	... Jaiminīyanyāyamālā (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 1892)
Kāś.	... Kāśikā (edited by B. Śāstrin, 2nd edition)
KKV.	... Kāmakaḷāvilāsa
MB.	... Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Nirayasagara Press, 1917)
MBP.	... Mahābhāṣyapradīpa : commentary on MB. (Nirayasagara Press, 1917)

M. Kār.	... Mādhyamikakārikā (Bibliotheca Buddhica)
MS.	... Mīmāṃsāsūtras
Nir.	... Nirukta (edited by S. Sāmaśramin)
NK.	... Nyāyakandalī (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series)
N. Kār.	... Nādakārikā (Vanivilasa Press)
N. Ku.	... Nyāyakusumāñjali (Chowkhamba Press)
NM.	... Nyāyamañjarī (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series)
NP.	... Nyāyaprakāśa (edited by K. Nyāyapañcānana)
l'ān. Sū.	... Pāṇinisūtras
PLM.	... Paramalaghumañjūśā (Chowkhamba Press)
PM.	... Padamañjarī (edited by D. Śāstrin, 1898)
PNT.	... Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra
PS.	... Prapañcasāra (edited by A. Avalon)
PSS.	... Paribhāṣenduśekhara (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series)
RKT.	... Ratnākarāvatārikā : commentary on PNT.
RVB.	... Ṛgvedabhāṣyopakramaṇikā (Sanskrit Sahitya Pariṣat Series)
Śab. K.	... Śabdakaustubha (Asiatic Society of Bengal)
Sam. Śār.	... Saṃkṣiptaśārīraka (Benares edition with the commentary of Madhusūdana)
Sān. Sū.	... Sāṅkhyasūtras
Śār. Bh.	... Śārīrakabhāṣya (Nirayasagara Press, 1917)
SB.	... Śabarabhāṣya (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series)
SC.	... Sphoṭacandrikā of Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa
SD.	... Sāhityadarpaṇa (edited by R. Tarkavāgīśa, 1303 B.S.)
Ś. Dīp.	... Śāstradīpikā (Nirayasagara Press)
SDS.	... Sarvadarśanasamgraha (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series)
S. Kau.	... Siddhāntakaumudī (Nirayasagara Press, 1908)
*SM.	... Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha (Do., 1916)

SS.	... Sphoṭasiddhi (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 6)
SS. (Bh.)	... Sphoṭasiddhi of Bharatamiśra
SSN.	... Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra
SSP.	... Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Benares Tara Printing Works, 1907)
ŚT.	... Śāradātilaka (edited by A. Avalon)
ŚV.	... Śloka-vārttika (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
TB.	... Tattvabindu (Do., 2nd edition)
T. Bod.	... Tattvabodhinī : commentary on S. Kau. (Nir-nayasagara Press, 1908)
TL.	... Tantrāloka
TS.	... Tattvasaṁgraha
Vāk.	... Vākyapadīya (Benares Sanskrit Series)
VB. or YSB.	... Vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtras (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series)
VBS.	... Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
VBSD.	... Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāradarpaṇa : commentary on VBS. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
VKP.	... Vedāntakalpataruparimala : super-commentary on Śar. Bh. (Nirnayasagara Press, 1917)
VNS.	... Vātulanāthasūtras
VP.	... Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Calcutta University publication)
VSLM.	... Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā (edited by G. Śarman)
YS.	... Yogasūtras

PREFACE

It is now five years since I have been working on Keats and my essay, "Keats and the Pre-Raphaelite Poets," submitted for the M.A. Examination in 1932, was published in the Journal of the Department of Letters of the Calcutta University for 1935. The present study, "Romance and Reality in Keats," which received the Griffith Memorial Prize in Letters in 1933, is intended to mark another stage in my progress on the subject.

I have tried to show in this study that the poet was defining 'Romance' and 'Reality' in the light of his intimate experiences. For him it was a gradual transition from romance to reality, not a sudden or complete and actual rejection of the one in favour of the other. In his case the knowledge of reality was a complex of many strands, and his humanitarianism, his grappling with the problem of evil, his knowledge of self, etc., formed each a link in the chain of his intense realisation. This conclusion has been supported by a study of the maturer poems of Keats which have been interpreted in a new light. Specially an attempt has been made to interpret the Greater Odes from a fresh point of view which, it is hoped, will clear up some of the obscurities or difficulties felt so long in consistently and fully explaining them.

I am still engaged in a study of the poet and, needless to say, I shall be thankful for any helpful criticism of my interpretations.

My thanks are due to Principal R. N. Ghosh of the Ripon College, Calcutta, who has been kindly guiding me in my studies on Keats and the Romantic Movement; to Mr. Priyaranjan Sen, Lecturer, Calcutta University, and Mr. Tarapada Mukherjee, Professor, Presidency College, Calcutta, for useful suggestions. I am obliged to the authorities of the Calcutta University for permitting this thesis to be printed in their Press.

RIPON COLLEGE,
27th August, 1936.

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N. N. CHATTERJEE

ROMANCE AND REALITY IN KEATS

OR

THE TRANSITION IN KEATS.

By

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INTRODUCTORY.

Keats lived a life singularly integral in its underlying meaning, significant, because of this integrity, and packed into a period of five short crowded years varied and countless thrills and experiences which went to the making of him, and made him a type of the creative artist. These were years of quick impression and feverish¹ poetic expression. He was the 'ever eager-eyed' youth, receptive, filling every rift of his life with fine ore, attaining like his autumn apple to a ripeness to the core, developing his verse from a faint early spring song into the murmur and plenty of summer. Yet that summer did not last for long. A career

¹ The word is used meaningly. Though Keats wanted poetry to come to him as 'naturally as leaves come to a tree' (letter to Taylor, 27th Feb., 1818, *vide* Buxton Forman, *Letters of Keats*, Vol. I), the writing of a poem often left him, in his own words, 'feverish' (letter to George Keats, Sept. 1819), though instances of emotional release are not lacking. We shall discuss this point later.

which was begun definitely in 1816¹ came abruptly to its end in the February of 1821.²

Contemporary criticism—loud and vindictive in the reviews—belittled the man and the artist. The feeble, broken-hearted, pale youth of Shelley's sympathy³ and Byron's scorn⁴ was vindicated by the Victorians, who, led by Monckton Milnes (Lord Houghton⁵) and followed by Matthew Arnold, D. G. Rossetti, Swinburne, and Morris (who considered Keats one of his masters⁶), discovered not only a great artist in him, a 'Shakespearean' artist, but also a strenuous, noble character with 'flint and iron' in him.⁷ The moderners, following in their wake, have given their erudite and enthusiastic appreciation⁸ of the artist, and paid due respect to the character of the man.

Post-War criticism, however, has gone one step further. Perhaps Fausset was the first to notice in the personality of Keats more than a mere biographical outline to the career of the creative artist. Mr. John Middleton Murry's two books,⁹ have created indeed

¹ Before 1816, Keats had written at least 17 short pieces (sonnets and lyrics, *vide* Miss Lowell's, *Keats*, Vol. I) and one long poem (*Epistle to Matthew*). But it was in 1816 that he definitely gave up the idea of being a physician, took up poetry as his vocation of life, was introduced to Leigh Hunt and his brilliant circle and initiated into their ways, and his first published poem (*Sonnet on Solitude*) appeared in Hunt's *Examiner*.

² Perhaps we would be more correct if we change it to Feb. 3, 1820, when his fatal illness commenced with a haemorrhage, because, after that event, Keats really wrote no poetry. (According to Miss Lowell, after the autumn of 1819 Keats wrote nothing.) But in any case, his personality developed, and for us, even his physical decay after February 1820 is not without significance.

³ Shelley's *Adonais*.

⁴ *Vide* Byron's *Don Juan*.

⁵ Lord Houghton's *Life and Letters of Keats*, 1848, 1857, etc.

⁶ Mackail's *Life of Morris*, Vol. I.

⁷ M. Arnold's *Essay on Keats*.

⁸ Reference is to the work of W. T. Arnold, Palgrave, Robertson, G. T. Drury, Notcutt, de Selincourt, Sir Sidney Colvin, Dr. Bridges, A. C. Bradley, etc.

⁹ *Keats and Shakespeare*, and *Studies in Keats*.

an epoch in Keats criticism. Mr. Murry brings to this study of Keats a faith and a formula with which we are not familiar, but its profound earnestness and persuasive mystery make us accept what perhaps, in rational analysis, is not acceptable. We may also refer to Miss Lowell's two heavy volumes, Prof. Garrod's realistic estimate, M. Erlande's short but piquant biography, and Mr. Thorpe's *Study of Keats*, which add greatly to our knowledge of the man and the artist.

Yet Keats is not fully known, I mean the personality of Keats. Whatever we may mean by personality (psychologists and metaphysicians have their meaning), the post-War speculation in this matter is singular in many respects. The present writer, an earnest student of Keats, is not satisfied with the speculations so far. He has his own ideas, about the movement of Keats's inner life during these five momentous years.

A post-War assumption. Our view.

The speculations, those of Fausset, Thorpe, and Murry all centre round an assumption, that, in Keats, we notice a line of development, and that this line of development may be clearly indicated. For us, there is no definite and particular line of development as such, though there is a general transition brought about by circumstances, over which Keats had, most often, no control. His sensitive soul was variously acted upon, and its reactions have followed a general system. We can, after a careful study, arrive at some conclusions and state them as parts of a wider scheme.

The poems of Keats are naturally kept out of the foreground of discussion. As expressions of intimate delights, sorrows, ambitions and impressions of the young poet they have indeed a value, which, apart from their unquestioned artistic worth, cannot be ignored. But we are not for discussing them as separate units of beauty and significance, but shall deduce from them materials for our study and try to fix their place in the general scheme of the development of Keats's personality. No doubt, this discussion would heighten our interest in the poems. But this fact should be

The poems of Keats — their value.

clearly borne in mind, that we believe in the significance of Keats the man to be greater than that of his poems, greater than that of his actual output, and we believe that a study of Keats's personality has a loftier moral than his sad song of truth and beauty and his abundant poetic raptures, though the more rational view would not try to discriminate between the two. There is another significant feature about Keats's life. His creative faculty did not grow side by side with his critical faculty—as has been so often pointed out. The latter outgrew the former. Naturally in the poems we do not find a complete picture of the man. His letters must be taken into consideration. Besides it should be noted that we want to provide by our study a background for these poems, a background to which we should be able to trace, if we like, the poems of Keats. But with that we are not concerned here.

What then is that transition we have spoken of ? It is, to put it simply, the transition from 'Romance' to 'Reality.' The wording may be simple, but the problem we have stated is not simple. By 'Romance,' we do not mean what is usually meant by the term. As to 'Reality,' it is hard, in such a discussion, to leave out the metaphysical significance which this elastic and baffling term has gathered. We should, even though our opinion be liable to attack, make our position clear as early as possible.

Keats's own utterances however are highly interesting. But we are not for taking as truth whatever Keats says. We incline more to the scientific scepticism of Miss Lowell than to the devout attitude of Mr. Murry. Keats did not say always exactly what he meant, we believe. If modern Psychology has taught us any truth it is this, that we cannot express ourselves as we really are. Perfect externalisation, by means of words, of our mental states, is impossible. Not only so. Keats himself did not like the idea that all his utterances should be accepted word for word. On Friday, March 13, 1818, he wrote a letter to his serious-

The Transition in
Keats—from 'Romance
to Reality.'

Keats's utterances—
their objective truth
discussed.

mind friend Bailey in a high strain. Towards the end of that letter he frankly admits—"Now, my dear fellow, I must once for all tell you I have not one idea of the truth of any of my speculations—I shall never be a reasoner, because I care not to be in the right, when retired from bickering and in a proper philosophical temper." It means that his speculations were a kind of intellectual luxury, which may not be taken as gospel truth always. The next day, he wrote a letter to Reynolds and remarked—"I wrote to Bailey yesterday, obliged to speak in a high way, and a damme who's afraid—for I had owed him so long; however, he shall see I will be better in future." What does it mean? It means that he did not exactly mean what he wrote to Bailey. Again, in a letter to his serious clerical friend, dated July 18, 1818, he wrote—"And here, Bailey, I will say a few words written in a sane and sober mind, a very scarce thing with me, for they may, hereafter, save you a great deal of trouble about me, which you do not deserve, and for which I ought to be bastinadoed. I carry all matters to an extreme—so that when I have a little vexation, it grows in five minutes into a theme for Sophocles. Then, and in that temper, if I write to my friend, I have so little self-possession that I give him matter for grieving, at the very time perhaps when I am laughing at a pun. Your last letter made me blush for the pain I had given you—I know my own disposition so well that I am certain of writing many times hereafter in the same strain to you—now, you know how far to believe in them. You must allow Imagination. I know I shall not be able to help it." This passage requires no comment and an artist of his fine sensibilities is bound to be carried away by momentary impressions. Not only so. Keats would echo the opinions of others (*e.g.*, those of Haydon), without a blush. Besides, he knew that his artistic disposition played a curious hide-and-seek with his personality, if by personality we mean the permanent features of his character and temperament. Of course the subjective value of all that he uttered does not diminish for all his protestations. The

psychologist can see a marvellous mind at work through all these.

Keeping, however, in mind these admissions, we may now see what Keats himself meant by the word 'Romance' and 'Romance.' We shall only adduce instances of Keats's use of the word and its derivatives in prose and poetry, the meaning in each case will easily follow :—

- (1) "What is more gentle than a wind in summer?

... ..
More serene than Cordelia's countenance ?
More full of visions than a high romance?"

Sleep and Poetry.

- (2) "No tumbling water ever spake romance,
But when my eyes with thine thereon could dance."

Endymion, Book III.

- (3) "O for the gentleness of old Romance."

Isabella.

- (4) "Numerous as shadows haunting faerily
The brain, new stuff'd, in youth, with triumphs gay
Of old romance,"

Eve of St. Agnes.

- (5) "O golden-tongued Romance, with serene lute!"

Sonnet on 'King Lear.'

- (6) "When I behold, upon the night's starr'd face,
Huge cloudy symbols of a high romance,
And think that I may never live to trace
Their shadows, with the magic hand of chance."

Sonnet, 'When I have fears,' etc.

- (7) "To feel no other breezes than are blown
Through its tall woods with high romances blent."

'Happy is England,' Sonnet.

- (8) " I shall believe in wizard-woven loves
And old romances ".....

Otho the Great, Act III, Sc. 2.

- (9) " For sure so fair a place was never seen,
Of all that ever charm'd romantic eye."

Imitation of Spenser.

- (10) " Some flowery spot, sequester'd, wild, romantic."

Epistle to G. F. Mathew.

(11) " I wish the Italian would supersede French in every school throughout the country, for that is full of real poetry and romance of a kind more fitted for the pleasure of ladies than perhaps our own."

Letter to Fanny Keats, Oxford, Sept. 10, 1817.

(12) " They (the novels of Scott and Smollett) appear to me to be quite distinct in every particular, more especially in their aim. Scott endeavours to throw so interesting and romantic a colouring into common and low characters as to give them a touch of the sublime. Smollett on the contrary pulls down and levels what with other men would continue romance."

Letter to George and Thomas Keats, Jan. 5, 1818.

(13) " Steam boats on Loch Lomond and Barouches on its sides take a little from the pleasure of such romantic chaps as Brown and I,"

Letter to Thomas Keats, July 17, 1818.

(14) " Stop! Let me see! being half-drowned by falling from a precipice, is a very romantic affair : why should I not take it to myself ? "

Letter to Mrs. Wylie, Aug. 6, 1818.

(15) " I have been *werry* romantic indeed among these Mountains and Lakes."

Letter to Mrs. Wylie, Aug. 6, 1818.

(16) " Bonchurch too is a very delightful place—as I can see by the Cottages, all romantic—covered with creepers and honeysuckles."

Letter to Fanny Keats, July 6, 1819.

There is nothing very particular in the use of this word and its derivatives in most of the instances. But almost everywhere we notice a faint opposition to reality. Romance is a thing apart from, or strange to, reality. In example No. 13, this opposition is definite. A few things should be specially noted. Instance No. 6 is very significant. What were those 'huge cloudy symbols of a high romance'? One commentator

says, "materials for a lofty poetic theme written in characters of cloud upon the star-bespangled sky." This is good paraphrase,

but no explanation. This 'romance' was the 'romance' of Keats's life, his personal ambition which made him dream of illimitable poetic power and kingdom of the earth. He saw on the star-bespangled night sky his ambition beckoning to him, and in a Shakespearean mood, he felt the hand of despair cold on his shoulders. He had fears that he might cease to be. This sonnet was written in January, 1818, when the young poet, full of promise, suddenly felt, at a moment when that "horrid Morbidity of Temperament"¹ he speaks of, manifested itself, that he was not to achieve what he aspired for. This sonnet, in his own opinion, contained some 'sense.'²

Instance No. 5 is perhaps most important from our point of view. The sonnet in which it occurs begins like this :

" O Golden-Tongued Romance with serene lute,
Fair plumed Syren ! Queen ! of far away,
Leave melodizing on this wintry day,
Shut up thine olden volume, and be mute.

Adieu ! for once again the fierce dispute,
Betwixt Hell torment and impassioned clay.
Must I burn through ; once more assay
The bitter sweet of this Shakesperean fruit."

¹ Letter to Haydon, May, 10, 1817 : " You tell me never to despair—I wish it was as easy for me to observe the saying—truth is I have a horrid Morbidity of Temperament which has shown itself at intervals—it is I have no doubt the greatest enemy and stumbling block I have to fear—I may even say that it is likely to be the cause of my disappointment."

² Letter to Reynolds, Jan. 31, 1818.

What does this passage mean ? Keats was bidding adieu to 'Romance,' before he was going to have an intense experience of reality. Mr. de Selincourt thinks that the 'Golden-Tongued Romance with serene lute,' refers to Spenser's *Faerie Queene* from which Keats turns to read Shakespeare's *King Lear*. Miss Lowell, however, remarks :¹ " I think...that he refers to all those mythological and symbolical conceptions which had held him enthralled for so long. At that moment² he was reaching out for a poetry of more depth and passion than can be found in even the most extraordinary and beautiful of imaginary evocations." In the language of our discussion, we take it that Keats was leaving 'Romance' with the 'wizard-woven loves,' its 'gentleness,' its 'visions,' for the intense truth of 'Reality.' Shakespeare's *King Lear* was a thing 'real' to him, and in rejecting 'Romance' here, he was rejecting his youthful dreams and 'fancy-sick' longings for an earnest and serious order of poetry. He must 'burn through' the 'fierce dispute' 'betwixt Hell torment and impassioned clay,' i.e., he must 'annihilate his self'³ in the tragic agony of Lear, sense it, 'burn through' it, forget his subjective pre-occupations in it. The surrender to the objective, which is but a definition of 'Realism,' he must achieve. That was in January 1818. Keats's own comment (letter to George and Thomas Keats, Jan. 23, 1818) is quite instructive. " I think a little change has taken place in my intellect lately—I cannot bear to be uninterested or unemployed, I, who, for so long a time have been addicted to passiveness. Nothing is finer for the purposes of great productions than a very gradual ripening of the intellectual powers. As an instance of this—observe—I sat down yesterday to read 'King Lear' once again : the thing appeared to demand the prologue of a sonnet, I wrote it, and began to read, (I know you would like

¹ *Keats*, Vol. I, p. 537.

² The poem was written on Jan. 22, 1819.

³ We have discussed this point later.

to see it)—” (So he quotes the Sonnet). “So you see I am getting at it, with a sort of determination and strength.” Indeed, with ‘the ripening of intellectual powers,’ he was bidding adieu to ‘Romance!’

Keats did indeed have a progressively clear notion of ‘things real.’ We shall give a few instances:—

The following lines occur in *Sleep and Poetry*, written in the Autumn and Winter of 1816:

“The visions all are fled—the car is fled
 Into the light of heaven, and in their stead
 A sense of real things comes doubly strong,
 And, like a muddy stream, would bear along
 My soul to nothingness: but I will strive
 Against all doubtings, and will keep alive
 The thought of that same chariot, and the strange
 Journey it went.”

(Ll. 155-162.)

Here the opposition is between Imagination¹ and reality, and the youthful poet chooses the former. A ‘sense of real things’ is like a ‘muddy stream’ bearing his soul to nothingness, and he would strive against it. And this in 1816. On July 2nd, 1818, he wrote a Sonnet ‘*On visiting the Tomb of Burns.*’ In that Sonnet occurs—

“For who has mind to relish, Minos-wise,
 The Real of Beauty, free from that dead hue
 Sickly imagination and sick pride
 Cast wan upon it!”

¹ Various interpretations of this magic car and the charioteer have been given. Miss Lowell thinks (Vol. I, p. 223) that the figure ‘is intended to mean a poet descending from the cloudy heights of imagination to mingle with humanity.’ Mr. Murry (*Keats and Shakespeare*, p. 19) considers this ‘a symbolic vision of Poetry itself.’ We prefer Prof. Garrod’s interpretation (*Keats*, pp. 29-30) that it is a description of ‘the car of the Imagination’ because the next paragraph begins with the small range of ‘high Imagination’ in the present age against which the poet protests.

Here the meaning is just the opposite. 'The Real of Beauty' is relished without imagination and pride which are habitually 'sickly.' The explanation is that in July 1818, Keats was a different man, he was for rejecting 'sickly' imagination, romantic and futile longings after unimaginable Beauty, but was for 'the Real of Beauty.' At least, that was his theoretical position in July 1818.

To sum up. We find that in the early Keats there was a tacit opposition between 'Romance' and 'Reality,' that his subsequent life illustrated a transition from the former to the latter, that by 'Romance' he understood all flighty unreal imaginative longings for far-off bliss and beauty. The question remains to be asked—what did Keats mean by 'Reality'?

In a letter to George and Thomas Keats, written on Dec. 28th, 1817, Keats says—"It (*i.e.*, West's "Death on a pale horse") is a wonderful picture.....but there is nothing to be intense upon, no woman one feels mad to kiss, no face swelling into reality." This 'reality,' if it had been present, would have made the sensuous attraction of the female figures great indeed, it would also have made the poet 'intense upon' the many details of the picture. We shall better understand Keats's meaning if we consider what follows. "The excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship with Beauty and Truth. Examine 'King Lear' and you will find this exemplified throughout: but in this picture we have unpleasantness without any momentous depth of speculation excited, in which to bury all unpleasantness." Here is then the answer. The 'intensity' of every artistic creation is nothing but this, *viz.*, it should even when unpleasant excite a 'momentous depth of speculation,' as *King Lear* with its unpleasant theme does, and 'Death on a pale horse' does not. If the artist is 'intense upon' 'his own work, he is naturally in close relationship with Beauty and Truth.' 'Beauty,' because through his profound imaginative realisation of an aspect of life—however unpleasant or ugly—and artistic presentation of it, he

makes it beautiful ; and Truth, because, as Keats himself wrote in a previous letter to Bailey (Nov. 1817), "What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth." There is no other objective 'Truth.' If then the artist is 'intense' upon his work it will excite, for one thing, 'a momentous depth of speculation' in his readers, and then will have 'burnt through' his own sensations and feelings (while composing the work), and secondly, every detail, every aspect of the work 'will swell into reality,' will bear the stamp of truth on them.

So, then, towards the close of the year 1817, Keats was convinced of nothing, but the 'truth of Imagination,'¹ his view of reality was out and out subjective. This is an idealistic view, he denies the existence of objective reality as such. He would fain bear up against 'the muddy stream, of a sense of real things,' that would bear him, he knew, to 'nothingness.' That reality was false. Keats was not at that time, in the language of old Psychology, exactly a 'solipsist,' holding the view that² 'the individual mind can with certainty and intuition know only itself and its own ideas and states. These exist and are known to exist. Objective (transcendental) reality, however, is neither known nor

¹ This is what Keats says :—"I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart's affections (i.e., feelings), and the truth of Imagination (we may remember that magic car and the charioteer of *Sleep and Poetry*). What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth whether it existed before or not—for I have the same idea of all our passions as of love : they are all, in their sublime (i.e., in their intensity) creative of essential Beauty." This statement was only an enthusiastic young poet's earlier version of Romance (Imagination and Beauty, subjective realisation of Beauty) and Truth (Reality). We should not consider this to be one of the guiding mottoes of Keats. Keats was only repeating, more vehemently, what he had said in *Sleep and Poetry*, that he would not give way to the 'muddy stream' of reality, but would "keep alive the thought of the same chariot" of Imagination, which when creating Beauty (out of pleasant or unpleasant theme) must be Truth. There is no other way of approaching Truth—"I have never yet been able to perceive how anything can be known for truth by consecutive reasoning," he says. It is only through intuition (or 'imagination' or 'sensation' as Keats variously calls it) that we get a glimpse of truth. A sense of 'real things' is not a sense of Truth! Keats denies objective truth to 'Reality.' In 1817, he was still an idealistic young man full of visions of 'a shadow of reality to come.' He was a romantic, to whom there was no non-personal reality.

² *Psychological Approach to Reality*—Francis Aveling, London, 1929, 2.

demonstrable as existent.' Keats was not a Solipsist, there was no truth to him without the 'seizing' of something by imagination as 'Beauty.' Of course his definition of 'Beauty' was so elastic.

It would not really do to bring in systems of metaphysics or psychology, while we are dealing with Keats. Keats had 'the philosophic temper,' but that was only a speculative temper which most romantics had. Later on, he understood what 'philosophic' detachment really was. He had no training in any metaphysical system. In a letter to Reynolds (April 27, 1818), he speaks of asking Hazlitt for the 'best metaphysical road' to take, but nothing, we know, came out of it. However, Keats's perceptions were real, and though he had not the trained mind, he was forming his own system of approach to Truth and Beauty.

Let us, however, resume our discussion.

As an instance of 'what the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth whether it existed before or not,'
 An illustration. we may refer to a passage of his (*Endymion*, Bk. I, ll. 777-802), which, when he wrote it, was, in his own words (letter to Taylor, *Postmark*, Jan. 30, 1818), 'a regular stepping of the Imagination towards a Truth,' an intuition of truth, which Taylor, who was 'a consecutive man,' might think. 'as a thing almost of mere words.' Here Keats emphasises his faith in intuition as a means of knowing truth, as opposed to consecutive reasoning. One thing should also be noted. By 'truth' Keats here means an ideal truth or principle, as opposed to concrete facts or events; and the test of this truth does not lie in any equation or relation between a subjective notion and objective principle, but in a direct realisation or intuitive perception of it. If there ever was an idealist, Keats of January, 1818, was one.

Now, our knowledge of reality is, as is recognised by all systems of philosophy, twofold. We know concrete facts or

events, and ideal principles or 'truths' so-called. Keats was, so long, denying the reality of the former, and emphasising that of the latter. But later on his ideas broadened. In a letter to Bailey (dated March 13, 1818), written just two months after, we find how his ideas were changed. He writes :—

Keats's classification
of 'real' things—an
advance.

"As tradesmen say everything is worth what it will fetch, so probably every mental pursuit takes its reality and worth from the ardour of the pursuer—being in itself a nothing. Ethereal things may at least be thus real—divided under three heads—Things real, things semi-real—and nothings. Things real—such as existences of Sun, Moon, and Stars—and passages of Shakespeare. Things semi-real, such as love, the clouds, etc., which require a greeting of the Spirit to make them wholly exist and Nothings, which are made great and dignified by an ardent pursuit—which, by the by, stamp the Burgundy mark on the bottles of our minds, in so much as they are able to '*consecrate whate'er they look upon.*'"

Here we find that Keats is acknowledging the existence of things which are 'real' even without any reference to any subjective recognition. Beyond the pale of this subjective recognition lie 'things real,' indisputable and eternal. The Sun and the Moon and the Stars have physical existence, they are real. But the works of Shakespeare have an ideal permanence and reality. As to things semi-real, Keats's distinction is important ; they require 'a greeting of the Spirit to make them wholly exist,' otherwise they have a half-true, relative reality. Not that the clouds have no objective existence, but they take up a reality—far more intense and full—when the human Spirit greets them, becomes 'intense upon' them. As to the 'Nothings,' they have no objective reality, they become real by an 'ardent pursuit' of the human Spirit. This was an important step for Keats. Now, he no longer believes in 'the truth of Imagination' and 'the holiness of the Heart's affections' only. Those would be, according to his maturer opinion, 'things semi-real.' He believes in things real over and above them !

That Keats's ideas advanced more we know. When he wrote to Reynolds on May 3 (1818), "Tom has spit a *leetle* blood this afternoon, and that is rather a damper—but I know—the truth is, there is something real in the world," he was seeing beyond the bourn of the immediate and the empirical, beyond Romance and longings, sufferings and sorrows.

The foregoing is a faint sketch of the philosophy of Keats's life, his magnificent transition from 'Romance' to 'Reality.' Let us now state the problem in our own words. By 'Romance' Keats meant many things, but through all the various uses of the word, we may notice an underlying opposition to 'Reality.'

Statement of the
problem. Keats himself was aware of this opposition, we have seen. Now and then, he actually suffered

from this opposition, as we shall see. His life was a rejection—tentative no doubt, not final, hence to some extent theoretical—of the former in favour of the latter. Romance was something compounded of his inner longings, thrills, likings, imaginings, illusions. He wanted, like a young Indian *Sannyasi*, in his revulsion from the world, to kill his acquisitive and illusive self, in order to approach 'Reality,' in order to see life consistently and see it whole. Keats had no definition of 'Reality' tucked up somewhere neatly; he was forming a definition through his intense sufferings and agonies, elaborating it through the fever and fret of life. His last days, torn between inner conflicts, force this definition into a tragic prominence.

This transition is to us, simply, from subjective pre-occupation to a surrender to the objective, from illusion, however beautiful, however Lamia-like, to the stringent, almost overpowering disillusionment. We know we are not metaphysically correct in the statement of this problem. The human perception of the objective is after all a subjective mental state. The ulterior Objective or Reality lies perhaps beyond all human thought, serene in its lofty negation, supreme and transcendental, whom we bring into our brief, quick, errant, play of subjective life through religion, through art, through philosophy. But we are

to state the problem as Keats felt it ; he did not grasp the metaphysical significance of his keen knowledge of Beauty and Truth. He was simple, direct and pure in his perception of things.

Now this general movement from 'Romance' to 'Reality' was threaded by numerous minor and allied movements. We are to refer to all of them to complete the picture of Keats's inner life of these momentous years.

But was there no error or confusion in these movements ? A sensitive spirit, like Keats's, is apt to go to the extreme to glorify the 'Nothings' as things 'real' in his revulsion from 'Romance.' That Keats often did. Again, the rough buffets of the world drew forth from him, now and then, protests, cynicism, pessimism; made him call all imagination 'sickly.' Lastly, he was for too long under the tutelage of others to think clearly or see clearly the face of reality, he took an inspiration from a third party for an intuitive perception of truth. All these we will have to point out as far as possible.

Keats's view of things was not 'rainbow-sided'¹ though none like him appreciated the gorgeous colouring of the rainbow. In the quest after 'truth' or 'reality' that was inherent in Keats's life, he was well equipped by his superabundant instinct for the concrete and the definite. With his keen sense-perception he was quickly responsive to the manifold sensuous appeals of things. But he had little love for the vague, shimmering, filmy shades of things, he loved the gorgeous and restful externality of natural phenomena. Even in his early inchoate idylls we find—

"Sweet peas, on tip-toe for a flight:

With wings of gentle flush o'er delicate white."

'I stood tiptoe.'

"How silent comes the water round that bend;"

Ibid.

¹ From *Lamia*, 'So rainbow-sided, touch'd with miseries, She seem'd...'

Again we find in his early sonnets, the perfect realism of—

“ Small, busy flames play through the fresh laid coals,
And their faint cracklings o’er our silence creep.”...

or

“ Keen, fitful gusts are whisp’ring here and there
Among the bushes half leafless, and dry ;
The stars look very cold about the sky.”...

or the perfect blending of sound and sense in—

“ On a lone winter evening, when the frost
Has wrought a silence.”...

or the perfect representation of the rising moon in—

“ The moon lifting her silver rim
Above a cloud, and with a gradual swim
Coming into the blue with all her might.”

‘ I stood tiptoe.’

Now this power of poetic observation and realistic, *i.e.*, faithful, representation is very rare indeed in poets. Shelley saw in his moth the desire for the stars. But Keats was more earthly, he was content to note the tiger-moth’s deep-damasked wings.”¹ The ethereal or spiritual aspects of things with their flitting airy touches escaped him, he worked in solid gold and marble. With his years, this glorious gift of sensuous perception matured. From the swooning delight in sumptuous colours, and taste, and touch in the *Eve of St. Agnes*—

“ The lustrous salvers in the moonlight gleam ;
Broad golden fringe upon the carpet lies.”

“ Lucent syrups, tinct with cinnamon.”

“ Unclaps her warmed jewels one by one ;
Loosens her fragrant bodice.”

¹ *The Eve of St. Agnes.*

From the many-sided sensuous appeal of—

“ ‘Mid hush’d, cool-rooted flowers, fragrant-eyed,
Blue, silver-white, and budded Tyrian ”...

to the bare, austere

“ Where youth grows pale and spectre-thin, and dies,”

this gift is everywhere. All these argue a feeling for the concrete and the real, a sense of the tactile actual. It makes for a feeling for the objective, as opposed to the ethereal and the subjective. This sensuous basis of Keats’s feeling for reality we should never lose sight of. What a pair of eyes he had ! Those eyes, now skimming ‘ the horizon’s crystal air ’¹ would soon gather power to go through reality as Apollonius’ eye went through Lamia ‘ like a sharp spear...keen, cruel, perçant, stinging.’” His senses would open out to him, in his maturer years, instead of the surface-beauty of things, their depth of significance and heart of pathos ; because our senses are the pathways of so many of our emotions.

Keats’s gift of observation we find amply illustrated even in his prose. Keats of the letters is mostly an engaging, alert, likeable young man, with a touch of the gracious sceptic about him. That is his working-day feature. In week-end

(i) Power of observation and other ‘realistic traits.’

moods, he can indeed carry a pun or a joke to its last Elizabethan stretch.² But there is

Keats of the sunless days or wintry days also.

Of him later on. Now Keats’s scepticism, so different from Shelley’s idealism, kept him in close touch with the daily tenor of life on earth. The working-day Keats was inquisitive, sceptical, ‘ realistic ’ as we would say of a young man of his type whom we might have met in some party or drawing

¹ ‘ I stood tip-toe upon a little hill. ’

² See letter to Jane and Marianne Reynolds, Oxford, Sept. 5, 1817, and letter to the Misses M. and S. Jeffrey, Hampstead, June 4, 1818, etc.

room. In a letter written to his brothers (*Postmark*, 16th April, 1817), on the way to the Isle of Wight, he describes Southampton thus—"I know nothing of this place but that it is long—tolerably broad—has by-streets—two or three churches—a very respectable old Gate with two Lions to guard it—the Men and Women do not materially differ from those I have been in the habit of seeing," etc. Such instances are by no means infrequent in Keats's letters. But they have also passages of profound romantic trust in fame, and genius, and eternal Beauty and glory. Keats the realist, mocking at popular illusions and vulgar superstitions,¹ protesting against the military policy of the government,² noting the racial characteristics of the Scotch and the Irish with a critical eye³ was, however, the very man who was, like a passive, plastic lump of clay impressed by Hunt's poetry, Haydon's genius, Hazlitt's 'depth of taste.' But, we know, how the realist emerged from all his romantic obsessions.

Keats had another very curious faculty. Miss Lowell considers it to be perfectly characteristic and highly important.⁴ In Keats we find numerous examples of what the psychologists call 'organic reaction.' In the words of Miss Lowell, 'organic reaction' is "the sudden sensation of physical participation in the action of an object seen, or proper to a word pronounced. For instance, the word 'wind' will give a person with strong organic reactions a sense of being buffeted and blown up by a high wind." We do not believe that 'organic reaction' explains this particular faculty of Keats. His reactions were not only to an object seen, or a word heard; as a matter of fact, he could participate in the action of objects imagined or remembered with a fine intuition as it were. He could throw himself into certain situations or states without

(ii) A singular instinct for the objective.

¹ See his *Sonnet written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition*.

² Letter to J. H. Reynolds, Carisbrooke, April 17, 1817.

³ Letter to Thomas Keats, July 11, 1818.

⁴ Miss Lowell, *Keats*, Vol. II, p. 104.

the least wrench from his normal human nature. We shall give examples :—

In a letter to Reynolds, written from Teignmouth, dated April 27, 1818, Keats writes :—" We are here still enveloped in clouds—I lay awake last night listening to the Rain, with a sense of being drowned and rotted like a grain of wheat." Gifted as he was with more than normal organic sensibility, any attractive or emotionally appealing object would press upon his senses : he speaks of his consumptive brother Tom.¹

" I wish I could say Tom was any better. His identity presses upon me so all day that I am obliged to go out and although I intended to have given some time to study alone, I am obliged to write and plunge into abstract images to ease myself of his countenance, his voice, and feebleness—so that I live now in a continual fever."

We may compare with this—" I never was in love—yet the voice and shape of a Woman has haunted me these two days—at such a time, when the relief, the feverous relief of poetry seems a much less crime.² What we are trying to drive home by these instances is that Keats was a man of very fine sensibility as he was responsive to the reality of things in an individual way. He could not ignore the world—" the open sky sits upon our senses like a sapphire crown—the Air is our robe of State ; " ³—his senses led him to take cognisance of those very features of things which, perhaps, his early romantic mind wanted to avoid.

Now we shall try to trace—chronologically—as far as possible—this transition in Keats.

Keats of the years 1816, 1817 and 1818, was a glorious poetic apprentice. The basis of his early life was ' romantic,' not realistic, in his constant submission to the influence of personalities. Each personality, that of Hunt or Haydon or Wordsworth, was an

The Romantic basis of his life—his apprentice mind.

¹ Letter to Dilke, *Postmark*, Sept. 21, 1818.

² Letter to Reynolds, *Hampstead*, 22nd Sept., 1818.

³ Letter to Jane Reynolds, *Oxford*, 14th Sept., 1817.

object, no doubt. But Keats had not the secure detachment of a realist at first ; he threw himself heart and soul into the objects of his devotion, echoing their opinions, looking to the world through their eyes. We are not detracting from the 'originality' of Keats.¹ 'Originality' does not mean uniqueness. No man is really unique, a really unique man is a monster. Even in his 'imitations'—there are really responsive creations—he was Keats. His apprentice mind worked with a glorious agility among the thoughts and works of other master minds, gathering impressions, storing them up, using them with a disarming artistry. Even some of his most startling expressions are but distant echoes of others' utterances. We cannot indeed trace each word uttered by Keats back to the background of his own life. Mr. Murry does this, not knowing that the apprentice Keats—sensitive to all powerful influences—was, especially in the early years of his poetic career, mainly forming himself. None of his utterances is final or absolute.

Like the eternal apprentice he aspired, industriously set himself to periods of imaginary apprenticeship and toil in the hope of a future conquest of the kingdom of the earth. In his *Sleep and Poetry*² written in the autumn and winter of 1816 we find this. In his *Epistle to Reynolds*, written in March, 1818, we find another utterance³ in the same strain. In that

¹ Cp. Prof. Garrod : " He (i.e. Keats) ends, save for the odes, still a conscious imitator of the manner of other poets." *Keats* (Oxford), p. 67.

² The passage referred to is this :

" O for ten years, that I may overwhelm
Myself in poetry ; so I may do the deed
That my own soul has to itself decreed.
Then will I pass the countries that I see
In long perspective, and continually
Taste their pure fountains. First the realm I'll pass ;
Of Flora, and old Pan : etc.

³

" For in the world
We jostle—but my flag is not unfurl'd
On the Admiral-staff,—and so philosophize
I dare not yet ! etc.

passage there is no characteristic "horrid mood," as Mr. Murry would have it, or any "threat of a philosophic poetry," as Prof. Garrod puts it. It is only a characteristic apprentice utterance and means that—due to the influence of Wordsworth—Keats was often, in 1818, when he was fast ripening his powers, haunted by the ambition of composing poetry in the right philosophic strain, and found that he could not, constituted as he was, do so. These utterances bespeak a mind ever eager to answer in responsive aspiration to any high ideal of poetic achievement. This trait in Keats's character comes out again and again in his early poems and letters. We may compare his sonnet *'Written on leaving some friends at an early hour'* (winter, 1816), written one morning when Keats had left the inspiring company of Leigh Hunt and his brilliant circle—

"Give me a golden pen, and let me lean
On heap'd up flowers, in regions clear, and far ;

* * * *

"Let me write down a line of glorious tone,
And full of many wonders of the Spheres :
For what a height my spirit is contending !"

The young apothecary's apprentice, of obscure and humble origin, found out in the stimulating company of Leigh Hunt, the lion of the liberals, the great poet (so it occurred to Keats at that time) who had praised his verses and been so kind to him, that he too was destined for great things. Again in March 1817, he had seen the Elgin Marbles in the company of Haydon. It was an overpowering impression, the young apprentice was simply inspired at the sight of those magnificent creations of ancient Greece. They recalled to him his many heights of poetic ambition and the hopelessness of his endeavour to reach them. He wrote two sonnets on the Marbles, but there is not a word of objective appreciation, there is only an intense subjective reaction.

“ My spirit is too weak—Mortality
 Weighs heavily on me like unwilling sleep,
 And each imagin'd pinnacle and steep
 Of godlike hardship, tells me I must die
 Like a sick Eagle looking at the sky.

* * * *

Such dim-conceived glories of the brain
 Bring round the heart an undesirable feud ;” etc.

This apprentice-mind of Keats, at first paying blind homage to undeserving masters like Hunt and Haydon, surrounded by the atmosphere of a literary school, emerged out of this cloying practice into a bold and individualistic pre-occupation with Milton and Shakespeare, developing, gradually, a direct vision for humanity as a whole.

But we are speaking of the early Keats. The apprenticeship was an ideal state, unsuited for a direct vision of reality. It burdened Keats's soul with illusions. It had a romantic basis. It took Keats quite a long time to get rid of these illusions. Circumstances gave their agonising touches of disillusionment to his receptive mind. His illusions were so much loved by his young heart, that he was not aware of their falsehood for a long time. In Keats we find the type of the youth of all ages.

What then were these illusions ?—They were so many : his unquestioning trust in petty masters,¹ his enthusiastic belief in his own divine genius,² and his own glorious future,³ his idealisation of friends and acquaintances,⁴ his very youthful distrust of normal love,⁵ etc. All these illusions withered at the chill touch of reality. Of that later on.

¹ Cp. His Sonnet, ‘ *Great Spirits now on earth are sojourning,*’ *Dedicatory Sonnet to Hunt, Sonnets to Haydon*, those to Byron and Chatterton, etc.

² and ³ See his letter to Reynolds (March, 1817), to Hunt (May 10, 1817), to Haydon (Postmark, 13th May, 1817), etc.

⁴ Letter to Jane Reynolds, remarks about Bailey (Sept. 14, 1817), remarks about Haydon, *Epistle to G. Mathew*.

⁵ Letter to G. and G. Keats (Oct. 1818).

These illusions were romantic, because they provided, in opposition to the contrary index of reality, a subjective satisfaction to the young dreamer. Nay, by and by, he came to believe in them, to make a creed out of them, especially out of his pet theory of poetic genius. Critics of the type of Mr. Murry have accepted the speculations of Keats as gospel truth so far as his own life was concerned. But we shall explain how he came to believe in a mystic poetic genius. That was in its crude form—the deepest romantic illusion that he had. In calling it an ‘illusion’ we are challenging the post-War view of Keats the mystic. Yet truth is exacting. The discussion that follows will clear up not only this particular problem of poetic genius, but will also shed some light on the intriguing problem of ‘Keats and Shakespeare,’ and illustrate our contention that Keats had a nimble apprentice-mind.

Keats was a great deal influenced by Leigh Hunt, no doubt. But, though the biographers of Keats have not emphasised this point, the influence of Haydon the man was the most potent influence on Keats’s early poetic career. Haydon, when he met Keats at Hunt’s in November, 1816, was known as a fairly wild painter of thirty, who had bearded the Academy at the age of twenty-six, had crossed swords with so noted an authority as Bayne Knight, defended with an effective vehemence the authenticity of the Elgin Marbles, had painted and exhibited huge ‘heroic’ pictures, a ‘glorious’ and ‘gifted’ man, in short, a ‘genius.’ Keats had evidently heard much of him before he actually met him.¹ Haydon was great in the poems of his friends. Wordsworth had sent him three sonnets in a letter on December 21, 1815.² Hunt praised him in a sonnet. Keats followed with two sonnets. Reynolds echoed him in a sonnet. Haydon was everywhere compared to Raphael and Leonardo.

¹ Letter to Charles Cowden Clarke (Oct. 31, 1816), in which he calls him ‘this glorious Haydon.’

² Haydon’s *Autobiography and Journals* (World’s classics).

Keats was very much impressed by the genius of Haydon. Haydon also writes in his *Autobiography* how he, on his part 'formed a very high idea of his (Keats's) genius.' Keats sent his 'Great Spirits' sonnet to Haydon, who acknowledged the receipt in a gracious letter, and informed him that he was sending it to Wordsworth. The very idea 'put' Keats 'out of breath.'¹ Another sonnet by Keats addressed to Haydon was written early in 1817. The two Elgin Marbles sonnets—already referred to—were also written in 1817, telling us in unmistakable terms Keats's profound spiritual and artistic reactions to the Elgin Marbles and to the personality of Haydon.

Now Haydon was, if anything, an ambitious man, and he endeavoured to realise his ambition by arduous application. His *Autobiography* is full of periodical outbursts of romantic ambition to restore heroic art to its ancient glory, to revive art-feeling in England, etc. His passionate evocation of Divine grace and aid has been laughed at,² but it has all the quality of the Hebraic evocation of God, the unfailing friend and helper of the assertive hero, Haydon. Haydon was indeed the Overman of Nietzsche's dreams. He had the same self-confidence, same contempt for others, same scorn for enemies, for patrons, for authorities. He, Benjamin Robert Haydon, was, in the domain of art, what the late eclipsed Napoleon was in European politics, the man of destiny! Alone he was destined—he felt—to turn the face of historical painting altogether, and so he bought very large, unmanageable canvas and rubbed in his grand designs.

The Overman myth is an exploded myth now-a-days. Early in the Nineteenth century there was no such myth at all. But there was the 'genius' myth. It was a great thing. A 'genius' like Haydon had every right to flout and belittle his contemporaries. Lord Byron's genius burnt in a lonely satanic

¹ Letter to Haydon, 10th November, 1816.

² Colvin's *Keats* (Eng. Men of Letters).

grandeur, a trifle sad somewhere, but very bitterly scornful. Shelley's *Ædipus Tyrannus* is a peal of Aristophanic laughter at his egregious, idiotic, blundering contemporaries...

But Haydon failed, he had to commit suicide we know—the last resort of the ambitious genius whom the world does not take at his own valuation. But this failure, this ineffectuality, was significant, nay, it was symptomatic of the Romantic pathology. Byron was somewhere, we cannot say exactly where, ineffectual. So were Coleridge, Lamb, Wordsworth, Shelley. This is no blame, no jaundiced view through the spectacles of Mr. Irving Babbit.¹ The Romantics succeeded best in their proper—but unacknowledged—mission, *viz.*, self-expression in poetry. But they failed in their much advertised mission, *viz.*, upliftment of the world or reform of human society through the quiet or vehement power of prophecy of poetry. The cool head of posterity has only assigned a second-rate place to Haydon the painter. But as a romantic who worshipped his own miraculous self through his large canvases, his colossal designs, who expressed that self in a compulsive, vehement way in his *Journals* and *Autobiography*, Haydon was effectual enough.

It was this romantic self of Haydon, with its thousand creative suggestions, that confronted Keats on a day in November, 1816.

Haydon was also a man of wide interests. Latin he knew quite well, he learnt French and Italian and tried to master Greek. We know from his *Autobiography* that in 1816, when he was a young man of twenty, he was reading 'Milton and Tasso and Shakespeare in grassy nooks by the rippling sea.' He loved the classics also. In 1816, he was studying Homer, Virgil, Dante and Aeschylus 'to tune,' as he says, 'my mind to make a fine picture of Macbeth.' His interest in the plays of Shakespeare was immense. He rarely missed an opportunity

¹ Rousseau and Romanticism.

of witnessing one being staged, but he seems, like Lamb, to have been shocked by the manner in which the actors usually rendered Shakespeare.¹ Haydon's regard for Shakespeare is of special interest for us when we think of his intimate association with Keats after 1816. Before that date Haydon had painted 'Lady Macbeth listening on the Stairs' (1804), 'Macbeth, the moment before the murder of Duncan' (1809-1812), 'Romeo leaving Juliet at the break of day' (1810). Beside all these, Haydon was a writer with a powerful style, he wielded the pen with much more vigour and success than the brush. His 'pencil' was hardly 'pregnant with ethereal hues,' but his use of the 'instrument of words' was an instance of 'Creative Art.'²

Haydon infected Keats with his flaming ambition. The young apprentice's heart and mind responded almost instantaneously to his call to glory. When Keats received Haydon's letter acknowledging the receipt of the 'Great Spirits' sonnet, he wrote in reply:³ "Your letter has filled me with a proud pleasure and will be kept by me as a stimulus to exertion—I begin to fix my eyes upon one horizon." So, henceforth, he began to fix his eyes "upon one horizon," the horizon, that is, of poetic fame.

From this time began a romantic mystery in Keats's life. Up till now Keats was thinking clearly, speaking clearly, with of course the natural vagueness and uncertainty of immaturity. Henceforth, however, he would be imitating the manner of Haydon, and speak in terms of 'genius,' 'mystery' and 'soul.' Indeed, Haydon's manner of communicating information had that whispered intensity, that intimate, initiational Masonic air as would convince any impressionable young man. And Keats was impressionable. Let us examine this letter, for example, written by Haydon, sometime in March, 1817:

1 *Journal*, 30th November, 1808.

2 *Vide* Wordsworth's Sonnet, 'High is our calling friend, Creative Art,' etc.

3 November 20, 1816.

" MY DEAR KEATS,

Consider this letter a secret—often have I sat by my fire after a day's effort, as the dusk approached, and a gauzy veil seemed dimming all things—and mused on what I had done, and with a burning glow on what I would do till filled with fury I have seen faces of the mighty dead crowd into my room, and I have sunk down and prayed the great Spirit that I might be worthy to accompany these immortal beings in their immortal glories, and then I have seen each smile on me as it passed over me, and each shake his hand in awful encouragement. My dear Keats, the friends who surrounded me were sensible to what talent I had, but no one reflected my enthusiasm with that burning ripeness of soul, my heart yearned for sympathy, believe me from my soul,—in you I have found one,—you add fire when I am exhausted, and excite fury afresh—I offer my heart and intellect and experience.....I have read your " Sleep and Poetry "—it is a flash of lightning that will rouse men from their occupations, and keep them trembling for the crash of thunder that *will* follow.

God bless you ! let our hearts be buried on each other.

B. R. HAYDON."

The occasion for the writing of this letter was the publication of Keats's poems of 1817. This letter is written in a soul's language to another initiated soul. To Keats Haydon must needs unburthen himself—it was a spiritual necessity. The impressionable Keats found this language so new to his ears, he heard spell-bound. Nobody in the Hunt School talked like this. A 'sacred secret,' a soul's secret, its experience of a mystical communion ! A wild streak of lightning showed him enormous vistas.—He was spell-bound, nay, hypnotised. Haydon knew it. He knew that from Keats he got 'sympathy' in the original meaning of the term, he knew that Keats 'reflected' his enthusiasm with 'the burning ripeness of soul.' Between them they shared a great secret, soul, greatness, awful encouragement—Keats was fixing his eye upon 'one horizon'...The apprentice was looking at a distant goal. This was one illusion. Keats did not know his proper goal. The goal set up by Haydon—for which he wanted Keats to go to the country and prepare himself,

like an early Christian Apostle in the desert of Egypt¹—was of such a vast and mystic character as once accepted would discourage Keats, would have discouraged any man—in his saner moments. Keats was regularly tormented by such thoughts of discouragement.² Latterly, he outgrew this illusion.

So Haydon succeeded in almost hypnotizing Keats into believing in a magnificent future of poetic fame. Haydon achieved it mainly through that magic word 'genius'! Haydon's first impression of Keats, was, as we have seen, that he was a genius. He added *John Keats's genius* to the three things³ 'to rejoice at' in that age, which Keats had mentioned. In his posthumous description of Keats he wrote, 'A genius more truly poetical never existed.' Every time he wrote to Keats about his poetry, he did not fail to mention his 'genius.' And Keats was impressionable. A 'genius' he certainly was.

The word 'genius' has curious associations. Writing in a lighter vein Mr. Murry—of the early review days—thus describes the word.⁴

"For genius is a distinctly romantic word: it seems to imply something over and above original talent or individual style, it carries vague but impressive associations of guardian spirits and affable, familiar ghosts, and also of Mr. Mortimar King, 'who took to scorning everything and became a genius.' There is something irredeemably Byronic and Bohemian about the word. A genius is, we feel, a queer creature who is not very careful

¹ Letter to Reynolds (March, 1817).

² Cp. (i) Letter to Hunt, Margate, 10th May, 1817—"I have asked myself so often why I should be a great poet more than other men, seeing how great a thing it is,—how great things are to be gained by it, what a thing to be in the mouth of fame,—that at last the idea has grown monstrously beyond my seeming power of attainment."...

(ii) Letter to Haydon, *Postmark*, 13th May, 1817—"The Trumpet of Fame" is as a tower of strength, the ambitious bloweth it and is safe. I suppose, by our telling me not to give way to forebodings, George has mentioned to you what I have lately said in my letter to him—truth is I have been in such a state of mind as to read over my Lines and hate them. I am one that 'gathers samphire, dreadful trade'—the Cliff of Poesy towers above me.'

³ Letter to Haydon (*Postmark*, Hampstead, 10th Jan., 1818).

⁴ *Pencilings*—'On Reading Reviews.'

about his shirt, and there is something queer about his writing as well. It is unexpected and incalculable."

In fact, in Keats's time we find the word used with almost all these associations. We shall give several examples from Haydon's *Autobiography* and *Journals* (though Haydon's *Autobiography* was written in the forties, it is yet good evidence)—

(i) "My father was much plagued with apprentices who thought they were geniuses because they were idle; one, I remember, did nothing but draw and paint."

(ii) "A very modest man, of talent not amounting to genius, with a very feeble power of invention,—Bird, from Bristol,—had sent up a work," etc.

(iii) "Genius is sent into the world not to obey laws but to give them! Nature to the artist is the field he must work in." (*Journal*, Wednesday, 7th Dec., 1808.)

(iv) Of Nelson, "He had the keen eager feelings of genius." (*Journal*, 10th Jan., 1813.)

(v) "Napoleon's system was inspired by all the genius and energy of a demon."

(vi) Of Lockhart, "In L—'s melancholy and Spanish head there was evidence of genius and mischief."

In the case of Keats, the repeated use of a word of such diverse associations had a curious effect. Haydon wrote—"He was the only man I ever met who seemed and looked conscious of a high calling except Wordsworth." Coleridge met Keats once in the Millfield lane, and thought him to be "a young man of very striking countenance."¹ Another version of the same incident appears in Coleridge's *Table-talk*: "A loose, slack, not well dressed youth met Mr. Green and myself in a lane near Highgate...It was Keats." Mrs. Dilke, writing to her father-in-law, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, with whom Keats was going to stay on a visit, said: "You will find him a very odd young man, but good-tempered and good-hearted, and very clever

¹ *A Talk with Coleridge*, edited by Miss E. K. Green, *Cornhill Magazine*—April, 1917.

indeed."¹ Was it all due to the influence of this pet 'genius' theory?

"Genius," at one time, "came to be thought² as a sort of guardian angel, a higher self; and as the Greek *dæmon* was sometimes rationalized into the individual's character or temper, so also Horace half-seriously says, that only the *genius* knows what makes one person so different from another, adding that he is a god who is born and dies with each one of us. This individual *genius* was worshipped by each individual especially on his birthday." Socrates, Napoleon Bonaparte, all believed in their personal *dæmons*. It is no wonder that people like Haydon and Keats, living such high-strung lives, should come to believe something of the sort. Being called constantly a genius and to be aware of a mysterious inherent power above ordinary talents within himself, these two were related as cause and effect in the impressionable mind of Keats. It was the first step in a series of romantic logic which led up to a presiding guardian, in Shakespeare. Let us trace the steps, for it will clear up a great fallacy in post-war criticism of Keats.

Keats knew this particular meaning of the word 'genius.'

Keats and Shakespeare fallacy.

In a letter to George and Georgina Keats (March, 1819), Keats quotes Hazlitt's defence against Gifford's attack and remarks—"The manner in which this is managed.....is in a style of genius. He hath a demon, as he himself says of Lord Byron."

Early in May, 1817, Keats had written to his brother George of his constant anxiety and despair about his poetic future. George met Haydon and informed him about it. Shortly after, Haydon wrote to Keats³:

"Do not give way to forebodings. They are nothing more than the over-eager anxieties of a great spirit stretched beyond its strength, and then

¹ Mrs. Lowell, *Keats*, Vol. II.

² *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th edition, Vol. 10.

³ *Correspondence and Table-Talk*, Vol. II.

relapsing for a time to languid inefficiency. Every man of great views is thus tormented, but begin again where you left off without hesitation or fear. Trust in God with all your might, my dear Keats. This dependence, with your own energy, will give you strength, and hope and comfort. I am always in trouble, and wants, and distress ; here I found a refuge...By habitual exercise you will have habitual intercourse and constant companionship ; and at every want turn to the Great Star of your hopes with a delightful confidence that will never be disappointed..... God bless you, my dear Keats ! do not despair ; collect incident, study character, read Shakespeare, and trust in Providence, and you will do, you must."

Keats was at that time greatly troubled, his mind was seething with doubts and despair. The romantic, egotistic youth wanted support, some objective support on which he could lean. Haydon advised him to trust in God. Constituted as he was and moving in the society of sceptics like Hunt and Shelley, Keats could not whole-heartedly put his trust in God. His ambition, the goal he had put before him, was so immense. He trembled, thinking of his incapacity. He had been reading Shakespeare so industriously, his letters are full of quotations. We can count them by scores. Shakespeare to his apprentice mind was the perfect poet and the perfect man, as he was to most of the romantics. Hazlitt and Coleridge were scattering their appreciations of Shakespeare. Had not Hazlitt said, " Shakespeare is enough for us " ? ¹ Lamb also was stammering his fine intuitions. Shakespeare was constantly staged. There was the inspired actor Kean whom Keats deified.² Keats needed an objective support, a " Great Star " of his hopes, a protecting guardian angel. He wrote to Haydon in reply :³

" Thank God ! I do begin arduously where I leave off, notwithstanding occasional depressions ; and I hope for the support of a High Power while I climb this little eminence, and specially in my years of more momentous

¹ Keats quotes Hazlitt's opinion in a letter to Reynolds.

² *Op.* Keats's articles in the *Champion* on the acting of *Richard III* and *Henry VI*.

³ Letter to Haydon, *Postmark*, 18th May, 1817.

labour. I remember your saying that you had notions of a good Genius presiding over you. I have of late had the same thought, for things which (I) do half at Random are afterwards confirmed by my judgment in a dozen features of Propriety. Is it too daring to fancy Shakespeare this Presider? "

For another reason Shakespeare was at that time constantly in his mind. He continues,

When in the Isle of Wight I met with a Shakespeare in the Passage of the House at which I lodged—it comes nearer to my idea of him than any I have seen—I was but there a week, yet the old woman (the landlady) made me take it with me though I went off in a hurry. Do you not think this is ominous of good? I am glad that you say every man of Great views is at times tormented as I am."

Again, he writes,—

"I never quite despair and I read Shakespeare—indeed I shall I think never read any other book much."

Is not the connection quite clear now? Without that potent suggestion of Haydon Keats would never have speculated about Shakespeare in this way. But it was perfectly natural for him to do so. There is no mystical meaning in this acknowledgment of Keats as Mr. Murry makes it out to be,—this is pure human psychology.

Now this romantic view of Shakespeare as his guardian angel Keats did not keep up for long—as Haydon's influence on him was gradually waning. He came to understand the humanist and artist Shakespeare more and more, but this romantic attitude towards the great poet disappeared with his maturity. We find no evidence for Mr. Murry's contention that Keats's reference lay to Shakespeare at all the critical moments of his life.

Thus we have stated the romance of Keats's life as also the feeling for reality which he had.

We shall trace now the successive shocks of disillusionment which flung Keats into a veritable Slough of Despond out of

which he clambered up to the solid shore of reality. He was not, however, happy reaching there, as we shall see.

There are people who live a dream, who do not fret after romance or reality. Keats was not of them, though in holiday moods, he wanted to be like them. These holiday moods have no particular value, though attempts have been made to read a metaphysical meaning in them. The urge for reality took the shape of an urge for greater knowledge in him. He wanted to know, to feel, more and more. He was not content, the youthful

The urge for reality
—as an urge for
greater knowledge.

Keats even was not, to surrender himself entirely to his poetic moments, he saw 'beyond his bourn'—

"O Poesy ! for thee I hold my pen
That am not yet a glorious denizen
Of thy wide heaven.....
.....Also imaginings will hover
Round my fire-side, and haply there discover
Vistas of solemn beauty.....
Write on my tablets all that was permitted,
All that was for our human senses fitted.
Then the events of this wide world I'd seize
Like a strong giant.".....

Sleep and Poetry, 1816.

Keats also knew that this greater knowledge and deeper feeling would lead him to 'bid these joys farewell,' and pass them for a 'nobler life,'—

"Where I may find the agonies, the strife
Of human hearts ".....

Sleep and Poetry.

This was only a vague perception of a reality. Keats of 1816 is quite sanguine about this aspect of his future knowledge, he would joyfully welcome it. He did not know what it would mean for him.

In his *Endymion* (written during April-November, 1817)

Endymion, 1817.

Keats, the moon-mad idealist, finds in the Shepherd Prince of old Greece, a type of his own romantic quest for ideal beauty, through ideal passion. But on the way, the Prince had to suffer so much; then his sympathy for Glaucus, his self-sacrifice, and lastly, his surrender to the human love of the Indian Maiden led him to the arms of his ideal beloved. This allegory pleads for human sympathy, self-sacrifice and is 'realistic' in so far as it teaches us to seek for the ideal in the human and the particular. But *Endymion* achieves this through dream-journeys, miracles and magic amidst romantic surroundings. This 'axiom of his philosophy' (*i. e.*, knowledge of reality or truth), Keats proved not by arguments, but with glowing pictures of unimaginable regions, flights of fancy and enchantment of music. His voice is not yet sad. There is no sundering of the ideal from the actual.

In April, 1817, when *Endymion* was begun, Keats was still the dedicated being, he had no existence outside poetry.¹ He was feverish, despairing, thinking of the great goal he had set before him. *Endymion's* momentary despair might have been a reflection of the despair of the young poet at 'the seeming power of attainment' being so much inadequate for his great goal. His life was then a continuous torment. He wanted to write so much, but found that he could not create to the measure set up by his ambitious soul. He suffered, he knew by flashes, because of this ambition, because of his romantic self. The romantic self wants to impose itself upon the real scheme of things, romance belittles reality. The Nemesis comes in the form of disillusionment.

The shocks of disillusionment were coming. We know how the high poetic standard set by Keats to himself was influenced

¹ Letter to Reynolds (April 18th, 1817)—'I find I cannot exist without poetry—without eternal Poetry. Half the day will not do—the whole of it—I began with a little, but habit has made me a Leviathan. I had become all in a Tremble for not having written anything of late,' etc. This was 'the Demon Poesy' seizing him heart and soul.

a great deal by his early masters like Hunt, Hazlitt, Haydon, etc. Haydon had been telling him repeatedly not to listen to Hunt, not even to show him his poems. Keats could not but listen to Haydon. Besides, he himself discovered the bad traits of Hunt and his circle. He writes to Bailey :¹

“ Everybody seems at loggerheads. There’s Hunt infatuated—there’s Haydon’s picture in statu quo—There’s Hunt walks up and down his painting room—criticising every head most unmercifully. There’s Horace Smith tired of Hunt. ‘The web of our life is of mingled yarn’...I am quite disgusted with literary men and will never know another except Wordsworth—no, not even Byron.”

The reference to Wordsworth is interesting. It was mostly through Bailey’s influence during his stay at Oxford that Keats came to have such a high regard for Wordsworth. He could also see the feet of clay of the giant Haydon. In that same letter Keats is quite bitter in his protest against Hunt. He was known in literary circles as a disciple of Hunt²; while writing *Endymion* he carefully kept out of the pale of Hunt’s influence. Hunt had unfavourably criticised the poem in private talks. Keats writes—

“ You see Bailey how independent my writing has been. Hunt’s dissuasion was of no avail—(I refused to visit Shelley that I might have my own unfettered scope)—and after all, I shall have the reputation of Hunt’s élève. His corrections and amputations will by knowing ones be traced in the poem.”

So, towards the end of 1817, Keats was asking for ‘unfettered scope.’ He was trying to discard the neophyte’s garment, at least he did not like the idea of being a neophyte of the petty poet Hunt. Together with greater knowledge of men and manners, his self was emerging from the bondage of

The two movements
—greater knowledge
and emergence of
self.

¹ Hampstead, October 8, 1817.

² How widespread this idea was may be seen from the fact that in the attack on Keats which appeared in the *Quarterly Review* (No. XXXVII) in April, 1818, Keats was called ‘a copyist of Mr. Hunt’ at a time when he had far outgrown Hunt’s influence.

tutelage. His knowledge was leading him to the inevitable 'Slough of Despond,' while his consciousness of an emergent self was endowing him with power and direct vision.

But in Keats, there was no straight line of development. His letter to Bailey, written in November, 1817, in which he details his views 'regarding the holiness of the Heart's affections,' and 'the truth of Imagination,' we have already discussed. Keats means to say that he would never be a 'reasoner,' that he would love 'a life of Sensations'...He did not know that the reasoners take to the abstract view of things, while it is the man of sensation (or intuition) who touches, nay, penetrates into the concrete and the real. He also did not know that his 'love of philosophy' was a by-product of his 'sensations,' because his 'sensations' made him insistently aware of realities, and by his growing knowledge he was systematizing them. Otherwise, he would not be happy, 'the fever and the fret' of life would be too much for him, if they would not be referred to any 'standard law.'¹

His letter to Bailey contains one or two remarkable utterances also. He announces, for one thing, his momentary nature, his power of surrendering to himself objective existence: "I scarcely remember counting upon any happiness—I look not for it if it be not in the present hour,—nothing startles beyond the moment. The setting sun will always set me to rights, or if a sparrow comes before my window, I take part in its existence." This rather bold statement was not really representative of Keats's feeling at that time. It was some sort of an ideal set by him before himself. Out of this, he elaborated a strain of thought, all too significant for us.

Two important
utterances regarding
(1) his own character,
and,

The second truth that Keats says is this—

"The first thing that strikes me on hearing a misfortune having befallen another is this—'Well, it cannot be helped; he will have

¹ *Epistle to Reynolds.*

the pleasure of trying the resources of his spirit'—and I beg now, my dear Bailey, that hereafter should you observe anything cold in me not to put it to the account of heartlessness, but abstraction".....

Now this 'abstraction,' a kind of escape in reverie from the pressing facts of reality, Keats will enter again and again. Next, he will solve the problem of evil and misfortune—a most important problem to the realist who cannot explain
 (ii) the problem of evil. them away like the idealist or the mystic—by reference to the subjective good, 'trying the resources of the spirit,' which adversity would bring about.¹

So then, by the end of 1817, we find several movements going on in Keats's inner life. There was, for one thing, a craving for greater knowledge ; then a dawning consciousness of an emergent self out of the shackles of 'influences' and tutelage sharpened by disillusionments ; also, a gradual awareness of some problems of reality, and tentative attempts at solving them. There was also his antagonism to 'consecutive reasoning,' and in his conviction about 'the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of imagination'—'what the Imagination seizes or Beauty must be Truth'—a subjective explanation of 'Truth' and a tacit denial of the truth of the extra-human and the purely objective. This was perhaps no illusion. Yet, Keats had to come down from this extreme position before long. There was also a vision of the Slough of Despond. Writing to Reynolds in November, 1817, he anticipates his remarks to Bailey, about the problem of misfortune—"Why don't you, as I do, look unconcerned at what may be called more particularly Heart-Vexations ? They never surprise me—Lord ! a man should have the fine point of his soul taken off to become fit for the world."

The year 1817 closes with Keats's letter to his brothers (Dec. 28). Therein we find a further elaboration of the

¹ We may compare with this Keats's ideas about the handling of the ugly in art. We have already discussed this point. See p. 11.

thought expressed in his letter to Bailey, *viz.*, that he is of the moment momentary, nothing startles him beyond the moment. To his brothers he says that Shakespeare, the greatest man of genius, possessed this quality. He was discussing it with Dilke :

The Negative Capability and Reality.

“ At once it struck me what quality went to form a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean *Negative Capability*, that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” It simply means that a great poet can surrender himself to the feeling or impression of a moment, can ‘express’ it in his art, without caring for factual truth or rational arguments, because ‘nothing startles him beyond the moment.’ There are bad poets who cannot do so. “ Coleridge, for instance,” continues Keats (he is thinking of the later Coleridge), “ would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty (*i.e.*, of the moment, being ‘seized’ by Imagination) overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration.” Now this opinion of Keats is by no means his final opinion about poetic genius, though some critics would go so far as to fix it as a motto for Keats’s life. Our reason is this : Keats would very soon come to know that the great poet’s surrender to the objective is no negation of fact or reason. Rather, his knowledge of fact or reason, of every fact or every reason, forms an essential part of his equipment, his vision of reality is no passive half-knowledge, but a positive, full realisation of it. The great poet’s sense of Beauty of the moment is the essence the final flowering of a continuous process of intellectual realisation.

But Keats was very far indeed, in practice, from what he preached in theory in December, 1817. He was indeed ‘startled’ beyond the moment, he was thinking of ‘before and after.’

His song '*In Drear-Nighted December*' was composed in December 1817. In it, he contrasts the lot of thinking man with that of the 'happy, happy tree' and of the 'bubbling brook,' who in winter, never think of their happy summer time and become unhappy.—The poet regrets—

“ Ah : would 't were so with many
A gentle girl and boy !
But were there ever any
Writh'd not at passed joy ?
To know the change and feel it,
When there is none to heal it,
Nor numbed sense to steel it,
Was never said in rhyme.”

Here we have a tacit admission of the fact that man is unhappy because of his 'Self' that miraculous, memorising, thinking self, which does not surrender itself to the objective sensation of pleasure or sorrow, without any reaching after fact or reason, which has not in short, any *Negative Capability*. Keats's idea of this negative capability would develop until he would come to the annihilation of Self, and lastly, to 'disinterestedness.'

Let us resume our narrative.

On Friday, Jan. 23 (1818), Keats expresses in a letter to his brothers his disgust at the unseemly quarrel between Hunt, Haydon and Reynolds, and also his view that "the works of genius are the finest things by God." He also expresses his admiration for Wordsworth's *Excursion*, 'Haydon's pictures' and 'Hazlitt's depth of taste.'¹ His friendship and regard for Haydon are yet almost as strong as ever. He praises the 'disinterestedness' of Bailey, an ideal quality for a man.

On Jan. 22, however, his sonnet *On sitting down to read 'King Lear'* once again was composed.² In it he bids fare-

¹ See *ante*, pp. 8-9.

For an interpretation, see *ante*, pp. 8-9.

well to 'Romance,' because he must 'burn through' 'the fierce dispute betwixt damnation and impassion'd clay.' He was thinking of 'Romance' as different from passionate, real humanity. He does not like to wander in a 'barren dream.'

This ideal experience of human suffering prompts him to write to Bailey, on the next day ¹—"One saying of yours I shall never forget...merely you said, 'why should woman suffer?' Aye, why should she? 'By heaven, I'd coin very soul, and drop my Blood for Drachma.'² These things are, and he, who feels how incompetent the most skyeey knight-errantry is to heal this bruised fairness, is like a sensitive leaf on the hot hand of thought." Here is a rather new strain,³ a new humanitarianism. Keats's knowledge of evil and suffering made his sympathies acute for

A new humanitarian
sympathy for the
sufferers.

the sufferers, his intellectual solution—"trying the resources of the spirit"—he did not always remember, nor could he, with his sympathy, achieve so early that detachment which would make him look at this problem from a philosophic distance and with a spiritual calm. He also prays in that very letter for toleration. Men have faults—but we must know these and knowing behave as such, we must not blame them. Keats was indeed gathering wisdom in the midst of life. He writes aptly to his brother on the same day—"Nothing is finer for the purposes of great productions than a very gradual ripening of intellectual powers."

Before the month was over he composed his sonnet, *When I have fears*, etc. This sonnet is full of a spirit of restlessness akin to despair, a projection of thought into the future and anticipation of failure, as also of that feeling expressed in the *Drear Nighted December*, that love cannot be enjoyed 'in an unreflecting manner' for long, that the memory of it haunts us.⁴ It

¹ Letter to Bailey, Friday, Jan. 23, 1818.

² *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, sc. iii, Brutus exhorting Cassius that he should much rather do this than extort money out of poor people.

³ Cp. *Sleep and Poetry*, his view of poetry. See p. 47.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 39-40.

was only the self, the romantic ego, that concentrated microcosm, which was torturing itself.

Very naturally in his letter to Reynolds¹ he is passionate in his protest against the egotistic philosophy of Wordsworth. "For the sake of a few fine imaginative or domestic passages, are we to be bullied into a certain philosophy engendered in the whims of an Egotist? We hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us. Poetry should be great and unobtrusive, a thing which enters into one's soul, and does not startle or amaze it with itself, but with its subject".....It is only another way of saying that poetry should be objective, poets should surrender

Criticism of Wordsworth.

themselves to the calm of the objective, they should not mar the right view of things with a startling philosophy. In this respect, Keats compares the Elizabethan poets with the modern poets. He was no doubt remembering Shakespeare. We notice how intimately Keats's speculations about poetry were bound up with his experiences and knowledge of reality. He cries—"I will cut all this—I will have no more of Wordsworth or Hunt in particular." Where is gone his admiration for the *Excursion*? He was somewhat disillusioned by coming into contact with Wordsworth during his stay in London. His self was indeed emerging out of all bondages. But of course, the rejection of Wordsworth was not complete.² Wordsworth was yet to teach Keats much.³

He was gaining knowledge, gathering experience. But now and then that old indolent mood would come when he would

Holiday moods.

luxuriate with his fancies. These were indeed holiday moods, moods of escape from reality. Such moods would occur again and again as Keats's disheartening knowledge would grow more and more. He preached a passivity,

¹ Feb. 3rd, 1818.

² Cp. 'I am sorry that Wordsworth has left a very bad impression wherever he visited in town by his egotism, vanity and bigotry. Yet he is a great poet if not a philosopher.' Letter to brothers, 21st Feb. 1828. Cp. also letter to Haydon, July 10, 1819.

³ See pp. 50-1.

an indolent receptive attitude of the intellect. He wrote to Reynolds on Feb. 19, 1818.—“Now it is more noble to sit like Jove than to fly like Mercury—let us not therefore go hurrying about and collecting honey, bee-like buzzing here and there impatiently from a knowledge of what is to be aimed at; but let us open our leaves like a flower and be passive and receptive—budding patiently under the eye of Apollo, and taking hints from every noble insect that favours us with a visit—sap will be given us for meat and dew for drink. I was led into these thoughts, my dear Reynolds,” Keats continues, “by the beauty of the morning operating on a sense of Idleness—I had not read my Books—the Morning said I was right—I had no idea but of the morning, and the thorn said I was right—seeming to say”—(he quotes his poem *What the thrush said*—)

“O fret not after knowledge—I have none,
And yet my song comes native with the warmth.
O fret not after knowledge—I have none,
And yet the Evening listens.”...

Keats knew however that “all this is mere sophistication to excuse my own indolence.”

Keats's three axioms of poetry, written to Taylor,¹ do not add much to our knowledge. He says that he understands Shakespeare to his depths, and his is an ‘objective’ theory of poetry. The main point is that the self of the poet must be hidden out of sight, poetry should be something spontaneous, objective and full.

His letter to Bailey, written from Devonshire (March 13, 1818), contains that significant sentence,
Human sympathy—
Isabella. “Scenery is fine—but human nature is finer—

¹ Feb. 27, 1818. (1) That poetry should surprise by a fine excess, not by singularity, and appear to the readers almost as a remembrance, (2) that its imagery should be full and calm, and that (3) it should come as naturally as leaves to a tree.

the sword is richer for the tread of a real nervous English foot—the Eagle's nest is finer, for the Mountaineer has looked into it." We know that between February and April of 1818, his *Isabella*, a poem full of passionate human sympathy, craving for justice and human consideration, was written. That is a distinct advance upon his *Sleep and Poetry* with its theoretical humanism, and *Endymion* with its idealism and romantic pursuit. His letter to Bailey contains a pessimistic remark—"I am sometimes so very sceptical as to think Poetry itself a mere Jack o'Lantern to amuse whoever may chance to be struck with its brilliance." The association of the romantic and the poetic was to the maturing Keats a very disheartening thing. He thought perhaps that the medium of poetry could not be a fit thing for his expression of the realities of life. He wanted his poetry to be real, just as 'passages of Shakespeare' are real. The famous classification of things real, semi-real, and nothings follows.¹ That was another advance, for Keats was conceding *reality* to objective presences, thinking it apart from the subjective. His sonnet, *The Human Seasons*, written about this time illustrates this illusive play of the subjective in various stages of human life.

Association of 'poetry' and 'Romance'—a mistake.

That wistful holiday mood comes back again. Keats writes to Rice²—"What a happy thing it would be if we could settle our thoughts and make up our minds upon any matter in five minutes, and remain content, that is, build a sort of mental cottage of feelings, quiet and pleasant—to have a sort of philosophical back garden, and cheerful holiday-keeping front one. But alas! this never can be"...In his *Epistle to John Hamilton Reynolds* (or *Reminiscences of Claude's Enchanted Castle*) that same thought is expressed. He wants to forget the before and after, forget reality, surrendering to the moment of beauty! His knowledge

A holiday mood.

¹ We have already discussed this, see p. 14.

² March 24, 1818.

of reality he cannot bring into a philosophical system—

“ Oh, never will the prize,
High reason, and the love of Good and ill,
Be my award ; Things cannot to the will
Be settled, but they tease us out of thought.”

He cannot have a calm knowledge of things, he cannot impose a philosophy on them by his will, experiences of reality ‘tease him out of thought’! The romantic does not know whither to turn—

“ Or is it that imagination brought
Beyond its proper bound, yet still confin’d
Lost in a sort of Purgatory blind,
Cannot refer to any standard in law
Of either earth or heaven ? ”

The romantic, brought beyond his proper bounds by his knowledge of reality, cannot keep a firm grasp on things. He suffers intensely, he is bewildered. Naturally, he cries—just as he wrote to Rice—

“ It is a flaw
In happiness, to see beyond our bourn,—
It forces us in summer skies to mourn,
It spoils the singing of the Nightingale.”

No knowledge, he cries, because knowledge makes him so sad, knowledge makes him aware of the untruth of his ‘Romance,’ it tells him that the glory of the summer sky is momentary, that the song of the Nightingale has no significance. Such is the penalty of seeing ‘beyond one’s bourn’...

It is the veritable ‘Slough of Despond.’ Keats’s knowledge sharpens his insight, and what does he find in the scheme of things —

The Slough of Des-
pond.

“ Dear Reynolds! I have a mysterious tale
And cannot speak it ; the first page I read
Upon a Lampit rock of green sea-weed
Among the breakers ; ’twas a quiet eve,
The rocks were silent, the wide sea did weave
An untumultuous fringe of silver foam

Among the flat brown sand ; I was at home
 And should have been most happy,—but I saw
 Too far into the sea, where every maw
 The greater on the less feeds evermore.—
 But I saw too distinct into the core
 Of an eternal fierce destruction,
 And so from happiness I was far gone.
 Still am I sick of it, and though, to-day
 I've gather'd young spring-leaves, and flowers gay
 Of periwinkle and wild strawberry,
 Still do I that most fierce destruction see,—
 The shark at savage prey,—the Hawk at pounce,—
 The gentle Robin, like a Pard or Ounce,
 Ravening a worm,—Away, ye horrid moods.

So this is the penalty of seeing 'beyond one's bourn.' Keats was of course to get out of this Slough, by his deeper realisation of the truth of things and achieve some sort of artistic detachment.

The next letter written by Keats to Reynolds (April 9, 1818) is full of his hatred for the public—he was still the 'genius' of Haydon's dream—"I have no feel of stooping, I hate the idea of humility to them." He has not, he says, 'the slightest feel of humility towards the public—or to anything in existence; but the eternal Being, the Principle of Beauty, and the Memory of great Men.' So, he would write a preface for his *Endymion*, without any concession or sign of humility towards the public. He would much rather go without a preface. It is almost a Byron speaking. But the wise Keats was fast dropping the accoutrements of the legendary genius. In the next letter to Reynolds (10th April, 1818), we know that he had written a very humble and conciliatory preface.¹

¹ The preface of *Endymion* (published in April, 1818), contains utterances like—"knowing within myself the manner in which the poem has been produced, it is not without a feeling of regret that I make it public.

"What manner I mean, will be quite clear to the reader, who must soon perceive great inexperience, immaturity, and every error denoting a feverish attempt, rather than a deed accomplished."

This preface, written about this time, contains a very significant passage—

“The imagination of a boy is healthy, and the mature imagination of a man is healthy, but there is a space of life between, in which the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick-sighted.”...

Here, we believe, there is a distinct reference to the ‘Slough of Despond’ in which Keats was at that time. He believed that the defects in his poem were due to this. But this Slough of Despond had in its depth a great thing for him, from its heart he was to win his philosophic realisation of reality.

Keats’s growing humanitarianism we have already noticed.

Growing humanita-
rianism.

Now this feeling is taking a definite shape. Writing to Taylor¹ he says,

“I find there is no worthy pursuit but the idea of doing some good to the world. Some do it with their society—some with their wit—some with their benevolence—there is but one way for me. The road lies through application, study and thought. I will pursue it, and for that end purpose retiring for some years.”

So he is setting a direction to his artistic powers, because of his growing interest in humanity. Not that this ideal was ever absent from his vision. As early as 1816, he wrote in *Sleep and Poetry*, that :—

“The great end
Of poesy, that it should be a friend
To soothe the cares, and lift the thoughts of men.”

But then it was a mere apprentice-echo of Wordsworth. Even the above utterance, coming from a maturer Keats, is partially that of an apprentice. For one thing, Keats did not retire for some years, though he was quite serious with regard to his aim. He also forgot that poetry cannot have a conscious humanitarian purpose ; its direct and proper aim should be artistic expression. Secondly, Keats is still very much under the monastic ideal set

¹ Teignmouth, Friday, 24th April, 1818.

by Haydon. But he diagnoses his mental state correctly—"I have been hovering for some time between an exquisite sense of

the luxurious, and a love of philosophy—were
 Love of knowledge.

I calculated for the former, I should be glad. But as I am not, I shall turn all my soul to the latter." This 'love of philosophy' is nothing but a yearning for greater knowledge of reality, and this 'exquisite sense of the luxurious' is of course his indolent holiday mood of escapist enjoyment. We have noticed what they are. Now, the young poet takes his courage in his hands and boldly declares that, no matter how much he may suffer, no matter how much he may lose, he would dedicate himself to his 'love of philosophy.'

His next letter, written to Reynolds (April, 27, 1818), is full of this his new zeal for his 'love of philosophy.' On May 3, however, he writes a most remarkable letter to Reynolds. In it, there is, first of all, his mature view of knowledge—

"Every department of knowledge we see excellent and calculated towards a great whole—I am so convinced of this that I am glad at not having given away my medical Books....An extensive knowledge is needful to thinking people—it takes away the heat and fever; and helps, by widening speculation, to ease the Burden of the Mystery,¹ a thing which I begin to understand a little..."

Knowledge gave him security in a world where experience of many hitherto unknown aspects of life was breeding in him a sense of fear and doubt. The 'Burden of the Mystery,' was, as

The Burden of the
 Mystery.

Wordsworth paraphrased it in his *Tintern Abbey*, 'the heavy and weary weight of all this unintelligible world.' Keats was understanding a little this burden which was weighing upon him.

¹ From Wordsworth's *Lines written above Tintern Abbey*--

"That blessed mood,
 In which the burthen of the mystery
 In which the heavy and the weary weight
 Of all this unintelligible world,
 Is lightened."

Keats quotes to Reynolds his fragmentary *Ode written on May Day* (or *Ode to Maia*). That fragment is important in so far as it throws some light on the mental condition of Keats at that time. Gone was the high-flaming ambition, the 'genius-loving heart'¹ of old days. He addresses 'Maia,' 'the Mother of Hermes' and wants to seek her smiles—

“ Seek as they once were sought, in Grecian isles,
By bards who died content on pleasant sward
Leaving great verse unto a little clan.”

He prays—

“ O, give me their old vigour, and unheard
Save of the quiet Primrose, and the span
Of heaven and few ears
Rounded by thee, my song should die away
Content as theirs,
Rich in the simple worship of a day.—”

This beautiful little fragment enshrining a rare mood of content attracts us a great deal. This mood will come again to Keats gazing on the stubble plains.² This mood of content has for its basis a greater knowledge of things, it is due to a secure hold on reality. Keats is humble in his knowledge, he wants only a select audience, a 'little clan' for the 'great verse' that he would write. There is a sense of dedication over this calm breath of prayer. But this calmness was only an oasis in a desert of burning sands.

Reynolds had written to Keats in a pessimistic strain, "I fear there is little chance of anything else in life." Keats comments—"You seem by that to have been going through with a more painful and acute zest the same labyrinth that I have—I have come to the same conclusion thus far." That is to say, Keats was not yet out of the Slough of Despond. He then con-

¹ *Epistle to George Felton Mathew.*
Ode to Autumn.

siders Wordsworth's genius and compares him with Milton from the standpoint of 'Humanity.' He makes a very pregnant remark—"Axioms of philosophy are not axioms till they are proved upon our pulses. We read fine things, but never feel them to the full until we have gone the same steps as the author."...(We may recollect his *Sonnet on King Lear*.) Indeed, no man had a greater right to promulgate this truth. All that Keats learnt of life and reality, that fine knowledge was struck out of him by unrelenting circumstances,—it was but the essence of his keen experiences. "Until we are sick, we understand not," continues Keats; "in fine, as Byron says, 'knowledge is sorrow,' and I go on to say 'sorrow is wisdom'—and further, for aught we can know for certainty, 'Wisdom is folly.'" The various strains of thought in Keats are clear here. He knows the great value of experience, he the sensuous man; without experience there is no real knowledge. But our experiences leave us often very sad, 'sorrow is wisdom,' cries Keats. But instantaneously there is the reaction—he is not yet out of the great Slough of Despond. Wisdom may after all be folly. His 'ways of life' were really 'uncertain.'¹

Then, in order to discuss Wordsworth's vision of humanity fully, he introduces his famous simile of human life, that is, as he says, "to the point to which I say we both (Keats and Reynolds) have arrived." He proceeds,—

Keats's simile of
human life exam-
ined.

"I compare human life to a large Mansion of many apartments, two of which I can only describe, the doors of the rest being as yet shut upon me. The first we step into we call the infant, or Thoughtless Chamber, in which we remain as long as we do not think. We remain there a long while and notwithstanding the doors of the second chamber remain wide open, showing a bright appearance, we care not to hasten to it; but are at length imperceptibly impelled by the awakening of the thinking principle within us,—we no sooner get

¹ Preface to *Endymion*.

into the second chamber, which I shall call the Chamber of Maiden-Thought, than we become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere. we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in delight. However, among the effects this breathing is father of is that tremendous one of sharpening one's vision into the heart and nature of Man—of convincing one's nerves that the world is full of Misery and Heart-break, Pain, Sickness, and Oppression—whereby this Chamber of Maiden-Thought becomes gradually darkened, and at the same time, on all sides of it, many doors are set open—but all dark—all leading to dark passages. We see not the balance of good and evil ; we are in a mist. *We* (Keats and Reynolds) are now in that state, we feel the 'Burden of the Mystery.' To this point was Wordsworth come, as far as I can conceive when he wrote 'Tintern Abbey,' and it seems to me that his genius is explorative of those dark passages. Now if we live, and go on thinking, we too shall explore them."

Taken with its proper context, this passage needs no comment. The wonder is that Keats was, by dint of a singular gift of introspection, aware of his mental development. He was quite convinced of the fact that he would get over this 'Burden of the Mystery'—that the 'Slough of Despond' would be crossed.

Towards the end of the letter, there is another startling remark. "Tom has spit a *leetle* blood this afternoon,¹ and that is rather a damper—but I know—the truth is, there is something real in the world." He repeats what he had said in the preceding sentence, "After all there is certainly something real in the world. Moore's present to Hazlitt is real," etc. Keats was looking beyond the great Slough, he could see the shore, which was beyond Tom's impending death, beyond all suffering, noble like Moore's present to Hazlitt, with a depth of human significance. Not that the real held any glad promise of happiness for him, but it was significant, enduring.

¹ Tom was consumptive and was at that time lying in a precarious state.

Some momentous
events in his life, and
the reactions.

In the meantime things were moving quickly for Keats; poverty loomed large in the horizon, George Keats married and was departing for America with his wife. Keats decided to go on his intended 'pedestrian tour' to Scotland, which would ultimately prove fatal for his health. Tom, in Keats's own words, was 'in a lingering state' 'with an exquisite love of life.' He wrote to Bailey (June 10, 1818), in a gloomy strain, "were it my choice, I would reject a petrarchal coronation—on account of my dying day, and because women have cancers.¹ I should not by right speak in this tone to you for it is an incendiary spirit that would do so. Yet I am old enough or magnanimous enough to annihilate self." No, he would not do so, as yet, though he felt at the time that the only remedy for his sufferings would be an annihilation of self, of the subjective, of the ego. At that time he had more than his share of suffering. He writes, "Life must be undergone, and I certainly derive some consolation from the thought of writing one or two more poems before it ceases." It is not a young hopeful poet speaking, he is 'writing old.'² On July 1st, 1818, he writes his sonnet on *Visiting the Tomb of Burns* which contains that stricture against the subjective—

"The real of Beauty, free from that dead hue,
Sickly Imagination, and sick pride
Cast war upon it:"³

Writing to Reynolds on 11th July from Scotland, he gives his idea of love. Reynolds had fallen in love and was going to be married. Keats, so long thinking of elements in terms of wife and children, now speaks—

Thought of love.

¹ See *ante*, Keats's letter to Bailey.

² The reference is to Mrs. Browning's famous estimate of Keats in her *Aurora Leigh*, "By Keats's soul...that nearly all young poets should write old."

³ See *ante*, p. 10.

"Things like these, and they are real, have made me resolve to have a care of my health—You must be as careful." That he was rather given to the thought of women and love at that time, we know from another letter written to Bailey.¹

The exhausting walking tour told upon Keats's health. He returned to London in August. The August number of *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* came out with the notorious attack upon Keats. It was followed by the attack in *The Quarterly*. It would be mere hero-worship to say that Keats did not feel anything. He felt and he felt bitterly. There was another thing. Tom was worse. Keats had to write and plunge into abstract images to ease himself of his countenance, his voice, and feebleness.² Keats was living in a continual fever. Very bitterly he says to Dilke, "It must be poisonous to life...Imagine 'the hateful siege of contraries'—

Poetry, as an escape
from reality: *Hyperion*
begun.

If I think of fame, of poetry, it seems a crime to me, and yet I must do so or suffer." Poetry, and thoughts of poetry offered him an escape from the pressing realities surrounding him. Next morning (2nd September) he wrote to Reynolds: "This morning poetry has conquered—I have relapsed into those abstractions which are my only life—and I am thankful for it." It was at this time, perhaps, that *Hyperion*, a very 'abstract' poem, was begun.³ Keats was plunging into abstractions, but into his *Hyperion* he carried the agony, the chill realization of failure and the passion of grief of his real life. In the poem his sorrow becomes sculptural, huge, Titanesque.

But Keats tried to get the better of it.

Keats's letter to Hessey (dated October 9, 1818) is full of high resolutions and lofty courage. He says that praise or blame can have only a 'momentary effect' on him, because his 'love of

¹ July 18, 1818.

² Letter to Dilke, *Postmark*, Sept. 21, 1818.

³ Sir Sidney Colvin and Mr. Murry support this view, though Miss Lowell opposes it.

beauty in the abstract ' has made him a severe critic of his own work. He writes, " I will write independently —I have written independently—*without judgment*. I may write independently, and with *judgment*, hereafter. The Genius of poetry must work out its own salvation in a man: It cannot be matured by law and precept, but by sensation and watchfulness itself. That which is creative must create itself...I was never afraid of failure; for I would sooner fail than be among the greatest." True words, there is no questioning them. But there is in them a lofty scorn not free from the suspicion of the Haydonian Genius theory. Keats—a realist now—feels it. " But I'm getting into a rant," he says. This is a curious personal commentary on his own resolutions! Whenever his ' Self ' assumes prominence with its illusions Keats lays the frosty finger of realistic judgment on it. The self must be ' annihilated.' It was emerging from bondage and influence and tutelage, it was assuming an independent identity. Quite true. But it must not impose itself on the scheme of things. It must be ' annihilated ' so that the great Objective may find full recognition.

This indeed is the text of his next letter, written to Woodhouse. He is writing to Woodhouse ' two principal points ' about ' genius,' ' achievement,' ' ambition,' etc. " 1st. As to the poetical character itself (I mean that sort, of which, if I'm anything, I am a member; that sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian, or egotistical sublime...), it is not itself—it has no Self—It is everything and nothing—It has no character, it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated. It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen (That is, it is 'Shakespearean,' 'objective,' 'detached'). What shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the Chameleon Poet." It does no harm from its relish

The emergent self
of the poet.

' The poetical
character.

of the dark side of things, any more than from its taste for the bright one, because they both end in speculation. Keats means to say, that, to the detached and disinterested poet, the ugly as also the bright are only stuff for 'speculation,' for detached intellectual estimate in the scheme of values. He is not aroused to any passionate joy or grief by them. If he is, he is not a great poet, he has an assertive self, he has not been able to 'annihilate' his self. Keats makes this point quite clear. "A poet is the most unpoetical of anything in existence, because he has no Identity—he is continually in for and filling so me other body." He describes how he loses himself in his objective speculation: "When I am in a room with people, if I ever am free from speculating on creations of my own brain, then, not myself goes home to myself, but the identity of every one in the room begins to press upon me, so that I am in a very little time annihilated." He means to say that now and then he can effectually surrender himself to the objective, can forget his own assertive individuality. Of course, he is not always free from the clutches of himself, he admits. He is elaborating that theory of 'Negative Capability.'¹

The second thing that he says is about his aim in life: "I am ambitious of doing the world some good: if I should be spared, that may be the work of maturer years—in the interval I will assay to reach as high a summit in poetry as the nerve bestowed on me will suffer." So, he is not thinking of

New ambition, distrust for poetry.

'doing some good' to the world through poetry only. He wants to be, in his 'maturer years,' a man of action. Indeed Keats was often—as we have seen before—associating poetry with 'Romance,' with that ineffectual dreaming part of himself. Naturally, now and then, he was full of distrust as to the efficacy of poetry as a means to some humanitarian end. But he was striking out a genuine artistic

¹ See *ante*, pp. 39-40.

standpoint for himself. He would not think of applause—"I feel assured I should write from the mere yearning and fondness I have for the beautiful, even if my night's labours should be burnt every Morning, and no eye ever shine upon them." This is in the mood of *Ode to Maia*. It is a 'maturer' Keats speaking. The creative artist would do his work of creation led by his own artistic impulse. But this same attitude did not last for long. Keats would get a glimpse of truth, and organise his attitudes thereby; but he would be swayed by some contrary sets of circumstances immediately after. It was not for him to find a sanctuary for himself in any moment's organisation.

Thomas Keats died early in December. And here another crisis of his life comes.

Keats's long journal letter written to George and Georgina Keats (October, 1818) hints at his preoccupation with the 'Idea of Woman' and love, as also his affected contempt for women. He speaks confidently of his 'powers for poetry.' Another journal letter, begun in December, 1818, and completed in January, 1819, contains detailed information regarding himself. And for the first time he mentions Fanny Brawne. There is not a word of love about her, but we know that even before this, Keats had fallen hopelessly in love with Miss Brawne! To his friends he was quite the same old Keats, though within him a storm was blowing. He had up till now dreamed of love, mocked at it; but now there was love in flesh and blood before him. It is no good reviling Fanny Brawne. There could be no question of her fitness. For a man of Keats's temperament even an angelic creature would have been unfit. And Keats's love was the last terrific experience which moulded him out of a half-hearted romanticist into a full-fledged realist. He now knew what human life was. Of course this experience exacted a price which he was not ready to pay. His power of resistance was not sufficiently strong. But he struggled hard to keep down his desires. Excepting Brown, no

Keats's love.

other friend knew exactly what was the matter with him for a long time. This enormous experience was the last rite in the initiation through fire and water that would make him a realist able to see life steadily and see it whole. All his pompous assumptions and self-deceptions were torn to shreds before this passion. Had Keats outlived this experience, perhaps he would have been what we now-a-days think of him as capable of becoming. The last months of his life should not be critically reviewed, because a dying man with no prospect, no hope before him, full of a delicate sensitiveness, is apt to be rather extreme in his utterances and desires. However we are anticipating events.

We come over to the year 1819, the *annus mirabilis* of Keats's poetic career. We have noticed how A craving for solitude—its significance. Keats had wanted quietness, solitude, retirement. Towards the end of the year 1818, he had written to Haydon, "My general Life in Society is silence." Again, "I should say I value more the privilege of seeing great things in loneliness than the fame of a prophet." This is almost the language of his *Ode to Maia*. We shall find how this craving for silence and solitude would occur again and again in Keats's letters. Keats was fast arranging his impressions of life. The memory of a brother's death, a harrowing love, poverty, despair about the future, all these linked an inexorable chain of suffering around him. Keats was maturing in silence. What a life it was! He compressed within the span of a few years the long-drawn-out history of any 'three score and ten' years.

The month of January was a fairly busy month for him. *Hyperion* was continued: he was working on the poem up till April. *The Eve of St. Agnes*, A busy month—his poems. which is full of the young lover's ardent worship of sensuous love fringed by warm colours and subtle designs, was begun in January, and completed in September. It is a medieval romantic poem. Psychologically, it is not at all out

of place. Poetry was, at that time, an escape to Keats, not an utterance of his real experience. But this poem has a realistic core, as has been admitted on all hands. It is a sumptuous worship of love, and that love was a reality. It is not full of the tender sympathy for another's woe that forms the core of the poems like *Isabella* and *Endymion*, it enshrines a deep, actual experience, real desire. Porphyro's love for Madeline is consummated—it was a vicarious consummation, for was not Keats at that time dreaming of such a thing? His *Ode to Fanny* which shows at once the strength of his passion and its weakness, was written in January. "I have been writing a little now and then lately," he writes to Haydon¹ "but nothing to speak of being discontented and as it were moulting." This expression, "as it were moulting" is significant. It means, in his own words, "I see by little and little more of what is to be done, and how it is to be done, should I ever be able to do it. On my soul, there should be some reward for that continual 'agonie ennyeuse.'² Keats felt that he was, at that time, almost on the brink of a creative outburst. In that he was not wrong—he had indeed perfected his 'powers of poetry,' considerably.

He was maturing in silence. *The Eve of St. Mark* was begun in February. The perfect realism of the fragment, an elaborate realism of detail, should be noticed. It is a medieval poem. But its romance is framed within an embroidery of exact details and right laying of colours. It is objective in the sense that Keats reaches through the mist of centuries the throbbing eager heart of a devout catholic maiden intent on mysteries.

He wanted strenuously to compose 'the songs of Experience,' 'the songs of Innocence' were long since over. "I have come to this

¹ The songs of Experience.

¹ Letter to Haydon, Jan., 1819.

² He had been suffering from this agony for a long time. See letter to Haydon, May 10, 1817. It was through this continuous suffering that Keats matured.

resolution," he writes to Haydon,¹ "never to write for the sake of writing or making a poem, but from running over with any little knowledge or experience which many years of experience may perhaps give me ; otherwise I will be dumb." This is not the romantic who wanted to " make 4,000 lines out of one bare circumstance, and fill them with poetry."²

Yet even now, he is not quite free from illusions. He continues, " With respect to my livelihood I will not write for it,—for I will not run with that most vulgar of all crowds, the literary." The Haydonian Genius is not dead in him. No doubt this resolution was quite consistent with his artistic integrity, nay essential for it. But alas! Keats did not know that the great Task Master 'Reality' would extort everything from him, would humiliate the artist in order to perfect the man.

Keats's long journal letter to George and Georgina Keats, begun in February and ending in April, gives us a detailed account of Keats's feelings and 'sensations.' We come to know that he was living a very 'quiet' life at the Wentworth Place (Hampstead). He speaks of his disillusionments. Bailey, that 'disinterested,' serious-minded man's dishonourable dealing with Mariane Reynolds completely shakes Keats's confidence in him. In this connection he utters a truth "This may teach them (the Reynolds family) that the man who ridicules romance is the most romantic of Men—that he who abuses women and slights them loves them the most (how true of Keats himself!)... and above all, that they are very shallow people who take everything literally. A Man's life of any worth is a continual allegory, and very few eyes can see the Mystery of his life—a life like the scriptures, figurative—which such people can no more make out than they can the Hebrew Bible. Lord Byron cuts a figure but he is not figurative—Shakespeare led a life of

The Allegory of his life.

¹ Letter to Haydon, *Postmark*, March 8, 1819.

² The reference is to his poem *Endymion*. *Vide* letter to Bailey, Hampstead, October 8, 1817.

Allegory ; his works are the comments on it." Keats is not here propounding any mystic truth, he is simply stressing the need of acknowledging the significance of inner life (or 'the Unconscious' as we would say now). Lord Byron's life was all there, he was for cutting a figure, it was a life surface-deep. We could not but take him literally, because no action or word of Lord Byron—so thought Keats, could be thought allegorical, could be thought to be symbolical of a greater truth that is veiled within him. All great men live quiet inward lives (as Keats was then doing), as Shakespeare did. Through his works we can, as through outward symbols, approach the reality of Shakespeare. Keats had every reason to know this. Was he not outwardly living quite an insignificant life, while within him raged the desires of a burning love, the flames of creative impulse, and the agony of illimitable sufferings? Any man taking him literally would have misunderstood him.

In March, 1819, though he was not cut off from poetry—he was really preparing for a great creative outburst—he felt a momentary revulsion towards it. He was not writing much. Life was too insistent with its claims. He writes "I know not why Poetry and I have been so distant lately." He is rather extreme in this revulsion—

'Poetry' and Keats
in March, 1819.

"I have been at different times turning it in my head whether I should go to Edinburgh and study for a physician ; I am afraid I should not take kindly to it ; I am sure I could not take the fees—and yet I should like to do so ; it's not worse than writing poems, and hanging them up to be fly-blown on the Review Shambles."

We know two things from this. Firstly, Keats really did take to heart the dastardly attack of the Reviews. Secondly, he knew that poetry was not going to feed and clothe him, that a man, if he is to maintain himself, must think of a vocation as well. This was a bitter pill to swallow. But Keats could

not summon up courage enough to act up to this knowledge. Poetry, luckily for us, held him in her toils.

Keats, in his intense search after reality forges out another truth, a truth of which he was so long vaguely aware—*viz.*, that it is only the perfectly disinterested man who can 'envisage circumstances all calm.'¹ He himself did not possess this blessed quality of disinterestedness, naturally he felt keenly the great need of it. While writing to his brother and sister-in-law in America he was reminded of this by hearing from Haslam, an intimate friend, that he expected the death of his father very soon. Keats remarks :

Disinterestedness
and reality.

"Very few men have ever arrived at a complete disinterestedness of Mind.....From the manner in which I feel Haslam's misfortune I perceive how far I am from any humble standard of disinterestedness. Yet this feeling ought to be carried to its highest pitch, as there is no fear of its ever injuring society—which it would do, I fear, pushed to an extremity. For in the wild nature the Hawk would lose his Breakfast of Robins and the Robin his of Worms—the Lion must starve as well as the Swallow."

We may recollect that passage in his *Epistle to Reynolds* where he speaks of his vision of a 'fierce destruction'.² This disinterestedness is an improvement on his former desire for complete 'annihilation of self.' Knowing as he did the evils of uncontrolled play of the subjective, he was carried—while in the Slough of Despond—to the opposite extreme of 'annihilation of Self.' It was a sentimental revulsion. He found out subsequently that 'annihilation' was not possible, it was equally absurd. As men we are doomed to carry with us this distressing, mysterious affair of self, we cannot jump this shadow. So the only alternative left to us is not to torture this self into utter submission ('annihilation'), but

¹ *Hyperion*.

² See *ante*, pp. 45-6.

to cultivate a noble disinterestedness, an attitude of 'calm envisaging' of things. We do not know exactly when the second book of *Hyperion* was written. But in Oceanus's advice to the fallen Titans—

“ O folly ! for to bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstance, all calm,
That is the top of sovereignty,”

can we not trace the working of Keats's mind ?

Observing the animal kingdom with this disinterestedness, Keats does not find any fault with the 'Hawk' or the 'Man' each of whom follows an instinctive course. The disinterested man is not troubled by thinking of any 'fierce destruction.' He rather derives a joy in detached speculation. This is a great advance for Keats. He continues

“ This it is that makes the Amusement of Life—to a speculative Mind—I go among the Fields, and catch a glimpse of a stoat or of a fieldmouse peeping out of the withered grass—the creature hath a purpose, and its eyes are bright with it. I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a man hurrying along—to what ? The creature has a purpose and his eyes are bright with it.”

And out of this detached speculative joy in the instinctive activity of all creatures—man or beast—great art originates. Keats propounds a theory of art which is strikingly true. He says—

“ May there not be superior beings, amused with any graceful, though instinctive, attitude my mind may fall into as I am entertained with the alertness of the stoat or the anxiety of

Disinterestedness and
art—Keats's theory.

a Dear ? Though a quarrel in the streets is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine ; the commonest man shows a grace in the quarrel. By a superior Being (*i.e.*, disinterested and detached being) our reasoning may take the same tone—though erroneous, they may be fine. This is the very thing in which consists Poetry, and if so it is not so fine a thing as philosophy—for the same reason that an eagle is not as fine a thing as truth.”

The objective artist, poet or dramatist, has to maintain this disinterested attitude in order to attain a conspicuous success in any representation of human life. And this art, as all great art is, is a thing of joy—calm, detached joy which is not ruffled by quick subjective reactions. We are speaking of the artist. This joy is due to the fact that the instinctive display of energy is 'fine'; it possesses 'grace' in the eye of the detached, observing artist. There is a beauty in it, without this perception of beauty no artist can take cognisance of any 'object.' This was Keats's view. Keats from the earlier theory of completely selfless poetic genius, has progressed thus far. A poetic genius must have a self, but this would be a disinterested self.

As to philosophy being 'finer' than poetry, it was only a misconception of Keats. A philosophic truth is an abstract, ideal truth. A 'Hawk' is a concrete object. There cannot be any comparison between the two. The poet's intuition of the instinctive activity of the hawk is as fine as a philosopher's apprehension of a truth. Keats's opinion was that of a man who was for the time being not in a proper mood to appreciate the full value of poetry. Again, he was not a perfect realist. To the genuine realist the knowledge of a truth is as essential a part of our knowledge of reality, as that of an object.

On the 19th of March Keats wrote the Sonnet *Why did I laugh to-night*. It was written, Keats himself says in the same letter, "with no agony but that of ignorance; with no thirst of anything but knowledge." This ignorance and thirst induce in him a very gloomy thought—

" I know this Being's lease,
My fancy to its utmost blisses spreads;
Yet could I on this very midnight cease,
And the world's gaudy ensigns see in shreds;
Verse, Fame and Beauty are intense indeed
But Death intenser—Death is Life's high meed."

Verse, Fame, Beauty all 'excite a momentous depth of speculation' being 'intense.' But 'Death' is 'intenser.' A preoccupation with this gloomy thought may henceforth be noticed in Keats's letters and poems. He found a gloomy compromise in the profound mystery of Death, the negation of everything, torn as he was between contrary desires and aspirations. The expression given to this gloomy pent-up feeling did Keats good. "I went to bed and enjoyed uninterrupted sleep," he writes.¹

On April 28 Keats composed *La Belle Dame Sans Merci*.

*La Belle Dame Sans
Merci*—its lyrical basis.

It cannot be taken as a mere successful exercise in the traditional supernatural ballad style. The horror of the knight-at-arms and his forlorn condition are a reality, they have the convincing truth of actual experience. The lyrical basis of this ballad has been acknowledged by almost all the critics. But who was this 'Belle Dame Sans Merci'?—Was she Fanny Brawne, as has been suggested, holding Keats in her thralldom? Or was she 'Beauty' or 'Love'? Keats's mind did not consciously work in parables and symbols. But a man of his imagination and strong power of thinking would strike out symbols almost unconsciously for himself. If we do not recognise this, we would not be able to follow the workings of Keats's mind quite well. This Belle Dame might well be the Goddess of Romance with her fatal lure, 'Romance' which is another name for the seductive dreams of one's self, which is compounded of all feelings of love and longings. This Goddess of fatal beauty tempted the young ambitious Keats and promised him endless bliss. The day of enjoyment was soon over. Then came the night of dreams with horrid warnings of ghostly beings—'La Belle Dame Sans Merci Hath thee in Thrall'...Did he not hear the warning? It was the Slough of Despond he was in. Now comes the chill dawn of full realisation. The young poet is

¹ See p. 1.

forlorn indeed, his 'ways of life' are 'uncertain.' The Belle Dame is really a symbol of Keats's romantic illusions, his heart-felt longings and aspirations, his tormenting love. The full realisation does not buoy him up, but leaves him 'forlorn' indeed. This is the eternal curse on the romantic, that he, even when disillusioned, cannot forget the lure of his illusions; like the knight he 'palely loiters.' In the *Nightingale Ode*, this thought-pattern is repeated almost exactly.

La Belle Dame Sans Merci is quoted by Keats in the same journal letter. It also contains a new philosophical explanation of evil. We have seen how¹ Keats thought that the adversities tried 'the resources of the spirit' of a man, and hence they

A new explanation
of the world of evils.

produced indirect good. But here Keats hints

at a loftier scheme of which the world with its

evils was a necessary part. Keats called his

friend Dilke, 'a Godwin-perfectibility man,' he himself never believed in that sort of ideal perfectibility for man. Yet he would not consider the world as entirely evil. He says:—

"The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and superstitious is 'a vale of tears' from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary interposition of God and taken to Heaven. What a little circumscribed, straightened (straitened?)² notion: Call the world if you please "The Vale of Soul-making." Then you will find out the use of the world."...

Theoretically, Keats is no longer a romantic. To Shelley the world was 'this dim vast vale of tears,' full of 'thorns of life' on which the sensitive romantic soul 'falls' and 'bleeds.' Keats had waded through the Slough of Despond, now he could feel solid ground underneath him. He turned an optimist; out of our sufferings would our 'Soul,' that immortal part of ourselves, be 'made.' "Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is," asks Keats; "to school an Intelligence and make it a soul?"

¹ See p. 38.

² Keats is criticising the Christian view of the world and salvation of the soul.

A place where the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways,"...

What is this 'Soul,' that is 'made'? Keats's explanation is highly interesting, and has a great psychological value. He says:—

Soul-making.

"I say '*Soul-making*'—soul distinguished from an Intelligence. There may be intelligence or sparks of divinity in millions—but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each is personally itself. Intelligences are atoms of perception—they know and they see and they are, in short they are God.—How then are Souls to be made? How then are these sparks which are God to have identity given them—so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to each one's individual existence? How but by the medium of a world like this? This point I sincerely wish to consider because I think it a greater system of salvation than the Christian religion—or rather it is a system of Spirit creation (so Keats considered 'Soul' and 'Spirit' as identical). This is effected by three grand materials acting the one upon the other for a series of years. These three materials are the *Intelligence*—the *human heart* (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the *World* or *Elemental space* suited for the proper action of *Mind* and *Heart* on each other for the purpose of forming the *Soul* or *Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity*. I can scarcely express what I but dimly perceive.".....

This was the final stage that Keats reached in his growing knowledge of his 'Self.' First he was worshipping this romantic self in colour and rhythm and beauty; then, with dawning consciousness of reality, he detested that self of his which made him unhappy with its selfish reactions and stood in the way of his understanding reality; in his revulsion he wanted to 'annihilate' it. Then, he found that annihilation was not the remedy, but complete disinterestedness. Lastly, he felt that the highest stage his 'self' could attain to was this 'soul stage,'

A brief survey of his spiritual progress.

when the scale would drop from his eyes and he would feel his immortal identity which would never be injured by anything. The emergent self of his which he felt in his apprentice stage was now developing into a soul. That was the order in which Keats apprehended this

aspect of the great 'Reality'—for his self was also a part of this 'Reality.' He did not see it clearly, but he knew that to the great end of soul-making every suffering, every pain had its justification. Keats was propounding a new religious system so to say. But he was still groping in a semi-darkness of apprehension. What he felt dimly he could not act up to, because the world with its evils he could not accept in his actual life. That story will soon be told.

Now we come down to the artistic expression of his tentative realisations.

Keats wrote his '*Ode to Psyche*,' the first of the greater odes about this time. Whatever his theoretical position might have been, Keats was perfecting his 'powers of poetry.' Now comes the outburst. This ode was written with elaborate care. Keats himself remarks in his journal letter:¹ "This I have done leisurely—I think it reads the more richly for it, and will, I hope, encourage me to write other things in even a more peaceful and healthy spirit." That was the main thing—'more peaceful and healthy spirit.' What he wanted was that he would have a detached and disinterested frame of mind. His *Ode to Psyche* shows an astonishing command over the rhythmic possibilities of assonance and word-pattern, and is full of restful, coloured, vivid pictures. Each verse distils the manifold appeals of the world of eye and ear. Keats's evocation of love with its accompaniment of rich rituals is not free from blemishes, but those are not prominent. Psychologically, his promise to Psyche to dress for her a 'rosy sanctuary' in the midst of 'the wide-quietness' of some 'untrodden region' of his mind is not uninteresting. He had just before been discussing 'soul-making.' From a 'soul' to 'Psyche' (the Greek word for 'Soul') was no bold transition for Keats; and the legendary associations came in naturally. But he rids himself of all these

The poetic outburst
of the Spring of 1819,
the *Ode to Psyche*.

¹ Journal letter to George and Georgina Keats, Feb.-April, 1819.

associations towards the end of the ode. This 'psyche' is nothing but his 'soul' so newly 'made.'¹ This soul would remain in an 'untrodden region of the Mind.' Just as he had speculated. But the mere rhythm of verse calls up the slumbering fancy of the poet, and he 'wreaths' 'trellis of a working brain' for Psyche and prepares—as he remembers the legend—for the entrance of 'Warm Love.'¹

The month of May was the month of the Great Odes. The *Ode on Melancholy*, *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, *Ode to a Nightingale*, and *Ode to Indolence* were written one after another.² Keats's life was far from happy. He was engaged to Fanny Brawne in April, but the engagement accentuated his misery. He knew that he must do something, a single-hearted devotion to poetry would not mend matters. Poverty is a great teacher and it taught Keats many unsuspected truths. He did not know what to do.

Besides, though he had 'perfected his powers of poetry,' he found that the writing of poetry left him 'feverish,' full of 'sick longings.' As a matter of fact, though his theoretical position was unimpeachable, Keats was very far indeed from the ideal he enunciated, or intellectually realised. At a sudden lilt of rhythm, at a chance-image, 'the demon Poesy,'³ would take hold of his

being, he would lose his dearly achieved detachment and give way to subjective expression. Poetry was his obsession. He vainly wanted to engage it in the survice of 'Reality.' The revival of the poetic impulse in him in the Spring of 1819, unsettled most of his purposes. Towards the end of May, when most of the odes were written he wrote to Miss Jeffrey—"I have the choice as it were of two Poisons: (yet I ought not to call this a Poison) the one of voyaging to and

¹ We think that no attempt has as yet been made to study the odes and other maturer poems of Keats in this light.

² Of course we cannot be certain of the order in which the odes were written.

³ *Ode on Indolence*.

from India for a few years ; the other is leading a feverous life alone with poetry. This latter will suit me best ; for I cannot resolve to give up my studies." This resolution of voyaging to India would occur again.¹

Poetry then was engrossing him. He associated, we have seen, poetry with 'Romance.' The touch of the poetic revived the 'Romance' in him. Yet now the influence of reality may be traced in his poems. But there was love also, love which set a keen edge to his poetic feeling. His clear grasp of reality was being loosened. Shall we call it the tragedy of his life ? Perhaps we should not. Are not the odes a sufficient compensation for all his theoretical failure ? Again, as we have suggested before, had Keats survived this love, he would have given us a more perfect rendering of reality.

We cannot study the odes here in all their bearings. We shall only point out their importance from our
The odes of Keats.
standpoint. They were, almost all of them, composed when Keats was in a highly unsettled state of mind, torn between contrary desires. They are all highly lyrical, they have little 'objectivity.'

The *Ode on Melancholy* strikes the keynote of all the May odes. They are all written in a mood of rich despair. The first stanza of the ode enunciates a truth, that only the man of intense power of enjoyment can penetrate to the 'Veiled Melancholy' beyond all joy.

But Keats enjoyed writing the *Ode to Indolence*.² That was perfectly natural. 'Feverish' as he was he courted this mood of Indolence when 'Pain had no sting, and pleasure's wreath no flower.' In that blessed mood of 'Indolence' when he saw the three figures, Love, Ambition and Poetry, he felt that they would bring

¹ Letter to Miss Jeffrey, *Postmark*, June 9, 1819; to Fanny Keats, *Postmark*, June 9, 1819, etc.

² Letter to Miss Jeffrey, *Postmark*, June 9, 1819, "The thing which I enjoyed most of this year has been writing an ode to Indolence."

him suffering if he followed them. This was a mature realisation. These were the figures—

“ The first was a fair Maid, and Love her name ;
 The second was Ambition, pale of cheek,
 And ever watchful with fatigued eye ;
 The last, whom I love more, the more of blame
 Is heap'd upon her, maiden most unmeek,—
 I knew to be my demon Poesy.”

This ‘demon Poesy’ was making him most unhappy. And, these three figures, Love, Ambition, and Poesy, did they not symbolise the ‘high Romance’ of his life, that Romance he so much wanted to get rid of ? He does not want them. He bids them farewell. He cries :

“ Vanish, Ye Phantoms ! from my idle spright,
 Into the clouds, and never more return ! ”

Nothing could have been more clear. Keats does not want to be ‘dieted with praise’ any more, to pay court to these three creatures of fatal lure any more ! So, along with his rejection of ‘Romance’ as we have pointed out so often, he was going to reject ‘Poetry’ as well !

In the *Ode to a Nightingale*, the same system of thought prevails—viz., symbolisation of ‘Romance, and its rejection. This Ode is not only the most beautiful poem that Keats ever wrote, but also the most significant of all his poems. There are several things worth noting about this ode.¹ In English poetry the nightingale is almost invariably associated with the Philomela legend of old Greece. Only two poets in the nineteenth century avoided the Philomela-association completely, Coleridge (when he was writing the later poem) and Keats. In the case of Coleridge,

¹ In a paper ‘*On the Nightingale Ode of Keats*’ read before the English Association of the Benares Hindu University, and published in April-June number of the B. H. U. Magazine I have elaborately dealt with these points, never noticed by anybody else before.

this avoidance is due to the fact that he was in that poem illustrating a theory, that he learned from his friend Wordsworth, *viz.*, that in nature there is nothing melancholy, there is joy everywhere. The melancholy Philomela-associations could not be naturally introduced. But why or how could Keats avoid it, Keats who was 'a Greek?'¹ It is curious that in this ode he goes against all traditions by calling the Nightingale a 'happy bird.' Why happy? In his mood of melancholy, the most natural thing for him would have been to hear a mournful strain in the song of this 'melancholy bird.' Yet his Nightingale has a 'happy lot.' The explanation is this. The song of the Nightingale, heard one morning in the garden of the Wentworth Place when Keats was living a life full of torments and despair, carried into his ears the voice of old 'Romance.' Once for all, he surrendered himself heart and soul to its lure. He would fade far away with this enchanting voice, and forget what the spirit of 'Romance' has never known—

"The weariness, the fever, and the fret
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan,"

(We should remember that old opposition in Keats's conception between 'Romance' and 'Reality'). And this flight would be achieved 'on the viewless wings of poesy.' Poetry was associated, as we saw more than once, with 'Romance.' By this power of poesy he conjures up moonlight and flowers and soft incense, his surrender is complete. He wants to cease, to die, fade away during this spell so that he may avoid the rude shock of disillusionment. Yes, he will die. But "thou, wast not born for death, immortal Bird," Thou, the voice of eternal bliss, the voice of 'Romance,' 'Thou wast not born for death,' 'No hungry generations tread *thee* down,' as they tread *us* down, as they have trodden down the ambitious young poet, John Keats. Yes, as a part of this reality, he will die, but he will take his courage in his hands and declare—"Thou wast not born for death,

¹ Shelley's opinion.

immortal Bird.' He will utter his last supreme praise of 'Romance,' it is his last supreme glorification of 'Romance,'... The 'self-same voice' was heard in old days by men and women in happiness and distress, and this 'self-same voice' opens up sudden vistas of 'faery lands' as it did open the magic casement of 'Romance' for Keats.¹

But the word 'forlorn' calls him back to 'reality.' Reality asserts itself, "Was it a vision, or a waking dream?" Again that heart-rending farewell note is struck—"Adieu, Adieu!" The disillusioned romantic knows that 'the fancy cannot cheat so well As she is fam'd to do, deceiving elf.' This bitter note Keats carries into the *Revised Version of Hyperion*.

¹ This interpretation of the Ode makes many difficult expressions clear (e.g., 'happy lot,' 'immortal Bird,' etc.) on which many a piece of critical ingenuity has wasted itself. Keats did not leave his meaning vague—the voice of the Nightingale 'hath charmed magic casements,' etc. Here the identification is quite complete. If we trace the use of the word Nightingale in the body of Keats's poetical works, we shall find that after the Nightingale Ode the word was used probably only once in *Hyperion*, Bk. III (we are not sure if Bk. III was written after this ode or before), where we find only this—

"The nightingale had ceas'd, and a few stars
Were lingering yet—"

As a matter of fact, for Keats the Nightingale 'ceased' to sing after that burst of enchanting melody which inspired the ode, and which made him pay, so to say, his last homage to 'Romance.' Although the Nightingale is mentioned 12 times in his poem (excepting the ode) it is not mentioned at all (leaving out the problematic case of *Hyperion*, Bk. III) after the writing of the ode. That is also significant. Again the Nightingale was gradually assuming a symbolic meaning in Keats's use. We may consider several instances—

- (1) "Where the nightingale doth sing
Not a senseless tranced thing,
But divine melodious truth,
Philosophic numbers smooth;
Tales and golden histories
Of heaven and its mysteries."

"Bards of Passion and of Mirth."

- (2) "It is a flaw
In happiness, to see beyond our bourn,—
It forces us in summer skies to mourn,
It spoils the singing of the Nightingale."

Epistle to Reynolds.

The Ode on a Grecian Urn conjures up a world of bliss, the life of a 'little clan' that Keats loved, with its delightful, blithe activities made permanent in art. The insistent contrast between the tormenting, non-enduring human life and human passion and the calm beauty of art forces the mind to see in the latter more than an aesthetic appreciation. However, the most intriguing of all is the 'moral' of the poem,—

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."

We should bring to this 'moral' our knowledge of the many movements of Keats's life. It holds in a concentrated form Keats's knowledge of 'Reality.' Formerly what the Imagination 'seized' as 'Beauty' was 'Truth.' But now, Keats says that 'beauty,' i.e., subjective apprehension of 'beauty,' is a 'truth' no doubt, as the 'Grecian urn' is a 'truth'; but truth also is 'beauty,' i.e., 'Reality' in its twofold aspect, viz., as principle and as object, is also 'beauty,' i.e., harmony (for beauty here means nothing but harmony). Keats means to say that when

Truth and Beauty. we come to apprehend 'Reality' as a harmony, the world as a 'vale of Soul-making,' when we come to derive a joy (in a disinterested frame of mind) from a display of energy in whatever place because of our awareness of an instinctive grace in it, we come to know that truth also is beauty, truth however ugly or repulsive it may appear to the self-ridden, ignorant man. That is the topmost of all knowledge in this world. And this we need to know, because knowing this we would have peace and philosophic calm in this world of misery and heart-break. Keats gives us the essence of his dearly earned knowledge.

Thus the great odes were conceived and written. But life has still so many experiences for Keats.

In June Keats wrote to Haydon (June 17, 1819): "My purpose is now to make one more attempt in the press—if that fail, 'ye here no more of me' as Chaucer says." He also asked Haydon to give him back the money he had lent to Haydon, as his need was great. Haydon the Overman never cared to pay back paltry loans. Keats was very much hurt. His friendship for Haydon waned rapidly from that time.

Then there was his love. His love letters to Fanny Brawne show us the naked heart of the man, they are full of self-torture and morbid imaginings. Keats knew how weak he was in the hand of Love. He was really 'burning through' the fierce dispute 'Betwixt Hell-torment and impassioned Clay.' We need not take upon ourselves the task of vivisection. It is enough that we have pointed out the significance of these letters in the general scheme of development of Keats's life. Keats was suffering the torment of self-knowledge when he wrote these letters, and he wanted to objectify his grievance against his own self by attributing untrue things to Miss Brawne. These letters are not pleasant reading as Keats was not in any pleasant mood when they were written. Desire blinds a man. It veils the truth of things. Now Keats knew it well.

Out of this love-torment was *Lamia* conceived. The poem was begun in July and finished in August. Dryden's measure suits well the half-cynical, half-sympathetic temper of the poet. The poem has a perfectly tragic close. This point has not been clearly noted by critics. The tragedy is perfect when Lycius dies broken-hearted, unable as he was to withstand the shock of disillusionment. Apollonius wanted to save him, the favourite disciple of the master. He did not know that the medicine might prove stronger than the disease. *Lamia* was the serpent no doubt. But she conferred unimaginable bliss on Lycius. He was happy with her, in her magic mansion. One day a trumpet

Another disillusionment, Haydon.

Keats's love letters.

Lamia (July-August, 1819).

call from some neighbouring hill calls up the young man, he wants to return to the outside world so long forsaken for the sake of Lamia. He can do it only if he marries Lamia. Lamia does not want it. The old opposition between 'Romance' and 'Reality' crops up again here (a point not at all noticed by any commentator) as it was almost always in Keats's thought. Lycius succeeds in persuading Lamia. He calls in the outside world in their peaceful magic home. His responsibility was great. Apollonius also comes, though unbidden. He discloses Lamia's identity. Lamia shrieks and vanishes, Lycius dies broken-hearted. It is a perfect tragic piece conceived on the Greek model. The irony of Lycius's eagerness to show to his friends his 'prize' (Lamia) is perfectly Sophoclean.

What was Keats really driving at? The meaning of the story is not that 'Romance' cannot survive the cold touch of the real; the meaning is that the man who voluntarily calls in the real in his life of romantic bliss (as Keats did), does so at his peril. Lycius's death was inevitable in this inexorable logic. Keats did not like this young romantic lover to survive this disillusionment, because he knew that beyond that disillusionment was a real world where 'but to think is to be full of sorrow.' Keats himself would have liked such an end for himself. In his letters we find how thought of death was occupying his mind at that time.

Keats's plaint, 'Do not all charms fly at the mere touch of cold philosophy?'—has been misunderstood. In the mood that he was he could but think so. The real world he now knew, through his 'philosophy,' i.e., knowledge of things. Did the knowledge make him happy? No. Not at all. He recalls what he had written in December, 1818, in the *Champion* seeing Kean act—"Kean! Kean! have a carefulness of thy health, a nursing regard for thy own genius, a pity for us in these cold and enfeebling times: Cheer us a little in the failure of our days: for romance lives but in books. The goblin is driven from the

health, and the rainbow is robbed of its mystery." In *Lamia* he cries—

"There was an awful rainbow once in heaven,
We know her woof, her texture ; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine—
Unweave a rainbow, as it ere while made
The tender-person'd *Lamia* melt into a shade."

This is no retrogression, because, theoretically Keats was not going over to 'Romance,' he knew that he must abide in reality. He was giving an outlet to his pent-up feelings. And this did him good. He was not going to accept 'Romance' in any case, though he pitied its plight before the scorching gaze of Apollo-nius. The subdued cynicism of the poem bespeaks a dawning contempt for the ideal and the romantic. The cynicism of

"Love, in a hut, with water and a crust,
Is—Love, forgive us—cinders, ashes, dust "

is evident ; but there is genuine knowledge in, "a moment's thought is passion's passing bell" (l. 39, Part II). Here 'passion' and 'thought' are characteristically opposed. *Otho the Great*, a joint venture of Keats and Brown, was begun in July. But the plot was Brown's. *Hyperion* Keats was working at in August and September when he left the poem in disgust.

In August Keats wrote to Taylor¹: "I feel every confidence that, if I choose, I may be a popular writer. That I will never be ; but for all that I will get a livelihood. I equally dislike the favour of the public with the love of a woman. They are both a cloying treacle to the wings of Independence." These are true words, Keats repeatedly

Love and the public.

¹ Dated August 23, 1819.

complained to Miss Brawne that she had robbed him of his 'Independence.' He wanted to preserve his individuality, so dearly won. But, as to the public so to his love, he had to submit in the end.

During these days Keats was studying Milton carefully. "The Paradise Lost becomes a greater wonder," he wrote to Reynolds.¹ Milton's influence is pervasive in *Hyperion*. But

Rejection of Milton. gradually Keats came to understand that by submitting to the influence of Milton he was injuring his artistic individuality. This was too heavy a price to pay. He writes to Reynolds on 22nd September :

"I have given up *Hyperion*—there were too many Miltonic inversions in it—Miltonic verse cannot be written but in an artful, or rather artist's, humour (*i.e.*, artificially). I wish to give myself up to other sensations." ²

Indeed Keats was rather disgusted with poetry itself. The claims of life were too insistently making themselves felt, and the

Distrust for poetry. eternal opposition—though mistaken—between poetry and real life was becoming prominent in his conception. On September 22, he writes to Dilke : "I have no trust whatever on Poetry, I do not wonder at it—the ma(r)vel, is to me how people read so much of it." He would rather write for 'the Liberal side of the Question,' be a man of affairs. To Brown³ Keats repeats this resolution.

The public must be placated however, this he knew. By his tragedy, *Otho the Great*, he wanted to achieve this. His *Lamia*, he thought, had "that sort of fire in it which must take hold of people in some way."⁴ In October, he wrote to Haydon, with sane knowledge : "I have no cause to complain because I am certain

¹ Letter dated August 25, 1819.

² In his Journal letter to George Keats (September 1819) he repeats the same charge against Milton's verse.

³ Letter dated 23rd September 1819.

⁴ Letter dated 23rd September 1819.

anything really fine, will in these days be felt. I have no doubt

Attitude towards the
public, new resolu-
tions.

that if I had written Othello I should have
been cheered by as good a mob as Hunt."¹

This was not the Haydonian Genius of old days.
He was forming new resolutions. He did not know that the
catastrophe was not far off. The 'fever' of poetry he must get
over finally, as he had wanted to do before. He writes to his
brother :²

"Some think I have lost that poetical ardour and fire 'tis said I
once had—The fact is, perhaps I have ; but, instead of that, I hope I
shall substitute a more thoughtful and quiet power. I am more fre-
quently now contented to read and think, and now and then haunted
by ambitious thoughts, Quieter in my pulse, improved in my diges-
tion, exerting myself against vexing speculations, scarcely content to
write the best verse for the fever they leave behind. I want to com-
pose without this fever. I hope I one day shall."

This 'fever' was a simple description for that enormous
mood of 'Romance' that would be inevitably resuscitated by his
verse. This 'fever' was the torment of all his dreamings.
Now he was determined to cut it to its root. About this time
was *the Revised Version of Hyperion* begun.

The *Revised Version* of *Hyperion*. The *Revised Version* or the *Fall of Hyperion*, a *Dream* is
full of Keats's passionate protest against
'dreaming.' Moneta admonishes the poet in
his dream thus :

"Thou art a dreaming thing,
A fever of thyself—think of the Earth ;
What bliss even in hope is there for thee ?
What haven ? every creature hath its home ;
Every sole man hath days of joy and pain,
Whether his labours be sublime or low—
The pain alone ; the joy alone ; distinct :
Only the dreamer venoms all his days,
Bearing more woe than all his sins deserve."

¹ The reference to the mob which cheered Henry Hunt, a popular leader, as he entered London.

² Journal letter to George Keats, September 1819.

The Temple of Fame is not for these dreamers but for the Great humanists, the lovers and benefactors of mankind—

“None can usurp this height,” returned the shade,

“But those to whom the miseries of the world

Are misery, and will not let them rest.”

The lonely romanticist flattering his dreaming self with imaginary bliss, is nowhere here. Keats's self-criticism is unsparing. This is a sort of cruel castigation of the flesh to make him fit for the truth that is in the world. He wanted to write ‘for the Liberal side of the question,’ he wanted to do his bit in the world.

Keats's poetic career after the October of 1819 is briefly narrated. A few sonnets, a fragment of a drama (*King Stephen*) and the *Cap and the Bells* constituted his poetic output. Keats's ambition to write ‘one or two fine plays’¹ before he died was not fulfilled. Had he lived, he would no doubt have succeeded with his keen knowledge of the real and feeling for humanity, in this line.

The rest of Keats's life is the study of a soul tormented by pangs of love and poverty, and meeting the buffets of the world with a saner and surer knowledge. He writes to Fanny Brawne (October, 1819): “I should like to cast the die for love or death. I have no Patience for anything else.....” But along with this, goes a greater knowledge of reality, a more assured sanity of temper. He writes to Taylor: ²

“Wonders are no wonders to me. I am more at home amongst men and women. I would rather read Chaucer than Aristo.”

His old masters are left far behind. He writes to Georgina Keats: ³

“If I go to Hunt's, I run my head into many tunes heard before, old puns and old music; to Haydon's worn-out discourses of poetry and painting.”

¹ and ² Letter to Taylor, *Postmark*, Hampstead, 17th November, 1819.

³ Letter, January, 1820.

On 3rd February, 1820, Keats had that fatal hæmorrhage.

The attack on February 3, 1820, and after.

His throat had been giving him trouble long before that. In that hæmorrhage Keats saw his 'death-warrant!' He was calm. The 'die' was indeed cast for death. From February, 1820, to February 1821, we are by the bedside of a dying man. His letters to Fanny with their wistful pathetic appeals tell us all that we require to know about his feelings of love. There is a sense of tears in his letters to his friends. He writes to Rice : ¹

"How astonishingly (here I must premise that illness, as far as I can judge in so short a time, has relieved my mind of load of deceptive thoughts and images, and makes me perceive things in a truer light) — how astonishingly does the chance of leaving the world impress a sense of its natural 'beauties' upon us ! Like poor Falstaff, though I do not 'babble,' I think of green fields..."

He writes to Fanny of the Spring thrush singing in the garden of the Wentworth Place : ²

"That Thrush is a fine fellow. I hope he was fortunate in his choice this year."

There was another relapse on 22nd June. All hopes were gone. The journey to Italy was arranged. On the 15th of August, Keats wrote to Haydon :

"I am glad you are in progress with another picture. Go on. I am afraid I shall pop off just when my mind is able to run alone...."

That was the tragedy of Keats's life. He knew that he was, after so many days of arduous pursuit of truth and beauty, just then able to 'run alone.' And then his call came. What a loss to English poetry !

Keats departed for Italy, but his heart lay in England. He knew he was going to die far away. The newly published

¹ February 16, 1820.

² February 24, 1820.

volume of verse and its appreciation in a fairly large circle did not at all satisfy Keats. He wrote to Mrs. Brawne from Naples Harbour: ¹ "I dare not fix my Mind upon Fanny, I have not dared to think of her..." In Rome he suffered intensely. The last letter that he wrote was written on November 30. On February 3 he breathed his last calmly. Before his death, he had told Severn to inscribe on his Tomb, "Here lies one whose name was writ on water,..." Looking back at his life, the dying man thought it a failure. It was not a failure, it was tragically incomplete. Around this incomplete life posterity has showered sincere homage. With a last flash of his youthful faculty, Keats could feel 'the flowers growing over him'...At last the cruel Objective had him completely in its grasp. Even to-day the flowers grow, as Keats would have liked it, 'over' his grave.

We have finished our study of the life of Keats.

The time has come when we should try to gather together the results of our study. Keats was defining
 Conclusions. 'Romance' and 'Reality' in terms of his own sufferings and delights. We have traced this lifelong definition with all its ramifications. By 'Romance' Keats meant different things on different occasions. But always this 'Romance' was opposed in his maturer conception to the real, the true. In his revulsion, he made mistakes, he wanted to annihilate his very romantic self.

His apprehension of reality took the shape of a greater knowledge of things through his personal experience, as also in his own life, of a consciousness of an emergent self which he later on wanted to make 'a soul.' We have shown how this knowledge of reality was a complex of many strains of thinking, how the objective reality in its twofold aspect unfolded itself before his searchful eye, how his humanitarianism, his grappling with the problem of evil, his knowledge of self, etc., formed each an inevitable link in the chain of his vast realisation. Poetry,

¹ October 24, 1820.

we have seen, 'Recalled' romance to him and old thrills and longings, poetry was at once his gift and curse, he felt. His 'Romance' was accentuated by his love. His romantic self we have been torturing itself into an intellectual submission to reality. It meant submission even to the public, the 'herd' (*Lamia*). We have also interpreted the maturer poems of Keats in the light of the context of our study of his life. Everywhere we have tried to keep the chronological plan intact.

The general conclusion that we arrived at is that Keats could not, knowing as he did with painful certainty the great 'Reality,' respond to it emotionally in colour and rhythm. From one standpoint his life was a huge waste. And to him, 'Reality' came to have a tragic meaning. Like Lycius, the young dreamer evoked the Goddess of stern mien; she gave him knowledge that he was athirst for and countless benumbing disillusionments; she sharpened his insight into the mystery of his own self, and that of the objective world. But the 'fine point of his soul' was taken off...The dreamer did not know that the price he would have to pay would exceed his capacity...He lost his romantic bliss, the song of the Nightingale was spoilt...

For him it was a general transition, not a complete and actual rejection of the one in favour of the other. But Keats would certainly have passed this transitional stage had he lived that concentrated life of his for some time more. He would have succeeded in enlisting poetry in the service of reality, and in seeing life steadily in a calm, disinterested state of mind.

For us the significance of Keats's experiences is great indeed. He was indeed the type of the creative artist. In his life he felt that 'Hell torment' which goes to form the artistic soul rich with its many realisations and calm in its final grasp over reality.

THE STŪPAS OF BENGAL

By

SARASI KUMAR SARASWATI

The most important class of early monuments in India is the Stūpa or the 'Tope,' consisting of a basement of one or more square terraces (*medhī*), approached by a flight of stairs (*sopāna*), a circular drum and dome (*aṇḍa*) and a cube (*harm-mikā*) surmounted by a parasol (*chatra*) attached to a shaft (*danḍa*). The earliest stūpas, almost semicircular in outline—there being no drum and the dome standing immediately on a circular base—seem to have originated from the funeral mounds or tumuli, under which, according to the Vedic ritual, the ashes of the dead were buried. The tendency, however, is, from the very beginning, towards elongation and in later examples the circular base has, as it were, become a drum the whole structure being raised on a square plinth. The dome, at the same time, becomes more elevated; from hemispherical it takes a conical shape. The umbrella, originally one, gradually increases in number. The whole composition thus gives the monument an elongated appearance, to be appropriately called the 'tower,' by which term the Chinese pilgrims usually designate it.

The stūpas may be divided into three classes so far as their objects are concerned—(1) the Relic, (2) the Memorial, and (3) the Devotional or the Votive. In the first instance they were raised to enshrine the bodily relics of Buddha himself and of his chief disciples. Secondly they were built to commemorate some specially sacred spot in his life or in his legend. Finally they

were erected merely for the sake of merit, and specimens of miniature size were dedicated as votive offerings.¹

We have as yet no evidence that the first class, the Relic Stūpa, existed in Bengal. As regards the second class, Hiuen Tsang² records that there were several in Bengal, built by Aśoka himself to commemorate the holy sites where Gautama Buddha preached his doctrine in person. The tradition of Buddha's visit is also preserved in the story of *Sumāgadhāvadāna* in the *Avadāna-Kalpalatā* of Kshemendra (11th century A.D.),³ where it is related how Buddha travelled from Jetavana to Puṇḍra-vardhananagara. It is no wonder hence that Aśoka, the imperial propagator of Buddha Dhamma, built here, as elsewhere, several stūpas at places connected with the sacred name of the great Teacher. None of them, however, can now be identified with certainty, more so, as the localities in which they were said to have been situated, have not yet been satisfactorily identified. Like other stūpas, known to have been raised by Aśoka, they most probably represented the archaic style—an almost hemispherical dome (*aṇḍa*) truncated near the top, with a small pavilion (*harmmikā*) and the umbrella (*chatra*) with the shaft (*danḍa*) on the summit—such as are those, still more or less intact, at Sānchi or Bharhut or figured in their sculptures. Like Aśokan stūpas elsewhere they were, in all probability, built of bricks, but being situated on the plains had not the good fortune of being preserved, like their contemporaries elsewhere, by a later encasement in stone. It is not improbable that the ruined

¹ Originally as sheltering the bodily remains of Buddha the stūpa in early Buddhist art stood for his *parinirvāṇa* or even for the Master himself, like so many other symbols, such as his Foot-prints, the Wheel, the Bodhi tree, the *Vajrāsana* (the diamond seat), etc. As such it was held in great veneration and we have frequent representations, at Bharhut, Sānchi and Amaravati, of devotees coming to worship, or actually worshipping, the stūpa. The worship of the stūpa does not seem to die out with the evolution of the image of the deified Teacher and the gift of the stūpa was reckoned as meritorious as that of an image, if not more.

² Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, Vol. II, p. 185.

³ *Avadāna-Kalpalatā* of Kshemendra, Sāhitya Pariṣat edition, p. 94.

mounds, in which the province abounds, might some day yield to the spade of the excavator the remains of the Aśokan stūpas, of which the Chinese pilgrim speaks of.

Foucher in his *Iconographie Bouddhique*¹ illustrates two stūpas of ancient Bengal from the inscribed miniatures in Ms. Add. 1643, Cambridge. These two stūpas, the Mṛgasthāpana Stūpa in Varendra (*Vārendrā Mṛgasthāpanastūpaḥ*) and the Dharmarājikā Caitya in Rāḍha (*Rāḍhyā Dharmarājikā Caityaḥ*), were in all likelihood some sorts of memorial stūpas. Dharmarājikā Caityas have been known from elsewhere too, e.g., from Taxila, Sarnath, etc., and from the analogy of the *Divyāvadāna*² they are generally taken to mean stūpas built by the Dharmarāja Aśoka. The Dharmarājikā Caitya in Rāḍha, that we see illustrated in Ms. Add. 1643, Cambridge, however, presents a shape quite unlike the Aśokan stūpas that we know of; and I think that the correct explanation of the term *Dharmarājikā* as well as of the term *Mṛgasthāpana* is yet to come. The Mṛgasthāpana Stūpa in Varendra (Pl. I, a) shows the circular dome raised over six terraces, each in the form of a lotus, surmounted by a small square pavilion (*harmmikā*), the whole topped by a tapering row of umbrellas ending in a point. The second, the Dharmarājikā (Pl. I, b), also shows a similar structure, but for the drum which is a high plinth of two terraces, square, with a projection on each face. The multiplicity of the terraces and of the gradually tapering umbrellas gives these edifices almost the shape of a cone, but for the break in the narrow neck between the dome and the *harmmikā*. In plan and elevation they present but little difference to the votive offerings, so numerous in Bihar, and like them may be said to represent a far advanced stage in the evolution of the stūpa, when the hemispherical structure has developed into a cone.

¹ Pl. I, Figs. 4 & 5.



² Cf. *Divyāvadāna*, ed. by Cowell and Neill, p. 379.

Aśoka nāma.....dharmarājo.....catur-aśītim Dharmarājikā-sahasram pratiṣṭhāpayi-
syati.

The third class, the Votive stūpa, though not so prolific as in the adjoining province of Bihar, was however not at all a rare feature, the specimens of course in this flat plain being mostly built up of bricks. The only stone specimen, so far known, can be found enshrined in Yogi Gophā (Dinajpur), a modern *maṭha* or establishment of the *Nāthapanthī yogīs* on what was probably an ancient settlement. Wrapped up in a piece of *sārī* it is now being worshipped as Bimalā Devī, said to have been a daughter of king Devapāla. At first sight the thing (Pl. II) looks quite unlike a stūpa. A close examination, however, reveals to us what was probably the final transformation of a hemispherical structure due to a tendency of elevation and elongation, a tendency, which we can trace even from the beginning of stūpa architecture. Along with the multiplication of the terraces and of the umbrellas, which this tendency occasioned, there was also a corresponding elevation of the semicircular dome and here, in the present specimen, we find that the dome has grown elevated twice as much as its diameter. It is divided into three unequal sections by two horizontal bands passing round it. The lowest one has, round its body, four figures in ornamental niches roofed over by indented pyramids. Above the dome we have the narrow neck capped by the cube (*harmmikā*) decorated on the edge by *āmalaka* ribs, a peculiarity which we notice for the first time in the case of a stūpa. Next rises the range of *chatras*, gradually diminishing in size as they go up, the topmost one thus ending in a point. The whole composition thus gives the stūpa almost the appearance of a miniature Egyptian obelisk, with however a round contour.

Bronze votive offerings of this kind were also not rare, as may be surmised from several such finds in the province. The first such find, and most probably the earliest in date, was unearthed in the sixties of the last century from a mound at Ashrafpur, a village in the Dacca district, along with two copper-plates, which have been assigned to the seventh century A.D. on good grounds. It is not unlikely then that this stūpa also

PLATE I



b

a





PLATE II



belongs to the same date. This fairly preserved specimen¹ shows a high, slightly sloping basement, square with a 'plane added on each face. Over it there is a lotus on which rests the tall cylindrical dome which, peculiarly enough, bulges a little towards the top. Next comes the *harmmikā* with the *gala*, which is a square turret with projecting roof from which rises the shaft of the diminishing tier of *chatras*, of which only one disc now remains. Under the disc attached to the shaft there is a minute plate inscribed with the Buddhist creed in now illegible characters. Like the stone prototypes in Bihar the basement and the dome are adorned with figures—the basement containing, on each of the four sides, three seated figures, one male between two females, and the dome four figures round its body, each within an ornamental niche, connected with one another by bands and festoons. What is however unique in this specimen is that the square turret (*harmmikā*) has its sides adorned with four seated figures of Buddha, projecting from walls—a peculiarity which, so far as my knowledge goes, is not met with elsewhere. One other bronze stūpa is known from Bengal—a miniature recently acquired under the Treasure Trove Act from Jhewari (Chittagong).² It stands on a pedestal of several pods (cf. the pedestals of the bronze images) and resembles, in general, the one described above, though the Buddha figures round the *harmmikā* and the bulging of the dome towards the top are absent.

The common practice, however, was to build such structures in brick, in and around monastic establishments, which, as recent excavations have shown, were not at all rare. Several such ruined edifices, the only remains of hundreds of such votive offerings, have already been laid bare. A number of them, exhibiting various shapes (square, oblong and round), have been exhumed in excavations³ conducted on the mound on which the Siddheśvara temple at Bahulara stands, the mound testifying to

¹ *Proceedings, A.S.B.*, 1891, pp. 119-20, Pl. III; R. D. Banerjee, *Eastern Indian School of Mediaeval Sculpture*, Pl. LXXV, 6.

² *A.S.I., A.R.*, 1927-28, p. 184.

an earlier occupation of the site associated with worship other than Brahminical.¹ The excavations at Paharpur (Rajshahi) have revealed groups of such brick stūpas, both inside the area of the big monastery as well as outside, in a mound locally known as the *bhiṭā* of Satyapir. Presumably they were meant as votive offerings, such as we find in their stone prototypes in famous Buddhist sites outside Bengal. These votive structures show elaborate designs in planning, reminiscent of the cruciform plan of the Paharpur temple, the cruciform shape being obtained by one or two projections on each face of a square, thus forming a recess or recesses in each corner (*cf.* also the bronze votive stūpas). The high basement also shows successive tiers of decorative mouldings and in plan and mouldings they very nearly correspond to their stone prototypes in Bihar. Like them, too, the basement was sometimes decorated with rows of Buddha figures, as the terracotta fragments with rows of Buddha figures in the attitudes of enlightenment and preaching, found while laying bare such votive offerings round the central shrine at Satyapir's *bhiṭā*,² clearly show. Unfortunately the superstructures above the high basements have gone. But we need not be dismayed, as, on the analogy of bronze votive stūpas found intact from this province, and of the stone specimens of Bihar, to which, as we see, the basements of these brick structures remarkably agree, we may safely imagine the existence of an elaborate drum, most probably with Buddha figures in ornamental niches, the plain cylindrical dome, the square or often the cruciform *harmmikā*, and the diminishing tier of umbrellas, each rising in succession one above the other from the basement upwards.

The examination of one of the votive stūpas around the central shrine at Satyapir's *bhiṭā* revealed a vast number of unburnt clay stūpas—complete with basement, drum and finial—encasing minute round sealings impressed with the Buddhist creed. Such relics were also found enshrined in some of the

¹ *A.S.I., A.R.*, 1922-23, p. 112.

² *A.P. Message, A.B Patrika*, 21st February, 1933 (Dāk).

votive stūpas at Bodhgaya.¹ It seems that in later stages of Buddhism the corporeal relics of Buddha and of his apostles, being scarce, were substituted in the sacred stūpas and shrines, by the well-known creed formulae, impressed in clay and treated as if it were the holy relic of Buddha himself. Such a practice is apparent from a passage in It-sing² which relates that in an image or caitya two kinds of *sārīras* are to be placed, namely first, the relics of the great Teacher, and secondly the *gāthā* or the chain of causation, in other words the formula of the faith. The monolithic votive stūpa, or one built up of solid blocks of stone, one component member being placed above the other, has but little scope, which the brick structure offered, of enshrining such relics. The pious devotee in Bengal hence could not check the temptation, which his material offered him, of acquiring greater merit by depositing within his votive offerings such relics as were available and current in his time. Such stūpas had thus a twofold character, the relic and the votive.

One such structure within the enclosure of the great monastery of Paharpur is however remarkable as supplying us with quite a novel plan. It shows a circular base, over which rises a high plinth with sixteen projecting corners (and so sixteen corresponding recessed angles), each corner just touching the outline of the circular base. It is well decorated with elaborate lines of mouldings, and the whole presents the shape of a beautiful lotus with sixteen petals evenly arranged inside a circle. The vertical lines of the corners and the angles are finely counterbalanced by the variegated lines of horizontal mouldings and in the whole composition we have a fine display of light and shade by a pleasing combination of the arrangement of the corners, the angles and the mouldings. The arrangement of the plinth into so many corners and angles most probably evolved out of an attempt at the variegation of the outline, an attempt, which was, in all likelihood, responsible

¹ Cunningham, *Mahabodhi*, p. 47.

² Takakasu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, p. 151.

for the addition of a number of planes on each face of a square structure. It seems we have here a type of the sixteen-cornered building, so frequently met with in treatises on architecture, and it is quite plain that this plan—a circle with sixteen projecting corners inside a bigger one, the points of projection just touching the outline of the bigger circle—is but the logical culmination of the cruciform plan of the Paharpur temple, which is peculiar to Bengal, whence it has travelled elsewhere. The superstructure of this novel structure, which might have supplied us with an unknown and interesting form has alas gone, a fact much to be deplored. So far as the basement is concerned, I think, we have possibly an anticipation here of the variegated outline of the basements of the Burmese pagodas, *e.g.*, the Shwe Dagon Pagoda at Rangoon.¹

From a study of the extant remains it appears that the stūpa in Bengal, whether in stone, bronze or brick, has but little difference with the mediaeval stūpas we so abundantly find in famous Buddhist sites in Bihar—a fact, which need not be wondered at, when we understand that the same identical quality also prevails in the mediaeval sculptures of the two provinces. The general style shows a high basement, often cruciform in plan, with numerous lines of mouldings and rows of sculptured figures and figures of deities in ornamental niches on four sides. Next come the elaborate drum with four figures in niches round its body, the plain dome—originally the principal feature of the stūpa, now a mere finish or top to a series of elaborated lines of decorated mouldings forming a lofty base—the square *harmmikā* and the series of diminishing *chatras* as the pointed finial. The whole height has thus become equal to three or four diameters of the hemisphere of the dome as against half the diameter of the earliest stūpas. The elevation exhibits a spire, which, but for the conical outline, would have resembled the lofty curvilinear spire of the Indo-Aryan temples.

¹ Fergusson and Burgess, *A History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, Vol. II, p. 347, Pl. XXXVII.

EARLY INDIAN TERRACOTTA STATUETTES * ¹

TRANSLATED BY CHARU CHANDRA DAS GUPTA, M.A.,
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For a long time attempts have been made to show the development of Indian art as an organic process in which different styles succeed one another ; but it is not such a process, as is applicable to European art, that Indian art ever presents in all its purity. A. K. Coomaraswamy is the first who has maintained this theory with success in his *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* (1927). According to him the beginnings of Indian art do not start from the third century B.C., as ordinarily admitted, but from the third millennium B.C. The first figure represents a limestone statuette found in the Indo-Sumerian excavations in the Indus Valley (Harappa and Mohenjo-daro). A date can be fixed for the monuments of this group by comparison with analogous monuments of Mesopotamia and of Central Asia. Like his predecessors, Coomaraswamy does not admit that civilisation came to India from Hither Asia, but according to him it is possible that it took the contrary course or even that it had its birth in India in a relatively spontaneous fashion. Thus we must set aside the presumption, so current, that the primitive and coloured peoples of India took no part in the cultural development of the country. The little statuettes

* From the French article " Statuettes Indiennes en terre cuite de haute époque " par Alfred Salmony. (*Revue des Arts Asiatiques*, tome V, pp. 98-101, 1928-29.)

¹ See Figs. 1-9. The exact measurements of the figures are indicated. Property of the Heeramanek firm, Paris—New York.

found in the mounds are the most valuable testimony in favour of the original development of Indian plastic art. The Museum of Fine Arts of Boston, first of all, acquired a great number of such statuettes and Coomaraswamy has published them in number 152 of the Bulletin of the Museum (December, 1927). For a considerable time all that was known about terracotta statuettes was derived from the reports of the Archaeological Survey of India (abbreviation: A. S.). The most ancient statuettes of Harappa are reproduced in the Annual Report, 1923-9124, Plate 21. By comparison with the monuments of Occidental Asia the date 4000-3000 B.C. is assigned to them. According to Coomaraswamy the terracotta plastic objects are found in the region which extends from Pataliputra to Taxila, from the middle Ganges to the Indus, consequently in the regions where the ancient Hindu civilisation principally developed. Incidentally it may be noted that the Madras region seems to have been neglected. Except for Harappa the chronology concerning the plastic objects is very uncertain. For the plastic objects found in the Indus Valley Coomaraswamy speaks of 1000-400 B.C., then from the 5th century to the 1st century B.C. Spooner estimates that the objects which he found in the vicinity of Pataliputra (Excavations at Basarh, A.S., annual report, 1913-1914) are of the period which extends from the 3rd century B.C. to the 5th century A.D. J. H. Marshall places the important group of Bhita on the middle Ganges between 1000 and 300 B.C., and has ascribed only certain terracotta objects to the Gupta epoch (Excavations at Bhita, A.S., annual report, 1911-1912). The same author has placed one coarsely engraved head found at Saheth-Maheth to the 11th-12th century (Excavations at Saheth-Maheth, A.S., annual report, 1910-1911, Plates 10, 3). The most important series, that of Bulandhi-Bagh near Pataliputra, bears no date in the A.S., annual report, 1917-1918, Part I.

The authors give very little information on the use of the terracotta. We see largely female figures. It is generally supposed that these were toys. In all probability it may be

asserted that they often represent mother goddesses and goddesses of fertility (Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 22) who used to be worshipped during the early period of Hindu civilisation and who are still the object of popular cult in our times. The votive character is occasionally emphasised by inscriptions.

Already the series of dates given by the A. S. show that the terracotta statuettes can lead us from prehistoric plastic art to the plastic art of the historic age. Coomaraswamy is the first to show this in the Bulletin of Boston. Perhaps the dates which he assigns to his second group (1000-300 B.C.) are a little more ancient. We have attempted to place some new types before the Maurya period. These types are borrowed from a series which, by chance, has appeared for sale at a curio dealer's and which is composed of pieces having no relation between themselves and of which one cannot indicate the place of origin.

Our Fig. 1 resembles most the two statuettes of Harappa already mentioned (and represented in the Fig. 1 of the Bulletin). It has, in common with them, the summary reunion of the nasal and buccal part, the reduction of the cheeks to one flat surface. But while in the statuettes of Harappa the head-dress rises in a projection from two sides of the head, here it appears to end in point. And especially in the specimens of the prehistoric age, reproduced elsewhere, all the parts of the face are represented in a plastic fashion, while in our figure they are engraved in the same way as the ornament of the neck and of the breast. Even though the employment, so frequent in later times, of the engraving seems to indicate a period subsequent to that of Harappa, the form of bird given to the head connects our Fig. 1 with the most ancient group. If one is able to classify Fig. 1 in the group of terracottas of a very early date, one would be justified in attributing to it about 1000 B.C. as its date.

For the Fig. 2 no comparison is made in the A. S. In the form of the head, as in the chain which serves for ornament, there is an energetic effort at plasticity and the consciousness of

the diversity of different parts. It seems that the statuette represents the head of a bearded man. The locks of hair fall down in disorder on the forehead. The almond-shaped eyes under the eyebrows made of little lines are flat and large. In the head-dress there is an attempt at schematic arrangement. The head gives a greater archaic impression than the most ancient Hindu stone-sculpture. Likewise another object, also schematic and massive as the colossal female statue of Besnagar (V. A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, Plate 14) appears to mark a development on our terracotta statuette. One may feel justified in placing our Fig. 2 after the period indicated for Fig. 1, but before the Maurya period, consequently about the middle of the last millennium.

The female head in Fig. 3 in its simplicity exhibits a still more serious effort at plasticity. While in the Harappa group the diverse parts, separately made, are joined to one another, the entire face is now grossly modelled. The large, flat, almond-shaped eyes occur already in Fig. 2. The material is ingeniously cleansed as in the most ancient group. The date of 300 B. C. appears very probable. There are points of comparison between this and the great plastic works of the group which approaches it most in style: this group is represented here by three specimens which can be attributed to the same epoch (Figs. 4, 5, 6). Fig. 4 represents a statuette which is the same as a terracotta from Basarh (A. S., 1913-1914, Plate 45a). Spooner describes it in the catalogue under number 518: "Head and shoulders of a human figure standing under a flowering tree(?)." Our specimen, certainly better conserved, proves that the discs surrounding the head and divided into one or three circles, do not represent a tree but an ornament which covers the head and which is placed above a fragment of cloth. In the specimen found at Basarh, this fragment of cloth is also distinctly recognisable. The same motif is again found on a kind of gigantic collar. These enormous ornaments of head are so frequently found in ancient Indian sculpture that the explanation which we

give has no novelty. (Comp. Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, Fig. 23 and Bulletin, Figs. 2, 4, 5.)

Fig. 5 shows to the right of the face fragments of modelling the significance of which is not understood if it cannot be, thanks to Fig. 2 of the Bulletin, considered as something appertaining to the hair. The form of the head with stripes of straight hair, the piece of cloth, eyes stretched in breadth, the complete shape of the nose and of the mouth is absolutely similar to the head of Fig. 4. Besides the bust of Basarh the terracottas of Bulandi Bagh, already mentioned, can serve us as data. Preferably this group ought to be placed at the beginning of the period fixed by Spooner for Basarh. Therefore the two latter statuette of which we have spoken should belong to the Maurya epoch (3rd, 2nd centuries B. C.). For precisely the same reasons the grotesque image which seems to be that of a man (Fig. 6) would belong to the same epoch.

According to Marshall a peculiar clumsiness in the composition (Excavations at Bhita, p. 72) is a characteristic of the Kushan age (1st, 4th centuries). There are numerous specimens belonging to this age in A. S. Boston possesses a very characteristic specimen (Bulletin, Fig. 14).

For the Hindu statuettes, as for Chinese ones, it should be possible to determine the age according to the material employed. Unfortunately the authors do not give any information on this subject. The specimens of which we have spoken just now are in gray clay. Those which are particularly well cleansed and hard date approximately from 3000 to 500 B. C. The colour is either brown (specimens of Boston) or gray. For the Maurya age and the Sunga age which succeeds it the gray colour is characteristic. The coarse and micaceous material of gray or red colour characterises the Kushana group of which we have no specimens here. The three following statuettes are of reddish clay: Fig. 7, it seems, represents a corpulent man with his two hands on the chest. If it were a female, the Hindu ideal of beauty would require that the breasts were closer.

All the details indicate a grotesque image. It is the same for the very deteriorated terracotta which represents Fig. 8. We can discern a certain movement in it. In Fig. 9 the head-dress may lead us to suppose that it represents a man. The type resembles that of Deogarh (Smith, *op. cit.*, plate 34) and may be Buddhist. These three specimens in red clay are related in nature and show plastic maturity; therefore they can be placed in the Gupta age, that is to say, in the 5th, 6th centuries.

This series grouped by chance shows that in the works which, till now, have been neglected there is a development of a purely Hindu origin, a continuous progress towards the full plastic spirit outside the sphere of the Hellenistic influence of Gandhara which this group has not been subjected to probably because at the very beginning it has no Buddhist characteristics. If the complete reproductions of small discoveries of early Indian art be presented to the public, the ideas expressed till now, even the suppositions, will largely contribute to complete the history of Hindu plastic art. This will be due to the excavations which are being made to-day in India. To the representations of human beings the representations of animals will shortly be added.

The aim of this short article is to draw the attention of museums and of European specialists to a group of work which is important from the standpoint of art and of its history.




Fig. 1—Light gray clay, H. 70 m/m.



Fig. 2—Bluish gray clay, H. 50 m/m.



Fig. 3—Gray clay, H. 40 m/m.



Fig. 4—Bluish gray clay, H. 70 m/m.

C. C. DAS GUPTA



Fig. 5—Bluish gray clay,
H. 45 m/m.



Fig. 6—Bluish gray clay, H. 60 m/m.



Fig. 7—Red clay,
H. 50 m/m.



Fig. 8—Red clay, H. 60 m/m.



Fig. 9—Red clay,
H. 32 m/m.

THE VISVANĀTHA TEMPLE AT MĀRIBĀG, REWA STATE, CENTRAL INDIA.

By

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Māribāg is a village situated within the Rewa State, Central India. It is approximately four miles away from Umaria, a railway station on the Bilaspur-Katni line of B.N.Ry., well-known for marine fossils and coal-fields. While travelling from Umaria to Māribāg one passes by a village named Vikatgañj. The temple situated at Māribāg is locally known as the Viśvanātha temple ; and as the principal object of worship is a *līnga*, it is undoubtedly a *śaiva* temple.¹

This temple belongs to the type which is termed Northern or Indo-Aryan by Fergusson,² Northern by Coomaraswamy³ and Nāgara by the *śilpa-sāstras* (Fig. 1).⁴ It is 23 ft. 3 in. in length and 21 ft. in breadth. Originally it consisted of the *vimāna*, the *śikhara* and the *maṇḍapa* and the last one appears to have already fallen down.⁵

The *vimāna* has two rows of sculptured figures on the outer portion of three sides, each row consisting of five sculptures.

¹ The present author visited this temple in April 1932 and in December 1933; this interesting temple seems to have escaped the notice of archaeologists up till now.

² History of Indian and Eastern Architecture, Vol. II, p. 84, 1910.

³ History of Indian and Indonesian Art, p. 107, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵ The *maṇḍapa* seems to have fallen down and thus there have been some repairs in the front façade to prevent the whole superstructure from tumbling down.

Thus there are, in all, thirty sculptures of which one on the western side is lost. Besides these, we find two more sculptures on each side of the door.

On the western side (Fig. 2) we get in the upper line five sculptures in five rectangular panels, *viz.*, in the middle, the standing image of *Sūrya*, in the panels to the right and to the left of *Sūrya* erotic couples and in the extreme right and extreme left panels, four-handed images. In the lower line also there used to be a figure in the middle panel which is now lost and there are also four figures in the remaining four panels of the same nature and arranged in a similar way to what we find in the upper line. In the spaces between these panels there are sculptural representations of erotic figures and conventional animals.

On the southern side (Fig. 3) we get in the middle panel of the upper line the image of an eight-handed *Mahishamardini* and in the middle panel of the lower line the image of a four-handed dancing *Ganeśa*. Besides these we get four sculptures in the upper line and four sculptures in the lower line and erotic figures and conventional animals in the spaces between the panels, of the same nature and arranged in the same manner that we find on the western side.*

On the northern side also we get in the middle panel of the upper line the image of a four-handed *Narasimha* and in the middle panel of the lower line the figure of an eight-handed *Chandi*. The sculptures in the other panels are of the same nature and arranged in the same manner that we find on the western and southern sides.

The door is 2 ft. 9 in. in breadth and 5 ft. 6 in. in length. The jambs and the lintel are profusely carved. Along with elegantly carved scrolls each of the jambs consists of a group of figures at the bottom and five figures in erotic poses in five vertical panels over it. The lintel itself contains three niches, two

* As light was insufficient on this side and as there was a hut adjacent to these sculptures, a photo of this side could not be taken.

at the ends and one in the centre. In the central niche we find the four-handed *Śiva*, putting on a *jaṭā-mukuta*, whose front two hands are in the dancing pose, back right hand holds the *triśūla* and back left hand the *kapāla*. The niche to the proper right contains an image of *Sarasvatī* who is seated in the *lalitāsana* pose, whose lower two hands hold the *vinā*, upper right hand the *pustaka* and upper left hand the *padma*. The niche to the proper left contains a seated four-handed *Gaṇeśa* whose upper right hand holds the *daṇḍa*, upper left hand some uncertain object, lower right hand the *modaka* and lower left hand is placed on the knee. The panels on the lintel between the figures of *Śiva* and those of *Sarasvatī* to its right and of *Gaṇeśa* to its left contain some sculptures.

As there is no inscription to give a clue regarding its age, we shall try to determine it by comparing the *śikhara* of this temple with those of similar temples. But before doing so it would not be superfluous to describe the *śikhara* of this temple. The *śikhara* which begins from the top of the *vimāna* is of a slightly elongated nature and is capped by an archaic *āmalaka-sīlā* which is topped by a *kalasa*. It is divided into five facets, each being separated from the other by a narrow sunken vertical line. The central facet has a slightly elevated surface in comparison with the other facets. The front facet of the *śikhara* has a miniature *śikhara* in the central facet. The corner facets meet each other at angular points.

Let us now compare the nature of this *śikhara* with those of the *Pātāleśvara*,⁷ *Machchhendranātha*⁸ and the triple-shrined⁹ temples at Amarakantak, of the *Virāṭeśvara*¹⁰ temple at Sohagpur, of the *Devī*,¹¹ *Chitragupta*¹² and *Kandārya Mahādeva*¹³

⁷ Memoirs of Archæological Survey of India, No. 23, pl. XVI. a, 1931.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pl. XVI. b.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pl. XIV. b.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pl. X.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pl. XVII. a.

¹² *Ibid.*, pl. XVII. b.

¹³ History of Indian and Indonesian Art, pl. LXIV, 1927.

temples at Khajuraho, of the Paraśurāmeśvara temple¹⁴ at Bhuvaneśvara ascribed to c. 750 A.D. and of Temple No. IV¹⁵ of the Begunia group at Barakar ascribed to an age later than that of the Paraśurāmeśvara temple and earlier than that of the Siddheśvara temple at Bahulara, dated in the 10th century A.D. The late Prof. R. D. Banerji has attributed the Pātāleśvara,¹⁶ Machchhendranātha,¹⁷ Amarakantak triple shrined¹⁸ and Virāteśvara¹⁹ temples to 'the second group of temples built during the rule of the Chedī kings,'²⁰ but has not discussed the age of the three Khajuraho temples. The Central Indian temples, inspite of local variations, follow the Orissan temples in the general architectonic evolution. The short and stunted *śikhara*, with angular corners and absence of miniature *śikharas* on the facets, is characteristic of the earlier temples of this group in Orissa as well as in Central India. The *śikhara* of the Paraśurāmeśvara is short and stunted, has no reduplication of miniature *śikharas* on the facets of the main *śikhara* and has the corner facets meeting at angular points. The *śikhara* of Temple No. IV of the Begunia group at Barakar resembles that of the Paraśurāmeśvara temple except that it is, though of a very similar nature, not so short and stunted; and it is mainly for this reason that it has been placed later than the Paraśurāmeśvara temple. The *śikhara* of the Viśvanātha temple is similar to that of Temple No. IV of the Begunia group except that, though of a similar nature, it is not so short and stunted. For this reason this temple appears to be later in age than Temple No. IV of the Begunia group. In comparing the *śikhara* of the Viśvanātha temple with those of the Central Indian temples we should take note of their two different types. The Pātāleśvara,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pl. LXVI, No. 216, 1927.

¹⁵ *Journal of Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Vol. I, pp. 124-27, pl. XXXVI, 1933.

¹⁶ *Memoirs of Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 23, p. 60, 1931.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 60.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-57.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-53.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-66.

Machchhendranātha and Amarakantak triple-shrined temples belong to the group where the duplication of miniature *śikhara*s on the facets is absent and consequently appear to be earlier than the group which shows this feature. The Pātāleśvara appears to be the earliest of this group because its *śikhara* has angular corners and is shorter and more stunted than those of the other two. Of the second group, *i.e.*, that with the duplication of miniature *śikhara*s round the central one the Virāṭeśvara temple at Sohagpur seems to be earlier than the Devī, Chitrāgupta and Kandārya Mahādeva temples at Khajuraho. In the Virāṭeśvara temple we have just the beginnings of that characteristic duplication of miniature *śikhara*s which has almost covered the central *śikhara* of the other three temples. The Virāṭeśvara and the Pātāleśvara groups exhibit two different types and the former is obviously later in age than the latter inasmuch as more recent tendencies, such as the elongated appearance of the *śikhara*, the rounded corners and duplication of miniature *śikhara*s on the facets of the main one are present in it. If we accept the late Prof. Banerji's statement relegating the Virāṭeśvara temple to the rule of the Chedi kings (*c.* 11th century A.D.), the Pātāleśvara group must be a little earlier than that. Of all these temples the Pātāleśvara temple resembles most the Viśvanātha temple. If we compare the *śikhara* of the Viśvanātha with that of the Pātāleśvara, we find that the *śikhara* of the Viśvanātha has, from the very bottom, an inward bend which is not to be found in Pātāleśvara and thus is shorter and more stunted than it. Secondly, we find that the central facets of the Pātāleśvara end in spear-heads in their approach towards the *amalaka-śilā*. It is a distinctly Central Indian architectonic characteristic and not found in the Viśvanātha and Orissan temples. For these reasons it seems that the Viśvanātha temple is earlier than the Pātāleśvara temple.






FIG. 1




FIG. 2



FIG. 3

ON THE METEOROLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF THE ANCIENT HINDUS.¹

By

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In the present paper, the meteorological concepts of the ancient Hindus, as found embodied in ancient authoritative Sanskrit texts, are discussed and critically analysed. In the next paper, is given an account of an elaborate experimental investigation, recently completed, on the Polarity of the Thunder Clouds of Bengal, which is probably the first or the only work of its kind in Bengal.

I. Introduction.

Sir P. C. Roy and Sir B. N. Seal in their respective works on The History of Hindu Chemistry and on The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus have proved beyond the possibility of any doubt, that the ancient Hindus possessed a very remarkably developed knowledge of the different branches of science, that some of their investigations were as elaborate as the investigations of the present day, and that in ancient Sanskrit texts are to be found the rudiments of some of the accepted laws of modern times. An attempt will be made in the present paper to analyse critically the extent of the meteorological concepts of the ancient Hindus.

The study of weather began in the very early age of the Rig-Veda, when specialization in industry had begun and irrigation

¹ Part I of a thesis approved by the University of Calcutta for the award of the Griffith Memorial Prize for original work in Science.

for agricultural purposes was resorted to. Scarcity, extending over a whole kingdom, caused by drought or floods is found mention in the text. The study of weather was undertaken to combat these evils and we find in later Sanskrit texts a system of rules for the forecast of weather, which bear a glowing testimony to their highly developed scientific knowledge and to their keen powers of observation. It should be noted, however, that these forecasts were mainly for agricultural purposes, as the maritime and other activities, requiring a knowledge of weather, were very limited in those early ages. An account will now be given of the early views regarding rain, cloud, thunder and of the rules of weather forecast together with the relevant original texts.

II. *The Origin and Nature of Vidyoot (Lightning).*

Details regarding the origin, nature and kinds of Vidyoot are given in the Vishnupurāṇa and in the Brihatsamhitā of the astronomer Varāhamihira, works which were written before the end of the sixth century. The different forms of lightning are described in the Brihatsamhitā as Vidyoollekhā (sinuous lightning) or Vidyootlatā, Vidyootdāman (ramified lightning), and Tatatatatsvanā Vidyoot. Tatatatatsvanā Vidyoot is described in detail thus :—

विद्युत् सत्त्वत्रासं जनयन्ती तटतटस्वना सहसा ।

कुटिला विशाला निपतति जीवेन्मनराग्निषु ज्वलिता ॥

Brihatsamhitā, Chap. 33, 5.

—This kind of lightning causes terror in the hearts of living beings by its sudden 'Tatatata' roar, is large and curved, and falls on living beings and wood burning them.

The origin of Vidyoot is given thus :—Dhūma (smoke or vapour) rises from the Sujalasamudra (the name of a sea) due to heat and moves to and fro in the atmosphere ; sparks of fire

originate in the Dhūma, which accumulate and produce Vidyoot. This view, although not very clear and accurate, nevertheless proves that the ancients believed that lightning originated from the water-vapour present in atmosphere and that it developed by the accumulation of vapour particles from the sea.

Vidyoot has been differentiated from another type of aerial flash, Ashani, which has the power of killing living beings and causing damage, and which drives down into the ground. The word Ashani is derived from the Sanskrit root Ash, to kill. The word Ashana, in the Vedas, means a stone which is thrown. The word Ashani, therefore, derivatively means a hurled stone which kills. It obviously refers to a meteorolite or an aerolite. Thus astronomer Utpal writes, “अश्मवर्षणमुल्काभेदो वा”—Ashani and Ulkā (meteor) are the same.

The character of lightning was taken to forecast weather according to the following rule :—

वाताय कपिला विद्युत् आतपायातिलोहिनी ।
पीता वर्षाय विज्ञेया दुर्भिक्षाय सिता भवेत् ॥

Vishnupurāṇa, Chap. I, 15.

—Tawny or reddish Vidyoot indicates storm, deep red Vidyoot indicates heat, yellow Vidyoot indicates rain, and white Vidyoot indicates famine.

The above passage also occurs in Pāṇiniya Mahābhāṣya, by Patañjali, which is an authoritative Sanskrit work of the second century B.C.

III. Clouds and Cloud-formation.

In the Raghu-avṁśa by Kālidāsa (who lived in the beginning of the fifth century A.D.) occurs the following line :—

सहस्रगुणमुत्सृष्टमादत्ते हि रसं रविः ।

Canto I, Verse 18.

—The sun attracts fluid only to discharge it once again with thousandfold intensity.

Again in Canto 13, Verse 4, of the same work the following line occurs, where the ocean is being described :—

गर्भं दधत्यर्कमरीचयोऽस्मात्—

—The sun's rays are impregnated by the ocean.

In the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa, which existed in the fourth century A.D., the following Śloka occurs :—

तेजो हि सर्वभूतेभ्य आदत्ते रश्मिभिर्जलम् ।

समुद्रात्त्वन्मसां योगाद् रश्मयः प्रवहन्त्यपः ॥

ततोऽयनवशात् काले परिवृत्तो दिवाकरः ।

नियच्छति पयो मेघे शुक्ताशुक्लैर्गर्भस्तिभिः ॥

अभ्रस्थाः प्रपतन्त्यापो वायुना समुदीरिताः ।

सर्वभूतहितार्थाय वायुभूताः समन्ततः ॥

—The sun takes up water from all kinds of matter and the sun's rays, by coming in contact with the water of the seas, carry water therefrom. Then as the sun changes position with time the water is transferred, by white and dark rays, to form clouds. The water of the clouds, being driven in all directions by wind, comes down (as rain), for the good of all living beings.

Further, we have the following lines in the Manusamhitā, Chap. 9, Verse 305.

अष्टौ मासान् यथादित्यस्तोयं हरति रश्मिभिः ।

तथा हरेत् करं राष्ट्रान्नित्यमर्कव्रतं हि तत् ॥

—Just as the sun takes up water all through the period of *eight months*, so also the king should daily realise revenue in his kingdom. Again, in the Nirukta, which is believed to be a work of the fifth century B.C., the derivative meaning of Āditya (the sun) is given as :—“आदित्यः कस्मादादत्ते रसान्”—That which takes up fluid (by its rays). (Nirukta, II. 13. 3.)

It thus appears from the texts quoted above, that the process of cloud-formation by evaporation of water caused by sun's rays, was widely known in ancient India and found place in the works of philosophers and poets. But this is rather a simple matter, as compared to what follows.

IV. *The Classification of Clouds.*

The different kinds of clouds are described in the Jyotistatta thus :—

आवर्तो निर्जलो मेघः संवर्तश्च वह्मदकः ।

पुष्करो दुष्करजलो द्रोणः शस्येप्रपूरकः ॥

—The cloud which is known as Āvarta, produces no rain, the cloud known as Samvarta gives too much rain, the cloud called Puṣkara discharges very little rain, and the cloud termed Droṇa is good for crops. This classification is rather vague. But in the Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa, the character of the different kinds of clouds is very accurately described. The rain-cloud is beautifully described thus :—

जीमूता नाम ते मेघा ये तेभ्यो जीवसम्भवाः ।

विद्यद्गुणविहीनाश्च जलधारावलम्बिनः ॥

मृदुसेका महाकाया आवहस्यन्व सानुगाः ।

क्रोशमात्राच्च वर्षन्ति क्रोशार्द्धादपि वा पुनः ॥

—The cloud, which is necessary for the preservation of life, is termed Jīmūta. It is devoid of thunder and holds copious rain. It is of very large size and closely follows the direction of the wind, and discharges rain from a distance of one *krośa* (two miles) and sometimes from a distance of half a *krośa* only. The word Āvaha, which means wind, requires explanation here. It was supposed in those days that there were seven distinct layers of air, one above the other, in the order given below :—

आवहः प्रवहश्चैव संवहश्चोदवहस्तथा ।

विवहाख्यः परिवहः परावह इति क्रमात् ॥

Thus Āvaha is the lowermost layer of air on the earth's surface. Whatever be the merit of this classification, it is clear that the rain-cloud was known to be a low cloud, moving with the lowermost layer of air. It is remarkable that the Hindus, in the days of the Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa (earlier than the fifth century A.D., but according to Pargiter as early as the beginning of the fifth century B.C.), studied the character of the rain-cloud in all details and were able to describe it so accurately. The height of the rain-cloud as mentioned in the above text is also fairly accurate. Another mode of classification of clouds is given in the Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa (Chap. 58). Clouds have been figuratively termed as Agniya (originating from Agni, the fire-god), Brahmaja (originating from Brahmā, the god of creation), and Pakshaja (having wings). *Agniya clouds* are thunder-clouds and they are described thus :—

The *Agniya clouds* appear on very cloudy days, take the forms of buffalo, boar, and maddened elephant and appear very low on the horizon.

This description of the thunder-cloud is, no doubt, very accurate. Brahmaja clouds are rain-clouds, and are devoid of thunder, extend over a vast region and hold copious rain. Pakshaja clouds are those which move very high in the air. These clouds obviously correspond to Cumulo-nimbus, Nimbus, and Cirrus in our modern classification.

In Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, the course of the rain-cloud from Rāmagiri to the Himalayas is indicated. In this work (which is earlier than the sixth century A.D.), the poet describes a Yaksha, who was banished from his home, Alakā, in the Himalayas, and was passing his lonely life at the Rāmagiri Āshrama. On the first day of the month of Āshāḍha (middle of June), the Yaksha noticed one dark cloud, like some elephant in form, and wanted to send it as a messenger to his wife who was at Alakā. The Yaksha then proceeded to describe the places, over which the cloud would have to pass, before reaching his home in the Himalayas. The route indicated in this work of the rain-

cloud corresponds, though not very closely, with the known course of the south-west monsoon current. But it cannot be definitely claimed that the course of the monsoon has not changed since Kālidāsa's time. It is just possible that the course described in the Meghaduta, was the actual course of one branch of the monsoon current in those days. The course is indicated in detail below.

V. The Course of the Rain-cloud as given in the Meghadūta by Kālidāsa, who lived in the 5th century A.D.

1. Rāmagiri Āshrama on Chitrakuta hill.
2. Āmrakuta hill.
3. The Vindhya.
4. Rebā or the river Narmadā.
5. The city of Vidiśā, on the river Vetravati, the capital of Dasārṇa.
6. The river Nirvindhya.
7. Ujjaini or Vesālā in Avanti.
8. The rivers Siprā, Gandhavati and Gambhīrā.
9. Devagiri.
10. The river Charmanvati.
11. Dasapura.
12. Kurukshetra in Brahmābarta.
13. The river Sarasvati.
14. The river Bhāgirathi at Kanakhal.
15. The Himālayas.
16. Krauncha-randhra or the pass of the Krauncha mountain.
17. Kailash mountain.
18. Manas-sarovara.
19. Alakā—The home of the Yaksha.

VI. *Rain.*

In the Brihat-samhitā by the astronomer Varāhamihira, elaborate methods are given for the determination and forecast of the time of rainfall. The methods originated with the sages Kāsyapa, Garga, Parāsara and others. As the methods are no longer of any practical importance, they will be summarised here very briefly. The time of discharge (प्रसव) of rain can be calculated if the time of formation or impregnation (गर्भ) of the cloud is known. The first impregnation of the cloud is to be looked for, from the day, in the brighter fortnight of the month of Agrahāyana (middle of Nov. to the middle of Dec.), in which the moon is in conjunction with the Pūrvāṣādhā Nakshatra.¹ Similar rules for detecting impregnation for every month are given in the Brihat-samhitā. Counting from the date on which the impregnation is effected, rain will be discharged after 195 lunar days. If the impregnation takes place in the brighter fortnight of a month, the corresponding discharge will occur in the darker fortnight of a month. Thus if the impregnation is effected in the brighter fortnight of the month of Māgha (which begins from about the middle of January) the corresponding discharge of rain will occur in the darker fortnight of the month of Shrāvana (which begins from about the middle of July); but if the impregnation takes place in the darker fortnight of the month of Māgha, the discharge will occur in the brighter fortnight of the month of Bhādra (which begins from about the middle of August).

If the impregnation takes place in the month of Agrahāyana or in the brighter fortnight of the month of Pausha, bad results are produced. If the cold is severe in the month of Agrahāyana or if dew falls copiously in the month of Pausha, the impregnation is retarded. It is also retarded by earthquake, eclipse, and

¹ A Nakshatra is an asterism in the moon's path or lunar mansion. There are twenty-seven such Nakshatras, distinct in name, figure, and number of stars, enumerated in the Purāṇas.

by the fall of meteors. The impregnation becomes very effective, if in the month of Fālguna the wind be very dry and violent and the sun be fiery, if in the month of Chaitra there be wind, cloud and rain, if in the month of Baiśākha the cloud be accompanied by thunder, wind and rain. In all months, if the impregnation takes place when the moon is in conjunction with पूर्वभाद्रपद, पूर्वाषाढा, उत्तराषाढा or रोहिणी Nakshatra, a large amount of rain is discharged. If the impregnation occurs under the influence of Nakshatras such as शतभिषा, अश्लेषा, आर्द्रा, स्वाति, मघा good results are produced. If the colour of the cloud is like the Tamal tree, blue lotus, or collyrium, it produces a large amount of rain.

VII. *Measurement of Rainfall.*

In the Brihatsamhitā, it is also mentioned that the rainfall is to be measured by collecting rain in a circular wooden vessel of circumference one cubit and of capacity one Ādhak (four Ādhaks make one Drona, and one Drona is equal to 32 seers.) If the moon is in conjunction with पूर्वाषाढा, मृगशिरा, हस्ता, चित्रा, स्वेतो, धनिष्ठा, the amount of rainfall will be 16 Dronas. If it is in conjunction with आर्द्रा, the amount will be 18 Dronas, if with पुनर्वसु, विशाखा, उत्तराषाढा the total amount will be 20 Dronas, and so forth, a quantity being specified for each Nakshatra with which the moon might be in conjunction at the time of impregnation. It seems that the amounts, mentioned above, refer to the total amount of rain that will be discharged by a particular cloud impregnated at the time of a particular position of the moon.

VIII. *Signs of Immediate Rain.*

In the rainy season, if the sun looks like molten gold and its rays are too scorching for the eyes, rain comes soon after. If salt is found to absorb too much moisture, if the colour of the clouds be like the eggs of a crow, if the air be motionless, if the

fishes agitate the water violently, if the frogs begin to croak incessantly, rain is sure to follow soon. If the mountains look like heaps of collyrium, if the caves be moist and warm, if the cows begin to jump, if the cattle refuse to come out of the house and begin to move their ears and hoofs, and if the dogs also do so, rain follows soon. If peals of thunder are heard in the night, if the lightning-flashes look like blood in colour in the day time, if halos are seen round planets, rain is sure to follow.

In the *Brihatsamhitā*, the above signs are mentioned as indicating immediate rain. Most of them are very significant.

IX. *Yajna and Rain.*

In the *Manusamhitā* the following Sloka occurs :—

अग्नी प्रास्ताहुतिः सम्यगादित्यमुपतिष्ठते ।
आदित्याज्जायते वृष्टिर्बृष्टेरन्नं ततः प्रजाः ॥

Manusamhitā, Chap. 3, Sloka 76.

—When oblations are offered to the sacred fire, they reach the sun. The sun brings about rain, and the rain brings about crops, which preserve the lives of the people.

In this connection, it will be interesting to note that the very ancient practice of making offerings to the sacred fire, with a view to cause rainfall, was in itself a scientific achievement of very high order and goes to the very root of the question of the necessity of nuclei for the condensation of water vapour. The very recent method of causing rainfall by throwing pulverised ice into the heights of the atmosphere from an aeroplane, may be regarded, in some respects, as a near parallel.

Moreover, this practice of making offerings to the sacred fire to cause rainfall is a very ancient one. In Yāska's *Nirukta*, which is believed to be a work of the fifth century B.C., a group of hymns of the *Rigveda* is called the *वर्षकामसूक्त*, i. e., hymns recited at a sacrificial ceremony whose object was to bring about

rain. (Nirukta, Chap. II, Sec. 11.) A few of the verses of the वर्षकामसूक्त, which occurs in Maṇḍala X, Sukta 98 of the Rīgveda, are given below.

वृ॒ह॒स्य॒ते॒ प्र॒ति॒ मे॒ दे॒व॒ता॒भि॒हि॒ मि॒त्रो॒ वा॒ य॒द्व॒रु॒णो॒ वा॒सि॒ पू॒षा ।
आ॒दि॒त्ये॒र्वा॒ य॒द्व॒सु॒भि॒ म॒रु॒त्वान्त्स॒ पर्य॒न्यं॒ श॒न्त॒नवे॒ वृ॒षाय ॥

Rīgveda, Maṇḍala X, Sukta 98, Verse 1.

O Brihaspati, I pray you to approach the other gods to fulfil my ceremony. You are, to me, Mitra, Baruṇa, or Puṣā. With the aid of the twelve Adityas, bring about rain for the relief of the King Santanu.

यं॒ त्वा॒ दे॒वा॒पि॒ शु॒शु॒चानो॑ अ॒ग्न आ॒ष्टि॒षे॒षो॒ मनु॒ष्यः॒ समी॒धे ।
वि॒श्वे॒भिर्दे॒वैरनु॑म॒द्यमानः॒ प्र॒ पर्जन्य॑मौरया वृ॒ष्टि॒मन्त॑म् ॥

Rīgveda, Maṇḍala X, Sukta 98, Verse 8.

O Agni, I pray you, who are being kindled by Debāpi with the proper offerings, send clouds impregnated with rain.

अ॒ग्ने॒ वाध॑स्व॒ वि॒ मृ॒धो॒ वि॒ दु॒र्ग॒हा॒पामो॑वा॒मप॒ रक्षा॑सि॒ सेध॑ ।
अ॒स्मात् स॒मु॒द्राद् वृ॒ह॒तो॒ दि॒वो॒ नो॒ऽपा॑ भू॒मान॑मु॒प न॒ सृ॒ज॒ह ॥

Rīgveda, Maṇḍala X, Sukta 98, Verse 12.

O Agni, inflict pestilence on the cities of our enemy and drive away diseases from our midst. Check the progress of the demons. From the vast sky above, send copious rain to the earth below.

There are a large number of hymns, scattered all through the Vedas (which are decidedly the oldest parts of the Sanskrit literature), clearly referring to the belief of the ancient Hindus that rain could be caused by making offerings to the sacred fire.

X. *Discussion.*

The texts mentioned in this paper have all been drawn from ancient authoritative Sanskrit works. The Vedas are the oldest parts of Sanskrit literature. The Manusamhitā is believed to have assumed its present form not much later than 200 A.D., and the Brihatsamhitā can be assigned to the middle of the 6th century A.D. (Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, 1917, pages 428 and 318.) Yāska's Nirukta is a work of the fifth¹ century B.C. The Raghuvamśa, and the Meghadūta are works of Kālidāsa, who lived in the 5th century A.D.² The Brāhmāṇḍa-purāṇa³ existed in the 4th century A.D., and according to some, as early as the fifth century B.C.

It appears from the texts mentioned above, that the Hindus, thousands of years ago, brought their critical faculties and keen powers of observation to bear upon their study of weather and achieved as much success as could be done by non-instrumental observation, and perhaps even more. They classified the clouds and studied the different kinds of lightning in detail and utilised their knowledge in forecasting weather. Their classification of clouds and their estimate of the height of the rain-cloud stand even to this day. Their elaborate methods of forecasting rain, from the relative positions of the moon and the stars at the time of impregnation of the cloud, must have been the results of deep and patient investigation, and enabled them to predict from year to year the best period for cultivating and sowing different kinds of crops. The ancient practice of performing Yajnas for causing rainfall is known to have been adopted, even in the present day, in some parts of India in times of drought and where the conditions necessary were present, the desired result was achieved.

¹ & ² Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, 1917, pp. 269 and 325.

Pargiter's Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, 1922, pp. 50 and 51.

ON THE POLARITY OF THUNDER-CLOUDS¹

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I. Introduction.

With the rapid growth of the science of meteorology, the detailed study of thunder-clouds has become a subject of first-rate importance, and physicists all over the world have undertaken the investigation of the subject in all its aspects. One of such investigations having far-reaching consequences and carried out in recent times by C. T. R. Wilson and Schonland, is in regard to the polarity of thunder-clouds. C. T. R. Wilson, who initiated work in this direction, has from theoretical considerations and actual experiments drawn certain conclusions regarding the kinds and the dispositions in space of the electrical charges which constitute a thunder-cloud. In two recent papers on "The Electric Fields of South African Thunderstorms" and on "The Polarity of Thunder-clouds," Schonland has given detailed descriptions of a series of observations which tend to confirm that the conclusions, previously arrived at by Wilson, are justified so far as the thunder-clouds which were the subject of his investigation are concerned. It was put forward by Wilson that every thunder-cloud exhibits two opposite polarities. Electrical charges of opposite sign exist at different heights in the thunder-cloud, one being the upper and the other lower, whatever be their exact position or relative magnitude. A cloud has been defined by Wilson to be of 'positive' polarity if its positive charge is situated above the negative charge, and 'negative' if the negative charge forms the upper part and the positive the lower.

¹ Part II of a thesis approved by the University of Calcutta for the award of the Griffith Memorial Prize for original work in Science.

But the distribution claimed by Wilson is at variance with the distribution put forward by Dr. G. C. Simpson on the basis of his breaking-drop theory of the origin of electricity in thunderstorms. According to the breaking-drop theory of Dr. Simpson, the cloud as a whole should be negatively charged with relatively small regions in which the positive electricity was concentrated. The recent experiments of Schonland support Wilson's hypothesis and show that in the majority of cases investigated by him the polarity was found to be positive. Several other papers have also been published by Appleton, Watson Watt, Herd and Wormell, containing measurements of potential gradient during thunderstorms, which also point to the same conclusion. Schonland carried out his investigations in South Africa, where the climatic conditions are favourable for the conduct of the experiment. In certain provinces in India, particularly in Bengal, the conditions necessary for the experiment prevail for several months in the year. As no experimental work appears to have been done in India¹ on this subject on the lines adopted in the present paper, and as the investigation, if carried out here, is likely to yield valuable information about the problem, besides testing the applicability of the conclusions arrived at by Wilson and Simpson to the thunderstorms formed in Bengal, the present work was undertaken. A very favourable position for the experiment was selected in the countryside, situated at a convenient distance from Calcutta, and the investigations, which are detailed below, were carried out, the experimental work lasting for a total period of about six months.

II. Theory and Method.

Before proceeding to describe the experimental procedure actually followed in the present investigation, it will be useful

¹ The only work so far published from India on this subject, seems to be the paper by Dr. S. K. Banerjee on "The Electric Field of Overhead Thunderclouds," published in Jour. Roy. Met. Soc., July, 1930, Vol. LVI, No. 236, in which a different method, i.e., the steady field method, has been used.

to state the theory, which is due to Wilson,¹ underlying these tests and to discuss the relative merits of the methods of different workers and their suitability to the present case. A thunder-cloud has been assumed by Wilson to be bipolar, consisting of electrical charges of opposite sign at different heights. At distances large [compared with the dimensions of the charged portions of the cloud, they may be regarded as point charges.




FIG. I.

Let A represent the upper charge Q_2 at height H_2 above the earth and B the lower charge Q_1 at a height H_1 . Let P be the point at which the vertical electric field is to be determined. The steady field of a thunder-cloud has been defined as the field produced just before the passage of a lightning discharge between the poles when the cloud charges have reached their maximum values. The steady vertical field at P due to the cloud will be given by the expression

$$F = \frac{2Q_2H_2}{(H_2^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} - \frac{2Q_1H_1}{(H_1^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} \quad (1)$$

When the distance L has less than a critical value the second term and consequently the lower charge B predominates,

while for distance greater than this critical value the first term is greater and the upper charge A predominates. Thus as the distance L between the cloud and the station increases, the sign of the field will first be the same as that of the lower charge, then become zero, and then reverse so as to assume the sign of the upper charge (provided that the lower charge Q_1 , is not less than H_1^2/H_2^2 times nor greater than H_2/H_1 times the upper charge Q_2).

The polarity has also been investigated in another way by examining the magnitude of the sudden changes of field caused by lightning discharges. Let an isolated thunder-cloud be represented by Fig. I. Let AB, AC, BC denote respectively the discharges that take place nearly vertically between the two charges, and between each of the two charges and the ground.

Then from I,

for discharge BC,

$$\Delta F = + \frac{2Q_1 H_1}{(H_1^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}}$$

for discharge AC,

$$\Delta F = - \frac{2Q_2 H_2}{(H_2^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}}$$

for discharge AB,

$$\Delta F = -2Q_2 \left[\frac{H_2}{(H_2^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} - \frac{H_1}{(H_1^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} \right]$$

if $Q_1 > Q_2$

$$\text{Or } \Delta F = -2Q_1 \left[\frac{H_2}{(H_2^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} - \frac{H_1}{(H_1^2 + L^2)^{\frac{3}{2}}} \right]$$

if $Q_1 < Q_2$

The field change ΔF is independent of the distance for discharges from either charge to the ground but for discharges

between the two charges it obviously reverses in sign as the distance L increases. Thus if a cloud be of positive polarity, the sign of the sudden field-changes corresponding to the discharges AB, BC and AC, would be positive, positive and negative respectively if it is near, and negative, positive and negative respectively if it is distant. The tests to determine the polarity by the 'sudden field-change' method can be summarised as follows :—

(1) In case of distant discharges within the cloud, the polarity will be positive if the field-changes be mostly negative.

(2) In case of discharge taking place to the ground (which usually occurs from lower charge to the ground) the cloud will be of positive polarity if the field change is mostly positive.

(3) In case of discharge between the poles of near clouds, the polarity will be positive if the field change is mostly positive.

III. Experimental Procedure.

In the present investigation the polarity was sought to be determined by observations of sudden field changes due to actual discharges. It was not attempted to record the steady field due to thunderstorms, which method has also been adopted by certain investigators. The steady field method has certain disadvantages, which has been mentioned by a previous investigator thus :—
“In view of the stipulation as to the relative strength of the cloud poles and the difficulty of dissociating the steady field of a distant storm from that due to other charged clouds, this effect does not offer a certain test of the polarity of a thundercloud except when the steady field is definitely observed to reverse in sign on approaching the station.” In order to note this reversal in sign of the steady field of a thundercloud, it is necessary that the cloud should pass overhead or very nearly over the observing station. This condition obviously puts a limit to the number of

clouds which can be examined from a particular station. As it was intended in the present investigation to test the distribution of charges of as many clouds as possible, which passed within the range of the observing station, the "sudden field-change" method was adopted.

The apparatus used was similar to that used by Schonland¹ with modifications where found necessary. An exposed conductor (Figure II), the test-plate mentioned in Wilson's paper was first of all constructed. It consisted of a conductor P, whose flat surface was at the top of a pit and was at the same level as the surrounding ground. It was supported on insulators I and was connected to earth through a specially constructed capillary electrometer, which was placed in the experimental hut. A was an earth-connected cover. The plate P remained




FIG. II.

uncharged when A was kept above or held above it. At the time of the experiment, the test-plate was kept exposed. Measurements of sudden changes of potential gradient due to lightning discharges were easily made by the capillary electrometer which was connected to the test-plate in the above manner.

¹ Proc. Roy. Soc. A, Vols. 114 and 118.

The sudden change of the earth's field would cause the electrometer to show a sudden change of potential. It can be easily shown that this sudden change of potential would cause a displacement D in the electrometer, given by $\pi C d V D = Q$, where Q is the charge flowing to the earth, d is the diameter, V is the contact difference of potential, C the capacity per unit area of the mercury-sulphuric acid surface.

The experimental hut was constructed in a vast open field and the exposed conductor was outside the hut at some distance from it. The wires connecting the plate to the electrometer were carefully insulated and the insulation was frequently tested. Arrangements were made to remove the rain-water from the pit by an underground clay pipe.

It was found more simple and satisfactory to note the indications of the electrometer visually than by a complicated photographic arrangement. The visual method was therefore adopted throughout, which had the further advantage that the electrometer could be easily and quickly tested, if necessary, during the observation period. The movements of the electrometer were found to be sufficiently rapid and dead-beat.

The nature of the discharges and the distance of the cloud were noted by an outside observer. In the case of near clouds, the discharges between the lower portion of the cloud and the ground could easily be distinguished from discharges within the cloud. But in the case of distant clouds, the discharges within the cloud could not always be noticed, specially in the daytime, when most of the storms passed. Moreover as a large number of discharges occurred within the cloud, comparatively small number of observations have been possible with distant storms.

The limiting distance below which a cloud is to be termed near, was approximately calculated from the available data, regarding the heights and the magnitude of charges of the thunder-clouds which pass over Bengal. It is found that distances below six kilometres can be safely termed 'near' for

the purposes of the formula, previously mentioned. Where the duration of a cloud was long and its distance changed by several kilometres during its period of activity, its period had been divided into two parts as shown in the table.

Rainfall, if any, during the period of activity of a thunderstorm, was noted as light, moderate, or heavy and the time of beginning and end of each spell of rainfall was accurately noted, should any reference become necessary afterwards. The wind force during the period was also noted in Beaufort scale numbers.

The distance of the cloud was measured approximately by noting the interval between the lightning flash and the moment when the thunder began to be heard. This interval was subsequently converted into distance in kilometres.

Preparations for the investigation began in November and all experimental arrangements were completed by the middle of January. During the period from February to the end of June all thunderstorms which approached the station during the day time and the early part of the night, were subjected to investigation. In February only one thunder-cloud was observed to approach the station, during the month of March seven, during April six, during May fifteen, and during the first half of June only three thunder-clouds were observed within the range of the station, and during the latter half, five.

In Table I, the date and the time of appearance of a thunder-cloud, its duration, and the maximum rainfall and wind force during the period of its activity are given. In Table II, the sudden field changes caused by lightning discharges within or from the cloud are given.

IV. Results.

TABLE I.

No.	Date.	Duration.	Maximum Rainfall.	Maximum Wind force.
1	Feb. 2	11-12 to 11-30	Light	4
2	March 16	17-45 to 18-40	Moderate	5
3	March 16	17-35 to 19-58	Heavy	6
4	March 25	0 20 to 1-55	Light	4
5	March 28	5-35 to 6-42	Light	5
6	March 29	14-52 to 15-50	Moderate	5
7	March 29	17-24 to 18-11	Heavy	7
8	March 30	20-40 to 21-26	Heavy	8
9	April 8	18-35 to 19-5	Few drops	4
10	April 9	18-40 to 19	Moderate	4
11	April 11	17-45 to 19-20	No rain	3
12	April 26	16 to 17-48	Moderate	7
13	April 27	19-10 to 21-5	Moderate	5
14	April 30	15-21 to 16-56	Moderate	5
15	May 1	13-15 to 15-5	Light	8
16	May 1	17-20 to 17-51	Light	4
17	May 2	15-46 to 17-40	Light	5
18	May 3	13-51 to 16-20	Light	5
19	May 6	18-26 to 21-30	Light	6
20	May 7	20-6 to 21	Light	5
21	May 8	17-50 to 18-14	No rain	6
22	May 15	19-45 to 22-15	Heavy	7
23	May 16	18-5 to 19-50	Moderate	6
24	May 21	17-45 to 19-33	Light	5
25	May 22	18-5 to 19-31	Light	4
26	May 23	18-30 to 19-22	Light	4
27	May 24	18-14 to 20-11	Moderate	6
28	May 26	13-57 to 14-48	Moderate	7
29	May 30	17-43 to 19-53	Light	6
30	June 3	18-29 to 19-42	Moderate	6
31	June 9	18-35 to 20-13	Moderate	7
32	June 13	18-47 to 19-55	Light	6
33	June 16	19-9 to 20-35	Moderate	6
34	June 22	14-10 to 15-2	Moderate	5
35	June 22	16-45 to 18	Heavy	7
36	June 23	14-30 to 17-40	Heavy	5
37	June 26	9-10 to 10-15	No rain	4

TABLE II.
Near Clouds.

No.	Duration.	Distances (in Kilos- metres)	Field.	Changes.
			Positive.	Negative.
1	11-12 to 11-30	4-5	8	7
3	17-35 to 19-58	2-5	31	12
5	5-35 to 6-42	4-6	23	8
7	17-24 to 18-11	3-5	21	5
8	20-40 to 21-26	2-5	14	3
10	18-40 to 19	3-4	7	5
12	16 to 17-48	3-6	22	9
13 (a)	(a) 19-10 to 19-45	3-4	13	4
13 (b)	(b) 19-45 to 21-5	4-7	16	13
14	15-21 to 16-56	3-5	31	7
15 (a)	(a) 13-15 to 14-6	3-6	20	6
15 (b)	(b) 14-6 to 15-5	6-8	9	13
17	15-16 to 17-40	4-6	31	8
18	13-51 to 16-20	3-6	51	7
19	18-26 to 21-30	3-6	39	3
20	20-6 to 21-46	4-6	13	4
22	19-45 to 22-15	2-5	38	8
23	18-5 to 19-50	3-5	27	4
24	17-45 to 19-33	4-7	29	13
25	18-5 to 19-31	2-6	31	5
27 (a)	(a) 18-14 to 18-50	3-5	15	2
27 (b)	(b) 18-50 to 20-11	5-7	13	9
28	13-57 to 14-48	2-6	23	6
29 (a)	(a) 17-43 to 19-26	4-6	18	11
29 (b)	(b) 19-26 to 19-58	6-8	4	8
30	18-29 to 19-42	2-5	31	3
31	18-35 to 20-13	2-6	41	5
33	19-9 to 20-35	3-6	27	7
34	14-10 to 15-2	6-8	5	11
35	16-45 to 18	2-6	32	8
36 (a)	(a) 14-30 to 15-30	3-6	21	3
36 (b)	(b) 15-30 to 17-40	6-8	19	17

TABLE III.
Distant Clouds.

No.	Nature of discharge.	Distance in Kilometres.	Field	Changes.
			[Positive.	Negative.
2	To ground	6-9	10	6
	Within cloud	6-9	2	5
4	To ground	5-7	3	2
		7-9	10	4
	Within cloud	5-7	5	5
		7-9	2	13
6	To ground	6-7	6	4
		7-10	14	3
	Within cloud	6-7	4	3
		7-10	3	7
9	To ground	7-10	7	4
	Within cloud	7-10	3	6
11	To ground	8-12	21	8
	Within cloud	8-12	3	9
16	To ground	5-7	9	6
	Within cloud	5-7	2	2
21	To ground	10-12	11	3
	Within cloud	10-12	0	3
26	To ground	6-7	7	3
		7-9	5	1
	Within cloud	6-7	2	2
		7-9	1	5
32	To ground	5-7	9	3
		7-9	7	0
	Within cloud	5-7	3	4
		7-9	2	5
37	To ground	9-12	9	5
	Within cloud	9-12	3	3

V. Discussion.

In the present investigation, the field changes produced by discharges were recorded in the case of thirty-seven thunder-clouds. Great care was taken to record the field changes produced by each and every discharge during the period of activity of a thunder-cloud. But it should be mentioned here, that the first few discharges could not be noted, in the case of some thunder-clouds, where they occurred before they were anticipated. When the discharges followed in quick succession, one or two of them were missed or could not be accurately read and hence could not be recorded. But these omissions in a few cases are negligible. In case of near clouds the records conclusively show that in the great majority of cases the clouds showed the Wilson distribution, and were of positive polarity. In case of distant clouds, large number of observations could not be made as most of the clouds occurred in the day time, when the discharges within the cloud were not in many cases visible. But some of the distant clouds—such clouds number 6, 11, 21—distinctly show that they have the Wilson distribution, and are of positive polarity.

It is not necessary to distinguish between the discharges within the cloud and those occurring from the cloud to the ground, in the case of near clouds and so they have not been so divided in Table II. But in Table III, such division has been shown.

In case of near clouds the few negative field changes which have been obtained in many cases, are perhaps due to exceptional discharges and as they are far outnumbered by positive discharges in each and every case, the conclusion is irresistible, that they show the Wilson distribution. The negative effects might also have been produced in one or two cases by discharges occurring simultaneously from two clouds, at different distances, present at the same time. Whenever such a case was detected observations relating to that case were rejected.

Another strong point is that almost all the thunder-clouds, which came within the range of the station, during the period of five months, from February to June, were studied. In July the observations were discontinued, as in many cases, two or more clouds were observed at the same time, which interfered with the observations and were likely to produce confused results.

In conclusion I desire to express my thanks to V. V. Sohoni, Esq., Meteorologist, for his kindly supplying me with certain necessary information during the progress of the work.